EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - US senators from both parties on Wednesday (3 March) pressured the Obama administration to implement free trade agreements with South Korea and Colombia, warning of competition from the EU, which recently clinched similar deals. Washington's free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea were signed during the George W. Bush administration, but their implementation has been blocked for some three years now due to opposition from Barack Obama's own Democratic Party.
EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - US senators from both parties on Wednesday (3 March) pressured the Obama administration to implement free trade agreements with South Korea and Colombia, warning of competition from the EU, which recently clinched similar deals.
Washington's free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea were signed during the George W. Bush administration, but their implementation has been blocked for some three years now due to opposition from Barack Obama's own Democratic Party.
EU single market commissioner Michel Barnier on a trip to the City of London on Wednesday told the FT that he supports a global tax on financial transactions: "It is a fair idea ...If there is a levy, it allows you to put in place a system to anticipate, prevent and manage a future crisis."
Italy's socialist head of state Giorgio Napolitano after a meeting with EU commission chief Barroso in Brussels on Wednesday said the bloc should create its own IMF-type bail-out fund. "There's something missing from our common tool box," he said, AFP reports.
Greek singer Nana Mouskouri, who served as MEP between 1994-1999, offered Athens her EU pension to help ease the pressure on the public finances. She said she saw this as her "duty to the country" and urged fellow Greeks to help the state as well. Ms Mouskuri gets an EU pension of €25,000 a year.
Three in four voters (74%) in Iceland are set to vote No to the Icesave deal in Saturday's referendum, according to a Gallup poll. Just 19% are in favor and 8% undecided. The Icelandic Icesave internet bank collapsed in 2008. The UK and the Netherlands want €3.8 billion back on behalf of clients.
Protests and praise greeted Greece's latest round of austerity measures on Thursday, as Prime Minister George Papandreou introduced a new multi-billion-euro bond in a bid to tackle his country's massive debt. In central Athens, more than 300 trade unionists occupied the entrance to the Ministry of Finance, protesting the latest measures and calling for an "uprising" in action. A second demonstration was planned for later Thursday.
Protests and praise greeted Greece's latest round of austerity measures on Thursday, as Prime Minister George Papandreou introduced a new multi-billion-euro bond in a bid to tackle his country's massive debt.
In central Athens, more than 300 trade unionists occupied the entrance to the Ministry of Finance, protesting the latest measures and calling for an "uprising" in action. A second demonstration was planned for later Thursday.
AFP - Hundreds of communists from Greece's All-Workers Militant Front on Thursday staged a sit-in at the finance ministry to protest against austerity measures announced by the government. Around 300 protestors pushed their way past a lone guard early Thursday to gain access to the building and unfurl a banner urging Greeks to "rise up" and thwart the draconian debt-reduction measures. Some activists also blocked employees from entering the building.
AFP - Hundreds of communists from Greece's All-Workers Militant Front on Thursday staged a sit-in at the finance ministry to protest against austerity measures announced by the government.
Around 300 protestors pushed their way past a lone guard early Thursday to gain access to the building and unfurl a banner urging Greeks to "rise up" and thwart the draconian debt-reduction measures.
Some activists also blocked employees from entering the building.
ATHENS (Reuters) - Debt-stricken Greece drew strong demand for a crucial bond issue on Thursday but paid a steep risk premium that underscored its plea to Germany and other EU partners for support to help lower its borrowing costs. A day after the government announced draconian new austerity measures, a 5 billion euro (4.5 billion pound) 10-year syndicated bond was more than three times oversubscribed at a price of about 6.4 percent -- twice what Berlin pays, banking sources said.
ATHENS (Reuters) - Debt-stricken Greece drew strong demand for a crucial bond issue on Thursday but paid a steep risk premium that underscored its plea to Germany and other EU partners for support to help lower its borrowing costs.
A day after the government announced draconian new austerity measures, a 5 billion euro (4.5 billion pound) 10-year syndicated bond was more than three times oversubscribed at a price of about 6.4 percent -- twice what Berlin pays, banking sources said.
Greece must consider a fire sale of land, historic buildings and art works to cut its debts, two rightwing German politicians said today in a newspaper interview that is bound to exacerbate tensions between Athens and Berlin.Alongside austerity measures such as cuts to public sector pay and a freeze on state pensions, why not sell a few uninhabited islands or ancient artefacts, asked Josef Schlarmann, a senior member of Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats, and Frank Schaeffler, a finance policy expert in the Free Democrats.
Greece must consider a fire sale of land, historic buildings and art works to cut its debts, two rightwing German politicians said today in a newspaper interview that is bound to exacerbate tensions between Athens and Berlin.
Alongside austerity measures such as cuts to public sector pay and a freeze on state pensions, why not sell a few uninhabited islands or ancient artefacts, asked Josef Schlarmann, a senior member of Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats, and Frank Schaeffler, a finance policy expert in the Free Democrats.
Eurointelligence: German nominal wages fall in 2009
So much for nominal wage rigidities. We have been used to real wage cuts, but in Germany during last year nominal wages have fallen for the first time since 1949, according to the Federal Statistics Office. They were down 0.4%. Nominal wages in industry fell by 3.6%, due to short-time work. This means that Germany's competitive position within the euro area has increased further last year - and with the most recent 0 per cent pay round, there are no signs that Germany-versus-rest-of-eurozone gap is stabilising, let alone closing.
That means at every point on this map where the current account balance is equal to the fiscal balance, we know the domestic private sector financial balance must equal zero. In other words, the income of households and businesses just matches their expenditures (or alternatively, if you prefer, the saving out of income flows by the domestic private sector just matches the investment expenditures of the sector). The dotted line that passes through the origin at a 45 degree angle marks off the range of possible combinations where the domestic private sector is neither net issuing financial liabilities to other sectors, nor is it net accumulating financial assets from other sectors. Once we mark this range of combinations where the domestic private sector is in financial balance, we also have determined two distinct zones in the financial balance map. To the left of the dotted line, the current account balance is less than the fiscal balance: the domestic private sector is deficit spending. To the right of the dotted line, the current account balance is greater than the fiscal balance, and the domestic private sector is running a financial surplus or net saving position. This follows from the recognition that a current account surplus presents a net inflow to the domestic private sector (as export income for the domestic private sector exceeds their import spending), while a fiscal surplus presents a net outflow for the domestic private sector (as tax payments by the private sector exceed the government spending they receive). Accordingly, the further we move up and to the left of the origin (toward the northwest corner of the map), the larger the deficit spending of households and firms as a share of GDP, and the faster the domestic private sector is either increasing its debt to income ratio, or reducing its net worth to income ratio (absent an asset bubble). Moving to the southeast corner from the origin takes us into larger domestic private surpluses. The financial balance map forces us to recognize that changes in one sector's financial balance cannot be viewed in isolation, as is the current fashion. If a nation wishes to run a persistent fiscal surplus and thereby pay down government debt, it needs to run an even larger trade surplus, or else the domestic private sector will be left stuck in a persistent deficit spending mode. (Author's bold.)
Once we mark this range of combinations where the domestic private sector is in financial balance, we also have determined two distinct zones in the financial balance map. To the left of the dotted line, the current account balance is less than the fiscal balance: the domestic private sector is deficit spending. To the right of the dotted line, the current account balance is greater than the fiscal balance, and the domestic private sector is running a financial surplus or net saving position.
This follows from the recognition that a current account surplus presents a net inflow to the domestic private sector (as export income for the domestic private sector exceeds their import spending), while a fiscal surplus presents a net outflow for the domestic private sector (as tax payments by the private sector exceed the government spending they receive).
Accordingly, the further we move up and to the left of the origin (toward the northwest corner of the map), the larger the deficit spending of households and firms as a share of GDP, and the faster the domestic private sector is either increasing its debt to income ratio, or reducing its net worth to income ratio (absent an asset bubble). Moving to the southeast corner from the origin takes us into larger domestic private surpluses.
The financial balance map forces us to recognize that changes in one sector's financial balance cannot be viewed in isolation, as is the current fashion. If a nation wishes to run a persistent fiscal surplus and thereby pay down government debt, it needs to run an even larger trade surplus, or else the domestic private sector will be left stuck in a persistent deficit spending mode. (Author's bold.)
