(Reuters) - It's too early to call the end of the euro zone crisis, but signs are growing that Europe may have turned a corner in its struggle to restore financial stability. French Economy Minister Christine Lagarde, mangling a treasured Winston Churchill quotation, said last week: "We are in the middle of the beginning of the end."More prudently, we may be seeing "the end of the beginning."The evidence comes partly from financial markets, which are calmer, partly from the real economy, which is perkier, and partly from policy, which is responding at last to at least some investor concerns.There are still plenty of risks -- lack of faith in planned stress tests of European banks; low or no economic growth; more credit rating agency downgrades of sovereign debt; an eventual Greek default or debt restructuring; weaknesses in euro zone governance; and political resistance to painful reforms.But on balance, things are starting to look up.
(Reuters) - It's too early to call the end of the euro zone crisis, but signs are growing that Europe may have turned a corner in its struggle to restore financial stability.
French Economy Minister Christine Lagarde, mangling a treasured Winston Churchill quotation, said last week: "We are in the middle of the beginning of the end."
More prudently, we may be seeing "the end of the beginning."
The evidence comes partly from financial markets, which are calmer, partly from the real economy, which is perkier, and partly from policy, which is responding at last to at least some investor concerns.
There are still plenty of risks -- lack of faith in planned stress tests of European banks; low or no economic growth; more credit rating agency downgrades of sovereign debt; an eventual Greek default or debt restructuring; weaknesses in euro zone governance; and political resistance to painful reforms.
But on balance, things are starting to look up.
July 12 (Bloomberg) -- Bank of America Corp. and Wall Street firms that notched perfect trading records in the first quarter are now depending on an accounting benefit last used in the depths of the credit crisis to prop up their results. Bank of America, the biggest U.S. bank by assets, may record a $1 billion second-quarter gain from writing down its debts to their market value, Citigroup Inc. analyst Keith Horowitz estimated in a June 23 report. The boost to earnings, stemming from an accounting rule that allows banks to book profits when the value of their own bonds falls, probably represented a fifth of pretax income, Horowitz wrote. Investor fears of a Greek default, stalled U.S. economic recovery and tougher industry regulations have rattled markets, snapping banks' trading streaks and rekindling doubts about their creditworthiness. Prices for Bank of America's credit derivatives -- used by traders to bet on the likelihood of the firm's default -- rose by 34 percent during the second quarter, while Morgan Stanley's doubled and Goldman Sachs Group Inc.'s surged 86 percent.
July 12 (Bloomberg) -- Bank of America Corp. and Wall Street firms that notched perfect trading records in the first quarter are now depending on an accounting benefit last used in the depths of the credit crisis to prop up their results.
Bank of America, the biggest U.S. bank by assets, may record a $1 billion second-quarter gain from writing down its debts to their market value, Citigroup Inc. analyst Keith Horowitz estimated in a June 23 report. The boost to earnings, stemming from an accounting rule that allows banks to book profits when the value of their own bonds falls, probably represented a fifth of pretax income, Horowitz wrote.
Investor fears of a Greek default, stalled U.S. economic recovery and tougher industry regulations have rattled markets, snapping banks' trading streaks and rekindling doubts about their creditworthiness. Prices for Bank of America's credit derivatives -- used by traders to bet on the likelihood of the firm's default -- rose by 34 percent during the second quarter, while Morgan Stanley's doubled and Goldman Sachs Group Inc.'s surged 86 percent.
The second-quarter results may include gains taken under a U.S. accounting rule known as Statement 159, adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 2007, which allows banks to book profits when the value of their bonds falls from par. The rule expanded the daily marking of banks' trading assets to their liabilities, under the theory that a profit would be realized if the debt were bought back at a discount. Accounting `Abomination' In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe, said Chris Kotowski, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York.
Accounting `Abomination'
In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe, said Chris Kotowski, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York.
Oh, the magic of discounting...
See this thread from a year ago...
Migeru:
Economics and Politics - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.comSo Citigroup is profitable because investors think it's failing, while Morgan Stanley is losing money because investors think it will survive. I am not making this up.
So Citigroup is profitable because investors think it's failing, while Morgan Stanley is losing money because investors think it will survive. I am not making this up.
