what about rooves? are you including those?
you can have solar panels in fields too, there's no need for this grim cement vision you keep describing.
as if nukes don't cover real estate!
weak part of your argument...
the strong part is the coal factor, no disagreements here on that, but DoDo is right, there is the possibility to solve the problem without nukes, but it will take more work (countering the pronuke propaganda) and a lot of nega-watting, something conspicuously absent from your posts.
..and a lot less wasting huge sums on fusion and fission, both which, like gas and coal, preserve the centralised grid, to the exclusive benefit of privatised bizniz interests, and the continued disempowerment of citizens all over.
corporate offshore wind could save britain's energy problems, but the recurrent chimera of nukes has probably done more to slow that solution down than anything else.
also conspicuously absent from your case is any reference to the amount of civic repression that will be needed to convince the public of its value, especially as the cat's out of the bag as regards the eco-supremacy of wind and sun.
there will be no repeat of the myths that were peddled by the media about solar 'not working' for decades, even as people were seeing them emerge everywhere, from on space vehicles, to emergency stop- and street-lights in their towns.
your arguments smack of the same propaganda, and the reference to looking at people as if they were slime, says more about you than the people you so confidently judge.
still, it's nice to have opposing viewpoints hashed out here, so cheers! ~"When an inner situation is not made conscious, it appears outside as fate." Karl Jung~
secondly; No you cannot place a solar panel in a field. Wind, yes. the practical footprint of a mill is small, since they are vertical and spaced out by necessity. Solar power uses up sunlight. Nothing can grow where it is deployed.
Third; Net Negawatts will not happen in any society that is seriously trying to combat global warming. Vast amounts of power can, and will be saved by superior design of electronics, the substitution of heat pumps for furnaces and so on. I can easily see a world where our total energy consumption goes down, a lot, through increased efficiency. Our electricity consumption, however, will rise. A lot. The more seriously we take global warming as a problem, the higher its going to go. Cars -> electric cars and rail = Net fall in power use as gasoline burning free falls, but an increase in electricity used by at least a third. More likely half, and I could see it outright doubling demand in the US (Sufficiently good batteries, and people will build great big "electron waster" cars..) Industrial use of gas and coal ended? that means vast demand for industrial heat, and electrochemical processes to replace thermo chemical ones. And so on, and so forth.
yes, no one is arguing for that here, you do realise, yes?
No you cannot place a solar panel in a field.
have you ever seen them on rotating columns? they're not vertical, but they aren't flat either, unless on rooves.
Nothing can grow where it is deployed.
obviously putting panels under shade trees is inefficient, but in the areas of europe most begging for them, shade is a plus. there's no reason why they can't be designed into beautiful landscaping or gardening projects, unless you're talking about huge mega arrays, for light industry.
you make it sound like nature will be paved over with cement and silicon. this is emotive reasoning, to carry your point further by imbuing PV tech with some anti-green vibe. planet-hating folks, those solar fanboys.
Net Negawatts will not happen in any society that is seriously trying to combat global warming. Vast amounts of power can, and will be saved by superior design of electronics, the substitution of heat pumps for furnaces and so on. I can easily see a world where our total energy consumption goes down, a lot, through increased efficiency. Our electricity consumption, however, will rise. A lot. The more seriously we take global warming as a problem, the higher its going to go.
i apologise for not being more precise. by 'negawatts' i intended to refer to the negation of the need for so many watts used, whether by your excellent points about heat pumps, electronics, and i'd definitely add better insulation and passive solar architecture being mandated, not a diminuition of watts productively used.
the waste right now is staggering, light bulbs and standby are the least of it, but as symbols of how tiny household changes, scaled up to countries and unions of countries, they make a tidy little example of 'small is beautiful'.
reducing the waste in all energy dynamics, and scaling down our concepts of what is 'normal' energy use, so to be less extravagant in relation to the poorer 4/5ths of the world, will cut our carbon footprint so significantly that we will be able to phase through to a non fossil fuel economy by 2050, globally.
