Note: Some years ago I had to write a paper about the mess which happened in Argentina. Actually, during the research I found papers on the IMF website which were written by some lowly scientists and very were true and predicted everything which finally happened. Needless to say, the bigwigs didn't listen. As this article is written by the Managing Director of the IMF, I would be careful.

Me personally, I'm just sick of the "growth, free trade, growth, flexibility, liberalization" mantra.

Here's some food for thought for you on the budgetary front:

Dépenses = Spending
Recettes = Income

both as a % of GDP.

This is the only time that spending has increased after the recession instead of going down. 9/11 changed everything.
This is also the most massive cut in income that you can see. Coming back on the insane tax cuts for the rich might be a good thing, don't you think? (And the increase in recent months is due to the one-off repatriation of profits by US corporates thanks to the law allowing these to be taxed less than usual)

I'd argue that a good way for Europe to consume more would be for the English language commentators to stop saying that everything is going badly in the eurozone. This has a bad influence on morale, and thus consumption, and happens not to be true:

As to Asia - indeed, they should invest more domestically. But they fear inflation, they fear losing their competitivity if they devalue, and they fear that the US economy will close to them if they stop buying US Treasuries, so it's not so easy.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

I was actually referring to the 2002 IMF World Economic Outlook. I must have originally learnt about it from this article (most likely the scavenged version at CommonDreams.org) but, given the standards of discourse on ET, I suppose I should refer to the original source, which is Chapter II: Essays on Trade and Finance:

How Worrisome Are External Imbalances?
External imbalances across the main industrial country regions widened steadily during the 1990s. Current account surpluses in many countries and regions, including Japan, the euro are and (in the late 1990s) emerging markets in east Asia, were counterbalanced by deficits elsewhere, most notably in the United States . Indeed, in the United States and Japan, the ration of the current account balance to trade flows—perhaps the best measure of the degree of underlying imbalance—have risen to levels almost never seen in industrial countries in the postwar period. A a result, Japan is exporting 1.5% of world saving and the United States is importing 6%.
[...]
One of the major concerns associated with the global imbalances is the possibility of an abrupt and disruptive adjustment of major exchange rates. At the outset, it should be emphasized that exchange rates are highly volatile and unpredictable, and economists have had little success in forecasting exchange rate movements over the short term(Meese and Rogoff, 1983). Over the medium term, however, real exchange rates do tend to revert back toward the fundamental values (Taylor, 2001, and Engel, 2002). While it is difficult to know when adjustment will take place, it is essential to anticipate the potential risks and costs that may be associated with adjustment, and whether these can be mitigated by policy actions.
[...]

Evolution of Global Imbalances
[...]
There is now a gap of some 2.5% of global GDP between the current account surpluses of continental Europe and east Asia (dominated by the euro area and Japan, respectively) and the deficit countries, dominated by the United States.
[...]
In short, the expansion in the imbalances in the deficit countries in the 1990s reflected faster growth combined with financial excesses involving buoyant expectations about future economic prospects associated with the IT revolution.
[...]
Large external surpluses and deficits have also led to increasing divergences in net foreign asset positions across countries, with Japan building up net assets and the United States, net liabilities (Figure 2.3). Indeed, the foreign asset position in both countries is approaching or beyond their own historical records.
[...]
Are the Imbalances Viable and How Might They Adjust?
[...]
in the absence of revaluations of asset prices, the current forecasts implies that Japanese net assets as a ratio to GDP would rise by about one-third (to about 40% of GDP) between now and 2007, and US net liabilities would double (again to about 40% of GDP). In both cases, this would be unprecedented by the countries' own historical standards. Indeed, even the existing net asset position of these two countries are difficult to explain on the basis of underlying fundamentals.
[...]
Large external adjustments would be needed to stabilize net foreign asset positions as a ratio to GDP. [...] Past experience indicates that significant reductions in external deficits generally occur through a combination of a slowdowns in output growth, which lowers demand relative to output through its effect on consumption an investment, and a depreciation of the real exchange rate, which switches spending from foreign to domestic goods. The time over which external adjustment occurs is also important . An extended period allows more time for countries to adjust their production structure, thereby reducing the size of the needed exchange rate adjustment (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).
[...]
The historical analysis suggests the likelihood of a reduction in external imbalances over the next few years, involving slowing output growth in the deficit countries and a depreciation of their currencies a year or so before these reductions are seen. Given the size of the deficit countries in the global economy, this in turn implies—all else being equal— appreciations of the currencies of the surplus countries. History also suggests that a rapid and potentially more disruptive adjustment is a significant possibility.

But my research surprised me, in the sense that I found that these deficits we are incurring are not out of line historically.  Let me refer you to my data sources, first USA Historical Budget Data, and then second Budget Outlook 2005--2014.  I have looked at the average annual budget deficit, as a % of the GDP, for each of the last three decades, and the projected annual average deficit for 2000--2009 for the USA.  In addition I have shown the highest budget deficit in each decade for one particular year.  Following is the summary chart, and as you will see, the current decade is not at all out of line with the previous three.  

            Avg % deficit         Highest % in one year

`70's             -2.1%                  4.0%
`80's             -4.1%                  6.0%
`90's             -3.1%                  5.4%
`00's             -2.3%                  5.0%

A legitimate criticism of the above, is that the first decade of the 2000's is half forecast, and half actual.  So maybe the forecasts won't be achieved.  my own perspective on that is that I think the tax revenue numbers will be overachieved, because they underestimate the growth of the economy, and that overachievement will offset the tendencies of these political loonies to spend as much as they can on "pork".  <snark,,,or maybe partial snark>

If you want to compare to the EU, my understanding is that the goal is to have annual deficits below 3% of GDP, and the USA beats that in this table for every decade except the '80's.

So that puts into perspective the annual borrowing of the US.  But a second question would be, how much does the US owe in total--in other words the cumulative effect of all of this borrowing.  As of today, this number has built to roughly 38% debt, as a % of US GDP.  It is projected to climb to the lower 40%, but be back down in the mid 30's% by the end of the decade.  I was a little disappointed in my ability to find data for other countries, but in what I found, it appeared that France was in the 40% zone, Germany a little higher, and Japan much higher being in the upper 70% of GDP.  I think the UK may be lower than all of these.  So I became convinced that the US is not out of line by any means on this measure--but there are economists on this site who may want to comment here--and perhaps set me straight, as I may have misinterpretted some data.

But my conclusion is that from an economic perspective, the US is going to weather this storm--the 9/11, Iraq war, dotcom plunge storm,, that is.  Though in my business, I'm going to watch this like a hawk for any slipping off this plan, or these assumptions changing.  I'm just encouraged as I see things now.