No, not when growth goes to zero. Which actually happened twice: first in 2002, then there was a special programme for repowering, which was such a success that it ashamed Rasmussen & co, but it was time-limited.
Notice the growth offshore.
The growth off-shore was a 25-year plan meted out nicely year-by-year by the SocDem government of the other Rasmussen in the nineties, with the aim to bring wind above 50% at least. However, in the early 2000s, Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that on-shore wind expansion was such a success that quotas for renewables have already been surpassed, so there is no need to continue with his predecessors' off-shore schedule -- and delayed further projects indefinitely while allowing the finishing of the two in-construction farms. Five years later, he was forced to re-think, and the next three projects were allowed to go ahead. The fun thing in all this was that it was all ideological: Denmark has two major semi-monopolist utilities that also own the grid [or at least that was the situation until a few years ago], both of which supported wind; and the gutting of the Danish wind market actually hurt Danish business interests: the wind manufacturers are big industry after all. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Spanish business is very protectionist, but in a much less open way than the French are - this is the reason why Gamesa got the license from Vestas in the first place - because otherwise Vestas couldn't have sold in the Spanish market.
Gamesa is still not that big outside of Spain or out of projects by Iberdrola and other Spanish investors. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
It was not really a surprise to Vestas... Gamesa bought out the license it had from Vestas, so this was done with Vestas' consent, and in the clear knowledge that they'd compete on their own and likely take over a large portion of the Spanish market.
That's interesting, because that's not the impression I got from newsarticles from the time.
Gamesa is still not that big outside of Spain or out of projects by Iberdrola and other Spanish investors.
I definitely get the Iberdrola connection. I ran the numbers from the Spanish wind energy associations wind farm database. I know that there are a number of small development corporations that develop a wind farm that aren't wholly owned by Iberdrola and Iberdrola Renewables. But the relationship (in Spain) seems to be stronger in turns of the % of Gamesa turbines in Iberdrola projects, than in terms of the % of Iberdrola projects as a % of total Gamesa sales. That was something I honed in on while I was writing.
What I'm most interested in is less a matter of the development of wind farm development than the relationship between Gamesa and the Basque regional government. It's that political science thing.
I do appreciate getting some things about the distribution issues cleared up. I know now that I need to go back through what I've written for my paper and change some things. The thesis was basically the importance of the Iberdrola-Gamesa relationship, and the role that the Basque government came in and had in terms of fostering the development of sectoral organizations like the energy cluster (cluster energia) And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
Spain could almost be designated a captive market in wind for its own companies, like India. Within that frame, with strong Iberdrola support, Gamesa became a power. But Gamesa has had very limited success when moving to other markets.
Their entry into the US is particularly telling, as their technology was not up to other European standards. Without the support of Iberdrola in the US, Gamesa would have a very hard time. Despite strong relationships with Pennsylvania unions, and the use of converted factories there, Gamesa has had a very hard time finding equilibrium.
The problem of success stories from captive markets not being able to replicate that in more mature markets is not limited to Spain, though by starting small Acciona is certainly moving forward. Suzlon's very tough and expensive entry into the US is a spectacular example of a company very successful, even controlling, of a particular market, yet having a very rocky entry into a more sophisticated market. Suzlon is not out of the woods yet, and without its purchase of REpower would be even deeper in the hole.
The Basque offshore cluster is but a shadow of the North Sea - Baltic cluster, and will have virtually no influence outside of perhaps small Spanish development. At this stage, there is no technology nor expertise replicable to the wider offshore space, Gamesa's 4.5 MW turbine notwithstanding.
Acciona and Gamesa have had tough times in China as well. This is a symptom of coming from a captive market, where the bar is set lower, but is not recognized until higher standards are needed. Smaller Acciona has the strategic advantage here because being smaller, they are able to adjust quicker with their very capable engineering. (Im writing about the wind division, not the entire company.)
To get a clearer picture of the split between Gamesa and Vestas, and the longer-term results, might well take some more digging. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
i suspect in the coming years REpower will grow some, GE will really begin to capture market share with their new 2.5MW machine, Nordex should increase, and if Fuhrländer can increase production and marketing of the W2E turbine, they could cut into Enercon. But it will be tough, and I wouldn't be surprised if GE focuses elsewhere. "Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin
