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Keen
One key component of Minsky's thought is the capacity for the banking sector to create spending power "out of nothing"--to quote Schumpeter.
Krugman
[Keen] asserts that putting banks in the story is essential. Now, I'm all for including the banking sector in stories where it's relevant; but why is it so crucial to a story about debt and leverage?
Krugman again
[Banks] exploits the law of large numbers to offer a better tradeoff between liquidity and returns, but does so at the cost of taking on very high leverage, with all the risks that entails.
I see here a conflict between an empirical and an idealistic approach. In the empirical approach it is crucial if banks do or do not create spending power out of thin air. In the idealistic approach, it is crucial if it makes a better story. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
But that is not crucial at all. It appears to be important to Keen, but it's not actually important in Minsky.
The crucial difference is that an economy with a single bank is more financially stable than an economy with many interconnected banks.
To make a thermodynamic analogy, in thermodynamics it is usual to encircle a chunk of your system in an imaginary boundary, call the imaginary boundary a "subsystem" and consider it a black box described only by its aggregate thermodynamic quantities (temperature, pressure...) and the aggregate flows through the boundary.
In economics, you can do the same with "the banking sector" and you get the "one bank" toy model used to explain the (bogus) money multiplier (see the table illustrating the "process of money multiplication" here).
In a real economy the black box "the bankign sector" may be "one bank" with an aggregate (net! meaning interbank debt, since it isn't debt between the inside and outside of the "imaginary boundary", doesn't count) balance sheet actually contains a dynamical system which is quite capable of generating its own instabilities, which then propagate to "the real economy" outside the "imaginary boundary" because it does matter to individual agents in the real economy which individual bank goes belly up inside the "imaginary boundary" even if the aggregate "ona bank" is still solvent and functioning.
That is why you need to model explicitly the banking sector as many banks. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
I see a conflict between an empirical and an idealistic approach. In the empirical approach wheter banks do or do not create spending power out of thin air is an empirical question that can be checked. In the idealistic approach wheter banks do or do not create spending power out of thin air is a question that is ruled by getting the simplest representation possible.
The idealistic models will thus have a preference for simplicity that is unchecked by empirical findings. Which then leads to oversimplification.
This may look terribly unfair, but Krugman is arguing that his description of banks is better because it has fever assumptions, without any reference to wheter the assumptions can be checked or not. And that is just straight out of scholasticism.
Or to put it another way, this is the impression I get when I read these articles. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
The answer is: Because `Keynesianism' had, after Keynes had met his `long run', accepted the preposterous proposition that one can think of the macroeconomy as if it comprised of millions of clones of a single person; a genetically reproduced Robinson Crusoe whose clones think the same thoughts (plus or minus some random error). (Recall the disastrous Samuelsonian interpretation of Keynes.) And why did they make this concession? In order to put Keynes' thought into a closed mathematical model or, at the textbook level, to capture his `thought' in terms of some appealing, easy to explain geometry. To see that this concession destroyed whatever analytical value Keynes had to offer, consider again the little game I presented (in blue) in Section 2. Suppose that the players are clones and they think identical thoughts, plus or minus a random error. Suddenly, the game loses all its interest: The outcome becomes predicable (each will choose 0 and everyone will gain $1000) and the game's subtle point (that it is impossible even for the smartest player to know what to do; the result depending on the average degree of optimism) vanishes. Similarly, the moment Keynes' thought was imprisoned in these mathematical models, populated by telepathic clones of some Robinson Crusoe, Keynes was doomed to oblivion.
the moment Keynes' thought was imprisoned in these mathematical models, populated by telepathic clones of some Robinson Crusoe, Keynes was doomed to oblivion.
And Samuelson had succeeded in doing to Keynes what the first generation of NCE economists had done to George, though, in this case, with a twenty year delayed action fuse. I cannot help but wonder about motivation. From Wiki:
Samuelson studied economics under Joseph Schumpeter, Wassily Leontief, Gottfried Haberler, and the "American Keynes" Alvin Hansen.
Of his graduate committee Hansen seems the most likely to have been the source of such motivation. Hanson had studied under Ely at Wisconsin who had been scarred by having taken inappropriate views towards socialism early in his career and was one to the NCE economists profiles by Gaffney. The others were foreign born and educated. But this is speculation. As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Are you sure about Minsky here? This is a crucial question. If a bank creates credit on top of the real economy, it creates extra demand that wasn't there. In practise banks create asset price inflation, ..and perhaps misallocation of capital. There is no wealth in the underlying real economy to pay these interest charges. And when credit creation ends, deflation begins. The situation is completely different, if the deflation preceeds credit creation. Then there is capacity to expand in the real economy.
When a bank grants credit to the real economy, it monetizes pent-up demand. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Perhaps, but without creating supply.
Basically, when a buyer pays a manufacturer on credit the supply exists (or the process to manufacture it is mobilized by the payment) and the credit monetizes pent-up demand.
Seriously. Not all credit fuels asset price bubbles. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
This argument assumes proper underwriting,
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
The supply is there, otherwise there wouldn't be a creditworthy credit request.
No there isn't for the interest charges without preceding deflation.
Basically, when a buyer pays a manufacturer on credit the supply exists (or the process to manufacture it is mobilized by the payment) and the credit monetizes pent-up demand. Seriously. Not all credit fuels asset price bubbles.
Seriously. Not all credit fuels asset price bubbles.
Seriously not. If the credit creates expansion of the real economy enough to cover the interest. Assuming the other factors are neutral.
Otherwise I don't understand your fundamental objection to the mechanism by which a bank creates the cash to advance to a client to purchase some good or service from a seller. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Even inflation in goods and services may not be such a bad thing. If that results wage inflation.
(Incidentally, this little fact blows "long-run money neutrality" wide open, which in turn torpedoes half the neoclassical modeling framework.)
But blowing bubbles is not the main activity of a properly run financial system. Of course, an improperly run financial system does all sorts of dumb shit, but that is a problem with right-wingers breaking the financial system, not a problem with interest-bearing debt per se. If the system worked otherwise, the right-wingers would just find ways to break that system.
But blowing bubbles is not the main activity of a properly run financial system.
That is the nature of fiat money. To prevent it self-destruct you need regulation.
blowing bubbles is not the main activity of a properly run financial system That is the nature of fiat money
That is the nature of fiat money
That is the nature of fiat money.
To prevent it self-destruct you need regulation.
Stock-flow consistency is your friend, and he's feeling left out of your argument.
Second: Some fiat bankers actually do earn their interest. It would be silly, of course, to claim that all do, but it would be equally silly to claim that none do.
I meant outside real economy. We can say that income distribution does not matter, within real economy, and call all income there earned.
Once you have the income distribution, you have the income distribution. To low order, its origin story isn't all that interesting for the purpose of economic forecasting.
No, income distribution absolutely does matter.
Of course (even neoclassists claim otherwise).
What doesn't matter is whether that income distribution arises from, say, high wages and high personal taxes, low wages and high corporate taxes; private pensions or discriminatory public pensions; and so on.
Yes, it matters. The more you have unearned (unproductive) incomes in an economy, the less there is returns to earned incomes and less wealth. Thats why rents, interest etc. create poverty. All the poverty.
I can see a plausible effect from finance soaking up talent that would otherwise have gone into engineering or industry. But that effect is, in my opinion, exaggerated - financialisation of the economy is as much a consequence as it is a cause of de-industrialisation.
Eh? Are you postulating some sort of supply side effect here, whereby lower profits discourage productive investment? If such effects exist (which is not totally clear from the available data), they are higher-order effects. To low order, investment is determined by current and expected demand. Where that demand comes from doesn't really matter that much.
Naturally the investments follow demand. But why would i.e. rents create demand? Actually Henry George says something that rents don't go into circulation, but to latifundasation. Lords buy more land and in the end rentmonopolies capture all economic surplus. And Marx says, i believe, the same about capital interest. This interest just buys off all capital and monopolises industry.
The same with banking. Intrest just creates more debt, it does not circulate. Finance capitalism is just a "cuckoo" version of capitalism. Banks don't have capital like a capitalist. They lay their eggs to other capital and suck their income stream. So this "bank capital" is the amount of debt.
Describe the operation of "credit" in the "real economy".
So this "bank capital" is the amount of debt.
That is bizarre identification. There are three stories about the euro crisis: the Republican story, the German story, and the truth. -- Paul Krugman
Naturally the investments follow demand. But why would i.e. rents create demand?
Actually Henry George says something that rents don't go into circulation, but to latifundasation. Lords buy more land and in the end rentmonopolies capture all economic surplus. And Marx says, i believe, the same about capital interest. This interest just buys off all capital and monopolises industry.
I see here a conflict between an empirical and an idealistic approach.
Krugman: What I can do, however, is offer some brief notes on what puzzles me here, and why, I guess, I'll never be a true Minskyite in Keen's sense. So, first of all, my basic reaction to discussions about What Minsky Really Meant -- and, similarly, to discussions about What Keynes Really Meant -- is, I Don't Care.
So, first of all, my basic reaction to discussions about What Minsky Really Meant -- and, similarly, to discussions about What Keynes Really Meant -- is, I Don't Care.
Krugman is honest, but some wise man said that: "wise men learn from other people's mistakes."
It is becoming clearer that, for Krugman, economic theory is not about analytic power, predictive power or internal consistency, but about rhetorical power in the service of the status quo.
What you are seeing is not an indication that he is a staunch defender of the status quo. It is, rather, an indication of how far down the rabbit hole really goes that it has taken him a ten- or twenty-year journey to get even this far.
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