..pressure for social democracy..

Lol. Pressure for neo-feudalism, that is called social democracy.

"to have concentrated ownership of industrial wealth is not fatal to an economy"

Thanks to the Reagan deficits and Bush's "read my lips: no new taxes" Republican convention speech, we blew the opportunity to make a $240 billion or so short-term investment that would have been likely to make the world a better place, and that would have removed the chance that we will have to spend $100 billion a year permanently--$2 trillion in present value--to guard against whatever follows the current Weimar Russia.

But even in the absence of large-scale western aid, and even with the lack of the political consensus--found in east and northeast central Europe--that copying the institutions of western Europe as rapidly as possible was job 1, Russia's reformers pushed ahead with (rapid) large-scale voucher-based privatization, (delayed) macroeconomic stabilization, and in the process struck a bunch of political [deals] that concentrated industrial wealth in the hands of a new group of "robber barons."

Let's unpack this bullshit, shall we.

Thanks to the Reagan deficits and Bush's "read my lips: no new taxes" Republican convention speech, we blew the opportunity to make a $240 billion or so short-term investment

But even in the absence of large-scale western aid, and even with the lack of the political consensus--foundmanufactured in east and northeast central Europe--that copying the institutions of western Europe as rapidly as possible was job 1

Russia's reformers pushed ahead with (rapid) large-scale voucher-based privatization, (delayed) macroeconomic stabilization, and in the process struck a bunch of political [deals] that concentrated industrial wealth in the hands of a new group of "robber barons."

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

And so I have begun thinking: What if I wanted to make the argument that the neoliberal policy mix adopted by President Carlos Menem and Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo was a big mistake, that it was all doomed to failure from the beginning and should not have been undertaken, that from the moment he proposed his Convertibility Plan to stop Argentina's hyperinflation the Sunday Horse was pulling the Argentine cart down a track that led nowhere? What would that argument look like?

As I see it, such an argument would have five steps:

• First, the neoliberal program pushed by Domingo Cavallo demanded free markets--the end to protectionism, the end to quantitative restrictions of all kinds, the end of limits on freedom of contract, and most importantly the end to controls on the ability of not just goods but money to flow into and out of Argentina, and the end of the government's ability to force Argentines to denominate their wealth in a unit of account--the peso--whose value it controlled.
  
• Second, the neoliberal program pushed by Domingo Cavallo required a hard peg of the value of the peso to the dollar: nothing else would convince Argentines that the days of hyperinflation had passed, and that they no longer had to dissipate resources and waste time insuring themselves against inflation, but could trust the unit of account.
  
• Third, Argentina is a country in which the government constantly promises the people more than it can deliver. It promises rich oligarchs that it will not collect too much in taxes. It promises workers and consumers a generous social insurance state. It promises rapid economic development, large expenditures on infrastructure, jobs for politically well-connected boys, and so forth. An unequal distribution of income and wealth, a lack of social comity between the working and the middle classes, a viciousness in politics going back to General Galtieri, the Dirty War, Juan Peron and his enemies, and even before means that claims on national product and demands that the government enforce those claims are inevitably going to mount up to more than 100% of what is available. The basic political fight over how national product is to be distributed among social classes is unresolved, and any political movement that makes only promises it can keep is doomed to rapid defeat.
  
• Hence, fourth, in Argentina government deficits--large government deficits--are a law of nature, a fact of life. Moreover, everyone knows that large government deficits are a fact of life and a law of nature. Hence interest rates on Argentine debt will be low and reasonable only rarely and for short periods.
  
• Fifth, points one through four mean that the neoliberal reform program in Argentina in the 1990s had exactly the same chance of avoiding disaster as one would expect if one gave a modern gene-splicing biochemistry lab to Doctor Frankenstein. The fundamental unresolved conflicts of Argentine politics mean that debt is going to mount. The fact that everyone knows that Argentine politics generates chronic deficits means that the interest payments due on that debt are likely to explode. Exploding interest payments mean that the dynamics of Argentine debt are unstable, and thus that the hard-currency exchange-rate peg cannot last. And free access to international capital markets, to dollar-denominated bank accounts, and so on, and so forth, means that when the crisis caused by the contradiction between the hard currency peg and the fundamentals of Argentine politics comes, it will be five times as bad: at least with tight controls on foreign exchange and a primitive, underdeveloped banking system, the amount of damage a government default can do to normal economic life is limited.

From this perspective, pushing neoliberal, market-opening reforms on Argentina looks as wise as giving a supply of gasoline to a bunch of pyromaniacs, on the grounds that gasoline is a very useful and powerful fuel.

My intellectual problem right now is that this argument I have just constructed--which was supposed to be a strawman that I, a card-carrying neoliberal, could easily demolish--feels too convincing.