Spain could almost be designated a captive market in wind for its own companies, like India.  Within that frame, with strong Iberdrola support, Gamesa became a power.  But Gamesa has had very limited success when moving to other markets.

Their entry into the US is particularly telling, as their technology was not up to other European standards.  Without the support of Iberdrola in the US, Gamesa would have a very hard time.  Despite strong relationships with Pennsylvania unions, and the use of converted factories there, Gamesa has had a very hard time finding equilibrium.

The problem of success stories from captive markets not being able to replicate that in more mature markets is not limited to Spain, though by starting small Acciona is certainly moving forward.  Suzlon's very tough and expensive entry into the US is a spectacular example of a company very successful, even controlling, of a particular market, yet having a very rocky entry into a more sophisticated market.  Suzlon is not out of the woods yet, and without its purchase of REpower would be even deeper in the hole.

The Basque offshore cluster is but a shadow of the North Sea - Baltic cluster, and will have virtually no influence outside of perhaps small Spanish development.  At this stage, there is no technology nor expertise replicable to the wider offshore space, Gamesa's 4.5 MW turbine notwithstanding.

Acciona and Gamesa have had tough times in China as well.  This is a symptom of coming from a captive market, where the bar is set lower, but is not recognized until higher standards are needed.  Smaller Acciona has the strategic advantage here because being smaller, they are able to adjust quicker with their very capable engineering.  (Im writing about the wind division, not the entire company.)

To get a clearer picture of the split between Gamesa and Vestas, and the longer-term results, might well take some more digging.

"Life shrinks or expands in proportion to one's courage." - Anaïs Nin