How many nations in Europe?

by ManfromMiddletown
Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 04:41:28 AM EST

I've been thinking about the possible impact of Scottish independence for a while now, and I've come to the conclusion that a Europe of the nations would have consinderably more flags than the current set.  Very few member states of the EU are not suspectible to fracture by active European automonous movements. So I started to map out what a Europe where stateless nations were given independence would look like.  The Europe of the 25 ballons to 75+.  Here's what it looks like.

From the diaries - whataboutbob


From the United Kingdom are born Scotland, Orkneys, Shetlands, Isle of Man, Wales, England, Cornwall, and a united Ireland.

From Spain come a rump Spain centered on Madrid, Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, Basque Country, Navarre, Aragon, Cataluna, Valencia, the Balearics, Andalucia, and the Canaries.

France fairs much better losing only Brittany, Normandy, Alsac-Lorraine, and Corsica.  Leaving what remains of France the largest country on the continent.  

Germany disunites, the federal states going their own ways.  

Belgium splits in three parts, Wallonia, Flanders, and the free city of Brussels.

In Italy, Venice is a state once more, along with Padania, Aostia, Sud Tirol, Fruilla-Venezia, the Latin Republic centered on Rome, the Napolitan Republic centered on Naples, Siciliy, and Sardinia.

Even the Sami get their own state.

While this is all interesting we have to ask, does this make any sense?  Will the states of Europe sit by idly while they are dismembered from within?  Yet, before we dismiss the posibility out of hand, let's consider the impact of Scots indepenence.  If the Scots have their way, what of the Welsh, Basques, and Catalans.

Very real nationalist movements exert political power in Europe.  And others that we take less seriously like Padania might be empowered in an enviromenment where the European state system is disinentegrating.

At the same time, if the European national states disentegrate even more of the functions of the national state will have to rise to the European Union.  While Europe faces few external threats, it will dissappear from the world stage as a player if it has no military power.  By what right should a England sit on the Security council?  And who gets the nuclear weapons?

Only the European Union can step into the vacuum.  So as the structures of the nation state collapse, a United Europe rises from the debri.  The world's leading economy, and a near peer to the United States militarily.  In the end Europe is able to exercise far more power as a whole at far less cost than when the states of Europe duplicated their efforts.

In the long term everyone just might be better off, but in the short term what's the cost in blood and treasure.  Will the UK allow Scotland to leave peacefully, or would they occupy Scotland and end Scots home rule?  When the Basques proposed an indpedence referendum in 2005, polls showed 54% of Spanish favored a military occupation of the province if the local government made an effort to hold a poll.  And the limited yet significant violence by Scots and Welsh nationalists against "white settlers", English who made homes in Scotland and Wales, is disturbing.  

It is reminiscent of the ethnic terror let loose on Irish Protestants during the 1910's and 1920's.  Through intimidation, discrimination, and assimiliation the Protestant population of the Republic of Ireland has declined by more than half since seperate figure for the South and North became available.

In the long run, Europe might be better off with 75 states instead of 25, but in the short term that might carry high costs.  And once tribal warfare of the type that devolution by revolution of the sort we're looking at from a cascade inititiated by Scots independence is let loose, can it be put back into the bottle?  Or will Europe divide into hostile blocs without an external threat to unite the Continent?

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I'm going to sleep now, but I look forward to your comments.  I'm vacilating between European nationalism, some sort of work on the effect of cultural capital (as in the Bordieu definition) and compartive labor policy as disseratation topics.  Ironically, I think that nationalism is the least contraversial.

Jerome, you say people in Europe like my maps, I guess we'll see.

We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 02:27:48 AM EST
Thanks for the great diary.  I am very curious to read what everyone's responses will be.  I shared your concerns, but was not as pessimistic about the possibilities of bloodshed as you (I think.)

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 02:42:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In which of these "devolving" pieces of land do we have a large proportion of inhabitants who seriously favour some kind of independence? For example, Skania (that red bit of southern Sweden), I think very few Skanians would seriously support independence. I have never met anyone who was serious about it and I lived the first 19 years of my life there. There is a little song about Skanian independence (or alternatively, Skania joining up with Denmark). It's primary point is that after we throw off the yoke of Swedish rule alcoholic beverages will no longer be the subject of government monopoly or extreme taxes. As far as I can tell, that is the extent of the independence aspirations there, people would like to get drunk more cheaply. Other than that, the flag of the region is often used by racist fucks, and this is the part of the country where the xenophobic Sweden Democrats got the most votes in the last election.
by someone (s0me1smail(a)gmail(d)com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 03:18:01 AM EST
Some separatisms started out with less popular support, so I wouldn't entirely dismiss it as a disntant possibility. But you are right, MfM is  extrapolating too far with some regions. Methinks Alsace-Lorraine is an even less likely candidate than Skania: no independentists even in joke, not much of independent history, even the wide majority of German-speakers had French national identity before WWII, and after it there was almost total assimilation.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 04:27:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not to mention to Alsace-Lorraine is actually only Alsace-Moselle (i.e. one out of the 3 départements), i.e. the German-culture areas that were part of Germany at various bits.

As far as I know (and I grew up there), there is zero support for any kind of independence over there, and quite an opposite pride in being French, and having fought and suffered to be French (there's nothing that Alsatians hate more than to be told that they are not completely French).

