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A test case, a guinea pig, because it is obvious that in one form or another this austeritarian disaster will be unleashed around the EU, and the core should not feel safe from harm. Already labor conditions and real wages in the EU southern periphery are converging downwards towards the poorest members of the union.
Not the Germans fault, isnt it ?I pretty sure German taxpayers know a better use for their hard earned money at home.
I am pretty sure that noone in europe enjoy the situation and all would have preferred not to exist.
So yeah, it really is the Germans' fault.
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
but you re right they should not be using the same currency as Germany/France, few others countries are in the same situation, I guess it will be sorted out soon by shrinking the Eurozone.
Query: who do they all export to?
If you don't like that, then you don't like the common currency.
Voila, problem solved.
The other periphery countries had their finances screwed as a result of the crisis, due to lower revenue, higher social costs (that is, good contra-cyclical policy) or retarded bank rescues (Ireland).
Greece is at a greater fault than Italy, Spain etc. But I'm not defending the ECB for a second. I argued Greece should default back in 2008, and I haven't changed my mind. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
I'm talking about simple rules of addition and subtraction telling you that if you make like the Spanish and run a public sector surplus in the face of an external deficit, you are pushing your private sector into a messy default.
I'm still not clear on how that's a more responsible sort of thing to do than to run a public sector deficit and then repudiate the public debt in an orderly manner.
public defaults do not lead to liquidation sprees that destroy extant capital equipment.
But ex ante it is not obvious that inflating a housing bubble and then popping it is less painful for the common Spaniard than selling bogus Spanish government bonds to German banks and then telling them to fuck off and die when they come to collect.
My point was that if you had been Senate and People of Spain in 2001 and, for some reason that defies rational comprehension, decided to hitch your wagon to the Eurozone, would it be better for the Spanish people to accommodate German mercantilism by blowing a real estate bubble (as they in fact did) or by selling bogus government bonds (as Greece did)?
My point is that that choice is far from clear-cut in 2001.
In 2012, after the fact, it's obvious what should be done. But also totally irrelevant to the discussion I was commenting on.
Incidentally, there was a recent op-ed in El Pais that's related to that: La gente que pagará esta reforma laboral (XAVIER VIDAL-FOLCH 16 FEB 2012)
Desde hace decenios existía en España un consenso básico, casi tácito, en que había que superar el modelo económico basado en salarios bajos y mediocre tecnología, que se reputaba propio de los países menos desarrollados. Pero la Agenda 2010 del canciller Schröder reverdeció una competitividad alemana basada en reducir costes al factor trabajo. De forma que si los vecinos, y entre ellos los más exitosos, optaban por ello, quizá había que volver a las (cutres) andadas del modelo español. No es así: con esta reforma estamos tomando solo en parte, en la parte más dura para los trabajadores (la reducción del coste del despido, por ejemplo), las recetas alemanas. Pero no las partes más blandas: allá se exige el permiso de la autoridad a los despidos colectivos; prosiguen intactos los mecanismos de cogestión en la empresa; existe una auténtica política activa de empleo / recolocación. Y sobre todo, se emplea a mansalva el kurzarbeit, o reducción temporal de la jornada laboral cuando disminuyen los pedidos, copagada por la empresa y el Estado: este es el mecanismo que salva a Alemania del paro --más que los minijobs-- y del que el decreto-ley realiza una ruda caricatura: descuento de la cuota de la Seguridad Social y pequeña compensación del seguro de desempleo, no real copago.
No es así: con esta reforma estamos tomando solo en parte, en la parte más dura para los trabajadores (la reducción del coste del despido, por ejemplo), las recetas alemanas. Pero no las partes más blandas: allá se exige el permiso de la autoridad a los despidos colectivos; prosiguen intactos los mecanismos de cogestión en la empresa; existe una auténtica política activa de empleo / recolocación.
Y sobre todo, se emplea a mansalva el kurzarbeit, o reducción temporal de la jornada laboral cuando disminuyen los pedidos, copagada por la empresa y el Estado: este es el mecanismo que salva a Alemania del paro --más que los minijobs-- y del que el decreto-ley realiza una ruda caricatura: descuento de la cuota de la Seguridad Social y pequeña compensación del seguro de desempleo, no real copago.
For decades there was in Spain a basic, almost tacit, consensus, that the economic model based on low wages and mediocre technology had to be overcome, as it was reputed to be characteristic of less developed countries. But Chancellor Schroeder's Agenda 2010 gave new life to a German competitiveness based on reducing the cost of the labour factor. Thus if our neighbours, and among them the most successful, took that option, maybe it was time to go back to the (shoddy) old ways of the Spanish model.
That's not the case: with this reform we're taking only in part, in the part that's harder on the workers (the reduction of the cost of layoffs, for instance), the German recipes. But not the softer parts: there, the authorisation of the authorities is required for collective layoffs [no longer the case in Spain]; the co-management mechanisms [union involvement] remain untouched; there is a true active employment/retraining policy. And, above all, there is massive use of the kurzarbeit, or temporary reduction of the workday when orders fall, copayed by the firm and the State: this is the mechanism that saves Germany from unemployment --more so than the minijobs-- and which the [labour reform] legislative decree roughly caricatures: a discount on the Social Security contributions and a small compensation from unemployment insurance, not a real copayment.
And, above all, there is massive use of the kurzarbeit, or temporary reduction of the workday when orders fall, copayed by the firm and the State: this is the mechanism that saves Germany from unemployment --more so than the minijobs-- and which the [labour reform] legislative decree roughly caricatures: a discount on the Social Security contributions and a small compensation from unemployment insurance, not a real copayment.
Purple: company profits Orange: wages of salaried workers
That's not going to improve "competitiveness" but it's definitely not the fault of the wages as the aggregate wage bill has dropped maybe 2% per annum over the past 3 years. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
But of course in your world everything is the germans fault.
Germany opposed any effort to work towards an EU-wide bank resolution scheme when the shit hit the fan in late 2008.
Germany opposed fiscal stimulus as the G20 in 2009 on the grounds that "automatic stabilizers were sufficient" only to spearhead the destruction of the EU's welfare state and social compact when the said automatic stabilizers pushed deficits well above 3% EU-wide as they couldn't possibly fail to do in a deep recession.
Germany has for 2 years and increasingly transparently pushing a laundering a bank bailout through Greece, in the process destroying the Greek economy and making the Greek debt situation worse with each crisis "resolution" proposal.
Germany is pushing treaty reforms and policy proposals at the EU level which have nothing to do with the causes of the crisis and do nothing to resolve it.
For "Germany" read "Merkel and her government" above if you must.
Now name another country and we can go through the ways it has contributed to the crisis. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
Germany has resisted efforts by other countries to extract even more money from the German taxpayers.
It was clear from the very beginning that the Euro was not supposed a wealth transfer mechanism.
You are basiscally whining about not beeing able to steal more from us. If that's what Europe is about, this is not gonna work at all.
If Germany does not like paying for keeping the Euro, then Germany must pay its workers enough that they can import as much from other Eurozone countries as Germany wishes to export to them.
Current accounts surplus; no wealth transfer. Pick one.
You are basiscally whining about not beeing able to steal more from us.
No, you're whining about basic arithmetic:
Total exports to other countries + total wealth transfers from other countries to you = total imports from other countries + total wealth transfers to other countries.
And that's really not negotiable unless you want to abolish double-entry bookkeeping.
Everbody has his own made up economic theory to explain why the most simple tenets of bsusiness, simple addition and subtraction don't apply any more. Instead we get drowned in fuzzy make-belive mathg that explains away basic tenetes.
You work hard and live frugal, you create wealth. You have wealth.
You spend and waste and idle and don't work - you go bankrupt and die poor.
What applies to your house applies, by simple iterative logic, also to a village, a city, a nation.
Thats the simple reality. Everything else is panicking make-believe and charlatanery.
Money is not wealth. It is not even a token representing wealth.
If Germany had accumulated real physical wealth instead of money claims on other people, we wouldn't be having this problem.
Instead it accumulated money, which has no value beyond the political power it commands, and is now attempting to claim a value that it believes the money should represent.
Swabian Housewife Economics.
A house that has a suitcase full of money in its basement but no car is richer than a house that has a car but no money. A country that has a vault full of money in its vault but no factories is poorer than a country full of factories but with no money.
This should not be difficult to understand, but apparently Swabian Housewife Economists have difficulty grasping it.
So, now, we abolish trade as well?
