His book "My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope" a year as governor of Iraq, Paul Bremer disavows Minister of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. "We had important differences of opinion."

WASHINGTON (NRC Handelsblad) 9 January 2006 --

You work 18-20 hours a day in your first months as civilian administrator in a complete chaos. Rumsfeld makes a visit and tells you: "I think you don't realize how urgent your task is".
"I was indeed bewildered - although I kept my anger in check. He didn't realize how hard we had to work. I think he was frustrated. The moment of his visit was shortly after the second suicide attack. We felt the pressure, everyone did, because we could not bring security to Iraq."

Busk asks you: can Rumsfeld delegate?
"He is tough, and he intimidates people in his surroundings such, that it's difficult to get people at the ministry to make decisions. Only Rumsfeld decides. In his case it works."

Why did the president put forward the question?
"There were stories in the press - he was such a difficult boss."

You describe how Rumsfeld doesn't take the reports of looting after the fall of Baghdad seriously. What was the impact?
"Later we made a calculation the cost of looting was $12bn. One of my biggest mistakes. I didn't urge a firm position to stop looting. I was criticized for the suggestion a shoot to kill policy for looters - I still believe that would have been the right approach. I should have made a stronger case for this policy. The true problem was, of course, we gave the impression we lacked the ability to invoke order and authority."

At the time, education came to a standstill, when 10,000 teachers who lost their jobs through deba'athification. You consider that decision wise today?
"We wanted regime change, and this meant the Ba'ath party had to be removed from power: 'deba'athification'. I still believe it to be the right choice. Often it's forgotten, with our policy we wanted to eliminate the top 1% of Ba'ath-members in high position of government. I wanted the Iraqis to decide: Americans could not distinguish between an ideological Ba'ath-supporter and a teacher who was a Ba'ath member for the sole reason to hold a teaching job.
The mistake was I delegated the implementation to the CPA. It then became part of the muddy domestic-political relationships. We discovered a much larger number then the intended top 1% was removed from office."

What was the result?
"The biggest problem were the 10,000 teachers who had lost their job. And of course the impression by the Iraqis that deba'athification meant for all Ba'ath party members. This fact led to serious ramifications in the process for reconciliation with the Sunni."

Did this provoke the uprising of insurgency?
"I don't think so. although, I don't know the answer. I believe the insurgency was to happen anyway. We found a secret document that mentioned Saddam had plans ready. But it is difficult. Our intelligence did not see the uprising coming. Equally they had no knowledge of the poor state of Iraq's economy."

Why did you not let the Iraqis administer a larger part of the government?
"I handed the Iraqis as much authority as they could handle. They were just not ready for it. They couldn't even set up an organization. They didn't have managers. They were in no position to manage - simply put - a budget."

Is it a fact the Pentagon was so angry you didn't want to transfer sovereignty, they developed a plan to hold you responsible for the post-war failure in Iraq?
"That's what Andy Card told me, chief of staff in the White House."

Nice city Washington.
"Well, you know how matters are solved here. I understood the danger."

Iraq's former US administrator, Paul Bremer, shakes hands with the country's interim president, Ghazi al-Yawar, during the handover ceremony as Bremer's deputy, David Richmond, applauds. The Guardian

When the insurgency is on the increase, you told Bush and Cheney at the end of 2003, the Pentagon has no strategy for victory. Was the White House vigilant?
"We didn't make gains on the ground in military terms. We entered a city, had a firefight, problems seemed solved, and our forces moved out. The same problems started all over. That's what I explained was going on."

Half a year later, you told Condoleezza Rice that "the worst" happened: the United States was an "incompetent occupation force".
"We were unable to secure the country. We had all the disadvantages that belong to, what is labeled, an occupier. When this becomes a fact, at least you have to provide security to the citizens."

The journalist Packer in his book The Assassins' Gate portrays you as an isolated man in the secure zone of Baghdad - a long distance from the demoralized population.
"To a certain extent, that is true. Because of safety precautions I wasn't free to walk the streets of Baghdad. It was frustrating. You are a diplomat and want to observe the country. The other side of this, I did travel throughout all of the country. I met thousands of Iraqis. But my freedom to move about was limited."

Is terrorism fostered by the war?
"It is clear they entered Iraq - in part likely, because we closed down Afghanistan. Otherwise they would still be there, I think. But ok - what else? Should we not have liberated Iraq? I don't understand the consequences of such an analysis. Should we have left Saddam in power?
The question illustrates that Europe still have difficulty understanding new terrorism. The Unites States were confronted with muslim extremists, who want to kill us by the thousands. That is totally different terror we experienced in the seventies and eighties. The conclusion is the U.S. cannot sit and wait. We have to preempt before we are attacked.
But Europe didn't move, and the U.S. refuse to be passive. I wouldn't call Europe an museum, like Thomas Friedman, that sounds too similar to `Old Europe' of Rumsfeld. But Europe has problems, no doubt about that. When you are threatened and you don't see this, then you are floating without any goal in sight."

NRC Handelsblad - January 9, 2006. Translation Oui.

● My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope
Paul Bremer III

≈ Cross-posted from Jérôme's diary @ Booman Tribune --
Bremer says he was 'fall guy', confirms lack of plan in Iraq ≈