Holding To AccountOwn Credit CVANow what about Citi? It has the same pricing model as GS, which calculates a FV of $1m. So surely C recognises a financial liability of $1m? No. Again, accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability is the price at which an entity could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction. I.e. "What price would a counterparty be willing to cancel/settle the trade at now. Well, we have seen above that GS, and probably the rest of the market, would accept $700k to cancel the deal. So, Citi gets to write the liability down to $700k. In accounting terms:DR Financial Liabilities $300kCR Principal Transactions $300kYes, you have read it correctly - Citi has made a profit of $300k as a result of becoming less creditworthy!!! In accounting/industry spreak, Citi has made an Own Credit CVA of $300k.Read the whole post.
Own Credit CVANow what about Citi? It has the same pricing model as GS, which calculates a FV of $1m. So surely C recognises a financial liability of $1m? No. Again, accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability is the price at which an entity could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction. I.e. "What price would a counterparty be willing to cancel/settle the trade at now. Well, we have seen above that GS, and probably the rest of the market, would accept $700k to cancel the deal. So, Citi gets to write the liability down to $700k. In accounting terms:DR Financial Liabilities $300kCR Principal Transactions $300kYes, you have read it correctly - Citi has made a profit of $300k as a result of becoming less creditworthy!!! In accounting/industry spreak, Citi has made an Own Credit CVA of $300k.
Some banks have actually been buying up their own bonds (for amounts less than their full face value), so it's not completely cut off from reality.
Again, [proprietary] accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability [sic] is the price at which an entity [sic] could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction.
The writer means the fair value of a SECURITY which is distinct from the "value of a liability," the total balance remaining or specified principal plus total interest owed. By "entity" I suppose the writer means seller, who may or may not be the only "creditor" entitled to the coupon rate since its issue. The PRICE of a marketable bond necessarily diminishes over time with balance of payments due.
That said, the sale date of the note WRT maturity date of the note is the more reliable gauge of PRICE, regardless of unobservable inputs ascribed by firm accountants to secured or unsecured assets' income or, even, amount of CDS proceeds applied to issuer's repayment schedule.
My question is --absent government intervention of securities circulating whereby treasury agents buy paper in the secondary market in order to sell those securities at a discount to their issuers OR exercise equity warrants -- at what point in the period is a bondtrader most likely to surrender a note for sale to its issuer below cost, i.e. price paid for the bond or balance of income to maturity?
I'm thinking, never, barring personal catastrophe, say, long-term unemployment or grandma's eviction.
It seems to me, this material is merely a explanation of one of a number of "mark-to-model" valuation methods --no matter how often the writer evokes the phrase "fair value"-- rather than fair ("mark-to-market") value reporting criteria proposed by FASB. (pdf).
Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
As everyone knows, Topic 820, now in revision, is the new name of FAS 157 which defined asset classes for Basel II "unification" purposes
Possibly related hooha of "complex structured financial product" EXPORTS: Level 2 assets are the new Level 3 NYSSCPA to FASB: Weak! Dems to NeuLabradores: Automate Suckas!, or the Blueprint for Working Families and Women Returns Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
at what point in the period is a bondtrader most likely to surrender a note for sale to its issuer below cost, i.e. price paid for the bond or balance of income to maturity?
Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION? Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION? Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION?
bacon, bacon, bacon, I want bacon.
What to do, what to do... Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
cash value added (CVA) is not an accounting term
It seems to me, this material is merely a explanation of one of a number of "mark-to-model" valuation methods --no matter how often the writer evokes the phrase "fair value"-- rather than fair ("mark-to-market") value reporting criteria proposed by FASB.
The rule expanded the daily marking of banks' trading assets to their liabilities, under the theory that a profit would be realized if the debt were bought back at a discount. Accounting `Abomination' In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe
In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe
Remember that, in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers' collapse, there was a puch to relax/suspend mark-to-market rules.
That is, when the market is bubbly, mark-to-market allows the booking of unrealised trading profits, and that's a good thing for people on bonuses.
But when the market sours, mark-to-market requires booking unrealised losses, which is a bad thing for people on bonuses.
And then when credit sours, mark-to-market allows booking unrealised profits from counterfactual debt buybacks, which is again good for the bottom line.