And your proverbial Swabian Housewife does not have the money in her basement - she has it in the bank. Where she gets decent interest. Which is practically the definition of wealth.
the basis of international trade is actually the mutual agreement that money actually does represent value, and thus, wealth.
No, the basis of international trade is comparative advantage. International trade does not require that money retain its purchasing power any longer than it takes the exporter to exchange his foreign currency with the importer's domestic currency.
For the purposes of foreign trade, you only need money to retain its value for longer than that if you want to run an aggregate current accounts surplus. Which your trading partners have no particular obligation to support or encourage.
Running a trade surplus is a form of industrial subsidy. Other people don't have any obligation to pay your industrial subsidies.
And your proverbial Swabian Housewife does not have the money in her basement - she has it in the bank. Where she gets decent interest.
In other words, the state pays her a subsidy for doing fuck all with her money. That policy creates no wealth. Not a single meter of railway is built because she has money in the bank. Not a single ball bearing is cast because she has money in the bank. Not a single ship is launched because she has money in the bank. Money in the bank has, quite literally, no economic function until it is spent.
Tell me again why money in the bank should pay interest at all?
That money in the bank is money the bank does lend to someone who needs money to create wealth. Economy needs credit.
And comparative advantage doesn't create trade any more than gravity creates rivers. Yes, it is a necessary precondition, but in real life, without money there is only very very limited trade actually happening.
Money is the abstraction of wealth and value, and a great facilitator for every kind of economics.
Denying money's existence or value is a sure sign of crackpot economics.
That money in the bank is money the bank does lend to someone
Loanable funds fallacy.
In the real world, banks create credit when someone borrows from them. They then turn around and get the central bank to sign off on that credit, thus turning it into legal tender.
There is no reason, save atavistic tradition, to even house deposit-taking and lending in the same institution.
Money is an abstract representation of state power. An important point of being a sovereign state is that you reserve the right to revoke this power from foreign parties (either through strategic default or inflation) arbitrarily and without notice.
That's what "sovereignty" means: That you reserve the right to revoke political commitments to foreign entities.
The very first example from the above wiki link:
In Keynesian macroeconomics, the "paradox of thrift" theory illustrates this fallacy: increasing saving (or "thrift") is obviously good for an individual, since it provides for retirement or a "rainy day," but if everyone saves more, Keynesian economists argue that it may cause a recession by reducing consumer demand. Other economic schools, such as the Austrian School, disagree.[
Insofar as economics is a scientific endeavor, therefore, Austrian moral theology does not qualify.
Like, as I've argued several times earlier, channeling all that surplus cash into buying out ENI, Iberdrola, Santander, UniCredit, all the Greek shipping companies et cetera et cetera. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
What applies to the finances in your house, village, and city does not apply to a nation, because the nation prints its own currency. It is a completely different situation, as is explained in tedious detail to thousands of college freshmen every year.
In fact, not even the Eurozone as a whole prints its own currency, because each Euro in existence is the result of the ECB president shitting a gold ingot. The Euro gold hoard is kept in Frankfurt by the Nibelungen. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
That is the most evidence-free statement about wealth I have ever heard. I know plenty, and I mean plenty of people who did exactly that and are now subsisting on 400 Euro pensions. This sort of way to create wealth, in the real world, is so rare as to be irrelevant. If you want to have wealth you inherit it, or steal it from someone, or set up fancy con-artist schemes such as Nth order derivatives etc. I mean take the Fortune 500 list of the wealthiest people on the planet, and see how many of those fit your description The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom - William Blake
Of course not. You may create wealth to markets, but there is no guarantee, that the market returns you the wealth you created. You may i.e. pay all your surplus to a landlord.
Or something. It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II
If German workers got paid enough to keep Germanys trade balanced, they could afford more holidays in Greece and the workers in Greece could then afford more industrial goods from Germany. Instead we get Harz in Germany to push wages (though they call it inflation) down and slaughter of jobs, wages and rights for workers in Greece. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
Can you explain?
And in fact, unit labour costs in Germany have fallen in relation to those of other eurozone countries since the implementation of Hartz IV.
When you have an agreement to keep exchange rates pegged to each other, each side should be responsible from defending its own currency from appreciation, because trying to defend your own currency from depreciation is an untenable position. This is because you can always print more of your own currency to buy foreign currency, thereby devaluing your currency ("defending your currency from appreciation") but you cannot always buy your own currency with your foreign currency reserves, thereby increasing the value of your currency ("defending your currency from depreciation"). The recently established one-sided bound on the Swiss Franc's exchange rate is an example of this - the Swiss bound is unassailable if the Swiss Central Bank chooses to defend it. It will never run out of reserves, rather it will accumulate reserves, trying to enforce its stated policy.
Bundesbank refusal to hold its end of a stable exchange rate deal (granted: nobody made it explicit that it was everyone's obligation to defend their own currency from appreciation) ejected the Pound and the Lira form the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 20 years ago. The EU should have recognised that this made stable exchange rates within it unsustainable and stopped pursuing them as a policy goal. The Euro project should have been abandoned by the French side. Unfortunately for us all, the Bundesbank did defend the DM from appreciation when it looked like it was the French Franc that would be ejected next.
Therefore, contra your claim I quote at the start, the Euro is a huge wealth transfer mechanism towards intra-EU net exporters (notably Germany, but also the Netherlands and Finland) because it put all the economic burden of the fixed exchange rate regime on the shoulders of the deficit countries (which would naturally see their currency depreciate if if were allowed to float).
Keynes recognised that devaluation, deteriorating terms of trade and indebtedness are in themselves a penalty that deficit countries have to pay, so at Bretton Woods he proposed that, in order to restore a sustainable fixed-exchange-rate system (then the Gold Standard) this system would have to impose some sort of penalty on surplus countries. The US, then the world's exporter of last resort, "took the position of absolutely no". This is typical of exporters of last resort in international trade crises (see China and Germany at the G20 in 2009). tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
So the case you describe should just not happen because all countries run the same deficits.
Current accounts is the surplus/deficit that actually matters. This pathological obsession with inflation, government bonds and government spending is an Austrian-school cargo cult, not any form of economics conventionally recognised in the social sciences.
You cannot legislate recessions deeper than 3% out of existence. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
I would be very careful about using the term "steal" in the context of Greco-German relationships. First of all Greece was among the countries that helped German recover in the 1953 debt settlement (without which Germany would never have gotten back on its feet), and also Germany has never repaid back the forced loan that the Nazi occupation forces forced on the Bank of Greece, taking pretty much all of the gold in its treasury. The loot was kept by the FRG without repayment, pending reunification. After reunification it became "old history". This is not about war reparations (a separate matter) but about an actual debt, never repaid but never forgiven also by the Greek state. At this stage of Greco-German relations it is a sure bet that the (quite defendable legally I'm told) loan claims will be put on the table by the successor gvt, especially if it is of the left. The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom - William Blake
It isn't "other countries" that "extract wealth" from the German taxpayer. It's European (and prominently German) banks.
<Theo Weigels' merry men wrote the 3-percent deficit limit into the Maastricht Treaty.>
No. They proposed it; and 1< other governments accepted it. What about their agency?
<Germany opposed any effort to work towards an EU-wide bank resolution scheme when the shit hit the fan in late 2008.>
Now you are just making things up. There was no effort to work toward a EU-Wide resolution scheme. Every country - and that was the problem - acted for themselves. As usual the main culprit and trigger were the Irish with their idiotic blanket guarantee.
> Germany opposed fiscal stimulus as the G20 in 2009 on the grounds that "automatic stabilizers were sufficient" only to spearhead the destruction of the EU's welfare state and social compact when the said automatic stabilizers pushed deficits well above 3% EU-wide as they couldn't possibly fail to do in a deep recession.>
That is a bit dubious history. In July 2009, when the summit happened, in Germany the stimulus was already enacted at about 1.6% of gdp in 2009. That was not really then the stimulus in the US, not to talk of the other G8 countries. And the argument that countries with big automatic stabilizers like Germany need a smaller explicit stimulus is at least plausible.
<Germany has for 2 years and increasingly transparently pushing a laundering a bank bailout through Greece, in the process destroying the Greek economy and making the Greek debt situation worse with each crisis "resolution" proposal.>
You mean Germany and the other EU-countries, I hope. And the greek economy was hardly in a healthy state in 2009. There was and in same sense is a global crisis starting in 2008, even if you like to pretend it isn't.
>Germany is pushing treaty reforms and policy proposals at the EU level which have nothing to do with the causes of the crisis and do nothing to resolve it.>
True. Neoliberalism in action. Is e. g. Rajoy any different? Most of europe is governed by right.wingers. What do you expect?