Parenteau notes that a prolonged negative cash flow for the domestic private sector is damaging. They have to assume debt to increase present spending, sell assets or make do with less or all of these. This makes the private sector increasingly fragile.
Spain is currently running a fiscal deficit of about 10%. The Pact for Stability and Growth requires that deficit to be reduced to 3%. This could be done with a massive Current Account (Trade) Surplus, but is highly unlikely with the present or likely value of the Euro. The policy space available to EU countries WITHOUT A CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS is shown in the chart below:
With respect to Spain, Parenteau notes:
Spain already is running one of the higher private debt to GDP ratios in the region. In addition, Spain had one of the more dramatic housing busts in the region, which Spanish banks are still trying to dig themselves out from (mostly, it is alleged, by issuing new loans to keep the prior bad loans serviced, in what appears to be a Ponzi scheme fashion). It is highly unlikely Spanish businesses and households will voluntarily raise their indebtedness in an environment of 20% plus unemployment rates, combined with the prospect of rising tax rates and reduced government expenditures as fiscal retrenchment is pursued. Alternatively, if we assume Spain's private sector will attempt to preserve its estimated 5.5% of GDP financial balance, or perhaps even attempt to run a larger net saving or surplus position so it can reduce its private debt faster, Spain's trade balance will need to improve by more than 7% of GDP over the next three years. Barring a major surge in tradable goods demand in the rest of the world, or a rogue wave of rapid product innovation from Spanish entrepreneurs, there is an additional way for Spain to accomplish such a significant reversal in its current account balance. Prices and wages in Spain's tradable goods sector will need to fall precipitously, and labor productivity will have to surge dramatically, in order to create a large enough real depreciation for Spain that its tradable products gain market share (at, we should mention, the expense of the rest of the Eurozone members). Arguably, the slack resulting from the fiscal retrenchment is just what the doctor might order to raise the odds of accomplishing such a large wage and price deflation in Spain. But how, we must wonder, will Spain's private debt continue to be serviced during the transition as Spanish household wages and business revenues are falling under higher taxes or lower government spending?
Alternatively, if we assume Spain's private sector will attempt to preserve its estimated 5.5% of GDP financial balance, or perhaps even attempt to run a larger net saving or surplus position so it can reduce its private debt faster, Spain's trade balance will need to improve by more than 7% of GDP over the next three years. Barring a major surge in tradable goods demand in the rest of the world, or a rogue wave of rapid product innovation from Spanish entrepreneurs, there is an additional way for Spain to accomplish such a significant reversal in its current account balance.
Prices and wages in Spain's tradable goods sector will need to fall precipitously, and labor productivity will have to surge dramatically, in order to create a large enough real depreciation for Spain that its tradable products gain market share (at, we should mention, the expense of the rest of the Eurozone members). Arguably, the slack resulting from the fiscal retrenchment is just what the doctor might order to raise the odds of accomplishing such a large wage and price deflation in Spain. But how, we must wonder, will Spain's private debt continue to be serviced during the transition as Spanish household wages and business revenues are falling under higher taxes or lower government spending?
These policy consequences are not without consequences. Some of those consequences may well redound to the detriment of those most fervently pushing the policies:
It is the height of folly to expect peripheral Eurozone nations to sail their way into the EMU triangle under even the most masterful of policy efforts or price signals. More likely, since reducing trade deficits is likely to prove very challenging (Asia is still reliant on export led growth, while US consumer spending growth is still tentative), the peripheral nations in the Eurozone will find themselves floating somewhere out to the northwest of the EMU triangle. The sharper their fiscal retrenchments, the faster their private sectors will run up their debt to income ratios. Alternatively, if households and businesses in the peripheral nations stubbornly defend their current net saving positions, the attempt at fiscal retrenchment will be thwarted by a deflationary drop in nominal GDP. Demands to redouble the tax hikes and public expenditure cuts to achieve a 3% of GDP fiscal deficit target will then arise. Private debt distress will also escalate as tax hikes and government expenditure cuts the net flow of income to the private sector. Call it the paradox of public thrift. As it turns out, pursuing fiscal sustainability as it is currently defined will in all likelihood just lead many nations to further private sector debt destabilization. European economic growth will prove extremely difficult to achieve if the current fiscal "sustainability" plans are carried out. Realistically, policy makers are courting a situation in the region that will beget higher private debt defaults in the quest to reduce the risk of public debt defaults through fiscal retrenchment. European banks, which remain some of the most leveraged banks, will experience higher loan losses, and rating downgrades for banks will substitute for (or more likely accompany) rating downgrades for government debt. A fairly myopic version of fiscal sustainability will be bought at the price of a larger financial instability. (Author's bold.)
