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I forgot to include a small portion of notes on the original Kuznets curve:
Kuznets and the Historical Record Let us first turn to the experience of the now-developed countries in that early phase of their development that might be seen as comparable with what is happening in contemporary poor countries. This will provide us with some historical perspective on the problem of income distribution. The classic pioneering work here is that of Simon Kuznets (1955). His careful and systematic analysis of somewhat fragmentary data for a number of now advanced capitalist countries (the USA, UK and Germany), in an attempt to compare historical trends and establish the general record, has been very influential among development economists.

From his analysis, Kuznets offers the cautious hypothesis that one might assume a long swing in the inequality characterising the secular income structure:

  • widening in the early phases of economic growth when the transition from the pre-industrial phase is most rapid
  • a temporary stabilisation of the possibly substantial widening in income inequality of the early period
  • and then a narrowing of income inequality in the later phases.
It is the early phase that interests us. And we need to focus on the question of whether the pattern shown by the older developed countries is likely to be repeated in the sense that, in the early phases of industrialisation in the underdeveloped countries, income inequalities will tend to widen before various levelling forces become strong enough, first to stabilise, and then reduce income inequalities.
Kuznets places the early phase in which income inequality might have been widening from about 1780 to 1850 in Britain; from about 1840 to 1890 in the USA; and from the 1840s to the 1890s in Germany. He suggests that a narrowing of income inequality possibly began towards the end of the nineteenth century in the UK, and around the time of the First World War in the USA and Germany.
The prognosis for poor countries attempting industrialisation and capitalist economic development (and assuming some success in repeating past patterns of development) is not, then, a good one with respect to the possibility of narrowing inequality. A halfcentury or more of widening inequality can be expected on the basis of the historical figures. Indeed, Kuznets notes that the size distribution of income in less developed countries was more unequal than in the developed countries during the post World War II period.
This experience has been encapsulated in the so-called Kuznets curve, or the U-shaped Kuznets curve, which simply puts in graphical form Kuznets' conclusion regarding the experience of the now advanced countries. The graph shows that as per capita income rises, the income share of the top 20% of income recipients first rises quite rapidly, stabilises at around 57 per cent, and then falls more slowly.


Rutherfordian ------------------------------ RDRutherford
by Ronald Rutherford (rdrradio1 -at- msn -dot- com) on Wed Mar 10th, 2010 at 02:02:31 AM EST
Thanks for the diary and presenting Kuznets, who I had not heard of, but who -- not surprisingly -- has come up on ET before -- again, not surprisingly, in a couple of comments by

Migeru: GDP emerged out of the work of Simon Kuznets in the 1920's, I believe. Back then it was called National Income. In a way, from the point of view of tax base, replacing the hard to measure National Wealth with the easier to measure (transaction-based) National Income (which measures not wealth but economic activity) makes it easier to tax income than to tax wealth.

But just how well established is the Kuznets curve?  The "Criticism" section for its Wikipedia entry is short, not very well written, and poorly cited.  Still, even though your excerpt calls it a 'cautious hypothesis', I think it is quite bold, and if true, extremely important.  So I wonder how generally accepted it is among economists and historians.

The march of civilizations is a series of defenses that man has put up against the dread of pure existence.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Wed Mar 10th, 2010 at 02:47:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In response to Migeru's comment about Kuznets in The roots of the subprime crisis by Eric Zencey, Zencey replied: I know of Kuznets from the application of his Kuznets Curve to pollution and environmental externalities--the so called Environmental Kuznets Curve, which is used to justify the idea that development requires pollution, and that further development will lead to cleaner air, cleaner water, etc. as consumers in developed nation choose a different "mix" of goods, and when they have enough money, they choose to reduce pollution.

While on the one hand Wikipedia, citing the "The Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Primer" by "Yandle B, Vijayaraghavan M, Bhattarai M", says that

Since 1991, Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKC) have become standard features in the technical literature of environmental policy.

on the other hand, the Criticisms of environmental Kuznets curves section, citing the same Yandle et al primer, says that:

Yandle et al. argue that the EKC has not been found to apply to carbon because most pollutants create localized problems like lead and sulfur, so there is a greater urgency and response to cleaning up such pollutants. As a country develops, the marginal value of cleaning up such pollutants makes a large direct improvement to the quality of citizens' lives. Conversely, reducing carbon dioxide emissions does not have a dramatic impact at a local level, so the impetus to clean them up is only for the altruistic reason of improving the global environment. This becomes a tragedy of the commons where it is most efficient for everyone to pollute and for no one to clean-up, and everyone is worse as a result (Hardin, 1968). Thus, even in a country like the US with a high level of income, carbon emissions are not decreasing in accordance with the EKC.

Indeed, in that same comment above, Eric Zencey added:

The data don't bear this out; but that rarely gives a neocon pause.

I contributed to the entry on the EKC in The Encyclopedia of Earth, a gated wiki.

______

The march of civilizations is a series of defenses that man has put up against the dread of pure existence.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Wed Mar 10th, 2010 at 03:02:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I hope to not bore everyone to death, but I do want to include my conclusion from my paper on Kuznets curve from class assignment:
Section IV: Conclusion.
This paper covered a lot of material by bringing up a lot of complementary theories including Lewis-Two Sector Model, Harris-Todaro model, Killick's flexible economy, and Bottomley's interest rate determination. Even though the Kuznets Curve theory has a lot of intuitive understanding based on other theories as well as many observers including Marx and Upton Sinclair, it is important to test whether it is able to be predictable. Stiglitz notes that: "But a good theory should have no implication which is inconsistent with observations." (Stiglitz, 262) And Birdsall et al showed that at least in the East Asian experience the theory has limited predictive power. But this does not mean it does not have any explanatory powers for when inequality does increase during industrialization. Which means that it most definitely not that inequality is a requirement or necessary for development as Birdsall et al pointed out in the East Asian experiences and it is not sufficient considering all the nations that have high levels of inequality but development is slow or non-existent? Namibia with the highest Gini index according some estimates (Wiki) and clearly showing non-convergence with other developed countries or the world as the CIA notes growth in 2008 was 3.3% while the world's growth was at 4.1. (CIA) It is predicted even slower growth in 2009 and 2010 according to the IMF with growth rates of -0.7 and 1.8% respectively. (IMF)

There is also the possibility that HICs are facing a similar Kuznets curve as the inequality between skilled and unskilled labor has been widening. While it may be relatively small, it seems significant and across a variety of markets and Nations that would reflect varieties in social structures also. For example even in Japan it was noted in NBER (NBER): "Wage income inequality rose initially in the 1950s but declined in the subsequent two decades, and has increased slightly since the 1980s. This recent increase in Japan, however, is very small compared to the recent surge in wage income concentration in Anglo-Saxon countries." This may be a subject to consider more in the future...




Rutherfordian ------------------------------ RDRutherford
by Ronald Rutherford (rdrradio1 -at- msn -dot- com) on Wed Mar 10th, 2010 at 02:12:33 PM EST
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