>For "Germany" read "Merkel and her government" above if you must.<
No, that would misconstrue your argument: You don't mean Merkel, you don't mean right-wing policies, you mean Germany, going back to at least Waigel. But probably you think that the root of this ancient conspiracy goes back to when Helmut Schmidt duped Giscard d'Estaing into a common european currency.
<Theo Weigels' merry men wrote the 3-percent deficit limit into the Maastricht Treaty.> No. They proposed it; and 1< other governments accepted it. What about their agency?
In most ethical systems, the quack and the con-man is held to a higher standard of foresight than his marks.
> Germany opposed fiscal stimulus as the G20 in 2009 on the grounds that "automatic stabilizers were sufficient" only to spearhead the destruction of the EU's welfare state and social compact when the said automatic stabilizers pushed deficits well above 3% EU-wide as they couldn't possibly fail to do in a deep recession.> That is a bit dubious history. In July 2009, when the summit happened, in Germany the stimulus was already enacted at about 1.6% of gdp in 2009.
Which is chickenshit compared to the magnitude of money printing needed to restore private sector solvency.
That was not really then the stimulus in the US, not to talk of the other G8 countries. And the argument that countries with big automatic stabilizers like Germany need a smaller explicit stimulus is at least plausible.
Only if you do not then proceed to destroy those automatic stabilisers when they start working.
<Germany has for 2 years and increasingly transparently pushing a laundering a bank bailout through Greece, in the process destroying the Greek economy and making the Greek debt situation worse with each crisis "resolution" proposal.> You mean Germany and the other EU-countries, I hope.
No, Germany and France.
If you start holding mini-summits with Merkozy and presenting their conclusions as fait accomplis that Germany will not deviate from, then Germany and France are to blame for EU policy.
And France will get its comeuppance soon enough, so again we're back to the problem of con-men and marks.
And the greek economy was hardly in a healthy state in 2009.
Irrelevant when the German response was to do everything in its power to make the crisis worse.
There was and in same sense is a global crisis starting in 2008, even if you like to pretend it isn't.
Irrelevant to the Eurozone. The Eurozone would have been fully capable of burying the crisis in newly printed money if the Bundesbank assholes and Frau Merkel and her merry band of Swabian Housewife Economists had not pitched a hissy fit every time an actual workable solution was proposed.
You don't mean Merkel, you don't mean right-wing policies, you mean Germany, going back to at least Waigel.
Germany has been consistently conducting right-wing policy at least since Weigel. So, yeah.
But probably you think that the root of this ancient conspiracy goes back to when Helmut Schmidt duped Giscard d'Estaing into a common european currency.
No, it goes back to when Schmidt duped d'Estaing into accepting that the Bundesbank's Lysenkoist economic theology was used as a foundation for that common currency.
That is just nonsense. Your picture of an europe where all other countries are not only powerless but not even able to understand what they sign is a fairy tale.
>Which is chickenshit compared to the magnitude of money printing needed to restore private sector solvency.<
And that is shifting the goalposts. Tgere was a very considerable fiscal stimulus in Germany, perhaps the biggest in the G8.
<Only if you do not then proceed to destroy those automatic stabilisers when they start working.<<p> The automatic stabilizers in Germany are unchanged.
>No, Germany and France.
And France will get its comeuppance soon enough, so again we're back to the problem of con-men and marks.<
What about the Netherlands or Finland? or Luxemburg? All german puppets? Once again, you are denying the agency of all other EU countries.
<Irrelevant when the German response was to do everything in its power to make the crisis worse.>
And here you are denying the agency of all other members of the governing council. Was Trichet a stealth keynesian or what? And neither the fed nor the BoE was able or perhaps willing to bury their great recession. Do want to blame Merkel or the "Bundesbank" for that result, too?
>Germany has been consistently conducting right-wing policy at least since Weigel. So, yeah.
No, it goes back to when Schmidt duped d'Estaing into accepting that the Bundesbank's Lysenkoist economic theology was used as a foundation for that common currency.<
And I thought I was joking. You really think everything is a german conspiracy. Have you worked in templars and jesuits yet?
As a matter of fact, given the quality of public debate, this is exactly what happened.
It is apparently a matter of national pride that Spain "will be in the core Euro" (that's just laughable given the fundamentals, in the case of France it's equally wrongheaded but at least borderline), just like it was a matter of national pride to get into the Euro in 1999. A lot of it must have had to do with "showing those Germans and Dutch" (do you remember the rhetoric of the late 1990s about undeserving Southerners? Not that different from Rutte's and de Jager's this past year)
Another example, when in late 2008 there were discussions about having a G20 there was a huge brouhaha in Spain about whether Spain would have a seat at the table or not. It was all about national pride again. There was not a single discussion of what it was that Spain wanted to say from that seat, if it got it (which it did, and we apparently had Sarkozy to thank for that, or something).
I mean, European politics is at the level of a nursery school playground.
In addition, as I have pointed out repeatedly, there is an issue of "European inadequacy complex" on the part of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which were kept out of the European Communities on account of, first, underdevelopment and then, until the mid-1970s, because they were dictatorships. Presumably Italy got in early because of its industrial North, because Italians also contributed greatly to the Gastarbeiter in the 1960s like the other Mediterranean countries.
Around 1990, only the lyrical left opposed the Maastricht treaty and, boy, were they right (and for the right reasons, too). By the time 1999 rolled by, the Euro wasn't debatable in serious company. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
Do really think the quality of public debate in Germany is higher? The other european countries have professional governments, professional administrations, armies of economist, jurist etc. too. So they shuold have been as bale or unable as germany to understand what they were doing. It is not as if Germany is the only professional government in the EU facing a bunch of prt.time village councils.
>It is apparently a matter of national pride that Spain "will be in the core Euro" (that's just laughable given the fundamentals, in the case of France it's equally wrongheaded but at least borderline), just like it was a matter of national pride to get into the Euro in 1999. A lot of it must have had to do with "showing those Germans and Dutch" (do you remember the rhetoric of the late 1990s about undeserving Southerners? Not that different from Rutte's and de Jager's this past year)<
You can't blame idiotic nationalistic pride in other countries on Germany.
>Another example, when in late 2008 there were discussions about having a G20 there was a huge brouhaha in Spain about whether Spain would have a seat at the table or not. It was all about national pride again. There was not a single discussion of what it was that Spain wanted to say from that seat, if it got it (which it did, and we apparently had Sarkozy to thank for that, or something).<
Like german as working language in the EU or the eternal german quest of a permanent seat in the security council.
>In addition, as I have pointed out repeatedly, there is an issue of "European inadequacy complex" on the part of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which were kept out of the European Communities on account of, first, underdevelopment and then, until the mid-1970s, because they were dictatorships. Presumably Italy got in early because of its industrial North, because Italians also contributed greatly to the Gastarbeiter in the 1960s like the other Mediterranean countries.>
I am reasonably sure a similar complex exists in most eastern european countries.
Luckily for them, they joined the EU in 2004. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
Do really think the quality of public debate in Germany is higher?
No, but Germany is benefiting from the delusions in question.
Again: Does Scientology magically become not a pyramid scam just because the people running it happen to believe in the bullshit they're selling?
Does a homeopath suddenly become blameless for killing people through malign neglect, just because he believes that his magic water will cure their cancer?
Does Jim Jones becomes blameless for lacing his kool-aid with cyanide, just because his followers swallowed it?
If the answer to any of those questions is "no," then why the fuck should we cut Germany a break for wrecking the Eurozone?
And this makes it OK for Germany to exploit it?
Just so we're clear on that. Because if it's OK for Germany place its own narrow national interest above the interests of the European community, then it would also be OK for, say, Ireland to selectively default on only German holders of Irish government bonds.
Sauce for the goose, and all that.
Do you really want to argue that out of 27 EU-Countries only one has a national interest?
>then it would also be OK for, say, Ireland to selectively default on only German holders of Irish government bonds.<
careful here, the mask is dropping-
Also, countries have not opposed Merkel more forcefully because doing so "might be un-european" or something. In the Spring of 2010 Sarkozy reportedly (later deniedly) threatened to quit the Eurozone there and then if Germany didn't agree to a Greek bailout. Also Zapatero should have realised the "European friends" were not his friends at all, but he probably couldn't fathom it (Here is a fully sourced contemporary diary to anger you). Less than a year after that, Socrates and Zapatero even saw it fit to shun a PES summit in order not to be seen as "not playing ball" with the Eurozone powers that be.