Alternatively, if households and businesses in the peripheral nations stubbornly defend their current net saving positions, the attempt at fiscal retrenchment will be thwarted by a deflationary drop in nominal GDP. Demands to redouble the tax hikes and public expenditure cuts to achieve a 3% of GDP fiscal deficit target will then arise. Private debt distress will also escalate as tax hikes and government expenditure cuts the net flow of income to the private sector. Call it the paradox of public thrift.
As it turns out, pursuing fiscal sustainability as it is currently defined will in all likelihood just lead many nations to further private sector debt destabilization. European economic growth will prove extremely difficult to achieve if the current fiscal "sustainability" plans are carried out. Realistically, policy makers are courting a situation in the region that will beget higher private debt defaults in the quest to reduce the risk of public debt defaults through fiscal retrenchment. European banks, which remain some of the most leveraged banks, will experience higher loan losses, and rating downgrades for banks will substitute for (or more likely accompany) rating downgrades for government debt. A fairly myopic version of fiscal sustainability will be bought at the price of a larger financial instability. (Author's bold.)
As Parenteau noted, policy advocates do not wish to consider the implications of basic accounting, especially, I would note, when they conflict with their political objectives, no less in Europe than in the USA. After having managed to avoid a debt-deflation death spiral after the October 2008 onset of the GFC, dogged pursuit of inappropriate policy objectives might still bring it about. He concludes:
These types of tradeoffs are opaque now because the fiscal balance is being treated in isolation. Implicit choices have to be forced out into the open and coolly considered by both investors and policy makers. It is not out of the question that fiscal rectitude at this juncture could place the private sectors of a number of nations on a debt deflation path - the very outcome policy makers were frantically attempting to prevent but a year ago. There may be ways to thread the needle - Domingo Cavallo's recent proposal to pursue a "fiscal devaluation" by switching the tax burden in Greece away from labor related costs like social security taxes to a higher VAT could be one way to effectively increase competitiveness without enforcing wage deflation. Cavallo's claims to the contrary, however, it was not the IMF that tripped him up. Fiscal cuts begat lower domestic income flows, which led to tax shortfalls, missed fiscal balance targets, and another round of fiscal retrenchment, in a vicious spiral fashion. But more innovative solutions than these, where financial stability, not just fiscal sustainability, is the primary objective, will not even be brought to light unless policy makers and investors begin to think coherently about how financial balances interact. Or to put it more bluntly, if European countries try to return to 3% fiscal deficits by 2012, as many of them are now pledging, unless the euro devalues enough, then either a) the domestic private sector will have to adopt a deficit spending trajectory, or b) nominal private income will deflate, and Irving Fisher's paradox will apply (as in the very attempt to pay down debt leads to more indebtedness), thwarting the ability of policy makers to achieve fiscal targets. In the case of Spain, with large private debt/income ratios, this is an especially critical issue. (My bold. ARG) The underlying principle flows from the financial balance approach: the domestic private sector and the government sector cannot both deleverage at the same time unless a trade surplus can be achieved and sustained. We remain hard pressed to identify which nations or regions of the remainder of the world are prepared to become consistently larger net importers of Europe's tradable products, but it is also said that necessity is the mother of all invention (and desperation, its father?). Pray there is life on Mars that consumes olives, red wine, and Guinness beer. (Author's bold, uno.)