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:20:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It was funny to watch when cyclist Thoma Voeckler had his days of glory on the 2004 Tour, and struggled to deal with his immense popularity in Germany: all that remained German in him was hearing his grandmother talk German, but all the reporters were prodding him to give some connection.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:27:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This is the problem with using wikipedia and a NUTS-2 outline map to make this.  Did you know that the EU has been funding Alsatian language radio?

And data from what I believe is EU research shows nearly 900,000 Alsatian speakers.

The Euromosaic study funded by the EU is a good place to start looking at where linguistic minorites exist.  These often form the basis for nationalist movements.

We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 12:14:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The problem is that (1) Alsatian-speakers are almost all older people, (2) almost all are bilingual, but in such a way that those below 70 using French even at home, and (3) ironically, it is suppressed not just by French but standard German, too.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 07:36:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have no idea where you get that information from, but this is almost all false:

  1. a surprising number of young people speak Alsatian - and use it regularly
  2. everybody also speaks French, but a lot of people speak Alsatian spontaneously. Go on the markets even in Strasbourg, and the chat will be in Alsatian. There is no hostility whatsoever to those that speak only French, but the default language is very often Alsatian.
  3. I do'nt see how it is suppressed. It's been shown on TV forever, and there have always been classes at school (where a lot of people learn German - hochdeutsch - anyway as the first foreign language rather than German)


In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 10:02:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have no idea where you get that information from

Hm, let's see...

  1. A (print) article referencing a (French) study titled "The decline of the Alsatian dialect" or something,
  2. a (German) documentary I saw,
  3. an article by an Alsatian I read a few months ago on the web,
  4. my own admittedly very limited experience of not having heard a single German(ic) word when I was in Strasbourg for one day.

...but based on what you write, these were apparently mistaken, alarmist, or I misinterpreted them, or what you write about young people is a newer trend also as a consequence of said study.

3. I do'nt see how it is suppressed.

Sorry, maybe not the best word I chose. I didn't mean suppression by force, I meant being eclipsed by the presence and use of the others. What you mention that many people learn Hochdeutsch rather than Alsatian is part of this (and parallels what happened and happens to some German dialects in Germany proper, BTW).

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 12:01:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
for my slightly dismissive tone.

I'd need to dig up sources again, but that's been the experience of my growing up there, and occasional visits. I cna ask my parents who live there...

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 12:37:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I will be happy if you can take time to dig up sources or ask your parents; but for clarity, for me your word was enough, I really meant that my sources or my reading of them might have bias or outdated.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 12:49:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
worth with the influence of the EU in Europe.

And I'll ask you a simple question.

What, if any, reason is there for Alsace to not call for self rule and independence if they can retaing the economic adavantages of being French by staying in the EU.

This is the problem that the growth of the EU creates. That post 1914 state system is being challenged from below by national minorities and above by European regulations.  Who needs France when you can get the same things from the EU?


We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 12:32:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]

if they can retaing the economic adavantages of being French by staying in the EU.

In France, they are the second richest region, close to Germany but with support of the central French state. Alone, they are the poorer cousin of the Rhine valley as Basel, Baden-Würtenberg et al. are even wealthier...


Who needs France when you can get the same things from the EU?

The question also is: what State will let go more easily. Not France, for sure.


In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 12:40:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The question also is: what State will let go more easily. Not France, for sure.

That is an issue of democracy, too.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 01:12:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In Spain it should be relatively easy to dig up polls asking people to rank their feeling of belonging to their region, to Spain and to Europe. I will try to do that later.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 04:27:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
 If we measure the desire of independence according to votes, in the last elections to Catalan Parliament (01/11/06), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, the only party that favours independence, got 14.03%  of votes in a low turnout of 56.04%.
No llegará la sangre al río...
After leaving the Generalitat, President Maragall wants to work for the European integration, being the Mediterranean his area of expertise.
Some days ago, he said that one can have a small fatherland ("una patria chica pequeña") --the sense of belonging to your hometown or region but that now, our big fatherland is Europe.
by amanda2006 on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 05:00:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, yes, Catalunya as patria chica and Europa as patria grande. If that is the position of the PSC, where does that leave Spain? As a preserve of the anti-Catalan PP, or of Ciutadans?

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 05:08:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, for the PSC, the idea of Spain is a federal state. And when Maragall was giving examples about patria chica, he said places like Torruella de Montgrí, Barcelona o La Mancha, not necessarily Catalunya. Especially since your patria chica can be La Mancha but you're living and working and voting somewhere else, as nearly have of the Catalunya inhabitants.
by amanda2006 on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 05:18:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
have meant to be half.
by amanda2006 on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 05:19:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Just because only ERC is explicitly separatist doesn't mean that ICV or CiU wouldn't campaign for independence if it were put to referendum.

Actually, IMHO a good thing about an independence referendum in the Basque Country and Catalonia would be to force PNV and CiU to stop sitting on the fence and being all things to all people regarding separatism.

But the Referenda would have to allow subsets of the respective regions to opt out of independence, too.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:12:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Actually, IMHO a good thing about an independence referendum in the Basque Country and Catalonia would be to force PNV and CiU to stop sitting on the fence and being all things to all people regarding separatism.

