I actually think there's too much focus on the military, and on their goals, rather than on overall goals of reconstruction, development, peacebuilding, governance, etc. In other words, people only want to talk about the military, while what's really important here is everything else but the military.
Some would argue that the international forces' presence here obstructs those goals, because they become a target. The fighting follows them. That is to some degree true, but if they were to leave, I suspect work towards those overall goals would screech to a halt in some parts of the country and then take a flying leap backwards. So is it bad with the international military forces here? Yes. Would it be worse if they left? Probably also yes.
But I think there are also good, important questions to be asked about those other goals, the overall ones, the ones that the "international community" is working to support through NGOs and multilateral institutions and quasi-military PRTs. I mean, that's what all this military activity is supposed to be making room for, right? And nobody's talking about that.
Well, almost nobody:
Veteran journalist (and, coincidentally, my friend, but I'd totally link to this excellent piece anyway) Ellen Knickmeyer, writing on the Foreign Policy blog, asks a lot of the right questions and makes some very important points in Is Afghanistan the New Africa?
But without smarter use of development money, it's a bump in prosperity that will disappear in Afghanistan, and Iraq, as soon as the foreigners do. Billions of dollars in aid have vanished without effect in both countries, thrown away by the hundreds of millions to U.S. contractors, frittered away in programs such as unending trash pickups in Baghdad's Sadr City paid for by the U.S. military's commanders' emergency response program. The trash remains; the commanders have rotated in and out and in; the money spent is gone. The bomb barriers stand to be the physical legacy of the United States' dismal occupations. In Afghanistan, aid efforts since the invasion have some success stories. They include improvements in health care for Afghans, especially at the clinic level. But the lack of coordination and focus among aid efforts has hurt. So has the United States' military-led insistence on pouring aid into the Taliban-saturated south, to the neglect of central and northern regions that could have more easily been made a bulwark for an Afghan government. Agriculture and other crucial sectors have gotten short shrift.
In Afghanistan, aid efforts since the invasion have some success stories. They include improvements in health care for Afghans, especially at the clinic level. But the lack of coordination and focus among aid efforts has hurt. So has the United States' military-led insistence on pouring aid into the Taliban-saturated south, to the neglect of central and northern regions that could have more easily been made a bulwark for an Afghan government. Agriculture and other crucial sectors have gotten short shrift.
This next part is important.
For Afghanistan, adherents of the "we broke it, we'll walk away from it" school express their shock, shock, shock at the squandering of development money, and call for Western leaders to wash their hands and consciences of Afghanistan. Absent smarter handling of all the money while it's still flowing, we may soon be abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and other armed factions -- no beer factories, but plenty of opium -- and leaving Afghans, as it were, by the side of the road, selling rat-on-a-stick.
Absent smarter handling of all the money while it's still flowing, we may soon be abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and other armed factions -- no beer factories, but plenty of opium -- and leaving Afghans, as it were, by the side of the road, selling rat-on-a-stick.
Read the whole thing, really.
Nothing is sure.
But with the word "surely" involved, the answer has to be no. Without that word, it's a lot harder to answer.
After the Soviets withdrew, Najibullah's regime held out longer than anybody expected, and the civil war that erupted afterward was also worse than anyone had feared. Some of the factors that contributed to that, and to the subsequent rise of the Taliban, would not be repeated if the international troops were to leave today. But there are a whole host of new and different factors that would affect the outcome, some for the better and others for the worse.
In short, I have absolutely no idea.
"over some of the country" = they already have.
"over more of the country than they already have" = probably yes, though it's not clear how much more.
Lots of factors to consider, but I think there are areas of the country where they'd run into serious resistance.
I need to log off now.
That's certainly true. I wonder if that is merely because the military has done the best job of making people think they have a clear goal and know how to get there.
I know there are development success stories in the relevant areas: promoting governance, fostering peace, mitigating ethnic tension, building a healthcare system, establishing an educational system, enabling girls and women to participate, fostering the rule of law encouraging institutions of civil society. But does anyone know how to do this all at once?
And if the West doesn't know how, or is not reasonably certain that it can figure this out in a timely manner, is it fair to the Afghans to remain? The fact is that what we're experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. -Paul Krugman
I wonder if that is merely because the military has done the best job of making people think they have a clear goal and know how to get there.
Wow, do you actually know anyone who thinks the military has a clear goal and knows how to get there? Because I don't, not even folks in the military. ;-)
if the West doesn't know how, or is not reasonably certain that it can figure this out in a timely manner
Well, first of all, define "a timely manner." We've already wasted eight years.
The thing is, these are lessons we've aleady learned, just failed to apply here. And nothing happens overnight. All of the things you've mentioned are happening, with varying degrees of success or lack thereof. The question should certainly not be about anyone doing all of them at once, but whether projects aimed at those discrete goals can be coordinated and carried out well enough that they don't work at cross purposes or undermine each other. Like the article said, it's not really about more money, it's about spending it smarter. We do actually know how to do that, but do we have the political will?
is it fair to the Afghans to remain?
Is it fair to remain? I'm not sure what that means.
I'm hearing a lot of commentary (including on ET) that sounds a lot like washing our hands of the mess we made, and leaving these poor people with the consequences. "Could we be forgiven for getting the hell out of there because it's too hard and too scary?" And that makes me deeply uncomfortable. It doesn't sound very fair.
Wow, do you actually know anyone who thinks the military has a clear goal and knows how to get there?
Maybe I just got that impression because they've been hogging the microphone.
We've already wasted eight years.
Well, that was my point. I suspect at some point the Afghan population is going to become impatient, and that this point is perhaps not that far off any more (though you would likely have a better insight into that). I guess by timely I mean "real soon". If another winter goes by and the West still doesn't have a credible concept, will the Afghans still listen to us? Again, you're on site, how do you see that?
We do actually know how to do that
Do we? That's a sincere question on my part.
The "political will to spend smarter" looks like a fairly substantial hurdle. The article you cite implies that "spending smarter" is equivalent to not giving Karzai&Cronies any more money, which in turn would show the Kabul regime up as a puppet government with no true legitimacy. Given the political capital that's been invested in asserting the opposite, that would take a great deal of political will indeed.
If I understand you correctly, you believe the West should remain in Afghanistan AND pursue broad, meaningful development objectives.
That's fine, because the latter legitimates the former, and the endeavor as a whole stands to benefit the broad population. But if the West fails to undertake the latter, I see neither legitimacy or benefit. The fact is that what we're experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. -Paul Krugman
I suspect at some point the Afghan population is going to become impatient, and that this point is perhaps not that far off any more
Impatient with...? Look, I have a very small window, but what I see people becoming more impatient with is being hungry and poor, and with lacking opportunities for work and education, and with corruption. None of these are things you can fix in six months.
I mean seriously, impatient with what? With Western aid? With the military? I don't understand. Because if people perceive the alternative to the international presence as abandonment of the country to domination by the Taliban, their level of impatience will depend on how much they don't want to live under the Taliban again. And (while sure, I have a pretty small window, and the Taliban is actually a pretty diverse set of groups) there are a whole lot of people who would choose the former over the latter.
will the Afghans still listen to us?
Why on Earth should they be listening to us? We should be listening to them. For Chrissake, it's their country.
People don't seem to understand this: most Afghans are mainly concerned with living their lives. They want to work, and buy or grow food for their families, and move around safely, and send their kids to school (yes, really) and do all the things that you & I take for granted. And they're doing those things.
When I first got here, an acquaintance put it like this: Most Afghans are just living their lives, and they think of the war as something the Taliban and the military do with each other, which hopefully they can avoid.
But does that mean they'd choose a peaceful life under the Taliban? No, because that doesn't let them live their lives either.
Every single person I know has several answers when you ask about their life stories, but one of them always sounds something like this: I used to {work as X, live in Y}, until the Taliban came. Or else it's this: In the Taliban time, my family and I left for {Tajikistan, Pakistan, Iran}....
Things are measured in eras here. The Soviet Time. The Taliban Time. Since 2002.
Since 2002 is now, although increasingly (in Kabul) there's also Since 2007, when things started getting worse.
that would take a great deal of political will indeed.
And yet I rarely hear anyone arguing for the political will. Instead, I hear people arguing to just give up. Which is sort of the opposite.
I'm sorry, I'm super tired now and need to log off because I have a few hours of work to do tonight and then have to get up at the crack of dawn.
There is also the question of institutional capability. Even if the political will is made to exist at the political level, it is far from self-evident that the NATO military machine can implement that political will in any meaningful fashion. After all, we'd basically be talking about a complete re-thinking of the current military doctrine and operational posture. This is something that NATO hasn't done since the last world war - even after first the French and then the Americans got their asses kicked in Viet Nam.
In short, you may (very probably will) need to take operational control of the theatre away from the Pentagon.
That is, of course, possible. In the same sense and to the same extent that it's possible to prosecute CIA operatives for torture and J.P. Morgan for insider trading.
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
far from self-evident that the NATO military machine can implement
I'm not talking about the military.
Which I'm all for, but then it has to be framed like that: Take control away from the military, and give it to the people who know what works and what doesn't (less confrontationally, the military is there to serve the civilian reconstruction, not the other way around). Framing it as "we should stay there to help the locals" reinforces the military control of the operation.
