Furthermore, the US, EU, and the rest of the world would suffer only marginal, if any, economic loss as they find that there are lots of inexpensive substitutes, domestic as well as foreign, for Chinese labor.
Except not, because the US does not have any capital plant left that's worth shit, outside the armaments industry. And most of the countries that the American capital plant has been relocated to (other than China) are in Korea, which will be a Chinese client about ten seconds after the commencement of hostilities, and Indochina, which is a region where China can stir up a whole lot of trouble even under an all-out naval blockade.
Oh, the US can build capital plant. But that will take them at least ten years, which is an eternity when a fifth of the (net) internationally traded steel and well over a third of the total global steel production just got taken off the market, and you're a net importer of both steel and finished products containing it.
That is not to say that the US couldn't make China lose more than China could make the US lose. But the US would lose.
But then again, why should China stop playing by the Americans' rules? They're beating the Americans at their own game, after all...
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
The US doesn't need its own capital plant to survive a conflict with anyone because it has a military capable of securing all of the resources it needs from anyone else. While China's borders are just China's borders, as far as political control over resources goes, America is effectively borderless due to its unique, global military reach. Unless a country today opts out of American empire by opting out of trade, America's military really does make all other countries mere constituencies of an American polity.
While China and other countries may be only able to politically secure economic resources within its nation-state borders, the global network of bases, ships, and aircraft that the US has allow it to secure anything it needs from anywhere just by buying it and shipping it. No one else has that capacity, and until they do, the world pretty much has to follow the leader.
Korea won't go with China, because China can't protect its trade-based economy like the US Navy can, and without US and EU markets, Korea faces famine and devastation. Korea therefore, like China, also has no choice of allies. Beating America at its own game really is the best strategy out of a very limited set of options available to would-be imperialist competitors to American power today.
an ecological disaster like we might face from unchecked global warming, for instance.
Financial collapse is not the same thing as economic collapse, though.
The thing is that the American economic collapse has already happened and should be treated in the past tense.
What's keeping the American empire going is its mental capture of the European elites and its control of the financial system. For a country whose only significant civilian economic activity is finance, financial collapse is a generalised economic collapse.
that's something that can take a thousand years to happen,
The US doesn't need its own capital plant to survive a conflict with anyone because it has a military capable of securing all of the resources it needs from anyone else.
Korea won't go with China, because China can't protect its trade-based economy like the US Navy can,
It's not about "going with China," it's about not being able to prevent China from going in there and taking it over. In a working or not so working condition...
You're right about Russia and Korea, but it's still the same catch-22 situation. If China invades Korea, but has no access to the resources it needs, then famine occurs in Korea as well as China, so Korea will always stick with America, and Chinese contesting power with America is off the table. So if China were to get cozy enough with Russia to be able to secure resources without a need for ocean transport (just as the US was able to do (and Napoleon was not) without worrying about England in the 19th century) then, yes, you have a scenario for the end of the empire.
Hence, US geopolitical strategy should be, and likely is, to keep that kind of relationship from ever occurring. That's where policy matters and mistakes can be made. Empires aren't deterministic organisms. People have to actually be smart enough to keep them working. My point is that really the only way American power can fall in our lifetimes is if American political leadership screws up. Without American mistakes, China can't overtake her, so it's America's game to lose, not China's game to win.
There is no inevitability in China's rise here, and that was even the thesis of Giovanni Arrighi in his otherwise anti-American tome about China's rise. China still has to solve the currently insurmountable problem of how to retain access to global resources without the military capability to do so. Without an American (or climatic, perhaps) calamity, China isn't likely to ever get the capacity to be independent of American power, even if it becomes a more powerful constituency for American political leadership to deal with. At the rate China is rising, however, it should be able to overtake Israel within the next decade or two, I think. /snark
And everybody else lives happily ever after.
And you don't need to defeat China to prevent China's access to resources. You just have to be able to dissuade the world's ship owners, even Chinese ones, from doing business with China, which an aircraft carrier battle group is really good at.
Only if you are prepared to interdict all shipping in the Sea of Japan. That will hit Korea and Russia as well. Now, Korea you can live without, but unless Russia actively collaborates in your embargo - and they have no particular incentive to do so - China can run their commerce under Russian cargo manifests and in Russian bottoms (the Vladivostok Global Shipping Company and the East Siberian Industrial District Consolidated Import/Export Company would suddenly become the most productive enterprises in the world...). So you'd have to be prepared to interdict Russian-flagged vessels sailing out of Vladivostok. The Russians will not be happy about that.
You're talking about a generalised confrontation with all of Asia here.
You're right about Russia and Korea, but it's still the same catch-22 situation. If China invades Korea, but has no access to the resources it needs, then famine occurs in Korea as well as China, so Korea will always stick with America, and Chinese contesting power with America is off the table.
No, it means that Korea will not be the ignition point of such a conflict. But once the conflict does escalate to the point of naval blockade
So if China were to get cozy enough with Russia to be able to secure resources without a need for ocean transport (just as the US was able to do (and Napoleon was not) without worrying about England in the 19th century) then, yes, you have a scenario for the end of the empire.
It's not a matter of being cozy - if the Americans join Israel and Somalia as state sponsors of piracy and target Russian-flagged vessels, they're going to get a lot more cozy than they are real fast. It's a matter of building the relevant infrastructure. It's a question of whether the infrastructure to transport enough crop far enough can be built fast enough for the Chinese political system to survive a blockade.