This could be a reaction to Puerto Rica's always smoldering independence movement.  Of course, the solution is a dose of reality as one PR native told us:  "We don't want to starve to death."

http://www.topuertorico.org/government.shtml

won't wonders never cease? _ Snuffy Smith

by Gringo (stargazing camel at aoldotcom) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 10:24:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Most of the surviving separatist movements in Europe involve the wealthier regions in their respective countries: the Basques and Catalans, the North of Italy, the Flemish, the Bavarians...

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 10:27:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This is the difficulty.

And independence referendum would shut the PNV and CiU up, however what happens if they win.  Or turning to the Basque county, it passes with 65% of the vote in Vizacaya and Guizpoca, is rejected by 65% in Alava, and is narrowly defeated with a a 51% no vote?

That will create all sorts of problems.

We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 12:00:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That's why you have to have extensive negotiations on the terms of any referendum. For instance, one could propose that the referendum will pass on its regional result, but that any province can opt out. But to agree on that would take some serious negotiations.

The problem at heart is not one of nationalism, but of democracy, community, and hierarchical and overlapping allegiances.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 12:08:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... was defeated when it was put to a referendum ... I think in the 50's or early 60's. The Hunter Valley was added to the referendum area, when the New England activists had done nothing to promote the idea in the Hunter, the Labor Party in the Hunter opposed the referendum, and the dairy farmers in the Upper Hunter were told they would lose their place in the NSW diary price support scheme.

Mind you, not to leave Australia, just to enter Australia as a separate state to New South Wales.

So in the end it passed in the areas originally agitating for seperate statehood, with larger majorities the closer to Queensland (and further from Sydney) ... but was overwhelmingly rejected in the Hunter and went down to defeat.


Utsukushii kereba sore de ii

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 04:22:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In 2003, El Mundo or El Pais has a front page story about a poll that showed majorities thought of themselves primarily in terms of regonal identity rather than being Spanish in the Basque Country, Navarra, and Cataluna.

Part of the reason the proposed Basque referendum was so contentious was because polls showed the referendum would pass with a narrow victory.  And that would sort of fuel the assertion by ETA that the Spanish state is undemocratic, no wouldn't it?

We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 12:17:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Except it wouldn't pass in Alava, making the Basque state undemocratic. And a joint referendum with Navarra would fail in navarra as well.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 12:25:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Which means that you can either have an undemocratic Basque or Spanish state, or you can have a divided Basque country.  None of these options are paricularly appealing.

In the long term, I suspect that a divided Basque country, Vicaya and Guipuzcoa Basque, Alava Spanish, and Navarra a state of its own would reduce the prevalance of conflict.  Significant minorities in Viscaya and Guipuzcoa support violence, but with their own state, the hardliners would lose the support of sympathizers.  

This is but one example of the type of messes that nationalism let lose by Scots independence could bring.

We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 12:53:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
So you are from Skåne? I see.

I agree wholeheartedly with your description.

There is also "Spetteklubben", a legendary organisation that (according to said legend) once a year gather on the Skania border with a collection of gardening tools to physically seperate Skania from the rest of Sweden. If successful seperation is achieved Skania is supposed to "drift back to Denmark".

According to some versions most of the participants are from Skania.

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 10:06:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
He doesn't even have Provence up there but the fascist or, at the very least, regressive tendancies of the various Provençau movements are well known.

Part and parcel, I suppose, of wanting to go back in time rather than forward, to a day when there weren't any "foreigners".

Freiheit ist immer Freiheit der Andersdenkenden

by redstar on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 10:48:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Aside from providing military defense to its residents, what are the functions of the nation-state in Europe that cannot or should not be served at more local levels?

This article, "EU Nations Refuse to Give Up Vetoes in Security Matters",  suggests that if there were such a break-up and proliferation of states within the EU, "security matters" would turn into a real mess:

European Union countries have refused to surrender their national vetoes in security matters, though they are thwarting EU ambitions to fight terrorism efficiently.

<...>

The issue of national vetoes on cross-border police cooperation in criminal affairs has festered into a major obstacle to the European Union's security ambitions.

<...> only three member states appeared to be fully in favor, diplomatic sources said.

Those states that diplomats most often named as being against the move included Germany, the Czech Republic, Ireland and Malta, while France, Luxembourg and Spain were cited as most ready to take the leap.

Some countries fear that a change to majority voting would surrender control over or water down national security legislation. Others are concerned that it may conflict with their constitutions.

But could such paralysing disagreement on security matters be resolved by the prior establishment of a common European defense force?

And if security matters (being taken care for all Europeans by a continent-wide defense force -- the same way the currency is being taken care of by a continent-wide solution) were no longer an obstacle for devolving "statehood" to more local and/or ethnic regions, what are other things that such smaller states not be able to take care of (or take care of as effectively)?

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 04:44:10 AM EST
Aside from providing military defense to its residents, what are the functions of the nation-state in Europe that cannot or should not be served at more local levels?

You are asking the wrong question. It's not what smaller states are capable of, but how (a) the people and (b) the current political elites and (c) if present, violent groups relate to a change. We are not talking about practical matters but about emotions, community feelings and power struggles; about conflicts in all of these fields. (The basic truth about separatisms which is amazingly under-recognised is that different people have different ideas about who constitute which community; people talk about "their people" yet many of whom they mean could count themselves in another people.)

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 04:58:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The basic truth about separatisms which is amazingly under-recognised is that different people have different ideas about who constitute which community; people talk about "their people" yet many of whom they mean could count themselves in another people.

With the striking yet relatively few exceptions of Yugoslavia [which makes me wonder why that case was so different] and Chechnya (I have the feeling I have overlooked or forgotten others), this does not seem to have been the case with the break-up of the Soviet Union and former East Bloc countries which recomposed themselves along more numerous and more "natural" borders.

Given such a large amount of quite recent evidence, I would say the burden of proof is on those who would argue that state power and authority could not be devolved to more local regional governments smoothly, expeditiously, and peacefully.

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:02:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They didn't "recomposed themselves". In the case of the former Soviet republics they just kept their internal USSR borders, and tehre were no territorial rearrangements in Eastern Europe other than the Yugoslav war (and, except for the internal borders of Bosnia, it was just a matter of breaking Yugoslavia into its constituent republics, with no change of borders).

You are overlooking and forgetting Transdnistria, North and South Osetia, Abkhazia, Nagorny-Karabakh, Crimea (there was a lot of angst over that one when Ukraine became independent), and this just off the top of my head.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:09:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In the case of the former Soviet republics they just kept their internal USSR borders, and tehre were no territorial rearrangements in Eastern Europe other than the Yugoslav war

I guess I was assuming that the same could happen in Europe: in many cases, it seems to me that existing regional borders would be sufficient just as they were in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union, with exceptions.  Purely an assumption.

You are overlooking and forgetting Transdnistria, North and South Osetia, Abkhazia, Nagorny-Karabakh, Crimea (there was a lot of angst over that one when Ukraine became independent)

Thanks for pointing these out.  I was indeed not aware of these, with the possible exception that I had read that South Ossetia was seeking independence from Georgia (but did not understand that there had been actual violence.)

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:46:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There are so many levels of internal borders...

In Spain:
Regional borders
Provincial borders
Comarca borders
Municipalities
Districts

Where do you draw the line?

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:52:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Also note that there was a lot of border rearrangements (and even whole populations being displaced) within the Soviet union. Many of the territorial conflicts in the former soviet union have their roots in these kinds of top-down territorial rearrancements. Stalin has his ugly paws all over Ukraine, Georgia and Chechnya, just for starters. Not to speak of the rearrangement of Eastern Europe's borders after WWII.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:54:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Also note that there was a lot of border rearrangements (and even whole populations being displaced) within the Soviet union.

Good point.  Which made the relative non-violence of the break-up (at least, what appeared to be non-violent to me) all the more remarkable, and consequently encouraged my belief that these independence movements can succeed peacefully.

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 07:03:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That's not exactly what I had in mind. For instance, the entire Chechen population was deported to Siberia and then back again into Chechnya.
The Chechens, though, again rose up against Soviet rule during the 1940s, resulting in the deportation of the Chechen population to the Kazakh SSR (later Kazakhstan) and Siberia during World War II. ... The Chechens were allowed to return to their homeland after 1956 during the de-Stalinization which occurred under Nikita Khrushchev.
Oh, and I forgot about Ingushetia.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 07:10:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
After Beslan i prefer not to talk about Chechens at all and i'll explain you why. Imagine an ethnic minority in your Europe, say, Basques which was fighting for its independency for a while and one day to improve their chances to get this freedom from those bloody Spanish decides to siege an English school . Why English? Just because both UK and Spain are in the EU. Imagine those innocent English kids some aged 2 or 3 or 5 or in their teens who spent 3 days without any food or water and drank their urine (how old is yours, Migush? I guess he could be considered as adult enough and let experience this). Oh, and in the same time all Russian channels would call those hipothetic Basques rebels or freedom-fighters (as it did the BBC) because ain't they not? Ain't they indeed fighting for their freedom from Spain in such an exotic form?

So when we, Russian people, saw how the Chechens and Ingushs (they are actually the one nation) had tortured the people, mostly children and almost none of them were Russian or Slavonic but the other way around belonged to the very close ethnic group  because they wanna independency from us, Russians... well, for many of us, they overdid Hitler. Literally. Once and forever.

I suppose, however, that their cruelty has been learned(and not genetic) and polished for almost 300 years under Russian protectorate. And the first who suffered  from it was their own elites because they were ...er... how to say, not immune to corruption and could sell their tribal freedom for russian rubles so they got rid of them - as i realise this is the mostly lefties site i think you may find it interesting as an example of the truly egalitarian rather secular society with a zero level of corruption  (before Yeltsin times that is) and complicated tribal rules and rituals.

Is that what most of you are dreaming about? The UK with their  now reviving and flourishing druidry and witchcraft and medieval courtship and paganism and obsession with natural healing has already made that "one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind" (funnily enough it may probably be the same response of the tiny ones towards the same stimuli of the giantic ones, i.e. the Chechens' response towards Russia is similar to the British towards the USA)

So, back (the first and the last time) to Chechens. They fought every outer governing betraying it - that was with Tsarist Russia (many Chechens welcomed revolution), than it was with Soviets (many Chechens greeted fascistic army in WW2), than it was pro-western Yeltsin and isolationist Putin. They will betray everybody. I personally, would a) get rid of them as soon as possible (give them their independency) and b) not allow any Chechen to enter Russia for at least a hundred years.

