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More Abominations
The second-quarter results may include gains taken under a U.S. accounting rule known as Statement 159, adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 2007, which allows banks to book profits when the value of their bonds falls from par. The rule expanded the daily marking of banks' trading assets to their liabilities, under the theory that a profit would be realized if the debt were bought back at a discount.

Accounting `Abomination'

In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe, said Chris Kotowski, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York.


Given that they should not even exist but that they were saved by the TARP, etc. call it [Abomination]2.
Now all that remains is to not require them to take the loss when the value reverts. Next they will be writing CDSs on themselves and using the increased value of the CDS as the bank's value tanks as profit. Someone please tell me they are not already doing this.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jul 12th, 2010 at 08:42:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In short, this is a consequence of mark-to-market accounting rules. It is not an abomination to reduce the present value of future debt insofar as you could buy back your bonds at a lower price than you issued them. But if you have the cash lying around to buy back your bonds your credit shouldn't be deteriorating? Anyway, I believe Ecuador pulled a fast one on the credit markets some time ago when they said they might default on their debt and when the bond prices plummetted they bought back a pile of their own debt for less than they would have had to pay otherwise. Share buybacks work the same way - if you believe the stock is undervalued (and management tends to have a better view of intrinsic value than shareholders) it makes sense to buy the shares back.

Oh, the magic of discounting...

See this thread from a year ago...

Migeru:

Economics and Politics - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com
So Citigroup is profitable because investors think it's failing, while Morgan Stanley is losing money because investors think it will survive. I am not making this up.
Which was followed by
Holding To Account
Own Credit CVA

Now what about Citi? It has the same pricing model as GS, which calculates a FV of $1m. So surely C recognises a financial liability of $1m? No. Again, accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability is the price at which an entity could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction. I.e. "What price would a counterparty be willing to cancel/settle the trade at now. Well, we have seen above that GS, and probably the rest of the market, would accept $700k to cancel the deal. So, Citi gets to write the liability down to $700k. In accounting terms:

DR Financial Liabilities $300k

CR Principal Transactions $300k

Yes, you have read it correctly - Citi has made a profit of $300k as a result of becoming less creditworthy!!! In accounting/industry spreak, Citi has made an Own Credit CVA of $300k.
Read the whole post.
To which Jerome replied
Some banks have actually been buying up their own bonds (for amounts less than their full face value), so it's not completely cut off from reality.


By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 04:40:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Pardon me. I read that holdtoaccount article. Had to: cash value added (CVA) is not an accounting term. It's another fin-cannibal sales tool: the easy way to calculate premium by comparing firms' cash flows!

Again, [proprietary] accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability [sic] is the price at which an entity [sic] could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction.

The writer means the fair value of a SECURITY which is distinct from the "value of a liability," the total balance remaining or specified principal plus total interest owed. By "entity" I suppose the writer means seller, who may or may not be the only "creditor" entitled to the coupon rate since its issue. The PRICE of a marketable bond necessarily diminishes over time with balance of payments due.

That said, the sale date of the note WRT maturity date of the note is the more reliable gauge of PRICE, regardless of unobservable inputs ascribed by firm accountants to secured or unsecured assets' income or, even, amount of CDS proceeds applied to issuer's repayment schedule.

My question is --absent government intervention of securities circulating whereby treasury agents buy  paper in the secondary market in order to sell those securities at a discount to their issuers OR exercise equity warrants  -- at what point in the period is a bondtrader most likely to surrender a note for sale to its issuer below cost, i.e. price paid for the bond or balance of income to maturity?

I'm thinking, never, barring personal catastrophe, say, long-term unemployment or grandma's eviction.

It seems to me, this material is merely a explanation of one of a number of "mark-to-model" valuation methods --no matter how often the writer evokes the phrase "fair value"-- rather than fair ("mark-to-market") value reporting criteria proposed by FASB. (pdf).




Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 03:29:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
"except for derivative assets and liabilities"  How nice.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 08:42:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Hold up. (Don't laugh too hard.) ¶ 820-10-50-2 (c-d) specifies appropriate disclosure of a Level 3 instrument credit event or transaction (purchase, sales, issuances, and settlements) resulting in a net gain or loss of other recognized income --OR--  transfer of a Level 2 or Level 1 instrument's fair value between classes.

As everyone knows, Topic 820, now in revision, is the new name of FAS 157 which defined asset classes for Basel II "unification" purposes

  • Level 1. Quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities; observable price
  • Level 2. assets do not have observable prices, but have inputs that are based on observable prices.
  • Level 3. Significant unobservable inputs of the fair value calculation of another asset

(NB. Liability classes require no other critera --one dood's asset is the other's liability--though one do wonder, which column of the counterpartays gets to claim authoritay.)

Possibly related hooha of "complex structured financial product" EXPORTS:
Level 2 assets are the new Level 3
NYSSCPA to FASB: Weak!
Dems to NeuLabradores: Automate Suckas!, or the Blueprint for Working Families and Women Returns

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 08:23:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
at what point in the period is a bondtrader most likely to surrender a note for sale to its issuer below cost, i.e. price paid for the bond or balance of income to maturity?

When he is convinced that it is now in fact worth less than the price offered and likely to further decline? If the choice could be taking a haircut or suffering a near total loss, he might take the haircut. Or not, depending on testosterone levels.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 09:06:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
One has to consider default risk and recovery rate...

By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 09:25:40 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ahh yess.

Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION?
Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION?
Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION?

bacon, bacon, bacon, I want bacon.

What to do, what to do...

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 10:17:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Both and, not either or.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 11:32:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Cat:
cash value added (CVA) is not an accounting term
But I thought we were talking about Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA)?

