I suspect there is also quite a lot of volatility in those numbers given that polling in Greece also suggests that "Don't know" or "Nobody" are polling, between them, in the 30% range.
Given Papademos is losing legitimacy as quickly as ipecac syrup tends to have one lose one's cookies (and the metaphor seems to me to be apt), what do the facts on the ground in Greece portend for a democratic rejection of the IMF and the EU? Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
Greece is now screwed if it defaults, and screwed if it doesn't.
Either way we'll see parents selling their kids into care more and more frequently now - followed by similar stories from the other southern economies, then the Atlantic ones, then Germany.
Oh yeah? What exactly are we talking about, and how is it worse than the alternative? That is the question I'm not seeign asked or answered.
That's why I'm asking. Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
here's a taste of an excellent article which documents and explains a lot.
Peak Money Arrives | The Agonist
MF Global had made a very large bet on European government bonds, and didn't want to be restricted by the US limits on re-hypothecation, so it notified its customers that it was transferring their accounts to MF Global's subsidiary in London, since England has no limits on re-hypothecation. This meant a single customer account could be pledged as collateral multiple times to different banks. MF Global did not notify its customers that it intended to use their margin as its own collateral for its own trading activity. The result was that MF Global was able to use customer margin multiple times with different bank lenders. This is the practice of using leverage to boost a firm's profits, but leverage also increases a firm's vulnerability to market losses. MF Global may have taken $1.2 billion in customer margin and pledged it as collateral to five different lenders, allowing it to create a position in European government bonds worth $5.0 billion. When these bonds sunk in value on the markets, the lenders watched their margin cushion shrink to the point where contractually they had to call for more margin from MF Global. At first MF Global was able to comply, but when five lenders are seeking more collateral from a firm that has little cash cushion in the first place, and when losses on the bond positions are mounting, a mad scramble takes place among the banks to seize whatever assets MF Global has, at the same time liquidating their trading positions to prevent any further losses. Some lucky banks may have been holding on to the margin accounts that MF Global controlled (MF Global was not a bank and so could not itself maintain margin deposits). These banks might have requested permission to seize the margin accounts, or they may be done so unilaterally and risked the consequences afterward (the party holding on to cash in a bankruptcy is always in a superior position). However it happened, thousands of individual investors were absolute pawns in a brutal game of self-protection played by the big banks.
MF Global had made a very large bet on European government bonds, and didn't want to be restricted by the US limits on re-hypothecation, so it notified its customers that it was transferring their accounts to MF Global's subsidiary in London, since England has no limits on re-hypothecation. This meant a single customer account could be pledged as collateral multiple times to different banks. MF Global did not notify its customers that it intended to use their margin as its own collateral for its own trading activity.
The result was that MF Global was able to use customer margin multiple times with different bank lenders. This is the practice of using leverage to boost a firm's profits, but leverage also increases a firm's vulnerability to market losses. MF Global may have taken $1.2 billion in customer margin and pledged it as collateral to five different lenders, allowing it to create a position in European government bonds worth $5.0 billion. When these bonds sunk in value on the markets, the lenders watched their margin cushion shrink to the point where contractually they had to call for more margin from MF Global. At first MF Global was able to comply, but when five lenders are seeking more collateral from a firm that has little cash cushion in the first place, and when losses on the bond positions are mounting, a mad scramble takes place among the banks to seize whatever assets MF Global has, at the same time liquidating their trading positions to prevent any further losses.
Some lucky banks may have been holding on to the margin accounts that MF Global controlled (MF Global was not a bank and so could not itself maintain margin deposits). These banks might have requested permission to seize the margin accounts, or they may be done so unilaterally and risked the consequences afterward (the party holding on to cash in a bankruptcy is always in a superior position). However it happened, thousands of individual investors were absolute pawns in a brutal game of self-protection played by the big banks.
read the rest, it's all connected... ~"When an inner situation is not made conscious, it appears outside as fate." Karl Jung~
there should be some punishment less, um, final than that which would serve as an equally powerful deterrent.
right now it's the opposite... ~"When an inner situation is not made conscious, it appears outside as fate." Karl Jung~
Greece is not Iceland, and the Greek people never got the chance to tell the money to fuck off.
So there will be some kind of no-default-then-default spasm, which won't be the clean break it needs to be.
If Greece leaves the Euro zone - or leaves Europe - expect something beyond the usual IMF riots, followed by something even less democratic than the 'technocratic' non-democracy in place at the moment.
So, do something else. :-)
Some actions that are immediately obvious, to readers of ET - (and probably nobody else):
Problem is Greek has been running a Current Account deficit for years ... if not decades. "Tallies," being internal to the Greek economy, can only go so far as a means of exchange for imported (external) goods and services. From what I can gather, the Greek macro-economy imports ~$69 billion worth of 'stuff' more than what it exports; a large percent of that being oil. (How much? Don't know.)
BUT ... in theory ... "Tallies" used for alternative energy infra-structure build would lower oil imports by shifting electrical energy production from oil to wind, say. Further, "Tallies" thrown into a electricity powered mass-transit build (trains, trams, etc.) in Athens and simultaneously increasing taxation on gasoline and diesel fuels (paid in "Tallies") would affect, in some way, the necessity for importing oil.
I note Greece is dependent on Tourism so a government run and favorable exchange rate for euros to "Tallies" might prove helpful for accumulating hard-currency (sic).
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
1. The only party calling for a united left front is SYRIZA, and they have already started cooperating with various left factions that have abandoned the Socialists when they brought in the IMF, on both a grassroots and a central level. The Communist Party however (without which as the numbers stand today there can't be a left government) is adamant about not collaborating with the reformists who want to beautify capitalism (I kid you not), and are rejecting any collaboration with SYRIZA even at a grass roots level. If that doesn't make sense to you, its because it doesn't make sense generally. This is a party that organizes its own separate demonstrations even when protesting the Israeli bombardment of Gaza. It recently attacked the Communist Party of Spain as being capitalist tools for participating in IU and the Party of the European Left. The only thing that might change their mind is massive pressure from their base, which, though happening at some level, hasn't been strong enough to move them yet. The Democratic Left meanwhile seems more interested in talking with PASOK cadres and ministers than with their former comrades. It remains temperately anti-troika and anti-austerity, though it is much more likely to compromise with the powers that be, than form a part of a left-radical solution. 2. Even if the issue of collaboration between the left in Greece was somehow resolved (either by the strengthening of one pole, or the popular pressure on all of them), it is not at all a given that elections would not be postponed. The current parliament has been elected for 4 years, until autumn 2013 that is, and despite the conservatives having made a deal that elections will be held March-April at the latest, most of the elites don't like the idea and the conservatives themselves might have a change of heart should they begin to have doubts that they will be the first party come election day. In that case I can easily imagine some sort of "emergency" producing an agreement between the three coalition partners (socialists, conservatives and the far-right) to postpone the expiration of the Papadimos government until the end of the parliamentary period, late 2013, and beyond. The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom - William Blake
If that doesn't make sense to you, its because it doesn't make sense generally.
I makes sense in a certain communist tradition - things has to get worse for the revolution to appear as it was promised by Marx, his apostel Engels and the holy spirit of the working class! A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
I do hope things turn out well. Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
