The Manufacturing of Consent | 134 comments (132 topical, 2 editorial, 0 hidden)

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

Who knows what's next

You seem to retreat into the ultimate unknowability of the future and your inability to do anything about the human condition whenever I try to game out how we might achieve better outcomes.

And then you accuse me of being an economist who takes the easy way out predicting that the sea will calm when the storm passes when I am actually suggesting positive outcomes are still possible where powerful institutional interests have vested interests in more positive outcomes.

Surely it is you who is taking the easy way out?

I know figuring out how the crisis may play out is difficult and fraught with uncertainties, but are we all supposed to just throw up our hands up in despair?

I know economists in general have a lousy track record in prediction, and sociologists often don't even try to predict future societal changes. But isn't politics partly about trying to figure out how things might be improved in the future even within the context of the real world (and economic interests) we live in?

I fear your fatalism is self defeating and in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy if everyone else took on the same attitude!

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sat Jun 9th, 2012 at 07:17:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

I fear your fatalism is self defeating and in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy if everyone else took on the same attitude!

Did you hear the news from Spain today?

I have no power of influence and I'm sick and tired of those who do making bad decision and ruining our futures.

I have been both predicting what would happen (with some success) and enunciating alternatives that I thought would work but I knew would not be adopted.

So, sue me.

If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Jun 9th, 2012 at 07:23:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

Well FWIW you have influenced my understanding of economics, limited though it still might be, and I'm sure others would agree that you have been amongst the foremost thinkers on ET on how better economic policies might be formulated.

However you don't seem to have the same interest in analysing political processes and in how your policy proposals might come to be implemented (even if only in small part).

As you know, it is not sufficient for policy proposals to be self-evidently superior to current policies in order for them to be adopted. A process of education, persuasion, credibility building, coalition building, consensus changing/building has to be engaged in.

Why do crap economists get to be in influential positions of power? Partly it is because their theories don't challenge the current status quo or result in policy prescriptions which further the interests of their paymasters.

But you have often argued that current economic policies don't even serve the interests of the status quo in the way their progenitors think they do. So it may be that their progenitors are better at influencing/persuading/coalition building than other, more theoretically sound economists.

So shouldn't a really good all round economist - acting as a change agent - also be interested in the processes of persuasion/influencing that can result in better policies being actually adopted and implemented?

"Enunciating alternatives" is probably the (relatively) easy part. Actually getting better stuff implemented can be incredibly hard. I learnt the hard way, in business, that the best proposals/ideas rarely get adopted/implemented unless you've done a lot of groundwork with the decision makers beforehand and build up a track record of credibility and success. Brand building applies as much to schools of economic thought as it does to more mundane products or services.

At some time you have to stop decrying what is and start building what needs to be built for a better future. Being a prophet crying in the wilderness only gets you so far. Even Keynes had to start somewhere.

So I won't sue you. But I do have an annoying habit of challenging people to use their formidable abilities to better effect! It rarely endears me to them at the time. But some have gone on to do great things.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sat Jun 9th, 2012 at 08:19:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

You jest.

I have no formidable abilities when it comes to political persuasion, and you know it. And I hope you're not referring to me when you speak of "a really good all round economist acting as a change agent" because I'm neither.

And you confuse "interest in analysing political processes" with "interest in participating in political processes" which, once analysed, I find repugnant, and in which, analyzing myself, I would be unlikely to succeed.

I do what I think I can do well and leave it to others to do what they hopefully will do better. And I have the annoying habit of not agreeing with people who think I have some sort of responsibility to do anything in particular with the abilities they think I have.

If enunciating alternatives is the easy part, I invite you to do it yourself. And since you're the better politician, to build the brands, coalitions, etc, necessary for a better future.

If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Jun 9th, 2012 at 08:47:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

Well it's you who accused me of being an economist who takes the easy option, and if I had had the skills to be a politician, I would have given it a try. I'm not suggesting you have any responsibility to do anything you don't want to do: merely that putting everything down to the "human condition" or suggesting it is pointless trying to do anything because no one knows what the outcome might be isn't up to your usual standard of analysis. You predicted war as a more or less inevitable outcome of what is currently happening, so I felt it was worthwhile trying to explore why you thought that had to be the case and whether more positive outcomes might still be possible. My apologies if I have misunderstood your position. I can see this conversation isn't leading anywhere at this stage so I propose to end my contribution to it here.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sat Jun 9th, 2012 at 09:27:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 2)

i think if you stare too deep into the abyss, you tend to fall in.
despair at the human condition is pretty much the stimulus for seeking a better one.

it's a fine line between trying to warn one's hapless fellow humans of dangers ahead and projecting one's own fears on to the future, even creating self-fulfilling prophecies.

orwell tried this, and now his prophetic warning has become a recipe book for tyrants everywhere.

conversely, project too much of one's innocent optimism on the future and you end up with shallow, blue-sky thinking that leads nowhere.

scylla and charybdis...

i think if one could fuse all the talents evinced on ET into one charismatic individual, you'd have a great global statesman/woman.

however, great ideas don't always rebound well on their ideators! :(

The power of knowledge is in mortal combat with the knowledge of power. It really is that simple... That's the Edenic apple we are all munching on.

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sat Jun 9th, 2012 at 11:42:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 5)

You seem to retreat into the ultimate unknowability of the future and your inability to do anything about the human condition whenever I try to game out how we might achieve better outcomes.

The problem is that right now the future is not merely unknowable in some abstract philosophical sense, it is also impossible to forecast. Forecasting relies on extrapolating the interests, circumstances and institutional tools of people and social groups into the future. But in this case, a lot of people are acting contrary to their medium-term interest, because their circumstances are going to change in ways they appear to not currently realize, and the institutional structure within which they act is fundamentally unsustainable in the medium term.

Which means that the outcome depends on (a) how rapidly people realize the conflict between their short-term interests and their medium-term interests, (b) how rapidly people can adjust their actions and tools in light of this realization and (c) whether the unsustainable current institutions prove weaker or stronger than the sustainable current institutions.

All of these are unknowable to outside observers - and perhaps even to inside actors - because they depend on unobservable subjective conditions.

As an example of this problem, we may observe that a war is not in Germany's or the Netherlands' interest. However, we may also observe that until this moment the austerity neurosis has not once been successfully cured, save by the circumstance of finding oneself on the receiving end for an extended period of time. And during that time, the logical propaganda ploy to pacify the German or Dutch public, given the internal logic of current narratives, is a dolchstosslegende about how the feckless Southerners skipped town before paying their tab, and how "we" must now tighten our belts to make up for it.

By the time the currently pro-austerity forces pull back from that brinkmanship, they may well find that they are already over the brink. Or they may not. It all depends on the subjective conditions in decisionmakers whose state and flexibility of mind I do not know. But so far, facts on the ground are not encouraging of the view that they are sane nor particularly farsighted or intelligent.

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 04:18:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

I appreciate the difficulty of making predictions or even gaming out possible outcomes of current policies. However if you ARE going to make predictions that current policies WILL lead to war then you have to be able to make out some logical case describing the mechanisms whereby current policies will lead to war between who and who, and with what outcomes. You can't say the future is unknowable and then make bold predictions about the inevitability of war all within the same comment thread.

The other general point I would make is that policymaking is all about gaming out what policy measures are required to prevent certain undesirable outcomes and increase the probability of desirable outcomes. When you are a policymaker, you don't have the luxury of academic detachment. You are an actor in the system, and if you want to gain support for your proposals you have to be able to show how your proposals will make things better, at what cost, and for whom.

Clearly current policy makers haven't been making a good fist of this. However if we want to become more influential, or want polcymakers sympathetic to our approach to become more influential, we have to make a case that our policies would have better outcomes than current policies. It is not enough to say current policies have failed to meet their stated objectives or that they will - in some manner yet to be argued - inevitably lead to war. We have to show that there are better policies which can address the minimal requirements of all key players more effectively to the general incremental benefit of the common-weal than current policies.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 08:37:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 5)

I appreciate the difficulty of making predictions or even gaming out possible outcomes of current policies. However if you ARE going to make predictions that current policies WILL lead to war then you have to be able to make out some logical case describing the mechanisms whereby current policies will lead to war between who and who, and with what outcomes. You can't say the future is unknowable and then make bold predictions about the inevitability of war all within the same comment thread.