I think it's not so much that these are accounting abominations but that accounting is itself an abomination because it was created in the days of fixed income streams and constant interest rates and is wholly unprepared to deal with fluctuating markets in a sensible way. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
The scandal, WTF-ery and double-taking comes about when the same rules are applied to their own obligations, whereby if your credit deteriorates you book a profit and if it improves you book a loss.
But, of course, tweaking accounting rules in good times to overstate the upside and in bad times to understate the downside is, apparently, par for the course. There wasn't a lot of outrage when the US Congress debated relaxing mark-to-market rules in late 2008... By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
There wasn't a lot of outrage...
The ignorance stems from them trying to talk about it from that "common sense" and "Appeal to Authority" stance we were talking about the other day?
But I really don't know.
That is obvious every time you see a commenter asking for advice on his 401(k)... By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
Step back for a moment.
Bonus pools are skimmed from revenue, are they not?
Let's be clear that the alleged defects or refinement of rules requiring estimation of market prices pertain to quality of information needed to approve a firm's credit application, not its actual operating performance. And perhaps what offends you most of all is, the representation of operating performance suggested by imaginary transactions --events which have not occurred-- rather than the realized gain (retired debt) in unobligated income or loss (asset "write down") attributed to repayments of historical cost, "buys" at market rate, or defaults which have occurred.
Mr Young [believed] that most [financial statement] users do not expect revaluation of the entity's securities (which are part of an entity's overall capital structure) to be a component of operating performance. In his view, the changes in the entity's overall capital structure (both debt capital and equity capital), particularly from the effect of changes in the entity's own creditworthiness, should not be reflected in business performance. Recognizing changes in an entity's own creditworthiness in earnings could mislead users and potentially represent or conceal operating performance issues. At a minimum, eligibility criteria should be required when the fair value option is elected for the debt portion of an entity's capital structure. [2007: 25]
820 would correct valuation errors allowed by 159 that permit firm accountants to discriminate cash equivalence and selection of certain classes of assets and assumptions about future operating conditions and income.
820 would force firm accountants to disclose data inputs to an estimated the value of securities, promissory notes and outstanding coupons as if the market price less historical cost of each instrument represented cash equivalent value in sum of the going concern if liquidated a/k/a its book value. Well, that's debatable. But there you have the solution to the problem of financing firms ever on the verge of insolvency.
At least 820 attempts to harmonize, or standardize, mark-to-model methodologies. That is a good thing.
Let's not lose sight of the so-called paralysis that seized the capital market because prospective traders lost "confidence" in the "liquidity" of each other's financial instruments for sale or pledged for collateral. The quality of that information is as important to prospective creditors as realized profit (loss) over a reporting period.
How else do you propose to evaluate the cash equivalence of financial instruments which comprise the manufacture and inventory of financial services firms? Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
I think it's not so much that these are accounting abominations but that accounting is itself an abomination because it was created in the days of fixed income streams and constant interest rates and is wholly unprepared to deal with fluctuating markets in a sensible way.
Anyway, accounting is an abomination. Exhibit A: off-balance-sheet items. Exhibit B: contingent liabilities. Exhibit C: loss of control enabling repo 105. Exhibit D: "Goodwill", that is, "intangible assets". By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
The deepest recession in Britain's post-war history was even more severe than previously feared, the government said today.Fresh information collected by the Office for National Statistics showed that the peak to trough decline in output was 6.4% of gross domestic product rather than the original 6.2% estimate.The new figures confirmed that the six successive quarters of negative growth from spring 2008 until autumn 2009 were the toughest for the economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s, harsher even than the slump of the early 1980s.
The deepest recession in Britain's post-war history was even more severe than previously feared, the government said today.
Fresh information collected by the Office for National Statistics showed that the peak to trough decline in output was 6.4% of gross domestic product rather than the original 6.2% estimate.
The new figures confirmed that the six successive quarters of negative growth from spring 2008 until autumn 2009 were the toughest for the economy since the Great Depression of the 1930s, harsher even than the slump of the early 1980s.
