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EFSF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT (pdf):
11. TERM AND LIQUIDATION OF EFSF ... (2) The euro-area Member States undertake that they shall liquidate EFSF in accordance with its Articles of Association on the earliest date after 30 June 2013 on which there are no longer Loans outstanding to a euro-area Member State and all Funding Instruments issued by EFSF and any reimbursement amounts due to Guarantors have been repaid in full.
...
(2) The euro-area Member States undertake that they shall liquidate EFSF in accordance with its Articles of Association on the earliest date after 30 June 2013 on which there are no longer Loans outstanding to a euro-area Member State and all Funding Instruments issued by EFSF and any reimbursement amounts due to Guarantors have been repaid in full.
I failed to find the actual Deauville Declaration on the government site, but here is a copy of the German version, and here is the French Presidential office's English translation. The relevant part:
The amendment of the Treaties will be restricted to the following issues: * The establishment of a permanent and robust framework to ensure orderly crisis management in the future, providing the necessary arrangements for an adequate participation of private creditors and allowing Member States to take appropriate coordinated measures to safeguard financial stability of the Euro area as a whole.
* The establishment of a permanent and robust framework to ensure orderly crisis management in the future, providing the necessary arrangements for an adequate participation of private creditors and allowing Member States to take appropriate coordinated measures to safeguard financial stability of the Euro area as a whole.
On the German government site, there is a copy of an op-ed for Handelsblatt by an advisor of the financial ministry (Schäuble), which comments the issue thusly:
This was not merely about early rollover but participation in a default, and an apparently mandatory one. So I would conclude that Merkel's March 2011 comments were probably motivated by the financial sphere's negative reaction to the Deauville proposal, saying "don't be scared, me and Sarko only proposed this for after 2013". *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The insolvency relates only to the servicing of public debt, not to other government activities, and does not include the selling off of state assets.
...oh was that long ago... *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
March? Merkel's position since October has been no losses for private bondholders before 2013
Germany's Angela Merkel, by contrast, pushed ahead with her plan to set in concrete the principle that government bondholders should be prepared post-2013 to suffer losses if a government can't pay its bills. She got her way and EU governments this month backed the principle as part of a future financial-rescue regime. Do note, however, that even conservative Angela Merkel kicked the can down the road a couple of years like any run of the mill politician is likely to do. Even so, Ms. Merkel's decision to be explicit about the possibility of future bondholder losses spooked the markets. There, a little more ambiguity might have been a good thing. Usually markets tend to like certainty but it is apparent that bondholders of sovereign debt dislike the certainty that in the future they will have to share in losses due to governments having a solvency problem and restructuring, really defaulting, on government bonds.
Even so, Ms. Merkel's decision to be explicit about the possibility of future bondholder losses spooked the markets. There, a little more ambiguity might have been a good thing. Usually markets tend to like certainty but it is apparent that bondholders of sovereign debt dislike the certainty that in the future they will have to share in losses due to governments having a solvency problem and restructuring, really defaulting, on government bonds.
For October, that's interpretation, for March, it's explicit. (And before Merkel and Sarko brought that proposal in, there was no one proposing it for any time including after the ESFS, either.)
Either way, there is no contradiction between the Schäuble proposal and either the Deauville Declaration or Merkel's March 2011 promise that I can see, and all of them seem motivated by appeasing the don't-spend-our-precious-tax-euros members of the own camp. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
why would a sane bond-holder accept a "voluntary" bailin?
The Nonsense of purely voluntary Bail-ins
A purely voluntary maintenance of exposure at current market rates would make the sovereign's debt even more unsustainable and, in time, will ensure a default on the new bonds. The only way to prevent the coupon/yield on the new bonds from being close to market rates and thus unsustainable would be to provide the new bonds with seniority or some collateral; but both options are undesirable as a rollover is not a case of "debtor-in-possession" financing and thus doesn't justify such credit sweeteners. If, instead the rollover occurs at original coupon or well below market rates, so as to provide Greece with some debt relief, the rollover option is not purely voluntary and has coercive elements; thus, it is not different in any substantial way from the orderly debt restructuring, or reprofiling, that the ECB and other official sector folks so vehemently oppose.
A purely voluntary maintenance of exposure at current market rates would make the sovereign's debt even more unsustainable and, in time, will ensure a default on the new bonds. The only way to prevent the coupon/yield on the new bonds from being close to market rates and thus unsustainable would be to provide the new bonds with seniority or some collateral; but both options are undesirable as a rollover is not a case of "debtor-in-possession" financing and thus doesn't justify such credit sweeteners.
If, instead the rollover occurs at original coupon or well below market rates, so as to provide Greece with some debt relief, the rollover option is not purely voluntary and has coercive elements; thus, it is not different in any substantial way from the orderly debt restructuring, or reprofiling, that the ECB and other official sector folks so vehemently oppose.
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