I call this Stockholm syndrome. You may disagree. What it isn't is a rational macroeconomic policy. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
The actual policies of the european countries - as opposed to the policies you thin they should pursue - matter very much.
>You may disagree.<
Very generous.
>What it isn't is a rational macroeconomic policy.<
Have I said so?
Accusing Zapatero of being spineless and clueless is blame shifting? tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
There was a notorious "open mike" gaffe between Sevilla and Zapatero. Zapatero had made some rookie mistake in a public statement as opposition leader and Sevilla said to him "don't worry, I can teach you all you need to know in two afternoons". tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
After all,
The day after ZP won the elections on March 14, 2004, the cry of the youth on the street was Zapatero, no nos falles (Zapatero, don't let us down). [After May 15, 2011], it's Zapatero nos falla y nos reprime (Zapatero lets us down and represses us).
Patently not, as you know from my commenting here.
But what is the implication of that? That we should just accept that the body politic is stupid and stop criticising stupid policy? tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
In most ethical systems, the quack and the con-man is held to a higher standard of foresight than his marks. That is just nonsense. Your picture of an europe where all other countries are not only powerless but not even able to understand what they sign is a fairy tale.
Caveat emptor, eh?
In point of fact, they did not understand what they were signing. This is a matter of public record. Nowhere in the Eurozone was there any substantive public debate on the consequences of accession. And what sorry excuse for a debate there was adopted Lysenkoist economics wholesale.
Suppose, now, that Germany was, in fact, acting in good faith. What is the good-faith response to realising that you have proposed a system that manifestly does not work?
It is to say "oops, sorry, let's fix this." In this case, to support unconditional fiscal defence of full employment, backed by the full seigniorage power of the central bank.
Germany has not made this good-faith response to the crisis. On the contrary, Germany has been the loudest and most hysterical voice decrying any and all reasonable plans, and proposing one Rube Goldberg-esque bullshit pseudo-solution after the other in order to avoid negotiating in good faith.
The fact that Germany is not the only Eurozone country to do so does not detract from the fact that it is both the largest, the most vocal and the most extremist in insisting that others bow down before its inflation neurosis.
No. To be "considerable," it has to bear some considerable relationship to the magnitude of the problem. Defining "considerable" as "considerable relative to what the Swabian Housewife Economists at the Bundesbank would have liked," by contrast, is moving the goalposts.
What about the Netherlands or Finland? or Luxemburg?
Were they invited to the Merkozy mini-summits?
No, I thought not.
If you presidentialise the EU around Frau Merkel, then you don't get to play the victimisation card and the "but they do it too" card when people assume that Merkel is the president of Europe.
All german puppets? Once again, you are denying the agency of all other EU countries.
I am noting that under current treaty arrangements they have no power to overrule an obstructionist German position.
And neither the fed nor the BoE was able or perhaps willing to bury their great recession.
The US Fed/Treasury are doing an almost reasonable job of fighting their recession.
The BoE can't tell the Exchequer to spend more money. But it sure as Hell isn't telling the Exchequer that it can't spend more money.
The central bank and the treasury have to work together to bury a downturn in newly printed money. In the UK, it's the Tory-controlled Treasury that is obstructionist. In the Eurozone, it is the BuBa-dominated ECB that is obstructionist.
I am not postulating a German conspiracy. I am noting that Germany has been peddling toxic economic Lysenkoism to the rest of Europe for four solid decades now.
The fact that the Swabian Housewife Economists believe in the bullshit they peddle is not an excuse, any more than being a fervent believer in homeopathy is an excuse for pretending that it can cure disease. Nor is the fact that the rest of Europe believes it as well.
Among professionals that is indeed the legal principle. And the other european governments are as professional or non-professional as the the german one.
>In point of fact, they did not understand what they were signing. This is a matter of public record. Nowhere in the Eurozone was there any substantive public debate on the consequences of accession.<
But this nowhere in the eurozone includes Germany doesn't it?
>Suppose, now, that Germany was, in fact, acting in good faith. What is the good-faith response to realising that you have proposed a system that manifestly does not work?
It is to say "oops, sorry, let's fix this." In this case, to support unconditional fiscal defence of full employment, backed by the full seigniorage power of the central bank.<
Hold on. is there a single, I repeat a single european government proposing that? You see the problem?
>No. To be "considerable," it has to bear some considerable relationship to the magnitude of the problem. Defining "considerable" as "considerable relative to what the Swabian Housewife Economists at the Bundesbank would have liked," by contrast, is moving the goalposts.<
That is not what I said. Considerable compared to all other G8 countries, including the US and considerable measured in gdp.
>I am noting that under current treaty arrangements they have no power to overrule an obstructionist German position.<
Of course they can. Theres is no German veto not shared with any other Eu country. In every majority voting case, there is a possibility to out-vote Germany. And at the ECB, the center of your complaints, is is really easy to outvote two german members on the council.
>The US Fed/Treasury are doing an almost reasonable job of fighting their recession.<
Nonsense. The stimulus was much to small. But even you can't refashion republicans or moderate democrats into german agents, so you rather paint a rosy picture.
>I am not postulating a German conspiracy. I am noting that Germany has been peddling toxic economic Lysenkoism to the rest of Europe for four solid decades now.<
In other words, you are postulating a conspiracy. And I thought blaming les anglo saxons is simple minded.
>The fact that the Swabian Housewife Economists believe in the bullshit they peddle is not an excuse, any more than being a fervent believer in homeopathy is an excuse for pretending that it can cure disease. Nor is the fact that the rest of Europe believes it as well.<
But a fact; a fact you tend to ignore in preferment to your nationalistic narrative.
>I am not postulating a German conspiracy. I am noting that Germany has been peddling toxic economic Lysenkoism to the rest of Europe for four solid decades now.< In other words, you are postulating a conspiracy.
In other words, you are postulating a conspiracy.
I mean, the conventional wisdom at street level is that anything Germans say on economics must be right. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
But back in the far-aywy day of say 2004 that wasn't conventional wisdom. Back then the celtic tiger was the model.
Or Slovakia or Estonia or whatever.
Among professionals that is indeed the legal principle.
Except when it comes to government bonds, apparently. You're not allowed to tell the buyer to fuck off and die on those, are you?
It does.
Believing in fairy tales is not an excuse for murder.
And let's be perfectly fucking clear here: What Mr. Schauble is doing is murder. Clear, cold-blooded murder. Before this crisis is over, he and his friends will have murdered tens of thousands of Greeks and God only knows how many Spaniards, Irish and Italians.
Major industrial depressions are not a fucking game that you get to play over drinks in the country club.
No, I do not see any problem with attacking the most stridently insane country of the lot.
When Germany starts acting less insane than the Netherlands, I will happily begin going after the Netherlands. Until and unless that happens, however, you are making pathetic excuses.
>I am noting that under current treaty arrangements they have no power to overrule an obstructionist German position.< Of course they can. Theres is no German veto not shared with any other Eu country.
My emphasis.
See the problem here?
In every majority voting case, there is a possibility to out-vote Germany. And at the ECB, the center of your complaints, is is really easy to outvote two german members on the council.
And every time they do that, the Bundesbank immediately goes to Frankfurter Allgemeine BildZeitung and shrieks and whines about how unfair everybody is treating Germany until it stops.
>The US Fed/Treasury are doing an almost reasonable job of fighting their recession.< Nonsense. The stimulus was much to small. But even you can't refashion republicans or moderate democrats into german agents, so you rather paint a rosy picture.
The stimulus was much too small, certainly.
But I note that no American state has seen 34 % drops in government outlays, 15 % drops in nominal wages and unemployment percentages in the high 20s. Even after you strip out all the lies the Americans put in their statistics, they're still outperforming the Troika by five to ten percentage points on all important measures.
>I am not postulating a German conspiracy. I am noting that Germany has been peddling toxic economic Lysenkoism to the rest of Europe for four solid decades now.< In other words, you are postulating a conspiracy. And I thought blaming les anglo saxons is simple minded.
I am blaming the Hayekians. I am noting that Germany is the foremost peddler of the Hayekian cancer in Europe today.
As far as I understand the legal situation, it is not any different. But you don't really want to hear that, do you?
>It does.
Believing in fairy tales is not an excuse for murder.<
And hyperbole doesn't replace an argument.
>No, I do not see any problem with attacking the most stridently insane country of the lot.
When Germany starts acting less insane than the Netherlands, I will happily begin going after the Netherlands.<
Ad calendas graecas or so.