i expect some large industries will relocate, not for cheap labour so much any more, as for cheap energy, so i'd expect more desert projects, and in europe more use of the scrubbety southern zones, where there isn't enough soil or conditions for much flora anyway. with the deserts growing, i doubt too many will complain too bitterly about some acres of solar panels helping them avoid more oil wars, or 3 mile island episodes.
i have no problem with upping electricity use by a third, or even more, as long as it's distributed more fairly to the poor countries, who get much more bang for the solar buck with small installations anyway, than us with our BMW lifestyles. plenty of sunshine to be 'used', as you put it, though i see it more as 'transformed'.
i note you haven't addressed the social repression angle, unless i missed it.
do you really think the public will go along cheerfully with these nuclear tidings of great joy?
the last time i was looked at as if i were slime, was by a uniformed thug, the kind whose numbers i would expect to blossom like vile weeds around nuclear installations, the transport routes for materiel, the 'disposal' arrangements etc. are those costs factored in, or will they be more of the famous 'externalities', so easy to forget during the planning phase?
because when i mention the word 'cost', the economics of all those 'security' services is the tip of the iceberg. what about the paranoia, the jackboot, the reconditioning of social fabric. are they airbrushed out of your vision? france has avoided the worst of this, but can you really believe other countries will hold to that kind of standard, especially seeing recent events in germany and finland regarding the engineering?
public trust is important, who do you think the public trusts to tell us the truth more, the nuclear industry or the crazy horse gang?
i think the nuke biz had its day in the sun, and that era proved we as humans are not up to the challenge of controlling such a nasty beast with any real consistency, and that was when the public was still very innocent and believed the 'too cheap to meter' propaganda unconditionally.
so we agree to disagree, we both sense the other's position as unwise and dangerous. time will tell. thanks for playing. ~"When an inner situation is not made conscious, it appears outside as fate." Karl Jung~
Real estate: As a matter of fact, the land use of nukes, including mining, enrichment and disposal is lower per kwh than anything else. By a lot.
And solar not working being a myth.. Do me a favor. look up how much of German electricity, never mind total energy use, is currently supplied by solar, and what the feed in tariff is set at. Then do the same for wind.
And as good spies have always known, the risk of a security penetration goes up faster than linearly with the number of people in the loop.
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
India tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), which it called a "peaceful nuclear explosive." The test used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor, and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes.
A look at the key personnel involved indicates that the nuclear expertise came from the civilian nuclear side. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
9. Apartheid's nuclear arsenal: Deviation from development: Centre de recherches pour le développement international
To illustrate the extent of the programme, it is necessary to link it to the entire nuclear project in South Africa. Each piece of the project added extra impetus to the development of a weapons programme... The programme had three prongs: research on uranium and other fissile materials, research on radio-isotopes and radiation, and research on the establishment of a power reactor. To house its research, the AEB moved from its suite in a Pretoria office block to secretly purchased farmland west of Pretoria. This site became known as Pelindaba (`The talking is over'), and became the new home of the South African National Nuclear Research Centre. Construction began and the first buildings were occupied in 1963.One of the buildings was designed to house a research reactor. Under the `Atoms for Peace' programme (Ambrose, 1984:147-51), the United States agreed to make available a reactor with a capacity of 20 megawatts (MW), running on highly enriched weapons-grade uranium. The United States was also willing to supply the enriched uranium on condition that South Africa signed a safeguards agreement allowing international inspection of the facility. This condition was accepted by South Africa. Named SAFARI-I, the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Reactor was first commissioned on 18 March 1965.1Scientific trainingThe `Atoms for Peace' initiative included the forging of a secret treaty: the US-South African Agreement for Co-operation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy.2 This co-operation enabled a cadre of South African scientists to be trained in reactor physics in the United States. Training occurred at the Argonne National Laboratories outside Chicago, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, and other venues. On their return to South Africa, this group was to form the active nucleus of an