The second-quarter results may include gains taken under a U.S. accounting rule known as Statement 159, adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 2007, which allows banks to book profits when the value of their bonds falls from par. The rule expanded the daily marking of banks' trading assets to their liabilities, under the theory that a profit would be realized if the debt were bought back at a discount. Accounting `Abomination' In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe, said Chris Kotowski, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York.
Accounting `Abomination'
In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe, said Chris Kotowski, an analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York.
Oh, the magic of discounting...
See this thread from a year ago...
Migeru:
Economics and Politics - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.comSo Citigroup is profitable because investors think it's failing, while Morgan Stanley is losing money because investors think it will survive. I am not making this up.
So Citigroup is profitable because investors think it's failing, while Morgan Stanley is losing money because investors think it will survive. I am not making this up.
Holding To AccountOwn Credit CVANow what about Citi? It has the same pricing model as GS, which calculates a FV of $1m. So surely C recognises a financial liability of $1m? No. Again, accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability is the price at which an entity could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction. I.e. "What price would a counterparty be willing to cancel/settle the trade at now. Well, we have seen above that GS, and probably the rest of the market, would accept $700k to cancel the deal. So, Citi gets to write the liability down to $700k. In accounting terms:DR Financial Liabilities $300kCR Principal Transactions $300kYes, you have read it correctly - Citi has made a profit of $300k as a result of becoming less creditworthy!!! In accounting/industry spreak, Citi has made an Own Credit CVA of $300k.Read the whole post.
Own Credit CVANow what about Citi? It has the same pricing model as GS, which calculates a FV of $1m. So surely C recognises a financial liability of $1m? No. Again, accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability is the price at which an entity could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction. I.e. "What price would a counterparty be willing to cancel/settle the trade at now. Well, we have seen above that GS, and probably the rest of the market, would accept $700k to cancel the deal. So, Citi gets to write the liability down to $700k. In accounting terms:DR Financial Liabilities $300kCR Principal Transactions $300kYes, you have read it correctly - Citi has made a profit of $300k as a result of becoming less creditworthy!!! In accounting/industry spreak, Citi has made an Own Credit CVA of $300k.
Some banks have actually been buying up their own bonds (for amounts less than their full face value), so it's not completely cut off from reality.
Again, [proprietary] accounting standards differ slightly in wording, but in principal the fair value of a liability [sic] is the price at which an entity [sic] could extinguish any future obligations, in an arm's length transaction.
The writer means the fair value of a SECURITY which is distinct from the "value of a liability," the total balance remaining or specified principal plus total interest owed. By "entity" I suppose the writer means seller, who may or may not be the only "creditor" entitled to the coupon rate since its issue. The PRICE of a marketable bond necessarily diminishes over time with balance of payments due.
That said, the sale date of the note WRT maturity date of the note is the more reliable gauge of PRICE, regardless of unobservable inputs ascribed by firm accountants to secured or unsecured assets' income or, even, amount of CDS proceeds applied to issuer's repayment schedule.
My question is --absent government intervention of securities circulating whereby treasury agents buy paper in the secondary market in order to sell those securities at a discount to their issuers OR exercise equity warrants -- at what point in the period is a bondtrader most likely to surrender a note for sale to its issuer below cost, i.e. price paid for the bond or balance of income to maturity?
I'm thinking, never, barring personal catastrophe, say, long-term unemployment or grandma's eviction.
It seems to me, this material is merely a explanation of one of a number of "mark-to-model" valuation methods --no matter how often the writer evokes the phrase "fair value"-- rather than fair ("mark-to-market") value reporting criteria proposed by FASB. (pdf).
Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
As everyone knows, Topic 820, now in revision, is the new name of FAS 157 which defined asset classes for Basel II "unification" purposes
Possibly related hooha of "complex structured financial product" EXPORTS: Level 2 assets are the new Level 3 NYSSCPA to FASB: Weak! Dems to NeuLabradores: Automate Suckas!, or the Blueprint for Working Families and Women Returns Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
at what point in the period is a bondtrader most likely to surrender a note for sale to its issuer below cost, i.e. price paid for the bond or balance of income to maturity?
Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION? Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION? Market solution? or CIVIL ACTION?
bacon, bacon, bacon, I want bacon.