>My emphasis.
See the problem here?<
No.
>And every time they do that, the Bundesbank immediately goes to Frankfurter Allgemeine BildZeitung and shrieks and whines about how unfair everybody is treating Germany until it stops.<
But that, like the two resignations, is actually a sign of weakness and waning influence.
>The stimulus was much too small, certainly.
But I note that no American state has seen 34 % drops in government outlays, 15 % drops in nominal wages and unemployment percentages in the high 20s.<
As far as I understand the states and local governments have almost offset the federal stimulus with their balanced budgets requirements. and the resulting fiscal austerity.
Believing in fairy tales is not an excuse for murder. And hyperbole doesn't replace an argument.
The closest point of comparison to what the Troika is inflicting on Greece is Russia under Yeltsin.
That experience killed roughly 1 % of the Russian population. If Greece performs similarly, and there is no, a priori, any reason it should not, you're looking at somewhere on the order of fifty thousand preventable deaths.
Yeah, I call that murder.
As far as I understand the [US] states and local governments have almost offset the federal stimulus with their balanced budgets requirements. and the resulting fiscal austerity.
And yet they are still doing measurably better than the Troika.
In other words, the Troika confidence fairie performs worse than a placebo stimulus.
Sadly, politicians far prefer spending during bad times than they enjoy saving during good times (try to convince the Swabian housewifes that taxes must rise during good times to increase the size of the budget surplus), which is likely why Keynesians has gotten such a bad reputation. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
It is true that ideally you would attempt to deter inflation whenever this is consistent with full employment. But under a floating FX regime and absent atavistic commodity pegs, nothing about having spent yesteryear prevents you from spending this year.
Yes, spending yesteryear may have created inflation. But it makes no sense to encourage deflation today just because because there was inflation yesterday. For the same reason it makes no sense to shoot a man in the back after he has been shot in the front, on the theory that "the average bullet velocity through his chest will be zero."
> Germany opposed fiscal stimulus as the G20 in 2009 on the grounds that "automatic stabilizers were sufficient" only to spearhead the destruction of the EU's welfare state and social compact when the said automatic stabilizers pushed deficits well above 3% EU-wide as they couldn't possibly fail to do in a deep recession.> That is a bit dubious history. In July 2009, when the summit happened, in Germany the stimulus was already enacted at about 1.6% of gdp in 2009. That was not really then the stimulus in the US, not to talk of the other G8 countries. And the argument that countries with big automatic stabilizers like Germany need a smaller explicit stimulus is at least plausible.
Here's a message from Berlin to U.S. officials arguing that Europe's governments should pony up as much as Washington has to stimulate their economies: Germany's already doing it. U.S. officials say they want to use the April 2 summit of the Group of 20 countries to persuade other economies to do more to boost flagging demand by passing bigger emergency government spending packages, similar in scale to the $787 billion that the U.S. administration recently pushed through Congress. ... But the trans-Atlantic debate over stimulus packages has touched a nerve in Germany, which believes many U.S. critics fail to take into account differences between the U.S. and European economies. One big one: In Europe's generous welfare states,when recession strikes, governments automatically start paying out more than in the U.S. in the form of welfare checks and other so-called automatic stabilizers.
U.S. officials say they want to use the April 2 summit of the Group of 20 countries to persuade other economies to do more to boost flagging demand by passing bigger emergency government spending packages, similar in scale to the $787 billion that the U.S. administration recently pushed through Congress.
...
But the trans-Atlantic debate over stimulus packages has touched a nerve in Germany, which believes many U.S. critics fail to take into account differences between the U.S. and European economies. One big one: In Europe's generous welfare states,when recession strikes, governments automatically start paying out more than in the U.S. in the form of welfare checks and other so-called automatic stabilizers.
Neoliberalism in action. Is e. g. Rajoy any different? Most of europe is governed by right.wingers. What do you expect?
What happened in July 2009 was that Germany passed its own "debt brake" constitutional amendment (see Berlin weaves a deficit hairshirt for us all), surely in an effort to rein in its own out-of-control "automatic stabilizers". tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
Yes, Jacques Delors, famous spineless political yes man, just a lost babe in the woods. But perhaps he was a long-term german agent.
>Hmm, I thought the summit took place in April 2009.<
Finance ministers, probably.
>And anyway, I didn't say that Germany opposed stimulus per se.< What about: "Germany opposed fiscal stimulus"?
>What happened was that first, the US tried to get some sort of global agreement and was shunned by China on the one hand and Germany with the "automatic stabilizers" argument on the other.<
I am a bit irritated. Why do always assume that "automatic stabilizers" is some german excuse cooked up on he spot in 2009 and not a age old economic concept? And the german argument: we are already doing what you demand, was right. Especially if you remember that the impressive looking american stimulus was full of non-stimulative things like the ATM fix.
And is that argument:
<But the trans-Atlantic debate over stimulus packages has touched a nerve in Germany, which believes many U.S. critics fail to take into account differences between the U.S. and European economies. One big one: In Europe's generous welfare states,when recession strikes, governments automatically start paying out more than in the U.S. in the form of welfare checks and other so-called automatic stabilizers.>
not largely right?
>May I ask you for the political affiliation and nationality of the person famous for the phrase crass Keynesianism (uttered at the end of 2008)?>
That would be the finance minister responsible for the biggest stimulus package in german history?
>What happened in July 2009 was that Germany passed its own "debt brake" constitutional amendment (see Berlin weaves a deficit hairshirt for us all), surely in an effort to rein in its own out-of-control "automatic stabilizers".<
Sticks and stones will break my bones, but words will never hurt me. What actually happened in Germany in 2009 and 2010 was a classical keneysian stimulus. The whole crisis was successful seventies revival in germany, including unions and employers.
I am a bit irritated. Why do always assume that "automatic stabilizers" is some german excuse cooked up on he spot in 2009 and not a age old economic concept?
It is extremely annoying that you keep misrepresenting this argument.
The point is not that the German argument did not make sense in 2009. The problem is the hysterical shrieking that the German Seriöse Leute began emitting the second those automatic stabilisers actually started making any meaningful contribution.
But that was the argument; a opposition in 2009 to fiscal stimulus, using the automatic stabilizer argument. So you admit that the argument was indeed right in 2009?
But that's because I believe that the hysterical children didn't realise in 2009 that their automatic stabilisers would certainly breach their magical voodoo 3 % deficit limit.
The other possibility is that they had realised this elementary fact that anybody who took the time to add the numbers together would realise. In which case they were lying when they said that automatic stabilisers would suffice, because they clearly didn't intend to let them work.
I'm going with stupidity here, but it's almost equally easy to make a case for malice aforethought.
Well, almost.
I remember the policy discussion in late 2008 early 2009 around quite good and as far as I was aware nobody thought that after the impact of the crisis and the stimulus where would be a german deficit inside the Masstricht rules.
The debt brake is a imitation of the debt brake in Switzerland introduced in 2001, the concrete german rule a result of commission working from early 2007 to early 2009. So I think we are talking less about a reaction to the crisis and ore about a manifestation of a long term obsession of the german body politic with public debt.
And what we're arguing is that it's toxic for the rest of the Eurozone to have by far the largest and currently most solvent country in the Eurozone acting on that obsession.
One thing we have pointed out is that after the summer of 2011 even France had lost any of the political leverage it may have had (and, again, reportedly Sarkozy got to make credible threats in the Spring of 2010 - now Merkel thinks she needs to help him with his reelection). So now it's just a Germany with a decades-old unhealthy obsession with public debt alone in the driving seat. Or do the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg set EU Council policy independently of Germany? tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
"Or do the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg set EU Council policy independently of Germany?"
A straw man. The three and others Austria e. g, share the "decades-old unhealthy obsession with public debt".
Why do deny this simple fact? The government of say the netherlands is not a bunch of fanatic keynesians forced on a difference course.
At which point one wonders if the inevitable conclusion is not that the Eurozone will shed its members one by one until all that's left is, well, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg.
The problem is that it's one thing to say that the countries South of the Alps should never have joined a currency union with Germany, and a very different thing to say the proper thing to do now is to throw them out. But that's what appears likely. And the rump Neurozone would probably not enjoy having their currency appreciate by maybe 50% with respect to the old broad Euro average. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
That is a much weaker claim and you could say the same with more justification about the american stimulus. As far as I remembered krugman admitted grudgingly that the (german) stimulus was big enough for Germany and then aargued oit was to small for the whole EU.