I don't. I say that it is a realistic possibility, because austerity creates the objective conditions for a revolutionary institutional change, while the pro-austerity propaganda seeks to externalize the blame for the catastrophe it causes to social out-groups.

If I have to place bets, I would have to say that I trust in the French nuclear deterrent to preclude a major European war. But I could easily see a coup d'etat in a Mediterranean or Balkan EU member with less than ten million inhabitants receiving more or less overt armed support from creditor nations. Or a Yugoslav wars style punitive expedition against an anti-austerity government that purges its police, press, civil service and/or central bank of far-right agitators.

Do I really think it will get that far? No, I think that the creditor countries will back down from their brinkmanship after the Greek default. But I acknowledge that (a) we are in a situation where it is not historically unprecedented for major powers to fail to back down prior to going over the brink, (b) I can see no plausible story about how they can back down, given the narratives they have cooked up for themselves and their clients, and (c) our political class has, throughout this crisis, consistently underwhelmed even my most pessimistic forecasts.

We have to show that there are better policies which can address the minimal requirements of all key players more effectively to the general incremental benefit of the common-weal than current policies.

Under the present narrative, there are no such policies. The minimal requirements of creditors and creditor states, under the narratives in which they currently operate, involve a repeal of the rules of addition and subtraction.

That means that the dominant narratives will change. The historically default way for human society to change a dominant narrative that is so deeply locked in society's institutions involves lining people up against a wall and shooting them.

Of course, the historically default way for creditor states of obtaining compliance from debtor states involves parking a gunboat offshore from their capital. So you may argue that Europe has a good chance of not reverting to historical norms in this crisis. And you may even be right. But right now, both those stories are plausible.

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 10:41:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 2)

I think the current dominant narrative is more fluent that you suggest with powerful actors taking quite different positions, and others hinting they are open to change should other conditions be met. Hence I made up a shopping list of 10 actions above which might constitute a package of measures capable for addressing the crisis at the same time as containing at least some elements favoured by each of the key players and thus minimally acceptable to them as a whole - provided they were convinced it would deliver a "full and final" resolution of the crisis and not constitute just another of a series of concessions they are constantly being asked to make.

In the peace process in N. Ireland negotiations were extremely protracted with all parties signalling publicly and privately the elements which were their "bottom line" minimally acceptable and utterly unacceptable elements. The mantra repeated by all was "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" to provide cover for participants engaging on proposals which would, in isolation, have been absolutely unacceptable to their constituents.

Lets not forget that most public utterances are part of an ongoing negotiating raindance designed to influence outcomes but only partially sacrosanct in the context of a "comprehensive" settlement containing elements both favourable and unfavourable from the point of each participant.

The key issue for structuring such a negotiation is "Are all the key players with a stake in ensuring a successful outcome represented around the table?" as there is no point in coming to an agreement which does not include all the key players who could sabotage the outcome. Thus all the earlier peace process talks which took place without IRA involvement were futile because the IRA laying down its arms was the only way peace could be achieved. There was little point in the SDLP agreeing something if they could not deliver the support of militant groups.

Part of my reason for some optimism is that almost all of the key players are represented, to some degree, in key EU fora. Some may not be negotiating very well, and others may be over playing their hands, but whilst these institutions remain in place there is always the possibility of slow, incremental process. Reality has a way of interrupting "business-as-usual".

So I don't really see the French nuclear deterrent being relevant to intra-EU conflicts unless the whole institutional infrastructure breaks down. I think we are all underestimating the resilience of the foundations of the EU which have served Europe rather well for 60 years. The architecture of the EU had some known structural flaws - and this is the reaons for much of the current crisis, but that does not mean that the other institutions of the EU cannot move - very slowly - to fix those flaws.

The processes of political and institutional change can be painfully slow and extremely frustrating for the participants - but do not necessarily include war, repression or firing squads on a large scale. The yearning for a benign dictator who can just make decisions and make things happen is not one that we should buy into. Dictatorships are, notoriously, even more inefficient that the "chaotic" democracies they seek to denigrate.