The sovereign debt crisis would seem to create worry enough for European banks, but there is another gathering threat that has not garnered as much notice: the trillions of dollars in short-term borrowing that institutions around the world must repay or roll over in the next two years. The European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the International Monetary Fund have all recently warned of a looming crunch, especially in Europe, where banks have enough trouble raising money as it is. Their concern is that banks hungry for refinancing will compete with governments -- which also must roll over huge sums -- for the bond market's favor. As a result, credit for business and consumers could become more costly and scarce, with unpleasant consequences for economic growth.... Banks worldwide owe nearly $5 trillion to bondholders and other creditors that will come due through 2012, according to estimates by the Bank for International Settlements. About $2.6 trillion of the liabilities are in Europe. U.S. banks must refinance about $1.3 trillion through 2012. While that sum is nothing to scoff at, analysts seem most concerned about Europe because the banking system there is already weighed down by the sovereign debt crisis.
The European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the International Monetary Fund have all recently warned of a looming crunch, especially in Europe, where banks have enough trouble raising money as it is.
Their concern is that banks hungry for refinancing will compete with governments -- which also must roll over huge sums -- for the bond market's favor. As a result, credit for business and consumers could become more costly and scarce, with unpleasant consequences for economic growth.... Banks worldwide owe nearly $5 trillion to bondholders and other creditors that will come due through 2012, according to estimates by the Bank for International Settlements. About $2.6 trillion of the liabilities are in Europe.
U.S. banks must refinance about $1.3 trillion through 2012. While that sum is nothing to scoff at, analysts seem most concerned about Europe because the banking system there is already weighed down by the sovereign debt crisis.
just indenture another few generations into the future, no?
it's the 'dropkick crisis', we had the drop, next... ~"When an inner situation is not made conscious, it appears outside as fate." Karl Jung~
I've been talking about this for some time.
The European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the International Monetary Fund have all recently warned of a looming crunch, especially in Europe, where banks have enough trouble raising money as it is. Their concern is that banks hungry for refinancing will compete with governments -- which also must roll over huge sums -- for the bond market's favor. As a result, credit for business and consumers could become more costly and scarce, with unpleasant consequences for economic growth.
Their concern is that banks hungry for refinancing will compete with governments -- which also must roll over huge sums -- for the bond market's favor. As a result, credit for business and consumers could become more costly and scarce, with unpleasant consequences for economic growth.
What's left of central bank independence? | Willem Buiter's Maverecon | FT.com
political independence: the central bank cannot seek or take instructions from any government/state body or other institution/body ... President Trichet of the ECB is already so far down the road of telling governments what to do and what not to do in the fiscal and structural reform domains, that one is hardly surprised by yet another lecture on budgetary policy from the Eurotower. Traditionally, continental European central bankers speak very little about monetary policy in public, and are often unwilling to engage in public debate or answer questions about their monetary duties, but carry on endlessly about budgetary and structural reform matters. It's always easier to speak about things you have no responsibility for, that are not part of your mandate and about which you probably don't know very much. The opposite problem has been encountered in the US, when Ben Bernanke has been so often seen shoulder-to-shoulder with past and present Secretaries of the Treasury, that it is hard to tell (except for the beard) where one begins and the other ends. A Chairman of the Fed ought not to publicly endorse or reject fiscal measures, budgets or plans. It's not his mandate and not his competence. It also further politicises the Fed and undermines its future independence. ... The regulation and supervision of financial institutions and markets is a deeply political activity. Property rights are being assigned, restricted, qualified or taken away. Banks are stopped from doing things they want to do and forced to do things they do not want to do. Barriers to entry and exit are created, lowered or removed. Such activities don't fit the image of an independent, a-political central bank very well. I consider it to be inevitable that when a central bank becomes deeply involved in the supervision of systemically important financial institutions and markets (let alone in their regulation), it will become politicised and lose its independence, even in the domain of conventional monetary policy (setting the official policy rate). This view is strongly supported by the increasing politicisation of the Fed - by far the least operationally independent of the leading central banks in the advanced industrial countries.
...
President Trichet of the ECB is already so far down the road of telling governments what to do and what not to do in the fiscal and structural reform domains, that one is hardly surprised by yet another lecture on budgetary policy from the Eurotower. Traditionally, continental European central bankers speak very little about monetary policy in public, and are often unwilling to engage in public debate or answer questions about their monetary duties, but carry on endlessly about budgetary and structural reform matters. It's always easier to speak about things you have no responsibility for, that are not part of your mandate and about which you probably don't know very much.