increasingly powerful nuclear bureaucracy.The early seeding by the United States of South Africa's nuclear research facilities was crucial. By the mid-1960s, South African universities were running their own nuclear research departments. The AEB was able to recruit 75 scientists to staff Pelindaba. With the inauguration of SAFARI-I, thanks to United States collaboration, South Africa's nuclear research effort had reached its critical mass. From the late 1940s onward, South African scientists were also given access to British facilities. However, by the late 1960s, it had become more difficult to sustain open nuclear collaboration. As the AEB turned its attention towards developing enrichment technologies, the relationship with its West German counterpart began to flourish. South Africa was keen to understand the jet-nozzle enrichment process pioneered by West German Professor Erwin Becker. Brokered by Franz-Josef Strauss, right-wing Bavarian politician, friend of apartheid, and minister in the West German coalition cabinet, South African scientists became interns at the Karlsruhe headquarters of the GfK, the federal Nuclear Research Centre. One of these scientists was Dr Waldo Stumpf, currently chief executive of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (successor to the AEB). The similarities between the Becker method and the final enrichment technique adopted by South Africa led to speculation about the close levels of collaboration (Cervenka & Rogers, 1978:43, 73-8). ...On 20 July 1970, the then prime minister, B.J. Vorster, stood up in the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town and, for the first time, revealed information about South Africa's enrichment plans. He announced that the main motive was based on the fact that South Africa, as a major uranium exporter, could derive more foreign exchange exporting uranium in its enriched form. A further motive was the immense cost of importing enriched uranium to fuel South Africa's nuclear power programme, envisaged as having a capacity of 20 000 MW by the year 2000 (more than 20 Koeberg-sized reactors). At no stage was there mention of a military application of uranium enrichment. Vorster emphasised the peaceful intention of the programme three times during his speech, and offered to collaborate with any non-communist countries in the exploitation of the process. Vorster also set in train the creation of a separate parastatal entity charged with uranium enrichment. Within a month of his speech, legislation had been signed creating the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa (UCOR). UCOR attempted to draw on the West German connection to create an international partnership in which its activities would be adequately financed and its product marketed globally. The calculation still held that such a partnership was a vital component of any commercial enrichment plant. For six years it entertained potential West German partners, embarking on discussions and negotiations with a view to securing a joint venture. The German company STEAG, which the GfK had entrusted with licensing the jet-nozzle process, signed a memorandum of understanding with UCOR in August 1973. STEAG aimed to sub-license UCOR. However, there was no unanimity in the West German cabinet, which had to approve the deal, and STEAG withdrew its formal application for federal government approval. Although the official deal fell through, a joint `feasibility study' was conducted comparing the South African and German enrichment processes. Many saw this study as a smokescreen for continued collaboration.
The programme had three prongs: research on uranium and other fissile materials, research on radio-isotopes and radiation, and research on the establishment of a power reactor. To house its research, the AEB moved from its suite in a Pretoria office block to secretly purchased farmland west of Pretoria. This site became known as Pelindaba (`The talking is over'), and became the new home of the South African National Nuclear Research Centre. Construction began and the first buildings were occupied in 1963.
One of the buildings was designed to house a research reactor. Under the `Atoms for Peace' programme (Ambrose, 1984:147-51), the United States agreed to make available a reactor with a capacity of 20 megawatts (MW), running on highly enriched weapons-grade uranium. The United States was also willing to supply the enriched uranium on condition that South Africa signed a safeguards agreement allowing international inspection of the facility. This condition was accepted by South Africa. Named SAFARI-I, the South African Fundamental Atomic Research Reactor was first commissioned on 18 March 1965.1Scientific training
The `Atoms for Peace' initiative included the forging of a secret treaty: the US-South African Agreement for Co-operation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy.2 This co-operation enabled a cadre of South African scientists to be trained in reactor physics in the United States. Training occurred at the Argonne National Laboratories outside Chicago, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, and other venues. On their return to South Africa, this group was to form the active nucleus of an increasingly powerful nuclear bureaucracy.