I thought is was to small back then too, but are not so sure now. That said, there was a bot of top on off the original stimulus
>And the argument was symptomatic of a general opposition to fiscal stimulus, as we saw by the "crass Keynesianism" "argument" (ahem) of late 2008,>
The stimulus in Germany did indeed came months to late, but the resistance had crumbled around the time of the inauguration of Obama.
As far as I remember the stimulus in other european countries wasn't timely too.
Only now are they starting to make noises about the need to have "jobs-friendly growth and growth-friendly fiscal consolidation". The "growth-friendly fiscal consolidation" is akin to "circle-friendly squaring".
So we're still withholding the necessary stimulus because, you know, 0.1% growth still destroys jobs and physical capital. So the criteria for fiscal stimulus should not be that growth is negative but that jobs are being destroyed. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
It is completely unrelated to wages, or their suppression (whatever that exactly means).
Wage suppression is lowering unit labour costs. Unit labour costs, judging by historical experience, need to remain at approximately 70 % for a modern industrial society to function. Pushing unit labour costs substantially below this creates demand-side crises, like the one we are presently seeing. It is conceivable that pushing unit labour costs substantially above this value will create other forms of dysfunction, but such an income distribution has not been observed for any length of time together in any mature industrial economy, so this remains speculation.
Before Hatz IV there were 2 completely parallel systems of welfare (unemployment benefits and classical welfare ("Sozialhilfe")). The Hartz reforms unified the systems in an attempt to make them more efficient. They also toyed with the procedural details of the system, also in order to increase efficiency and decrease cost.
It is open to debate if the desired effect actually happened.
Yes, there was a concerted effort to keep wage increases down. And, yes, that was a mixed blessing, to put it mildly.
OTOH, maybe you stop whining about the efficient Germans and start getting a little more efficient yourselves.
But the Hart IV reforms did not substantially degrade anything.
You were the one who appended the "IV." The Hartz wage suppression programme, taken as a whole, certainly did degrade the income security of the unemployed.
Before Hatz IV there were 2 completely parallel systems of welfare (unemployment benefits and classical welfare ("Sozialhilfe")). The Hartz reforms unified the systems in an attempt to make them more efficient.
The Hartz degradation packages also introduced bullshit measures like excluding the unemployed from benefits when they refused to take shit jobs at shit wages, and reducing their stipend when they failed to find jobs.
Germany hourly productivity is flat over the last ten years. Every single bit of "competitiveness," so-called, has come from falling wages.
As noted elsewhere, that is a fundamentally unsound policy.
[...falling wages...] As noted elsewhere, that is a fundamentally unsound policy.
As for the "bullshit" measures, it's not that simple. Yes, able bodied unemployed welfare recipients are expected to work. If they can't find work to their liking, after some time (Months or years, actually) they will be forced to accept any work they can do, otherwise their benefits will be reduced.
I consider this perfectly appropriate. As does, fort that matter, the majority of taxpayers across all parties.
Both are facts not in evidence.
Further, such measures do contribute to a deterioration of labour's overall bargaining position, and must therefore be compensated with some combination of higher baseline unemployment benefits and greater bargaining power for unions. Otherwise, they contribute to unsustainable erosion of wages.
Greece probably excluded.
In fact, the reason we have no minimum wage in Germany is that unions fought hard to prevent it to be enacted.
It is my understanding that unions in Germany live quite comfortably, and in a position of strength, compared to, say, the US, or Mexico, or China
Yeah, you're not really making a great case by comparing Germany to third-world countries like that.
Oh, and your prejudice is showing. The Greek unions have less power than the German ones, and stand to have even less if current German demands are met.
In point of fact, there is a very clear relationship between union power and prosperity: More powerful labour unions makes your country prosperous by enforcing prosperity-creating economic policies like high wages and full employment.
I will add that Germany and Greece are hardly the only trade partners of each other.
Nobody here is begrudging Germany its exports. What I and others are saying is that Germany needs to either stop short-charging its workers so they can start importing stuff from other European countries, or accept that Germany will never get paid for its exports.
Because there is one and only one way to pay for exports: Through imports.
The low-wage service sector may be unimportant to the export side (to low order), but it is very important to the import side.
This is partly why it's utter madness that the Serious People of Europe continue argue for IMF involvement. Why should the IMF get involved in loaning Euros to Euro countries, when there's a perfectly functional ECB? And that's why especially the BRICs are increasingly annoyed by EU suggestions for IMF involvement, saying (not without irony) that the Eurozone "hasn't done its homework" and that it has sufficient resources. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
Apart from you.
>What I and others are saying is that Germany needs to either stop short-charging its workers so they can start importing stuff from other European countries, or accept that Germany will never get paid for its exports.<
They could also import from non-euro countries; what then?
>Because there is one and only one way to pay for exports: Through imports.<
Germany is also one of the biggest importers in the world.
<The low-wage service sector may be unimportant to the export side (to low order), but it is very important to the import side.>
But then you are shifting your argument
Then the Euro falls relative to those currencies, until those imports stop. That is why you have a floating currency.
This isn't fucking rocket science.
<The low-wage service sector may be unimportant to the export side (to low order), but it is very important to the import side.> But then you are shifting your argument
No, my argument has always been about current accounts imbalances.
That it comes as a surprise to you that current accounts imbalances can arise from both import suppression and export subsidies speaks to the quality of your knowledge of national accounting, not to the quality of my argument.
That is not true; you have a habit to conflate trade and sometimes even merely exports with CA.
You are assuming quite a lot; but if if you prefer to make my arguments in your head to defeat them, go ahead.
Under an "economic equilibrium" frame it would go something like this:
Then the Eurozone would no longer be in trade balance as a whole so there would be a downward pressure on the exchange rate. The rest of the Eurozone would benefit from the lower exchange rate, and would increase their exports outside the Eurozone, too. Equilibrium (again balanced trade EZ-wide) would be attained at a lower exchange rate. But now Germany would be running a smaller trade surplus and some of the deficit countries a smaller deficit.
Imports would become more expensive and that would lead to some pain, but also for opportunities for import substitution if because of the lower exchange rate production in the EZ became profitable where it was marginally unprofitable before.
Unfortunately, the ECB would react to the consumer price inflation resulting from the more expensive imports by raising interest rates and nipping in the bud any private-sector attempts at investment for import substitution. And the public sector, as we know, cannot do anything meaningful without running afoul of EU "illegal state aid" rules. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
The reverse should be true as well: don't cut rates and blow bubbles just because you're importing disinflation from China. Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
It's funny how one does not separate different kinds of inflation from each other (in central bank practice).
Central banks like their interest rate management to be based on very very simple rules of thumb.
There is more than one rate of inflation? Wud? <bits of central banker cranium all over the walls>
I think they use deliberately obscure language so as to hide the fact that there isn't much there, there. Also it might explain why they spend all their time admonishing the fiscal authorities on fiscal policy and protesting that nobody else should admonish them on monetary policy. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
As we say in Sweden: det dunkelt sagda är det dunkelt tänkta, "what is unclearly said is unclearly thought". Peak oil is not an energy crisis. It is a liquid fuel crisis.
You know another funny thing the ECB does? If a government raises VAT, they interpret the resulting price rise as inflation, and raise interest rates.
A swedish kind of death:
Riksbanken var oenig om räntebeslutet - Ekot | Sveriges RadioFörklaringen finns bland annat i högre priser på livsmedel och energi, och i Riksbankens egna räntehöjningar. The explanation [to higher inflation] is partly found in increased prices on food and energy and also in the increased interest rates of the Central Bank.Men till det kommer ett problem med att effektiviseringen av produktionen sjunkit, att produktiviteten blivit sämre än väntat. Något som i sin tur delvis bottnar i att det är goda tider på arbetsmarknaden med fler jobb och högre löner.But adding to that is the problem that the efficiency increase in production has declined, the productivity is worse then expected. That in turn is related to the good times on the labor market with more jobs and higher salaries. Det är de problemen som vice riksbankschefen Svante Öberg i redan i december ville stävja med höjd styrränta.These are the problems deputy chairman Svante Öberg already in december wanted to stop by increased interest rate.
Here's Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/government_finance_statistics/introduction
Click on the following:
Greece was at 39.5% for 2010, and hovered around 40% for the last decade.
Are you seriously judging how people are handling their money during a total economic meltdown when capital has fled the country? Seriously? It's very hard to believe.
Greece right now has a primary surplus for the gov't budget. the interest on debt is well above 10% GDP. Are you saying that the Greeks should pay an amount well over and above that primary surplus in order to pay the bankers?