What to do, what to do... Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
cash value added (CVA) is not an accounting term
It seems to me, this material is merely a explanation of one of a number of "mark-to-model" valuation methods --no matter how often the writer evokes the phrase "fair value"-- rather than fair ("mark-to-market") value reporting criteria proposed by FASB.
The rule expanded the daily marking of banks' trading assets to their liabilities, under the theory that a profit would be realized if the debt were bought back at a discount. Accounting `Abomination' In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe
In practice, it's an accounting "abomination" because fluctuations in the value of the debt don't change the amount the banks owe
Remember that, in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers' collapse, there was a puch to relax/suspend mark-to-market rules.
That is, when the market is bubbly, mark-to-market allows the booking of unrealised trading profits, and that's a good thing for people on bonuses.
But when the market sours, mark-to-market requires booking unrealised losses, which is a bad thing for people on bonuses.
And then when credit sours, mark-to-market allows booking unrealised profits from counterfactual debt buybacks, which is again good for the bottom line.
I think it's not so much that these are accounting abominations but that accounting is itself an abomination because it was created in the days of fixed income streams and constant interest rates and is wholly unprepared to deal with fluctuating markets in a sensible way. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
The scandal, WTF-ery and double-taking comes about when the same rules are applied to their own obligations, whereby if your credit deteriorates you book a profit and if it improves you book a loss.
But, of course, tweaking accounting rules in good times to overstate the upside and in bad times to understate the downside is, apparently, par for the course. There wasn't a lot of outrage when the US Congress debated relaxing mark-to-market rules in late 2008... By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
There wasn't a lot of outrage...
The ignorance stems from them trying to talk about it from that "common sense" and "Appeal to Authority" stance we were talking about the other day?
But I really don't know.
That is obvious every time you see a commenter asking for advice on his 401(k)... By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
Step back for a moment.
Bonus pools are skimmed from revenue, are they not?
Let's be clear that the alleged defects or refinement of rules requiring estimation of market prices pertain to quality of information needed to approve a firm's credit application, not its actual operating performance. And perhaps what offends you most of all is, the representation of operating performance suggested by imaginary transactions --events which have not occurred-- rather than the realized gain (retired debt) in unobligated income or loss (asset "write down") attributed to repayments of historical cost, "buys" at market rate, or defaults which have occurred.
Mr Young [believed] that most [financial statement] users do not expect revaluation of the entity's securities (which are part of an entity's overall capital structure) to be a component of operating performance. In his view, the changes in the entity's overall capital structure (both debt capital and equity capital), particularly from the effect of changes in the entity's own creditworthiness, should not be reflected in business performance. Recognizing changes in an entity's own creditworthiness in earnings could mislead users and potentially represent or conceal operating performance issues. At a minimum, eligibility criteria should be required when the fair value option is elected for the debt portion of an entity's capital structure. [2007: 25]
820 would correct valuation errors allowed by 159 that permit firm accountants to discriminate cash equivalence and selection of certain classes of assets and assumptions about future operating conditions and income.
820 would force firm accountants to disclose data inputs to an estimated the value of securities, promissory notes and outstanding coupons as if the market price less historical cost of each instrument represented cash equivalent value in sum of the going concern if liquidated a/k/a its book value. Well, that's debatable. But there you have the solution to the problem of financing firms ever on the verge of insolvency.
At least 820 attempts to harmonize, or standardize, mark-to-model methodologies. That is a good thing.
Let's not lose sight of the so-called paralysis that seized the capital market because prospective traders lost "confidence" in the "liquidity" of each other's financial instruments for sale or pledged for collateral. The quality of that information is as important to prospective creditors as realized profit (loss) over a reporting period.
How else do you propose to evaluate the cash equivalence of financial instruments which comprise the manufacture and inventory of financial services firms? Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
I think it's not so much that these are accounting abominations but that accounting is itself an abomination because it was created in the days of fixed income streams and constant interest rates and is wholly unprepared to deal with fluctuating markets in a sensible way.
Anyway, accounting is an abomination. Exhibit A: off-balance-sheet items. Exhibit B: contingent liabilities. Exhibit C: loss of control enabling repo 105. Exhibit D: "Goodwill", that is, "intangible assets". By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan