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I suppose examples can be found. But the overall tenor of discourse from patented economists was not to sound a warning about grave imbalances.
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 04:59:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Um, we're talking the IMF managing director. And he did so repeatedly. And I think his predecessor did, too. And the OECD, and... It doesn't get more serious than that.

However, nobody was listening.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 05:03:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'll give you that.

How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? - NYTimes.com

There was a telling moment in 2005, at a conference held to honor Greenspan's tenure at the Fed. One brave attendee, Raghuram Rajan (of the University of Chicago, surprisingly), presented a paper warning that the financial system was taking on potentially dangerous levels of risk. He was mocked by almost all present -- including, by the way, Larry Summers, who dismissed his warnings as "misguided."

...

Take, for example, the precipitous rise and fall of housing prices. Some economists, notably Robert Shiller, did identify the bubble and warn of painful consequences if it were to burst. Yet key policy makers failed to see the obvious. In 2004, Alan Greenspan dismissed talk of a housing bubble: "a national severe price distortion," he declared, was "most unlikely." Home-price increases, Ben Bernanke said in 2005, "largely reflect strong economic fundamentals."

...

But there was something else going on: a general belief that bubbles just don't happen. What's striking, when you reread Greenspan's assurances, is that they weren't based on evidence -- they were based on the a priori assertion that there simply can't be a bubble in housing. And the finance theorists were even more adamant on this point. In a 2007 interview, Eugene Fama, the father of the efficient-market hypothesis, declared that "the word `bubble' drives me nuts," and went on to explain why we can trust the housing market: "Housing markets are less liquid, but people are very careful when they buy houses. It's typically the biggest investment they're going to make, so they look around very carefully and they compare prices. The bidding process is very detailed."



En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 05:12:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Who listens to the IMF's MD?

How many divisions bonuses does the IMF manage?

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 05:20:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
More from 2005:

FRB: Speech, Bernanke -- The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit -March 10, 2005

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 05:08:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But these pious speeches from functionaries who are supposed to show a certain prudential spirit don't characterize the message from economists in general. Though the media were certainly channeling the appropriate CW, economists were not making any notable counter-effort to be heard with a warning. It probably wasn't the best way to be taken "serious"ly.
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 05:39:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The problem is not that "there were no warnings" or that the warnings that there were were "pious" or perfunctorily made by people whose job it is to sound grave and prudent. The problem is that, when well-placed individuals even at the top of the regulatory/policy apparatus saw that there was an imbalance and warned about it, they still believed that the best policy response was to leave the market to its own devices. As if saying "tsk, tsk" were enough to make speculators think twice about the soundness of their business decisions. To give an example not involving the US economy or Greenspan, consider Hungary's foreign-currency consumer loans. I wrote
What is remarkable is that the same causes of the currency fluctuations were quoted back then (large amounts of loans in foreign currencies) and nobody has done anything about it. Our friend Ambrose again (he seems to be the only one to have talked about that mythical unpublished report "deja vu all over again" from the IMF).
Borrowers have rushed to take out loans in francs and other currencies, but murmurs over the exchange risks are growing, reports Ambrose Evans-Pritchard in Budapest (21 Sep 2006)

...

Over 60pc of total loans to businesses and households are now in foreign currencies, and damn the exchange risk. Though Hungary is the region's pioneer with some $2bn a year in Swiss franc loans, Poland, Croatia, Romania, and lately Turkey are catching up fast. This is Europe's "carry trade", every bit as creative as the better-known yen trade that has juiced the world's asset markets with liquidity at near zero interest rates from the Bank of Japan.

...

"There is nothing we can do to stop foreign exchange borrowing, and we don't even try. As members of the European Union, we have to respect the free flow of capital," he [Hamezc Istvan, director of Hungary's Central Bank] said.

The Central Banker blames the government '4 years ago' (that would be 2002) for making a mess of the economy. Who was in power in 2002? A fistful of Euros also carried the story.
(my emphasis) Here's another regulator who sees his country's private borrowers engage in a carry trade and, what does he say? "There is nothing we can do".

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 09:47:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
No argument from me on that, except to point out that the regulator in the example is presumably himself competent/trained/got some degree in economics, and that the important bit is the blind assumption that the market would work out the problem if left undisturbed. This conventional wisdom is the fruit of years of economic orthodoxy that a few sincere and a few less sincere voices did not break through.
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Sep 22nd, 2009 at 04:21:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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