There is no inevitability in China's rise here,
I actually agree with you on that.
What is happening right now to strengthen China's hand is that American industry is being moved to China. Mechanically, what happens is that China sells industrial goods to the US at discounted prices (through a variety of means, including but not limited to maintaining currency discounts) and uses the proceeds to buy the raw materials that make up the American colonies' tribute, in order to power Chinese industry. The reason that China is trading with the US rather than buying raw materials directly from the producers is that by discounting against the Americans, they incentivise the movement of the American industrial base to China (at the cost of selling their products for less than the full value).
It is always in the US' power to stop this process by changing policy away from favouring finance and towards favouring industry.
If and when that happens (and I predict that it will happen when the US runs out of civilian industry to ship overseas, because they will be understandably reluctant to ship their armaments industry overseas), the game changes. Then China no longer has any incentive to sell stuff to the US at a discounted price, and every incentive to deal bilaterally with the American colonies.
China then faces opportunities and challenges. To take the opportunities first, they can nationalise the Chinese-based holdings of transnational companies with relative impunity, since the only reason that those transnats are currently being treated according to the American rules is the prospect of them moving more of their operations to China. In the face of determined industrial policy, that prospect radically diminishes. The Americans are going to piss and moan about that, just as the British bitched a lot when Putin renegotiated their transnats' fraudulent Yeltsin-era contracts. But like the British, they will suck it up, because the alternative - a generalised trade war with all of Asia - is more expensive.
China can also begin to demand the full price for their goods from the Americans - they won't need to be hyper-competitive anymore, because there is no serious prospect of getting more of the American industrial plant (and for the same reason, they can always erect trade barriers to avoid losing what they have).
The challenge - and where the Americans can make monkey business for China - will be diverting colonial tribute from the American colonies to China while no longer paying the Americans a cut. But they are not entirely powerless here. The Americans keep their colonies not by virtue of military superiority - they have the capacity to wreck a colony, but not really to conquer it in any useful condition. Mostly they keep their colonies in line by bribing the local strongmen and then saddling them with unpayable debts... both activities denominated in US$ (and the way the Americans have traditionally saddled their colonies with unrepayable debts has been by building infrastructure projects with revenues in local currency but financed by loans denominated in US$ - but there's no reason why the Chinese can't play that game too).
Take away the post-Bretton Woods monetary system, and you take away the American empire.
But I agree with you completely on the need for the US, and the West in general, to break its relatively recent addiction to financing wealth instead of creating it through industry if remaining powerful in the world is important to them. Long term, allowed to continue, poor industrial policy will doom an imperialist project.
That was a diary by by richard carlucci on May 11th, 2006. There was also Hot Summer for Mr Bush by FarEasterner on May 22nd, 2006; and Afghanistan neglected - and now Russia and China want US out by Jerome a Paris on July 7th, 2005. But 2006 was a different era and after the Global Clusterfuck started we haven't heard a lot about the SCO. Is it still alive? Can it be revived? Does it matter? By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
You don't have to win a war (in the conventional sense of achieving your stated objectives) in order to wreck a country and deny its resources to everyone else. By laying out pros and cons we risk inducing people to join the debate, and losing control of a process that only we fully understand. - Alan Greenspan
I fully agree with santiago's description of the asymetry of the relationship between China and the US. China has to play by the rules of the game, as set by the dominant power. The US can isolate any country form the rest of the world; no country can do that to the US. Wind power
China's government has the great advantage of being able to conduct policy without particular regard for popular sentiment, and can always play the Chinese nationalism and Han exceptionalism cards to good effect. And they have the advantage of powerful cultural traditions that, well played, bolster the government -- so long as the economy keeps working.
Something from the I Ching relevant to the US-China relation comes to mind:
The Taming Power of the Small
"The yielding obtains the decisive place, and those above and those below correspond with it: this is called THE TAMING POWER OF THE SMALL."*
Subtle and inscrutable these Chinese. The Book of Changes is thought to have taken shape in the centuries before Confucius and is basic to Chinese culture and habits of mind. China will play to its own advantages, which are considerable, when it can, while accommodating US advantages where it must.
For now probably advantage China. They have the currency reserves, a growing economy and the ability to conduct foreign policy strategically, even if they play by US rules. Meanwhile the USA is run by a cabal of pirates and is constrained to act and react according to the short term needs of that constituency. The Chinese undoubtedly think us to be barbaric fools, even if dangerous and powerful fools.
Time will tell just how valuable our military power is in this relationship. But we cannot readily use it to immediately get whatever we want. Most frustrating.
*From the Wilhelm/Baynes translation, Princeton, 1961 As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
the WestTM plays chess...
With friends like Fox And Friends and the American Petroleum Institute ... who needs external enemies?
Seriously, if war is politics by other means, then the question if whether "America can survive a conflict with anyone" is a massive non sequiter when it seems increasingly plausible that American cannot survive business as usual, with the ongoing destruction of our industrial capacity and pillaging of our natural resources as thorough as any foreign occupier ever could aspire to accomplish. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Except not, because the US does not have any capital plant left that's worth shit, outside the armaments industry.
That's not quite true. US industry is employing less and less, and has abandoned some sectors, but its output has never been higher, when measured in the value of the goods produced. I'm not sure it would be so hard to rebuild, if a war-type effort were put into it. Wind power