Stalin, being a Georgian dictator chose to deal with Chechens by sending all of them to Siberia (if Stalin could, i think, he would have been sending there almost everybody of us apart a few millions, i.e. the biggest number a person born in a very small country could manage comfortably without getting paranoic in the endless Russia). Being the people who grew in the smaller countries you no doubt guess who's to blame for Stalin's actions. Well, Chechens have always  blamed Russians and why not?

PS My responses are well off-topic but so do Migeru's (to answering the Q How many nations etc he starts listing the numerous evils did by Stalin (read: evil Russians, read: those who're bigger, read: those who'll do the same to me because i am so tiny and lovely and they are so huge and nasty)

PPS Those who're interested in Chechens history may try to find a link to the Sakharov centre - the best suitable for a western mind articles are there (only in Russian though)

by lana on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 10:40:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's not off-topic in this subthread. Brunoken seems to think that the breakup of the USSR was peaceful and that the few conflict points were sort of flukes.

On Chechnya, I mostly agree with you.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 05:51:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The UK with their  now reviving and flourishing druidry and witchcraft and medieval courtship and paganism and obsession with natural healing has already made that "one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind"

Huh?

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 05:51:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Probably best to think of it as surrealist humour.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 06:50:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I was glad to read long replies with high information and low insult content, but then you write things like these:

fter Beslan i prefer not to talk about Chechens at all... So when we, Russian people, saw how the Chechens and Ingushs (they are actually the one nation) had tortured the people... not allow any Chechen to enter Russia for at least a hundred years.

Can you separate out individuals from groups of people at all?

(And if Chechens and Inhushs are the same, do you believe in Panslavism too? Which Slavs are proper Slavs?)

They fought every outer governing betraying it

How can an outer government that wasn't respected in the first place be betrayed? (How did that outer government came there?)

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 04:18:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Let's see if your hopeful, starry-eyed view can survive this:
The wholesale removal of potentially trouble-making ethnic groups was a technique used consistently by Joseph Stalin during his career: Poles (1934), Koreans (1937), Ukrainians, Jews, Romanians (1939-1941 and 1944-1953) Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians (1940-1941 and 1945-1949), Volga Germans (1941), Balkars, Chechens, Ingushs (1944), Kalmyks (1944), Meskhetian Turks (1944), Crimean Tatars (18 May 1944). Large numbers of kulaks regardless their nationality were resettled to Siberia and Central Asia.

...

In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev in his speech On the Personality Cult and its Consequences condemned the deportations as a violation of Leninist principles, asserting that the Ukrainians avoided such a fate "only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them." His government reversed most of Stalin's deportations, although it was not until as late as 1991 that the Crimean Tatars, Meskhs and Volga Germans were allowed to return en masse to their homelands. The deportations had a profound effect on the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union and they are still a major political issue - the memory of the deportations played a major part in the separatist movements in Tatarstan, Chechnya and the Baltic republics.



Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 07:26:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Regarding the Chechens and the Ingushs, as it happens, in your parallel comment, these were the exception that I mentioned originally.  There is no surprise that having been displaced, replaced, etc. has been followed by the current disaster.

I would have to read up on the rest of the internally displaced peoples you list to see in which cases countries that consisting mainly of them emerged with some violence, and how stable the resulting countries are.

It seems to me that all the displacements in the Soviet Union would make the break-up of that country into multiple independent states more likely to be quite violent and prolonged.  Although I acknowledge the cases you and DoDo brought up involving violence, I would still take a look at the entire range of countries that came out of the ex-Soviet Union and how many did so fairly peacefully and quickly.  If Stalin had not displaced so many peoples, it seems to me that perhaps there would have been even less violence than there in fact had in been.

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 07:43:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Stalin has his ugly paws all over Ukraine, Georgia and Chechnya, just for starters.

That's exactly the very popular western point of view which will never be accepted in the modern Russia because it shows the extreme level of hypocrisy and  dishonesty i.e. what we call triple standards of Yer Ole Bitch Europe. The USA you lot so like bitching about has double standards. Quelle horreur! And you - have triple!

What about Russia? Didn't Stalin (being a Georgian-born and grown and  somehow educated) had his ugly paws all over Russia first and foremost? Did  that one of my parents who was born in Gulag or my numerous relatives who died there really asked for the bloody revolution, for being ruled by the international bunch of murderers? How about the Polish twat Felix Dzerzhinsky, the notorious founder of CheKa (KGB) who is personally responsible for the death of the best of the old Russian elite?  How about other two Georgians at the top of communistic power - sexual maniac and murderer Lavrenty Beria and Sergo Ordzhonikidse? They all started as revolutianaries in Tsarist Russia which was oh so cruel that sometimes sent them to Siberia (just the cosy conditions they had lived in were in no way comparable with those nightmarish ones which the millions of RUSSIAN people experienced there later) so guess which nation had the better chances to die in the very beginning of the massacre, 1917-1920 or as you put it for starters??? Georgians during the Stalin's era were the most priviledged nation, in fact they so got used to be  the superior bullies that still may think we have to thankful them for him and his cronies.

Yes, later the rest of the countries which were under the Russian Empire protectorate experienced the same - Gulags, torture, agony and death - first it was their elites, less numerous than the Russian one and  even more later - in 30s when the simple folk irrespectively of their nationality  all over USSR realised at last that somehow they live much worse that it'd been in the previous era with Russian Tsar and nobility then the big chistka (cleansing) started. And again, why it is so difficult to understand that it wasn't the ethnic cleansing but quite international (with a big tormenting bias towards the ex-ruling russian nation) - those who didn't manage to demonstrate enough belief in the beautiful communistic future were sent to the hell of Gulag or just killed?