The opposite problem has been encountered in the US, when Ben Bernanke has been so often seen shoulder-to-shoulder with past and present Secretaries of the Treasury, that it is hard to tell (except for the beard) where one begins and the other ends. A Chairman of the Fed ought not to publicly endorse or reject fiscal measures, budgets or plans. It's not his mandate and not his competence. It also further politicises the Fed and undermines its future independence.
The regulation and supervision of financial institutions and markets is a deeply political activity. Property rights are being assigned, restricted, qualified or taken away. Banks are stopped from doing things they want to do and forced to do things they do not want to do. Barriers to entry and exit are created, lowered or removed. Such activities don't fit the image of an independent, a-political central bank very well.
I consider it to be inevitable that when a central bank becomes deeply involved in the supervision of systemically important financial institutions and markets (let alone in their regulation), it will become politicised and lose its independence, even in the domain of conventional monetary policy (setting the official policy rate). This view is strongly supported by the increasing politicisation of the Fed - by far the least operationally independent of the leading central banks in the advanced industrial countries.
Alessandro Profumo, UniCredit's chief executive, has received lukewarm reactions from other European banks to his proposal for a 20bn privately financed fund to support cross-border banks in distress. The continent's bankers are presumably more warmly united around the main purpose such a fund would serve - to dam a rising tide in favour of a bank levy.Some of the mixed feelings about Mr Profumo's idea, floated in an FT comment article yesterday, can be put down to confusion about exactly what the proposal entails. He explicitly says it is not a resolution or bail-out fund intended to cover the losses of insolvent banks. The idea, rather, seems to be for Europe's cross-border banks to voluntarily pay into a fund that, if wholesale markets were to freeze up as they have done in this crisis, would carry solvent banks through their dire straits until they could again raise funding in the markets.
Some of the mixed feelings about Mr Profumo's idea, floated in an FT comment article yesterday, can be put down to confusion about exactly what the proposal entails. He explicitly says it is not a resolution or bail-out fund intended to cover the losses of insolvent banks. The idea, rather, seems to be for Europe's cross-border banks to voluntarily pay into a fund that, if wholesale markets were to freeze up as they have done in this crisis, would carry solvent banks through their dire straits until they could again raise funding in the markets.
China, the world's largest foreign exchange holder, bought several hundred million euros of Spanish bonds last week as Asian investors returned to the eurozone peripheral market after a two-month hiatus.China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange, or Safe, which manages the reserves under the country's central bank, was allocated up to 400m ($505m) of Spanish 10-year bonds in a debt deal last Tuesday, according to people familiar with the situation.Safe had put in an order for about 1bn after demand rose to 14.5bn in a matter of a few hours last Tuesday. Mike Amey, portfolio manager at Pimco, said: "The fact big Asian investors are back in the market is a big vote of confidence for the eurozone. There was strong demand for the Spanish bond. It really helped sentiment."
China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange, or Safe, which manages the reserves under the country's central bank, was allocated up to 400m ($505m) of Spanish 10-year bonds in a debt deal last Tuesday, according to people familiar with the situation.
Safe had put in an order for about 1bn after demand rose to 14.5bn in a matter of a few hours last Tuesday. Mike Amey, portfolio manager at Pimco, said: "The fact big Asian investors are back in the market is a big vote of confidence for the eurozone. There was strong demand for the Spanish bond. It really helped sentiment."
BEIJING (AP) -- A Chinese firm that aims to compete with Western rating agencies declared Washington a worse credit risk than Beijing in its first report on government debt Sunday amid efforts by China to boost its influence in global markets. Dagong International Credit Rating Co.'s verdict was a break with Moody's, Standard & Poors and Fitch, which say U.S. government debt is the world's safest. Dagong said it rated Washington below China and 11 other countries such as Switzerland and Australia due to high debt and slow growth. It warned the U.S. is among countries that might face rising borrowing costs and risks of default. The report comes amid complaints by Beijing that Western rating agencies fail to give China full credit for its economic strength, boosting borrowing costs -- a criticism echoed by some foreign analysts. At June's G-20 summit in Toronto, President Hu Jintao called for the creation of a more accurate system. Dagong, founded in 1994 to rate Chinese corporate debt, says it is privately owned and pledges to make its judgments impartially. But in a sign of official support, its announcement Sunday took place at the headquarters of the Xinhua News Agency, the ruling Communist Party's main propaganda outlet. Dagong's chairman, Guan Jianzhong, said the current Western-led rating system is to blame for the global crisis and Europe's debt woes. He said it "provides the wrong credit-rating information" and fails to reflect changing conditions.