The early seeding by the United States of South Africa's nuclear research facilities was crucial. By the mid-1960s, South African universities were running their own nuclear research departments. The AEB was able to recruit 75 scientists to staff Pelindaba. With the inauguration of SAFARI-I, thanks to United States collaboration, South Africa's nuclear research effort had reached its critical mass.
From the late 1940s onward, South African scientists were also given access to British facilities. However, by the late 1960s, it had become more difficult to sustain open nuclear collaboration. As the AEB turned its attention towards developing enrichment technologies, the relationship with its West German counterpart began to flourish. South Africa was keen to understand the jet-nozzle enrichment process pioneered by West German Professor Erwin Becker. Brokered by Franz-Josef Strauss, right-wing Bavarian politician, friend of apartheid, and minister in the West German coalition cabinet, South African scientists became interns at the Karlsruhe headquarters of the GfK, the federal Nuclear Research Centre. One of these scientists was Dr Waldo Stumpf, currently chief executive of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (successor to the AEB).
The similarities between the Becker method and the final enrichment technique adopted by South Africa led to speculation about the close levels of collaboration (Cervenka & Rogers, 1978:43, 73-8).
...On 20 July 1970, the then prime minister, B.J. Vorster, stood up in the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town and, for the first time, revealed information about South Africa's enrichment plans. He announced that the main motive was based on the fact that South Africa, as a major uranium exporter, could derive more foreign exchange exporting uranium in its enriched form. A further motive was the immense cost of importing enriched uranium to fuel South Africa's nuclear power programme, envisaged as having a capacity of 20 000 MW by the year 2000 (more than 20 Koeberg-sized reactors). At no stage was there mention of a military application of uranium enrichment. Vorster emphasised the peaceful intention of the programme three times during his speech, and offered to collaborate with any non-communist countries in the exploitation of the process. Vorster also set in train the creation of a separate parastatal entity charged with uranium enrichment. Within a month of his speech, legislation had been signed creating the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa (UCOR).
UCOR attempted to draw on the West German connection to create an international partnership in which its activities would be adequately financed and its product marketed globally. The calculation still held that such a partnership was a vital component of any commercial enrichment plant. For six years it entertained potential West German partners, embarking on discussions and negotiations with a view to securing a joint venture. The German company STEAG, which the GfK had entrusted with licensing the jet-nozzle process, signed a memorandum of understanding with UCOR in August 1973. STEAG aimed to sub-license UCOR.
However, there was no unanimity in the West German cabinet, which had to approve the deal, and STEAG withdrew its formal application for federal government approval. Although the official deal fell through, a joint `feasibility study' was conducted comparing the South African and German enrichment processes. Many saw this study as a smokescreen for continued collaboration.
Nuclear Weapons Programs - Brazil
Brazil made a radical change in 1975, when it opted for nuclear technology from West Germany, despite strong protests from the United States. The agreement, signed on June 27, called for West Germany to transfer eight nuclear reactors (each of which could produce 1,300 megawatts), a commercial-scale uranium enrichment facility, a pilot-scale plutonium reprocessing plant, and Becker "jet nozzle" enrichment technology. West Germany's Kraftwerk Union, an affiliate of Siemens, was hired to construct the power plants. The projected cost of the program was US$4 billion, to be paid over a fifteen-year period. The most important element of the agreement was that it called for the first-ever transfer of technology for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. The United States government opposed the accord vigorously. Although it was unable to revoke the agreement, the United States convinced West Germany to enact stringent safeguards. ...West Germany did not require IAEA safeguards, and following the 1975 agreement Brazil transferred technology from its power plant projects to a secret program to develop an atom bomb. Code-named "Solimões," after a river in the Amazon, the secret program was started in 1975 and eventually came to be known publicly as the Parallel Program.
...West Germany did not require IAEA safeguards, and following the 1975 agreement Brazil transferred technology from its power plant projects to a secret program to develop an atom bomb. Code-named "Solimões," after a river in the Amazon, the secret program was started in 1975 and eventually came to be known publicly as the Parallel Program.