I have a visceral objection to "war is inevitable" narratives because they can become self fulfilling prophesies and betray so little understanding of the complexities and possibilities fro transformational change within peaceful mechanisms. Neither will I join the ranks of professional pessimists and cynics.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 11:26:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 5)

The most worrying feature in this whole sorry saga is the penchant of the creditor country elites and the EU economic policy establishment for meting out (economic) "punishment" or advocating same, and the favourable reception such rhetoric or actions have received from public opinion, goaded by the press.

There is already an established narrative of moral superiority centered on national/cultural/ethnic divisions. This narrative is popular with a sizeable segment of the population, is promoted by the press and is used by the politicians.

And you want to talk about "the politics of the possible".

If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 01:03:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 4)

This underlines the failure of the European project to promote a European identity. The economic pretext, by which (supposedly) pooling (supposed) common economic interests would lead to greater integration on all other fronts, is responsible for this failure. Because 1) the time has long gone by that any equitable pooling was in fact taking place; 2) the focus on economics obstructed the necessary efforts on other fronts, by eating up resources and/or being a pretext for inaction.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 02:18:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

The failure was accepted as inevitable when the Eurozone was unable to agree on real monuments to put on Euro bills. As if somehow picking the Colosseum for a representative building from antiquity for the 5 euro bill would have offended those North of the Rhin. Would it? I find it preposterous but the politicians obviously thought it was a problem.

If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 05:25:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

Do you now even want to turn the buildings on the Euro-Bill into a german conspiracy?

What is next, everybody searching for free-masonic symbols?

by IM on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 05:32:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

Of course it wasn't a German conspiracy, just the idiocy of the Brussels establishment and their inability to come up with suitable symbols. I said the design of the bills was an admission of the impossibility of forging a common european identity, not a heinous ply to prevent an identity from arising.

I would have had nothing against using the Brandenburg Gate for the 100 Euro note or the Colosseum for the 5 Euro note, but either my fellow European citizens would have, or the politicians themselves projected their own hangups onto the populatin at large as an excuse.

Like all symbolic facts it's a silly thing if analysed rationally, but we're talking politics and symbolism matters.

If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 05:47:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

It was an admission of weakness. Some countries obviously would have left out. But there wouldn't have been a problem to give Germany, France , Italy and Spain a suitable building each.

"but either my fellow European citizens would have, or the politicians themselves projected their own hangups onto the populatin at large as an excuse."

Rather an excuse.

by IM on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 06:00:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

In particular, when they decided to put "classical antiquity architecture" on the 5 Euro bill, that means Roman Empire of which the Rhine was the border at maximum extent. Excuse me for using the dogwhistle phrase North of the Rhine, I really wasn't expecting anyone to be that sensitive.

If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 06:03:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 2)

Migeru:

And you want to talk about "the politics of the possible".

Is there any other kind?

Was there any less fear and loathing between N.I. Loyalists and Republicans? Or South African whites and black for that matter?

The petty chauvinist prejudices that have been stoked up over the Euro crisis are pretty trivial compared previous antagonisms and hatreds between Nazis and Jews, the Germans, French, Spanish and British etc. which led to centuries of wars.

I think we need to take a longer historical view on this. The present Euro crisis could come to be seen as little more than a blip on the radar screens of history if (and it is a big if) we can resolve the crisis before it gets a lot worse.

Just because our leaders and MSM have such petty agendas and limited vision doesn't mean we have to buy into their narratives prejudice and racial superiority, and neither should the presence of those petty narratives drive us to cynicism and despair.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 06:35:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

Austerity has already created at least one failed state, and I would be very surprised if already implemented austerity has not outright killed somewhere on the order of ten thousand Greeks and Baltics by this point.

There's an order of magnitude or two to go before we reach "Russia in the '90s" level of disaster, let alone "African civil war." But we are some way past "blip on the radar."

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 07:22:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

It will be studied by future economists as an example of how not to run a currency union.

If you are not convinced, try it on someone who has not been entirely debauched by economics. — Piero Sraffa

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 07:25:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

Alas, it probably won't. If the history of economic thought is any indication.