Dagong International Credit Rating Co.'s verdict was a break with Moody's, Standard & Poors and Fitch, which say U.S. government debt is the world's safest. Dagong said it rated Washington below China and 11 other countries such as Switzerland and Australia due to high debt and slow growth. It warned the U.S. is among countries that might face rising borrowing costs and risks of default.
The report comes amid complaints by Beijing that Western rating agencies fail to give China full credit for its economic strength, boosting borrowing costs -- a criticism echoed by some foreign analysts. At June's G-20 summit in Toronto, President Hu Jintao called for the creation of a more accurate system.
Dagong, founded in 1994 to rate Chinese corporate debt, says it is privately owned and pledges to make its judgments impartially. But in a sign of official support, its announcement Sunday took place at the headquarters of the Xinhua News Agency, the ruling Communist Party's main propaganda outlet.
Dagong's chairman, Guan Jianzhong, said the current Western-led rating system is to blame for the global crisis and Europe's debt woes. He said it "provides the wrong credit-rating information" and fails to reflect changing conditions.
Jesse has a bit to say about this, including:
Governments like China do not take actions like this randomly, and their quasi-state organizations do not march to the beat of their own drummer. It will be interesting to watch this develop, and calculate the strategy, to figure out the next steps. From a thematic perspective, coming up, competitive devaluations, and a shift in the reserve currency regime that will resemble a seismic shift, most likely pivoting around the SDR composition discussions later this year. The US battered the euro and has been sitting on gold and silver ahead of the SDR discussions. And now China has slipped a shiv between the ribs of the almighty Dollar. This is just the overture, the prelude to the dance. And further down the road, trade wars, well, at least trade wars more overt than the ones which have been ongoing since 1980, in which the US based multinationals thought they were pulling the strings, breaking the back of American labor. And guess who the arms dealers are in this paper chase, selling to all sides? Who are the untouchables, the TBTF, a strategic asset in the financial arsenal of democracy? When these boys roll into town it's time to hide the women, children, livestock and provender.
From a thematic perspective, coming up, competitive devaluations, and a shift in the reserve currency regime that will resemble a seismic shift, most likely pivoting around the SDR composition discussions later this year.
The US battered the euro and has been sitting on gold and silver ahead of the SDR discussions. And now China has slipped a shiv between the ribs of the almighty Dollar. This is just the overture, the prelude to the dance.
And further down the road, trade wars, well, at least trade wars more overt than the ones which have been ongoing since 1980, in which the US based multinationals thought they were pulling the strings, breaking the back of American labor.
And guess who the arms dealers are in this paper chase, selling to all sides? Who are the untouchables, the TBTF, a strategic asset in the financial arsenal of democracy? When these boys roll into town it's time to hide the women, children, livestock and provender.
The world needs more than three major credit ratings agencies because their actions exacerbate market swings, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet was quoted on Tuesday as saying. "The ratings agencies in general tend to amplify rises and falls in financial markets. You can see it still today very visibly. That goes against financial stability," he said in an interview with French daily Liberation. "It is probably appropriate not to continue to have a worldwide oligopoly of three agencies. But the underlying issue is to attenuate or cancel out this amplification to which the rating agencies contribute."
The world needs more than three major credit ratings agencies because their actions exacerbate market swings, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet was quoted on Tuesday as saying.
"The ratings agencies in general tend to amplify rises and falls in financial markets. You can see it still today very visibly. That goes against financial stability," he said in an interview with French daily Liberation.
"It is probably appropriate not to continue to have a worldwide oligopoly of three agencies. But the underlying issue is to attenuate or cancel out this amplification to which the rating agencies contribute."
So, national supervisors (that is, central banks) would be well in their rights to decree that the institutions they supervise are not required to use agency credit ratings to risk-weight their assets for regulatory capital purposes.
Banks can use their own ratings or market CDS spreads or they can read the entrails of chickens or consult Paul the Octopus... By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan