There have been three big banking booms in modern U.S. history. The first began in the late nineteenth century, during the Second Industrial Revolution, when bankers like J. P. Morgan funded the creation of industrial giants like U.S. Steel and International Harvester. The second wave came in the twenties, as electrification transformed manufacturing, and the modern consumer economy took hold. The third wave accompanied the information-technology revolution. Each wave, Philippon shows, was propelled by the need to fund new businesses, and each left finance significantly bigger than before. In all these cases, it wasn't so much that the bankers had changed; the world had. The same can't be said, though, of the boom of the past decade. The housing bubble was unique, and uniquely awful. Each of the previous waves had come in response to a profound shift in the real economy. With the housing bubble, by contrast, there was no meaningful development in the real economy that could explain why homes were suddenly so much more attractive or valuable. The only thing that had changed, really, was that banks were flinging cheap money at would-be homeowners, essentially conjuring up profits out of nowhere. And while previous booms (at least, those of the twenties and the nineties) did end in tears, along the way they made the economy more productive and more innovative in a lasting way. That's not true of the past decade. Banking grew bigger and more profitable. But all we got in exchange was acres of empty houses in Phoenix. There's no doubt that the financial sector needs to be smaller; Philippon suggests that, given the demands of businesses for capital, a normal financial sector would be about the size it was in 1996. Besides just shrinking the industry, though, we have the harder task of making credit bubbles like the one we just lived through less likely. That will require limiting the ability of banks to rely on vast amounts of leverage, which clearly increases risk without adding social value. Many financial innovations also seem to be overrated; it's not clear that they actually help finance do its core job of channelling capital to businesses. The most important change, though, may be something harder to legislate: Wall Street needs to recognize that its proper role is, as it has been in the past, to follow the real economy, rather than trying to drive it. During the housing bubble, the financial sector essentially tried to create reality. Now's the time for it to respond to reality instead
The same can't be said, though, of the boom of the past decade. The housing bubble was unique, and uniquely awful. Each of the previous waves had come in response to a profound shift in the real economy. With the housing bubble, by contrast, there was no meaningful development in the real economy that could explain why homes were suddenly so much more attractive or valuable. The only thing that had changed, really, was that banks were flinging cheap money at would-be homeowners, essentially conjuring up profits out of nowhere. And while previous booms (at least, those of the twenties and the nineties) did end in tears, along the way they made the economy more productive and more innovative in a lasting way. That's not true of the past decade. Banking grew bigger and more profitable. But all we got in exchange was acres of empty houses in Phoenix.
There's no doubt that the financial sector needs to be smaller; Philippon suggests that, given the demands of businesses for capital, a normal financial sector would be about the size it was in 1996. Besides just shrinking the industry, though, we have the harder task of making credit bubbles like the one we just lived through less likely. That will require limiting the ability of banks to rely on vast amounts of leverage, which clearly increases risk without adding social value. Many financial innovations also seem to be overrated; it's not clear that they actually help finance do its core job of channelling capital to businesses. The most important change, though, may be something harder to legislate: Wall Street needs to recognize that its proper role is, as it has been in the past, to follow the real economy, rather than trying to drive it. During the housing bubble, the financial sector essentially tried to create reality. Now's the time for it to respond to reality instead
During the housing bubble, the financial sector essentially tried to create reality. Now's the time for it to respond to reality instead.
It would be possible for them to lead without leading the economy over a cliff were they actually concerned that the money they were lending was being used to create lasting value. What is needed are measures that will extract prohibitive costs from corporate officers and board members for activities of their institutions that squander money merely so that those worthies can be paid fees. Make lack of due diligence that leads to significant capital destruction grounds for piercing the corporate veil and going after the personal assets of the officers and board members as a means of recovery. Fat chance with the putzes now in charge. As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
...the ability of banks to rely on vast amounts of leverage, which clearly increases risk without adding social value. Many financial innovations also seem to be overrated; it's not clear that they actually help finance do its core job of channelling capital to businesses. The most important change, though, may be something harder to legislate: Wall Street needs to recognize that its proper role is, as it has been in the past, to follow the real economy, rather than trying to drive it.
It would be possible for them to lead without leading the economy over a cliff were they actually concerned that the money they were lending was being used to create lasting value.
As a stockholder in BigBank, I want return. I demand return. If, along the way, the marketing department has to buy the paint for the local charter school, so be it, but I want a positive return even for that. If I have to pay BiggusDickus $100 million, I don't care (and let's face it, I understand that a dollar doesn't really go so far in the Mediterranean yacht world anymore), as long as my return is ComingTheFuckInTM.
So, "adding social value", "channeling capital", "follow the real economy" and "create lasting value" can be part of your faith-based-christ-on-a-cross-to-save-us-from-our-sins reality, but in my world we go out and squash the butterfly in the Pacific that causes those hurricanes. Never underestimate their intelligence, always underestimate their knowledge.
Frank Delaney ~ Ireland
I have a retirement fund to think about and not too many years to get it sustainable. As a stockholder in BigBank, I want return. I demand return.... but in my world we go out and squash the butterfly in the Pacific that causes those hurricanes.
As a stockholder in BigBank, I want return. I demand return.... but in my world we go out and squash the butterfly in the Pacific that causes those hurricanes.
But watch the insider trading...they are selling now like they did the last time...hard rain a gonna come...sell high, buy back in low. Never underestimate their intelligence, always underestimate their knowledge.
