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The Eurozone rules, enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty (now part of the Lisbon Treaty), explicitly bar the ECB from giving credit to public entities or buying their bonds. This, quite simply, means the Eurozone member states now operate as local/regional governments under them used to. Lacking funding from a supranational entity since the European Union does not have its own fiscal resources, all states can rely on is their own tax income and they must run balanced budgets like a private firm or a local government in order to retain access to private credit. In the Eurozone, therefore, the State must be run like a private firm. What used to be a political slogan is now the only way to function consistently with the institutional framework. Even the Social Democrats admit it and propagate it.
But as usual your linked blog post (very self-referential) is off topic.
The ECB is a part of the european government; but hardly the only one. There is the commission, the parliament, the council, the court. The ECB is not even the most powerful part: The council is equal in power, the court more powerful.
So if the EU is sovereign and I think it is, the ECB is one aspect of it. Not more or less.
And in fact, the ECB has on several occasions over the past year threatened to crash the banking systems of entire countries as a way to get neoliberal shock-doctrine reform packages implemented.
But don't take my word for it, just read Stiglitz's latest piece:
The discussions before the crisis illustrated how little had been done to repair economic fundamentals. The European Central Bank's vehement opposition to what is essential to all capitalist economies - the restructuring of failed or insolvent entities' debt - is evidence of the continuing fragility of the Western banking system. The ECB argued that taxpayers should pick up the entire tab for Greece's bad sovereign debt, for fear that any private-sector involvement (PSI) would trigger a "credit event," which would force large payouts on credit-default swaps (CDSs), possibly fueling further financial turmoil. But, if that is a real fear for the ECB - if it is not merely acting on behalf of private lenders - surely it should have demanded that the banks have more capital. ... Indeed, the most curious aspect of the ECB's position was its threat not to accept restructured government bonds as collateral if the ratings agencies decided that the restructuring should be classified as a credit event. The whole point of restructuring was to discharge debt and make the remainder more manageable. If the bonds were acceptable as collateral before the restructuring, surely they were safer after the restructuring, and thus equally acceptable. This episode serves as a reminder that central banks are political institutions, with a political agenda, and that independent central banks tend to be captured (at least "cognitively") by the banks that they are supposed to regulate.
The ECB argued that taxpayers should pick up the entire tab for Greece's bad sovereign debt, for fear that any private-sector involvement (PSI) would trigger a "credit event," which would force large payouts on credit-default swaps (CDSs), possibly fueling further financial turmoil. But, if that is a real fear for the ECB - if it is not merely acting on behalf of private lenders - surely it should have demanded that the banks have more capital.
...
Indeed, the most curious aspect of the ECB's position was its threat not to accept restructured government bonds as collateral if the ratings agencies decided that the restructuring should be classified as a credit event. The whole point of restructuring was to discharge debt and make the remainder more manageable. If the bonds were acceptable as collateral before the restructuring, surely they were safer after the restructuring, and thus equally acceptable.
This episode serves as a reminder that central banks are political institutions, with a political agenda, and that independent central banks tend to be captured (at least "cognitively") by the banks that they are supposed to regulate.
The ECB is not subject to oversight from either. Another piece of obvious and manifest insanity that was instituted at the insistence of Helmut Kohl and the BuBa.
- Jake Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.
And of course in any legal conflict about the powers of the ECB the court would decide. Don't know if you can call it oversight in a strict sense.
And the ECBuBa isn't subject to any meaningful oversight from any court of law. Central bank "independence," remember? Will you at least concede that this is a stupid doctrine that needs to be killed dead and exorcised with garlic and holy water?
Sure, if Trichet commits embezzlement or rapes his secretary, he might be prosecuted (or maybe not - bankers have done worse and walked away in recent times). That does not mean that the courts can in any meaningful way provide oversight and policy direction to the ECBuBa (nor should they - that should be Parliament's job, through the Commission).
Of course they are. Who do you think constitutes the council?
But you got me there: The executive board is indeed appointed by the council, not the governments. They even use qualified majority voting. (I was thinking of the way the commission and court are appointed)
The rest of the governing council is indeed appointed by national governments, namely the heads of the central banks.
And who can determine the personal of another institution has power over that institution.
And if the ECB is ever in a legal dispute, the European Court of Justice will decide. The court is probably the most powerful european institution and if you don't even know this, you have no business commenting on the EU.
Again: Will you at least grant that central bank independence is an idiotic doctrine and that the bank should be directly subservient to the Commission, just like every other EU civil service?
b) will you at least grant that the ECB is the ECB and not the Bundesbank?
c) will you at least admit that the national governments and the council determine the composition of the governing council of the ECB? Giving the federal republic about as much influence as larger german state had on the Bundesbank?
a) will you at least grant that the court is more powerful
In most policy areas, yes. In economic policy, which is, after all, the area presently under discussion, no. There is no substantial judicial review of ECB policy decisions.
De jure, certainly. De facto, I cannot point to a single material difference in policy before the past few days.
c) will you at least admit that the national governments and the council determine the composition of the governing council of the ECB?
Obviously, yes.
Giving the federal republic about as much influence as larger german state had on the Bundesbank?
a) That does not follow from the composition of the board.
b) The BuBa always was a state-within-the-state in Germany, so pointing out that the German government fails to control the BuBa representatives to the ECB board hardly proves that the BuBa is not still a cancerous state-within-the-state.
Now, do you or do you not believe that inflation targeting and central bank independence are moronic policies? Do you or do you not believe that states should be forced to pay interest on their own currency? I'd really like to know if we're even speaking the same language here.
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