My first "reading" was very cursory, basically just noticed the names of Keynes and Veblen on the second page. The link to Veblen's predictions of the German trajectory is the best catch by far. Most of the rest is pretty incomprehensible (like unkind words on Keynes, speculations that Soviets financially supported Nazis as well, etc. So it is hard to digest. But the bit about work-creating "money" (Mefo-Wechsel) byt zero-interest loans is perhaps informative (at the bottom of page 3). The question "Why the Allies never bombed the train tracks that lead to Germany's extermination camps in the occupied territories of Poland, even though the leadership of the Allies had solid information of what was going on there?" looks haunting indeed.

Preparada uses 'spiritual' in an uncommon way and that is not all. But his link to Veblen's review of The Economic Consequences of the Peace, by itself, justified the time to read the article. I think Preparata makes the same error of treating Veblen's analysis in 1920 as definitive as he accuses Keynes of doing in Economic Consequences.

Veblen is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that the unmentioned specter of Bolshevism colored all that Wilson did at Versailles, despite the fact that Wilson's 14 Points antedated the Bolshevick takeover in Russia. But at the time of his review Britain and the USA both had troops in what became The Soviet Union, opposing the Bolshevicks. Does anyone know if Veblen revisited his treatment of The Economic Consequences of the Peace at a later date?

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."