Or to put it more bluntly, if European countries try to return to 3% fiscal deficits by 2012, as many of them are now pledging, unless the euro devalues enough, then either a) the domestic private sector will have to adopt a deficit spending trajectory, or b) nominal private income will deflate, and Irving Fisher's paradox will apply (as in the very attempt to pay down debt leads to more indebtedness), thwarting the ability of policy makers to achieve fiscal targets. In the case of Spain, with large private debt/income ratios, this is an especially critical issue. (My bold. ARG)
The underlying principle flows from the financial balance approach: the domestic private sector and the government sector cannot both deleverage at the same time unless a trade surplus can be achieved and sustained. We remain hard pressed to identify which nations or regions of the remainder of the world are prepared to become consistently larger net importers of Europe's tradable products, but it is also said that necessity is the mother of all invention (and desperation, its father?). Pray there is life on Mars that consumes olives, red wine, and Guinness beer. (Author's bold, uno.)
So, is the German dominance of the policies of the ECU, combined with their policy objectives poised to crush the economies of the south and blow up even German banks in the process? One thing in common with the USA is a refusal to acknowledge and deal with both the problems and the power of the big banks. As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
A selected bibliography of the writings of others is given in Appendix III of Booms and Depressions, ... This bibliography omitted Veblen's Theory of Business Enterprise, ...Chater VII of which, Professor Wesley C. Mitchell points out, probably comes nearest to the debt-deflation theory. Hawtreys' writings seem the next nearest. Professor Alvin H. Hansen informs me that Professor Paxson, of the American History Department of the University of Wisconsin, in a course on the History of the West some twenty years ago, stressed the debt factor and its relation to deflation. But, so far as I know, no one hitherto has pointed out how debt liquidation defeats itself via deflation nor several other features of the present "creed". If any clear-cut anticipation exists, it can never have been prominently set forth, for even the word "debt" is missing in the indexes of the treatises on the subject.
This is Keynes' paradox of thrift at work. But the problem is that we just came out of a debt and asset price bubble with low savings and high indebtedness. Denying households and businesses the ability to deleverage will be painful.
It is not out of the question that fiscal rectitude at this juncture could place the private sectors of a number of nations on a debt deflation path - the very outcome policy makers were frantically attempting to prevent but a year ago.
It is surely wrong to stop fiscal stimulus of even embark on austerity programmes when the economic cycle is yet to unequivocally hit bottom.
Prices and wages in Spain's tradable goods sector will need to fall precipitously, and labor productivity will have to surge dramatically, in order to create a large enough real depreciation for Spain that its tradable products gain market share (at, we should mention, the expense of the rest of the Eurozone members).
Here there's an assumption that the sharing of the Eurozone's trade balance among the various member states is zero-sum. For one country to improve their trade balance, that of some others must worsen. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
Last year, Presidents Hu Jintao of China and Boris Tadic of Serbia cemented their bilateral relations and traditional friendship with a strategic partnership. Besides reaffirming their mutual respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, pledging broader, stronger and deeper ties, the two republics firmly stated their aim to promote economic cooperation and trade. A document resulting from their partnership agreement said the two sides had expressed a readiness to "ensure continuous and steady growth of bilateral trade and gradually improve the balance of bilateral trade through development in accordance with the principle of equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and win-win result."
Last year, Presidents Hu Jintao of China and Boris Tadic of Serbia cemented their bilateral relations and traditional friendship with a strategic partnership. Besides reaffirming their mutual respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, pledging broader, stronger and deeper ties, the two republics firmly stated their aim to promote economic cooperation and trade.
A document resulting from their partnership agreement said the two sides had expressed a readiness to "ensure continuous and steady growth of bilateral trade and gradually improve the balance of bilateral trade through development in accordance with the principle of equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and win-win result."
Following the Kosovo War, from 12 to 26 June 1999 there was a brief but tense standoff between NATO and the Russian Kosovo Force (KFOR) in which Russian troops occupied the airport. After securing an agreement by which Russian forces would be integrated into peacekeeping duties, independent of NATO, Pristina Airport was reactivated as a military airport on 15 October 1999 and then started to operate international air transport to several European cities. During that period of time the Russian KFOR along with other NATO forces were in charge for security of the airport. Airport Pristina initially began its operations with 45 employees.
------------ Russian troops occupied the airport ------------ And NATO troops ocupied Kosovo.And they are still persisting on an ilegal proclamation of independance. But you will not see that this way...so it's a waste of time to talk about it... It is one thing to sand UN troops in a CIVIL war to try to make peace and totaly another thing to ilegaly bomb country and ocupay part of it's teritory, put military bases and recognize ilegal independance.