As I said, they collect enough in tax revenue now for gov't expenditures. They don't collect enough for debt--and they never will. It is impossible.
If Eurostat says one thing and the OECD/IMF/World Bank says another thing, then Eurostat is more likely to be right.
What ever works but yes things are going to change now.
2 years ago, the Greeks were at 115% debt to GDP, but they were overspending by $30 billion. A quick adjustment of the budget deficit down to 5% (or $20 billion) would have turned them around in one fell swoop and those could have coupled with 5% cuts as in Portugal. Instead, they have cut by 19% or $56 billion and are now looking at 2% more cut in GDP (an additional $6 billion). And the bailout money paid out so far is around $80 billion. Do the math, it doesn't add up.
And now you know precisely why the troika wants an escrow account to funnel money directly to the banks in Greece's name. Greeks won't own that debt that's in an escrow account. Essentially, the troika has underscored to the Greek people that this money is not for Greece, but for the banks. The natural reply of the citizens is: "in that case...."
German taxpayers know a better use for their hard earned money at home.
What would that be? Spend money, buy stuff, stimulate internal demand?
What would happen then?
What s the alternative to what s happening now ? frankly ?
Germany could stop laundering the bailouts of its banks through the Greek government. (Because that's what's happening here: None of this money ever actually gets to Greece.)
at this moment bankers would prefer to be on another planet
Just tell them not to slam the door as they leave.
Stephanie Flanders at the BBC ran through the math and has a citation for the last two quarters.
The surplus was achieved solely through cuts because revenue is still paltry.
BUT, when you consider that the amount of debt isn't going down (the budget deficit is still 9-10%), then all numbers are now relative to the budget which has shrunk by 19% so far and is being cut another 6% soon.
They went from a 15% budget deficit to 9%. Meanwhile, their debt rose from 115% debt to GDP to 150%. This phenomena is primarily because of the huge contraction in the budget.
That said if the result of the last half year was relatively positive, why is everybody so hysterical right now? That the debt would still rise in 2011 should have been clear at the beginning of this year.
why is everybody so hysterical right now?
Because those Serious People comprising your 'everybody' mostly have few clues as to what is going on but can accurately judge how the public will react to their histrionics and posturing?
Both of the above? As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
As demonstrated by the German proposal of paying the bailout money into an "escrow account" out of Greece's reach. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
I'll give you one alternative, it is that those people rise up and cut the more wealthy into bite-sized chunks.
Another would be a form of default that does not involve hardship for the same ordinary people through inflation on imported necessary commodities. Perhaps not easy to bring about, but given the alternative to which you say there is no alternative...
Oh, but that would involve our magicians of the financial world taking a hit that would make them look like the sorry assholes they really are. Can't have that kind of alternative, can we?
They robbed their kids.
you are the media you consume.
Plus, the worsening situation is often presented as Greece not upholding its promises -fuelling more anger at those lazy southerners.
So I would say that the public is unlikely to wake up this decade. Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi
The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom - William Blake
Now, since the argument is that Greece's bureaucracy is bloated, how are you to argue that everyone cheats? A bloated bureaucracy of half of all workers means half of all workers at least are taxed at the source. There's a contradiction there.
My concern isn't that the economics of the bailout make no sense - obviously, they don't - but that Greece is being used as a testbed for a return to 19th century capitalist values across Europe.
Not so popularly known as 'reform.'
So yes - I think it's likely we'll see similar measures in other countries, using whatever melodramatic excuses can be waved in front of the financial press.
This is basically a class-led land-grab similar to the Enclosures in the UK and the Clearances in Scotland, but making a claim on the productive economy instead of physical territory.
bingo. the consumer economy is tapped out, and there's nothing to take its place.
planet couldn't take it this way for long anyway.
i heard an italian economist say today that all greece's profitable industries are registered and pay taxes in the netherlands, wtf?
nothing else but yoghurt and tourism, according to him... The power of knowledge is in mortal combat with the knowledge of power. It really is that simple... That's the Edenic apple we are all munching on.
Not.
you do it by having a populist story
The 1% stole everything. We are the 99%.
asdf:
and a lot of political power
Yes, it is unclear how the Occupy movement can translate their street presence into political change, without loosing their strengths. But the meetings are a start. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
Do you really think that is just? Are the people who are being forced to take a huge drop in living standards to blame for corruption or unpaid taxes by the more wealthy?
Yes.
Elections have consequences. The greek mess is collectively and very firmly the product of the Greek citizens.
Sovereign states have no duty to repay their creditors.
Don't like that? Don't lend money to sovereign states.
Nobody will lend you money if you stop paying it back.
Don't like that? Pay your debts...
It goes both ways.
Only in wishful thinking land money printing produces actual value.
But if you don't accept this reality, you can not be helped.
Refusing to print money can destroy real value.
So when in doubt, print more money. If that doesn't solve the problem, print even more money while looking for other ways to solve the problem. The only harm that can do is inflation, which isn't actually harmful at all.
States have always been able to default on their debts, and other states have always been willing to lend to them again afterwards, as other states are the only game in town. Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
But if it makes it easier for you to feel self-righteous, I guess it must be worth it.
Nobody is 'punished' here, any more than you are 'punished' when you get wet after walking in the rain. Dont want to gert wet? Don't walk in the rain...
Actions have consequences.
This, Germany will certainly learn in the next few years.
Except apparently not in this case.
Politics is a human construction. The rules can be changed at any moment. (And often are, to suit someone or other.)
The ordinary, lower-income, least powerful citizens are entirely to blame for the corrupt wealthier classes and for the successive governments of different parties - and their guilt is such that they should be punished.
An astounding version of democratic responsibility. The ordinary, lower-income, least powerful citizens are entirely to blame for the corrupt wealthier classes and for the successive governments of different parties - and their guilt is such that they should be punished.
If you can think of anyone in mainstream politics in the UK who actually represents the interests of the voting majority, instead of pretending to in a rather half-hearted way but very serious way, let me know who they are.
I promise to vote them for them next time around, if you can convince me it will make a useful difference.
Satisfy enough of enough people's dark side and you'll get away with a lot.
Run on the basis of people's good side and you tend to not get elected - so even originally well-meaning politicians don't and that's an awful slippery slope. Once you're inside the machine you end up being swallowed by it.
Labour tacked to the right partly because they decided it was the only way to get elected.
But this is neither here nor there: this type of democracy we supposedly have is in fact a mediated system in which the "viable" choices are selected for the people by a series of checks and mechanisms, in which cultural hegemony plays a big role. Not only Greece though. What you say is the same type of fallacy that Al Qaida has employed in the not so distant past: Americans elected Bush, Bush kills Arabs, Arabs have a right to kill all Americans as complicit in Bush's election in a free and fair (well...) way. It doesn't work that way. The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom - William Blake
What we after all should not forget is that neoliberalism is a religious movement. The poor are "sinners." They must be punished, when the elites f** up.
Do you really think that is just? Are the people who are being forced to take a huge drop in living standards to blame for corruption or unpaid taxes by the more wealthy? Yes. Elections have consequences. The greek mess is collectively and very firmly the product of the Greek citizens.
Being such a fan of collective punishment, I assume you will be prepared to argue that every surviving Wehrmacht soldier should have been shot at the end of the last world war?
For that matter, you should be a big fan of the Versailles treaty.
Papademos and his merry band of collaborators should take very careful note of what happened to Vidkun Quisling.
Germany received some 1.4 billion US$ over the whole Marshal plan duration; which amounts to slightly more than 10% of its overall size. Germany repaid about 2/3 of that.
On the other hand, the allies took values from Germany, in the form of dismantled industries, patents, trademarks, trade secrets and abducted scientists that exceeded that sum by orders of magnitutde.
And that doesn't even account for all the other willful damage that the allied occupation forces inflicted, especially in the early years of the occupation (when they did not fear a surging Soviet Union).
Go, read some Wikipedia
you might want to read a little about that before making wild claims. Germany received some 1.4 billion US$ over the whole Marshal plan duration; which amounts to slightly more than 10% of its overall size. Germany repaid about 2/3 of that.
Forgetting the Versailles war reparations, are we?
Forgetting the reparations to the victims of war crimes, are we?
Forgetting the reparations to occupied states for the goods and services looted from them during the war, are we?
Oh, you mean they took away war criminals like von Braun and put them to use in their own industries instead of shooting them? How was that burden not self-inflicted, again?
Patents, trademarks and trade secrets were not internationally protected at the time, so no dice there.
Which is the signal for me to call it a day. It probably was time for that hours ago.