I DON'T know a single russian family here in St Petersburg who didn't lose at least one relative in a Siberian Gulag (or what was a prelude to it in early-mid 20s, not so centralised) or wasn't killed by the local CheKa. Do you really expect us to apologise for what the Soviets did to Georgians, Ukrainians, Latvians (quite a lot of them joined the Red Army and  CheKa and with such ardour confiscated the nobility's property her in St Pete and killed and tortuted its ex-owners)?

by lana on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 08:58:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
All true.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 05:51:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Lana, you will note, if you make the effort, that I never say "Russian" when I mean "Soviet" or vice-versa. I seriously cannot imagine why you're convinced I'm an anti-Russian bigot.

It was brunoken who used the breakup of the Soviet Union as "evidence" that self-determination in the EU should be expected to be a peaceful business. DoDo and I are throwing out bit and pieces of Soviet history in an attempt to disabuse him of that notion. He mentioned the way Russians are second-class citizens in the Baltic republics. What I meant by "Stalin's ugly paws in Ukraine" is not only the Holodomor but also the fact that Stalin gave Ukraine a chunk of Russia in his top-down border rearrangements and from that comes a lot of the current trouble within Ukraine (we've had some detailed discussions of the minority language status of Russian for instance) and between Russia and Ukraine. It's neither the fault of the Russians nor of the Ukrainians ultimately, but as you say of "the Georgian dictator".  

Back in 1991 I was appalled at the glee with which "the West" watched and even encouraged the breakup of the Soviet Union. It could have been done in a less rushed way, maybe? I don't know.

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 06:09:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have to admit I am surprised, I always had the impression that you are rather well-informed about every region of the Earth and in particular Europe.

So if you haven't heard of them, I must supplement my and Migeru's information in that most of the mentioned conflicts were armed conflicts at some stage or the other, and none were truly settled. Maybe the conflict over Nagorny-Karabakh was/is the worst in terms of losses of life and connected misery. A different kind of ugliness is Abkhazia. I suspect blackhawk will protest, but what I read was that that region had not much of a separate identity, with 85% of the population having been ethnic Georgian, but back in the Yeltsin era, the local clan of a former apparatchnik took over and chased away the Georgians, relying on cover from Russia.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 07:08:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have to admit I am surprised, I always had the impression that you are rather well-informed about every region of the Earth and in particular Europe.

I am flattered, but at the same time embarrassed, by that impression, because my own ignorance is all too obvious to myself -- and grows the more so the longer I spend on EuroTrib.

On the contrary, that's one of the things I am really appreciative of on ET: it's a forum where you can learn a lot through dialectic, where assumptions, presumptions and expectations can be altered, corrected, enriched, etc., if you are open to that.  In particular, I am grateful to people like you and Miguel and so many others who are patient enough to inform and educate on matters which may seem elementary.  It's like getting admitted into a club full of PhD's and post-docs with only a (barely obtaine) undergrad degree.

So if you haven't heard of them, I must supplement my and Migeru's information in that most of the mentioned conflicts were armed conflicts at some stage or the other, and none were truly settled.

I'm not sure if other people who lived in the U.S. during the break-up of the Soviet Union would agree, but my impression from the public presentation in the U.S. of these independence movements was that they occurred with little significant violence.  I don't know if that is my own mistaken impression or if the U.S. mainstream media had an agenda in portraying things that way.  So it does come as a bit of surprise to learn about the extent of the violence of these secessions (though I guess in retrospect the bigger surprise -- mistaken, it turns out -- had been that so many countries could become independent in such a short period of time so peacefully.)

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 08:27:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't know if that is my own mistaken impression or if the U.S. mainstream media had an agenda in portraying things that way.

I wouldn't call it an agenda (others may disagree), just believing and reporting according to a (simplistic, optimistic) narrative. My favourite example for this is my comparison of what I read in different papers when the Oslo peace process was still in a roll over a decade ago: Newsweek and Time reported all positive things and outbreaks of friendship, Der Spiegel also wrote about the distrust, the struggles of leaders; and correctly analysed why Barak is incapable of brokering peace before he was even elected party leader.

the extent of the violence of these secessions

Note about the Soviet disintegration: that happened in form of an agreement of the leaders of the Republics (e.g. chiefly driven by politicians with power aspirations), and violence was either already present or broke out only later in time.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 07:30:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
this does not seem to have been the case with the break-up of the Soviet Union and former East Bloc countries which recomposed themselves along more numerous and more "natural" borders.

You apparently haven't read about the conflict over Russian minorities in all the other post-Soviet states, the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Karabah, the Georgian mess, the Ukrainian identity and language question (which is NOT 'Russians vs. Ukrainians' but a lot more complex), Moldova's break-off Dnester Republic, and the lack of Moldovan-Romanian reunion. I think the Czech-Slovak split was the only one really without conflict, though the process had big losers: Gypsies in the Czech half (almost all of whom descentd from Slovakia) who became stateless.

But you could think back also longer. There was more mess after WWII, and much more after WWI.

I would say the burden of proof is on those who would argue that state power and authority could not be devolved to more local regional governments smoothly, expeditiously, and peacefully.