How many times do I have to say that I disagree with Kosovo's independence and that Spain hasn't recognised it?
Do you actually pay attention to what people say? En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
REUTERS - France will play a more hands-on role in managing its state shareholdings, President Nicolas Sarkozy said on Thursday as he unveiled policies aimed at halting the decline of French industry. Sarkozy also said he would earmark millions of euros to encourage companies to innovate with green investment and bring jobs back to France as part of a plan to help a sector that has shed over half a million workers in the last 10 years. "The state is going to profoundly review its role as a shareholder in the big industrial companies," he told workers at a Eurocopter factory in southern France.
Does anyone think France regrets not getting involved in Iraq? lol.
In the media today, forgotten tomorrow.
'If monopoly persists, monopoly will always sit at the helm of the government," Woodrow Wilson once wrote. "If there are men in this country big enough to own the government of the United States, they are going to own it." This was the great, consuming fear of the once-robust antitrust movement: that competition would be destroyed and government itself brought to heel by concentrated private power. That movement was a force to be reckoned with in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but after World War II the public's dread of bigness seemed to fade away.
'If monopoly persists, monopoly will always sit at the helm of the government," Woodrow Wilson once wrote. "If there are men in this country big enough to own the government of the United States, they are going to own it."
This was the great, consuming fear of the once-robust antitrust movement: that competition would be destroyed and government itself brought to heel by concentrated private power. That movement was a force to be reckoned with in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but after World War II the public's dread of bigness seemed to fade away.
...Barry C. Lynn's recent book ... arises directly from the old antitrust tradition, and it presents us with an amazing catalogue of present-day monopolies, oligopolies and economic combinations. Its subjects are, by definition, some of the largest and most powerful organizations in the world. And yet almost none of it was familiar to me. Mr. Lynn tells us, for example, about the power of single companies or small groups of companies over such disparate fields as eyeglasses, certain categories of pet food, washer-dryer sales, auto parts, many aspects of food processing, surfboards, medical syringes... .... Mr. Lynn ... describes companies that swallow their rivals and then, with competitive pressure diminished, set about "destroying product variety and diversity." ... We learn of entire industries where competitors have grown so close to one another that a collapse at one company would probably bring down many of the others as well. This is, we are often reminded, a populist age, with fresh flare-ups of fury every time Wall Street bonuses hit the headlines. ...Mr. Lynn's anger at the Wall Street bailout, his fondness for small business, and his frequent homages to the nation's founders may seem superficially similar to the attitudes of the tea party protesters. But Mr. Lynn also takes pains to demonstrate that the economic "freedom" so beloved by the snake-flag set has actually yielded the opposite of freedom: a "neofeudal" system of "private corporate governments" answerable to no one.
Mr. Lynn tells us, for example, about the power of single companies or small groups of companies over such disparate fields as eyeglasses, certain categories of pet food, washer-dryer sales, auto parts, many aspects of food processing, surfboards, medical syringes...
....
Mr. Lynn ... describes companies that swallow their rivals and then, with competitive pressure diminished, set about "destroying product variety and diversity." ... We learn of entire industries where competitors have grown so close to one another that a collapse at one company would probably bring down many of the others as well.
This is, we are often reminded, a populist age, with fresh flare-ups of fury every time Wall Street bonuses hit the headlines. ...Mr. Lynn's anger at the Wall Street bailout, his fondness for small business, and his frequent homages to the nation's founders may seem superficially similar to the attitudes of the tea party protesters. But Mr. Lynn also takes pains to demonstrate that the economic "freedom" so beloved by the snake-flag set has actually yielded the opposite of freedom: a "neofeudal" system of "private corporate governments" answerable to no one.
This statement ought be greeted by readers with extreme skepticism. First, its meaning is to be compared with historical events, in particular third party formations and prosecution of their constituents in the US, M&A activity, and legislative results, if any, authorizing state dissolution of combinations (pools, trusts). Second, its meaning is to be compared with the pull-quote which is morally but not historically ambiguous. Mr Wilson affirmed the obvious. He also said, in 1907, the next year in a series of financial panics and one of marked labor agitation, in a lecture at Columbia University.
Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process... the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down. [Zinn: 362]
Third, and most important, the reader is to be alert to the legal usage and epistemologic meanings of the word "trust" and as compared to its ambiguous utility in discussions of "antitrust" political conflict between corporate entities, in particular, legitimacy of trust --or license to operate-- vested in private enterprise on the one hand versus state enterprise on the other. Ironically, Thoma approaches this topic tentatively in a preceeding post, another book review promotion, summarizing Adam Smith's intuition of a natural monopoly exemplified by the state, or if one prefers, a representative government.
In other words, evoking "the old antitrust tradition" in this post "New Age of Monopolies" more accurately expresses the political intransigence of US capitalist celebrities than it does jurisprudential and law enforcement priorities of federal agents, much less mystical competitive "forces" or popular appeals for "reform."
Finally, this statement "after World War II the public's dread of bigness seemed to fade away" is symptomatic of the ignorance that perenially plagues policy "analysts". This ignorance is blindness to political agency among and between individual firms' owners exerted in particular to indemnify their own monopolistic business practices whether from prosecution by statute or popular sanction. This ignorance is repeated in the sentiment often poured over "technical" documents into the innerboobs, "I'm here to discuss economics, not politics."
The public's dread didn't fade away. It was pulverized. 1900-1941, US federal government institutionalized "self-regulation" of incorporated entities into law. The National (Industrial) Recovery Act epitomizes the strategy to legitimize private trusts and to classify beneficiaries of proferred exemptions by industry, purportedly balanced with the state sanction of the National Labor Relations Board --a trust-- established in principle to combine unions' interests in wage arbitrage (rather than violent strikes) and Congressional patronage. Simultaneously, the state enacted prohibitions of certain competition, namely ideological, and executed, deported, or imprisoned large numbers of persons and criminalized any enterprise inimicable to national policy objectives addressed by state or corporate agents.
Then the US went to war, again. That enterprise produced 11M casualties. After which re-education of survivors proceeded apace, culminating one could argue in Mr Thoma's unfamiliarity with a history of US industry structure and practices prior to Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign. Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
Who knows what Brad, Brad, and Mark know.
Possibly related post:
Y. Smith harvests Web 2.0 material, celebrates with N. Wolf
pfft Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
European leaders have called for an inquiry into the Greek crisis. Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, has told Congress that the Fed is "looking into" Wall Street's deals with Greece, and the Justice Department is investigating the euro bets. That is better than turning a blind eye, but it is not nearly enough. The bigger problem is in America, where markets are supposed to be fair and transparent. These particular -- and particularly complicated -- instruments are traded privately among banks, their clients and other investors with virtually no regulation or oversight. The Obama administration and Congress have been talking for a year about fixing the derivatives market. Big banks have been lobbying to block change. And the longer it takes, the weaker the proposed new rules become. Here are some of the problems that must be fixed: NO TRANSPARENCY <...> LIMITED POWER TO STOP ABUSES <...> NO STATE REGULATION, EITHER <...> Without effective reform, the derivative-driven financial crisis in the United States that exploded in 2008, and the Greek debt crisis, circa 2010, will be mere way stations on the road to greater calamities.
European leaders have called for an inquiry into the Greek crisis. Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, has told Congress that the Fed is "looking into" Wall Street's deals with Greece, and the Justice Department is investigating the euro bets. That is better than turning a blind eye, but it is not nearly enough.
The bigger problem is in America, where markets are supposed to be fair and transparent. These particular -- and particularly complicated -- instruments are traded privately among banks, their clients and other investors with virtually no regulation or oversight.
The Obama administration and Congress have been talking for a year about fixing the derivatives market. Big banks have been lobbying to block change. And the longer it takes, the weaker the proposed new rules become.
Here are some of the problems that must be fixed:
NO TRANSPARENCY <...>
LIMITED POWER TO STOP ABUSES <...>
NO STATE REGULATION, EITHER <...>
Without effective reform, the derivative-driven financial crisis in the United States that exploded in 2008, and the Greek debt crisis, circa 2010, will be mere way stations on the road to greater calamities.
[Milton Friedmanesque Economic Propaganda Site Alert] The march of civilizations is a series of defenses that man has put up against the dread of pure existence.