Arguing with fanatics is a waste of time.
It really is bizarre. These facts are a matter of public record. Anybody can look up how great a fraction of the Versaille payments Germany actually made, and how many reparations Germany paid to the victims of its various occupations. The numbers are not secret. Just embarrassing to any German who gets on a high moral horse about international debts.
First the allies pillaged Germany: Industrial plans for Germany - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The first "level of industry" plan, signed by the Allies on March 29, 1946, stated that German heavy industry was to be lowered to 50% of its 1938 levels by the destruction of 1,500 listed manufacturing plants.[2] In January 1946 the Allied Control Council set the foundation of the future German economy by putting a cap on German steel production capacity: the maximum allowed was set at about 5,800,000 tons of steel a year, equivalent to 25% of the prewar production level.[3] The UK, in whose occupation zone most of the steel production was located, had argued for a higher limited reduction by placing the production ceiling at 12 million tons of steel per year, but had to submit to the will of the US, France and the Soviet Union (which had argued for a 3 million ton limit). Steel plants thus made redundant were to be dismantled. Germany was to be reduced to the standard of life it had known at the height of the Great Depression (1932).[4] Car production was set to 10% of prewar levels, etc.[5]
Destroyed forests: Industrial plans for Germany - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Timber exports from the US occupation zone were particularly heavy. Sources in the US government admitted that the purpose of this was the "ultimate destruction of the war potential of German forests." Extensive deforestation due to clear-felling resulted in a situation which could "be replaced only by long forestry development over perhaps a century.".[7]
And took over patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets: Industrial plans for Germany - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Allies also confiscated large amounts of German intellectual property (patents and copyrights, but also trademarks).[28] Beginning immediately after the German surrender and continuing for the next two years the US pursued a vigorous program to harvest all technological and scientific know-how as well as all patents in Germany. John Gimbel comes to the conclusion, in his book "Science Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany", that the "intellectual reparations" taken by the US (and the UK) amounted to close to $10 billion.[29][30][31] The US competitors of German firms were encouraged by the occupation authorities to access all records and facilities.[32] In 1947 the director of the US Commerce Department's Office of Technical Services stated before congress: "The fundamental justification of this activity is that we won the war and the Germans did not. If the Germans had won the war, they would be over here in Schenectady and Chicago and Detroit and Pittsburgh, doing the same things."[32] A German report from May 1, 1949 stated that many entrepreneurs preferred not to do research under the current regulations (Allied Control Council Law No. 25) for fear of the research directly profiting their competitors. The law required detailed reporting to the Allies of all research results.[32] The patents, drawings and physical equipment taken in Germany included such items (or drawings for) as electron microscopes, cosmetics, textile machinery, tape recorders, insecticides, a unique chocolate-wrapping machine, a continuous butter-making machine, a manure spreader, ice skate grinders, paper napkin machines, "and other technologies - almost all of which were either new to American industry or 'far superior' to anything in use in the United States."[33] The British took commercial secrets too, by abducting German scientists and technicians, or simply by interning German businessmen if they refused to reveal trade secrets.[34]
The Allies also confiscated large amounts of German intellectual property (patents and copyrights, but also trademarks).[28] Beginning immediately after the German surrender and continuing for the next two years the US pursued a vigorous program to harvest all technological and scientific know-how as well as all patents in Germany. John Gimbel comes to the conclusion, in his book "Science Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany", that the "intellectual reparations" taken by the US (and the UK) amounted to close to $10 billion.[29][30][31] The US competitors of German firms were encouraged by the occupation authorities to access all records and facilities.[32] In 1947 the director of the US Commerce Department's Office of Technical Services stated before congress: "The fundamental justification of this activity is that we won the war and the Germans did not. If the Germans had won the war, they would be over here in Schenectady and Chicago and Detroit and Pittsburgh, doing the same things."[32] A German report from May 1, 1949 stated that many entrepreneurs preferred not to do research under the current regulations (Allied Control Council Law No. 25) for fear of the research directly profiting their competitors. The law required detailed reporting to the Allies of all research results.[32]
The patents, drawings and physical equipment taken in Germany included such items (or drawings for) as electron microscopes, cosmetics, textile machinery, tape recorders, insecticides, a unique chocolate-wrapping machine, a continuous butter-making machine, a manure spreader, ice skate grinders, paper napkin machines, "and other technologies - almost all of which were either new to American industry or 'far superior' to anything in use in the United States."[33]
The British took commercial secrets too, by abducting German scientists and technicians, or simply by interning German businessmen if they refused to reveal trade secrets.[34]
Though I must say that I do not know exactly how that worked. I would imagine that at least they transfered the rights companies held in the western allied countries to allied companies and the rights companies held in Germany to allied companies. If enforced in Germany that should have been quite devastating. I know that the neutral Swedish government did not quite accept these seizures leading to an interesting period. Still does not accept some of them as the copyright of Mein Kampf in Sweden was in the 90ies found by a Swedish court not to belong to the state of Bavaria. Probably would belong to hitlers relatives but they do not enforce their rights.
Anyway, then the Allies changed their policy and instituted the much more well known policies to let West Germany rebuild.
So what Jake should say that in keeping with Cris view on the consequences of going out in the rain, the policy of grabbing everything should have continued. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
You can quibble with the valuation, of course, but one and a half orders of magnitude is a pretty big quibble.
I recall being shown equipment in the Mechanical Engineering Lab at Oklahoma State University that had come from Germany in the early years after WW II. But given Germany's performance during and before WW II, a case could be made for the first policy: "Never Again!" Now, an argument can be made that they are accomplishing through economic means what they could not accomplish through military might. As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
I mean, massive amounts of German debt were expunged. In Greece alone, Germany not only had its pre-war debts expunged, but its forced loan for the German occupation was never repaid, it took many billions of gold from the National bank treasury, not to mention all the damage, death and destruction.
Read all about it: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,769703,00.html
In an American context, this is equivalent to $225 billion today.
In a German context relative to GDP, this would be $50 billion.
The total amount Greece has received from Germany so far is $15 billion, but it will all be paid back, and it is being paid back at 5.25% over the last 18 months. Germany actually received the Marshall Plan money. The Greek money however has mainly gone to the creditors.
Wikpedia seems to differ (it gives the total amount as 12.731 bn), but in any case, as mentioned before, the actual subsidy to Germany was about 400m US$, plus another 1bn in repaid loans. The vast majority of Marshal Plan funds went to US allies; and the British received another 40bn on top outside of it.
But this exists in a context of allied powers extracting/looting several 10bns of values from Germany during the same period; and further damage through malicious and/or stupid occupation rules and actions. (like, intentionally starving the population, forbidding food imports etc). Just read the Wikipedia article.
From Deutsche Welle: Als Griechenland deutsche Schulden halbierte. That's what "European solidarity" means. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
You would see Schäuble walking around as Greece's biggest supporter.
But, alas, they can't.
Oh, wait... tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
Very early on quite a few European politicians noted that Greek debt in and by itself was not the major problem.
Greece's complete inability to balance its budget even with much reduced debt, though, certainly was. (and is)
The government is the employer of last resort. This implies that the government has to be able to print and spend money at will.
Why is this difficult to understand?
since everybody is going to jump on that:
s/balance/curb to a level appropriate for its growth/
Balanced budgets are bad. Why is this so hard to grasp? Governments need to run deficits - usually quite substantial ones - to ensure full employment and macroeconomic stability. Any deal that does not allow European states to run any deficit required to defend full employment is a totally unacceptable deal and should be rejected and repudiated.
Greece has cut its budget by 19%. It is being asked to cut it another 6%.
No country in history has ever cut its budget that much without an accompanying economic stabilizer (such as currency devaluation).
In other words, Greece has slashed a ton already.
And it did so in a recession. Any further so-called reforms would have only killed the economy even more.
Not single serious economist has ever said this plan would ever work. And now that it hasn't worked, the dunderheads are looking for scapegoats, as though the deregulation of the taxi and pharmacy sector will save Greece.
Even the IMF in its own handbook warns against cutting the budget like this in so short of time without any economic stabilizer whatsoever.
... and to retire to a sinecure at a global corporation. tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
And the current political mood last now for over twenty years.
Before the usual blame shifting starts: I am pretty sure that most - perhaps all - european governments would do the same.
i dont see much bullying by Nasty Kapitalists here.
The troika are the front men of the group of states that Greece has desperately been begging for ever increasing amounts of money.
Don't like the Troika? Just fucking throw them out of the country - and stop begging for money.
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