By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 09:22:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
lol. Could be. Finance gives me gas anyhoo.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
by Cat on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 10:13:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Cat:
It seems to me, this material is merely a explanation of one of a number of "mark-to-model" valuation methods --no matter how often the writer evokes the phrase "fair value"-- rather than fair ("mark-to-market") value reporting criteria proposed by FASB.
Nice...

By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 09:24:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
ARGeezer:
The rule expanded the daily marking of banks' trading assets to their liabilities, under the theory that a profit would be realized if the debt were bought back at a discount.

Accounting `Abomination'

In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe

But then fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks are owed (i.e., mark-to-market accounting of assets is also an abomination).

Remember that, in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers' collapse, there was a puch to relax/suspend mark-to-market rules.

That is, when the market is bubbly, mark-to-market allows the booking of unrealised trading profits, and that's a good thing for people on bonuses.

But when the market sours, mark-to-market requires booking unrealised losses, which is a bad thing for people on bonuses.

And then when credit sours, mark-to-market allows booking unrealised profits from counterfactual debt buybacks, which is again good for the bottom line.

I think it's not so much that these are accounting abominations but that accounting is itself an abomination because it was created in the days of fixed income streams and constant interest rates and is wholly unprepared to deal with fluctuating markets in a sensible way.

By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 05:55:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My major concern is allowing mark to market on the up-side but not requiring it on the down side. Over and over.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 11:07:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They already mark a loss when debtors' credit deteriorates and a profit when it improves.

The scandal, WTF-ery and double-taking comes about when the same rules are applied to their own obligations, whereby if your credit deteriorates you book a profit and if it improves you book a loss.

But, of course, tweaking accounting rules in good times to overstate the upside and in bad times to understate the downside is, apparently, par for the course. There wasn't a lot of outrage when the US Congress debated relaxing mark-to-market rules in late 2008...

By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 11:55:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There wasn't a lot of outrage...

Certainly not from the financial sector or their hirelings. And, as bizarre as it seems, I cannot rule out the possibility that they have written credit default swaps on themselves and booked profits when they declined, whether they held them or sold them. Wall Street is worse than a casino. At least a casino has some rules by which it is required to abide. Wall Street mostly makes up and changes rules to suit itself at any given moment.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 12:08:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The average US citizen - see any number of diaries and discussions on dKos - doesn't understand what is going on.  Most US citizens don't even understand the Federal Reserve system ... which IMHO is the easiest part of the US FIRE complex to grasp.

The ignorance stems from them trying to talk about it from that "common sense" and "Appeal to Authority" stance we were talking about the other day?

But I really don't know.

by ATinNM on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 12:16:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The average US citizen - see any number of diaries and discussions on dKos - doesn't understand what is going on.

That is obvious every time you see a commenter asking for advice on his 401(k)...

By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 02:19:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
FASB 159

Step back for a moment.

Bonus pools are skimmed from revenue, are they not?

Let's be clear that the alleged defects or refinement of rules requiring estimation of market prices pertain to quality of information needed to approve a firm's credit application, not its actual operating performance. And perhaps what offends you most of all is, the representation of operating performance suggested by imaginary transactions --events which have not occurred-- rather than the realized gain (retired debt) in unobligated income or loss (asset "write down") attributed to repayments of historical cost, "buys" at market rate, or defaults which have occurred.

Mr Young [believed] that most [financial statement] users do not expect revaluation of the entity's securities (which are part of an entity's overall capital structure) to be a component of operating performance. In his view, the changes in the entity's overall capital structure (both debt capital and equity capital), particularly from the effect of changes in the entity's own creditworthiness, should not be reflected in business performance. Recognizing changes in an entity's own creditworthiness in earnings could mislead users and potentially represent or conceal operating performance issues. At a minimum, eligibility criteria should be required when the fair value option is elected for the debt portion of an entity's capital structure. [2007: 25]

820 would correct valuation errors allowed by 159 that permit firm accountants to discriminate cash equivalence and selection of certain classes of assets and assumptions about future operating conditions and income.

820 would force firm accountants to disclose data inputs to an estimated the value of securities, promissory notes and outstanding coupons as if the market price less historical cost of each instrument represented cash equivalent value in sum of the going concern if liquidated a/k/a its book value. Well, that's debatable. But there you have the solution to the problem of financing firms ever on the verge of insolvency.

At least 820 attempts to harmonize, or standardize, mark-to-model methodologies. That is a good thing.

Let's not lose sight of the so-called paralysis that seized the capital market because prospective traders lost "confidence" in the "liquidity" of each other's financial instruments for sale or pledged for collateral. The quality of that information is as important to prospective creditors as realized profit (loss) over a reporting period.

How else do you propose to evaluate the cash equivalence of financial instruments which comprise the manufacture and inventory of financial services firms?


Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 07:05:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think it's not so much that these are accounting abominations but that accounting is itself an abomination because it was created in the days of fixed income streams and constant interest rates and is wholly unprepared to deal with fluctuating markets in a sensible way.

To my untutored outsider view it seems that the abomination is having allowed "financial innovation" to create the complexity which led to the instability. We have allowed the financiers to sail us well out of sight of land without a compass and we can only see clouds overhead. We need to get back to solid ground.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jul 13th, 2010 at 09:14:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
"Financial innovation" is another word for "regulatory arbitrage" more often than not...

Anyway, accounting is an abomination. Exhibit A: off-balance-sheet items. Exhibit B: contingent liabilities. Exhibit C: loss of control enabling repo 105. Exhibit D: "Goodwill", that is, "intangible assets".

By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 14th, 2010 at 02:40:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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