OK, I didn't know that. But you should be aware that it is not the only case: there was separation in California before the great (fake) California Energy Crisis, too. Within the EU, still predating the EU-level deregulation drive, England & Wales had it. Post-deregulation, the most notable separation of generation and grid (at least of those I am aware of) is Italy's.
In Denmark, 9%. Virtually no capacity was added in Denmark between 2003-2008. They hit a wall, or rather they ran out of land based sites.
Nope. There was a government change. And the new government changed rules on purpose. Which was easier, given that unlike Germany and Spain, Denmark had no feed-in law (which obligates distributors to buy the generated wind electricity, in effect giving priority to wind). *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The problem that I see with a feed in tariff is that this does nothing create a disincentive for use during peak periods. So the policy is basically based on expanding supply instead of cutting demand.
The second thing is that wind is never going to be dispatchable in the same way that coal power, for example, is. You can't just flip on a switch at will. Which is why I think that it is important that wind energy be used before that back-up from coal and the like is called in.
Those forms of energy are dispatchable, and by having a rate schedule that increases with increased use you create an incentive for conservation. At the same time, this is dispatchable. And, you can use the premium generated to fund a feed in tariff (subsidy) for renewables. So that kills the back-up argument against wind power, and it creates a clever funding mechanism that encourages conservation. And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
No, not when growth goes to zero. Which actually happened twice: first in 2002, then there was a special programme for repowering, which was such a success that it ashamed Rasmussen & co, but it was time-limited.
Notice the growth offshore.
The growth off-shore was a 25-year plan meted out nicely year-by-year by the SocDem government of the other Rasmussen in the nineties, with the aim to bring wind above 50% at least. However, in the early 2000s, Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that on-shore wind expansion was such a success that quotas for renewables have already been surpassed, so there is no need to continue with his predecessors' off-shore schedule -- and delayed further projects indefinitely while allowing the finishing of the two in-construction farms. Five years later, he was forced to re-think, and the next three projects were allowed to go ahead. The fun thing in all this was that it was all ideological: Denmark has two major semi-monopolist utilities that also own the grid [or at least that was the situation until a few years ago], both of which supported wind; and the gutting of the Danish wind market actually hurt Danish business interests: the wind manufacturers are big industry after all. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Spanish business is very protectionist, but in a much less open way than the French are - this is the reason why Gamesa got the license from Vestas in the first place - because otherwise Vestas couldn't have sold in the Spanish market.
Gamesa is still not that big outside of Spain or out of projects by Iberdrola and other Spanish investors. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
It was not really a surprise to Vestas... Gamesa bought out the license it had from Vestas, so this was done with Vestas' consent, and in the clear knowledge that they'd compete on their own and likely take over a large portion of the Spanish market.
That's interesting, because that's not the impression I got from newsarticles from the time.
Gamesa is still not that big outside of Spain or out of projects by Iberdrola and other Spanish investors.
I definitely get the Iberdrola connection. I ran the numbers from the Spanish wind energy associations wind farm database. I know that there are a number of small development corporations that develop a wind farm that aren't wholly owned by Iberdrola and Iberdrola Renewables. But the relationship (in Spain) seems to be stronger in turns of the % of Gamesa turbines in Iberdrola projects, than in terms of the % of Iberdrola projects as a % of total Gamesa sales. That was something I honed in on while I was writing.
What I'm most interested in is less a matter of the development of wind farm development than the relationship between Gamesa and the Basque regional government. It's that political science thing.
I do appreciate getting some things about the distribution issues cleared up. I know now that I need to go back through what I've written for my paper and change some things. The thesis was basically the importance of the Iberdrola-Gamesa relationship, and the role that the Basque government came in and had in terms of fostering the development of sectoral organizations like the energy cluster (cluster energia) And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
Spain could almost be designated a captive market in wind for its own companies, like India. Within that frame, with strong Iberdrola support, Gamesa became a power. But Gamesa has had very limited success when moving to other markets.
Their entry into the US is particularly telling, as their technology was not up to other European standards. Without the support of Iberdrola in the US, Gamesa would have a very hard time. Despite strong relationships with Pennsylvania unions, and the use of converted factories there, Gamesa has had a very hard time finding equilibrium.
The problem of success stories from captive markets not being able to replicate that in more mature markets is not limited to Spain, though by starting small Acciona is certainly moving forward. Suzlon's very tough and expensive entry into the US is a spectacular example of a company very successful, even controlling, of a particular market, yet having a very rocky entry into a more sophisticated market. Suzlon is not out of the woods yet, and without its purchase of REpower would be even deeper in the hole.
The Basque offshore cluster is but a shadow of the North Sea - Baltic cluster, and will have virtually no influence outside of perhaps small Spanish development. At this stage, there is no technology nor expertise replicable to the wider offshore space, Gamesa's 4.5 MW turbine notwithstanding.
Acciona and Gamesa have had tough times in China as well. This is a symptom of coming from a captive market, where the bar is set lower, but is not recognized until higher standards are needed. Smaller Acciona has the strategic advantage here because being smaller, they are able to adjust quicker with their very capable engineering. (Im writing about the wind division, not the entire company.)
To get a clearer picture of the split between Gamesa and Vestas, and the longer-term results, might well take some more digging. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
i suspect in the coming years REpower will grow some, GE will really begin to capture market share with their new 2.5MW machine, Nordex should increase, and if Fuhrländer can increase production and marketing of the W2E turbine, they could cut into Enercon. But it will be tough, and I wouldn't be surprised if GE focuses elsewhere. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
It is true that electricity sold with a feed-in tariff caps the increase of market prices in peak periods, if that increase would otherwise exceed the feed-in tariff. When makret prices would stay below, of course it does the opposite. Either way, why do you want a disincentive in peak periods?
it is important that wind energy be used before that back-up from coal and the like is called in.
As I said two times now, a feed-in law does just that by obligating distributors to buy the wind electricity. That creates a priority, the other producers are forced to throttle production in high wind. That's exactly what happens in Spain and Northern Germany.
a feed in tariff (subsidy)
To expand on why there should be no equation: a feed-in tariff is a guaranteed purchase price. You can at best consider the difference between the tariff and the momentary market price the subsidy. (And it can actually be negative.) But even that is not really a subsidy, because in the end, it is not something paid from a public or private budget, but costs are spread out to customers (or eating away the profits of other producers). *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
a feed in tariff (subsidy) To expand on why there should be no equation: a feed-in tariff is a guaranteed purchase price. You can at best consider the difference between the tariff and the momentary market price the subsidy. (And it can actually be negative.) But even that is not really a subsidy, because in the end, it is not something paid from a public or private budget, but costs are spread out to customers (or eating away the profits of other producers).
To expand on why there should be no equation: a feed-in tariff is a guaranteed purchase price. You can at best consider the difference between the tariff and the momentary market price the subsidy. (And it can actually be negative.) But even that is not really a subsidy, because in the end, it is not something paid from a public or private budget, but costs are spread out to customers (or eating away the profits of other producers).
Given that wind power lowers the marginal price when it blows, there is a merit order effect of supporting wind, which reduces prices for all producers at that time and creates savings for consumers. The aggregate value of that merit order effect has been measured in Denmark, Germany and Spain and is now larger than the net subsidy from the feed-in tariff.
In other words, the so-called "subsidy" to wind actually brings prices down for consumers! In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Note that if "imports and exports balance" is key to making even the green argument: Norway has no significant fossil generation and will not build any under any circumstances, so net exports merely displace norwegian investment in carbon neutral power, which is not a gain, since the danish power sector is overall the worst CO2 emitter in europe.
Which is as it should be, given that DK incumbents are largely coal-based. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
The problem that I see with a feed in tariff is that this does nothing create a disincentive for use during peak periods.
Well, if wind is blowing at a peak period, it will alleviate the need for peaker plants to be turned on, thus turning that period into a "non-peak" one (at least in terms of system strain). and if it is not blowing, then the price will go up to very high levels and that creates disincentives for consumption as well as incentives for marginal producers.
The problem is that wholesale price peaks at times of system tension are usually not passed on to consumers, who have no idea they should save. So either you impose fully variable power prices to retail customers, in perfect market-driven fashion, to get consumers to change their behavior at times of high demand and thus high prices, or you find other ways to impose power savings (education, financing of energy saving devices and investments, technical standards for energy consuming goods and services, etc...) In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
I'd accept paying a spot price the day my power outlet carried ticker quotations from various distributors and I could pick and choose between them. Maybe. But mostly, I'd really rather that it was treated as an infrastructure business without all that spot market nonsense.
Which is not to say that you can't make some kind of incentive system for the part of the middle load that follows a reasonably stable pattern across the day.
And/or you could improve building codes and energy standards in consumer products. Eliminating standby power in non-critical products (TVs, private computers, etc.) sounds like a good idea to me.
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
From what I have heard, this standby in Spain is sometimes not profitable anymore as the lucrative peak opportunities are less and less (and lower (!)), therefore owners of CCPP are actually thinking of shutting down their plants for good!
This brings up a whole new set of challanges...
owners of CCPP are actually thinking of shutting down their plants for good!
You know, I have trouble believing this. I could understand utilities being reluctant to invest in new gas-fired plants as they know the capacity factor will be less than required. But existing plants should used as long as it's cash-flow positive, and I don't see that it's not the case often enough to keep the plants spinning.
Do you have public data on this? Is this just political posturing by the utilities? In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