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 07:29:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

Greece had a lot of problems before austerity exacerbated them - an almost complete lack of modern industrial infrastructure, a lack of an efficient tax collection system, and an appallingly inefficient and corrupt public administration system. The Greek elite were getting a free ride. Of course austerity isn't going to solve those problems, but many, assuming creditor nations were never going to bankroll Greece indefinitely, were going to come sooner or later in any case, with or without the Euro, although a currency devaluation would have been a lot less painful.

In allowing Greece into the Euro and lending so excessively for so long, the EU took on some responsibility for these problems, but not all.

Ireland still has issues with a rapacious private medical industry and an appalling legal monopoly which allows the legal profession to charge outrages fees for antiquated services. We can't blame that on the EU. There never was a time when people weren't dying needlessly for lack of prompt medical care. It's a scandal, but not entirely a Euro scandal. You can't take an idealised welfare state as your baseline for countries which never had anything remotely approaching that.

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 07:50:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

I'm not. If I were, the numbers would be a good deal higher (though probably still in the same ballpark - "give or take half an order of magnitude" is a large ballpark after all).

I'm using Russia in the '90s. Less than ten years of "shock therapy" killed on the order of 1 % of Russia's population (most respectable studies place the excess deaths attributable to deteriorating economic conditions around 1 million Russians). Greece, Estonia and Latvia have now had two full years of austerity.

Assuming that the Russian experience is reasonably representative (and there is no reason it shouldn't be), and assuming (conservatively) that for the first decade of austerity cumulative casualties is quadratic in time (people and communities take some variable time to exhaust their reserves before going tits-up), that gives a guesstimate of four in ten thousand. Greece, Estonia and Latvia have a combined population on the order of 20-25 million people. So, back-of-the-envelope math says somewhere on the order of ten thousand casualties. So far.

To place these numbers in context, a mortality of two in ten thousand per year on average is around three times the ordinary mortality from traffic accidents, either two or three orders of magnitude more than from terrorist attacks (depending on whether you count the WTC attacks in your average), and one and a half order of magnitude less than from heart and circulatory disease.

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Jun 11th, 2012 at 03:42:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

Greater fiscal integration, oversight, and harmonisation conducted by an EU Commission "Budget Office".

an unlimited investor and employer of last resort who is definitionally solvent and charged with ensuring full employment/capacity utilisation is so far outside the current universe of "serious" economic thinking that I can't see any of the major players currently embracing it

a "full and final" resolution of the crisis and not constitute just another of a series of concessions they are constantly being asked to make.

Pick at most two.

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 01:19:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

Given its record why should any think that the EU Commission would usefully accomplish anything? How about converting the EU to a parliamentary form of governance or a more balanced formal executive-legislative-judicial system?

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jun 11th, 2012 at 04:15:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (4.00 / 4)

The problem with analogies to peace settlements is that, so long as you can get every major armed group to agree on them, there are no borders which are fundamentally unworkable. They can be impractical, but any peace agreement that can be reached between every major stakeholder can be upheld.

By contrast, there are forms of economic organization which cannot work, no matter how great the unanimity is among the relevant stakeholders that they should be made to work. Every Eurozone state can ratify a paper saying that every state should be a net exporter. But as long as the Euro floats against the yen and dollar, and so long as China retains its current development strategy, that is not going to happen in the real world.

The rules of addition and subtraction are not subject to political compromise.

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 01:28:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 0)

Most political settlements contain contradictory and unworkable elements which have to be revisited and revised as reality intrudes. There never is a final solution to economic problems. The current Euro architecture is probably the best than could be agreed 20 years ago. Virtually everyone is now agreed it requires serious revision, and if the next major revision lasts 20 years we will be doing very well indeed. (I wouldn't pitch my expectations so high given our current crop of leaders).

Index of Frank's Diaries

by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot male dotty communists) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 06:46:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Manufacturing of Consent (none / 1)

An agreement to federalize budget decisions without federalizing the responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization won't last twenty days, nevermind twenty years. It won't even stop the crisis from getting worse, because the crisis is one of inadequate macroeconomic stabilization.

- Jake

Austerity can only be implemented in the shadow of a concentration camp.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Jun 10th, 2012 at 07:09:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The Manufacturing of Consent | 134 comments (132 topical, 2 editorial, 0 hidden)

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