Read my original comment again. It's not about "burden of proofs", it's not an academic question, enlightened people debating in a forum and then deciding. It's on-going struggles, driven by what people want (you can poll that), what politicians want (you can see it from their actions and rhetoric), and facts violent groups create (you can see that on TV and poll their effects).

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:18:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You apparently haven't read about the conflict over Russian minorities in all the other post-Soviet states, the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Karabah, the Georgian mess, the Ukrainian identity and language question (which is NOT 'Russians vs. Ukrainians' but a lot more complex), Moldova's break-off Dnester Republic, and the lack of Moldovan-Romanian reunion. I think the Czech-Slovak split was the only one really without conflict, though the process had big losers: Gypsies in the Czech half (almost all of whom descentd from Slovakia) who became stateless.

Thanks for pointing these out.  With the exception of the "Georgian mess", I was not aware of violence and/or disenfranchisement in these cases.  My superficial understanding (based mostly on the mass media) was that the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc overall went smoothly and non-violently.  Even though these instances still seem to be relatively few, I see there are certainly enough of them to warrant a lot of caution with respect to encouraging similar independence movements in Europe.  

One question:  How "stable" would you say the situation is Eastern Europe, and especially among the former Soviet Republics, and is that stability increasing, decreasing, or remaining about the same?

It's not about "burden of proofs", it's not an academic question, enlightened people debating in a forum and then deciding. It's on-going struggles, driven by what people want (you can poll that), what politicians want (you can see it from their actions and rhetoric), and facts violent groups create (you can see that on TV and poll their effects).

Of course.  I guess I overinterpreted (misinterpeted) your previous comment to mean that such separatist/independent movements necessarily involved "conflict", which I took to mean violent conflict.  And my understanding -- now corrected -- of the post-Communist creation of independent countries suggested to me that violence was not a sine qua non of such movements to more local political autonomy.  So by "burden of proof", I was asking for evidence that violence does typically accompany such events... and boy did I get it!

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 07:00:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I was not aware of violence and/or disenfranchisement in these cases.

As I referred to above, there was violence and/or disenfranchisement in most cases.

  • The status of most members of the high-percentage Russian minorities in Baltic countries as second-class citizens (not rhetorically, but legally!) is a shame of the EU,
  • the conflict over language (or at least nominally about language) almost tore Ukraine in two just recently,
  • Transdnistria fought a war for independcence and has it de-facto even if not recognised by anyone,
  • the conflict over Karabakh involved a lot of spilt blood, conquests of areas for strategic position not inhabited by the own ethnic, economic blockades.
  • Moldavia-Romania is a special case not for separatism conflicts, but strange effects of border reearrangements -- Moldavia was torn from Romania after WWII by Stalin, but once free, they didn't want to re-join, causing a strange ideological conflict with Romanian nationalism.
  • In giving such further aspects, I should also mention the intra-ethnic-Hungarian conflict between those who live in Hungary proper and who live (since WWI) nearby, since the xenophoby against extra-Hungary Hungarians who are 'poor, dumb, dirty, and take jobs' came to the surface in a referendum over giving them double citizenship.
  • The case of the stateless Roma in the Czech Republic was covered in an old thread I have no time to dig up now; short recap: the Nazis exterminated most original Czech Gypsies, those there now were re-settled forcibly to Sudetengerman areas or emigrated during the 'communist' regime, but when the countries split, the new citizenship law was drafted such that most of these Roma would be excluded, without calling them Roma (calling them 'Slovakian' instead).

Even though these instances still seem to be relatively few

By what standard of 'few'? They include all the break-up products, and affects tens of millions of people.

How "stable" would you say the situation is Eastern Europe, and especially among the former Soviet Republics, and is that stability increasing, decreasing, or remaining about the same?

I would be hard-pressed to identify trends. In Southeastern Europe, the Yugoslav disintegration is bound to continue, question is at what speed. In Central-Eastern Europe (where I am), it's the older post-WWI conflicts that simmer on, and might flare up here or there (say in Transsylvania). In Eastern Europe, that is basically the European part of the former Soviet Union, methinks Ukraine's future has the most uncertainties, even if Georgia's conflicts are 'hotter'.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 07:33:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
DoDo and bruno-ken: could you use blockquotes rather than italics? I find it harder to read.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 11:02:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Hm... my standard is italics for quotes of stuff written on ET, and blockquote for off-site quotes.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 01:14:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]


You can't be me, I'm taken
by Sven Triloqvist on Thu Nov 30th, 2006 at 11:29:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks for the detailed response and case-by-case breakdown.

Even though these instances still seem to be relatively few

By what standard of 'few'? They include all the break-up products, and affects tens of millions of people.

I obviously have to do more reading on this, which may force me to retract that "relatively few".  But in a quick listing of post-Soviet countries --

  • Ukraine
  • Moldova
  • Azerbaijan
  • Georgia
  • Armenia
  • Transdnistria
  • Chechnya

  • Latvia
  • Lithuania
  • Russia
  • Belarus
  • Kazakhstan
  • Kyrgyzstan
  • Uzbekistan
  • Tajikistan
  • Estonia
  • Turkmenistan

(I am sure I have missed some)

-- I believe only the top five countries, plus the ambivalent cases of Chechnya and Transdnistria -- involved significant (i.e. large-scale and prolonged) violence that was due to ethnic disagreements and/or border disputes.  I understand that in Lithuania, Gorbachev caused the deaths of 19 Lithuanian civilians when he tried to stop the indendence movement, and in Latvia there was a tense stand-off that ended peacefully.  However, while tragic and scary, I see these as historically relatively small incidents of violence in light of the potential of much broader and protracted violence that the independence of those two countries might have entailed.

Also, as Miguel pointed out in a parallel comment, Stalin had caused mass removals and replacements of populations internally in the Soviet Union; it is conceivable that had populations been left in place, there would have been even less conflict and violence in the eventual emergence of these independent countries.  (Obviously pure speculation.)

Nevertheless, I take your two broader points: (1) each historical situation is unique and (the putative break-up of European countries into smaller ones) should ultimately be evaluated on its own terms and not primarily by analogy to a previous, in some ways similar situation (like the break-up of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); (2) there was plenty enough violence and disenfranchisement and/or potential for them in the break-up of the Soviet Union and Easter Bloc that even that historical case is not a good example for the argument that many countries can decompose into smaller countries within a short time frame peacefully.

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 08:13:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]
a quick listing of post-Soviet countries

Nitpick: Chechnya and Transdnistria weren't countries (at least officially). The first is part of Russia, the second officially part of Moldova.

only the top five countries ... involved significant (i.e. large-scale and prolonged) violence

Note that my focus was on Europe, and the countries you mentioned are the European ones. Also note that our discussion wasn't only about violence, but disenfranchisement, too, and that's the main problem in the Baltics.

I don't profess to know much about the conflicts and their underlying causes in Central Asian former Soviet Republics, say if and what role they had in the Tadjik civil war (which was worse than any of the secession wars in the European part). I do know that borders don't correspond to ethnic borders at all, and that there are large Russian minorities. I also know that there is one border-related big issue with certainty: the Ferghana Valley, home to the Central Asian tradition of Islamic fundies, was divided by Stalin between Uzbegistan, Tadjikistan and Khyrgyzistan in the most twisted way.

Finally, I try to redirect you back to what I intended as my original point.

Separatism can be driven by three different forces, of which just one is sufficient: (1) majority opinion of the populace in a territory, (2) power aspirations of certain politicians or potentates, (3) facts created by small groups using violence. Separatism can be blocked by the same three different kinds of forces, with the complication that in all three cases, the mover (popular majority, politician, armed group) can be within the supposed-to-separate community or the rest of the large community.

A typical separatist struggle will not only pinch the different kinds of forces against each other (say, an armed group against a majority opinion against separation), but the various forces will try to do some gerrymandering. I mean disputes about what exactly the borders of the splitting-off part should be (compare Ireland and Croatia), deny voting rights to certain groups (beyond Czech stateless Gypsies and RUssians in the Baltics, there is Montenegro, independent only because Montenegrins living in Serbia were denied the vote), or even, ethnic cleanse (as in most cases in the post-WWI and post-WWII separations which you still don't seem to have contemplated for a big picture), be it with police or military power.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 07:14:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Awesome comment.  Especially the last two paragraphs.

Nitpick: Chechnya and Transdnistria weren't countries (at least officially). The first is part of Russia, the second officially part of Moldova.

Yes, I was torn between including them all as "ambivalent cases" or leaving them out and risk being accused of skewing the numbers in favor of my position.  ;-)

Note that my focus was on Europe, and the countries you mentioned are the European ones.

Whether they are European or not was not the issue for me.  Rather, it was whether mass "autonomization" of regions into sovereign states can happen peacefully in a short period of time.  I do not see any a priori reason why non-European examples should be treated differently than European examples.  If there were an alternate example in Africa, Asia or the Americas that came to mind, I might have used it as well.

Also note that our discussion wasn't only about violence, but disenfranchisement, too, and that's the main problem in the Baltics.

True.

I also know that there is one border-related big issue with certainty: the Ferghana Valley, home to the Central Asian tradition of Islamic fundies, was divided by Stalin between Uzbegistan, Tadjikistan and Khyrgyzistan in the most twisted way.

Stalin did twist things up pretty well, didn't he.  Again, it makes me wonder whether the Soviet Union would have come apart less violently had he left the peoples of that country alone.

Separatism can be driven by three different forces, of which just one is sufficient: (1) majority opinion of the populace in a territory, (2) power aspirations of certain politicians or potentates, (3) facts created by small groups using violence. Separatism can be blocked by the same three different kinds of forces, with the complication that in all three cases, the mover (popular majority, politician, armed group) can be within the supposed-to-separate community or the rest of the large community.

This paragraph was really helpful to me for grasping separatism.  Is this your own analysis, or a standard one among in history and/or political science?

A typical separatist struggle will not only pinch the different kinds of forces against each other (say, an armed group against a majority opinion against separation), but the various forces will try to do some gerrymandering. I mean disputes about what exactly the borders of the splitting-off part should be (compare Ireland and Croatia), deny voting rights to certain groups (beyond Czech stateless Gypsies and RUssians in the Baltics, there is Montenegro, independent only because Montenegrins living in Serbia were denied the vote), or even, ethnic cleanse (as in most cases in the post-WWI and post-WWII separations which you still don't seem to have contemplated for a big picture), be it with police or military power.

When I read this, it occurred to me that there must be some subfield of politcal science/history that focuses specifically on separatist and independence movements, though I had never been aware of any before.  A diary -- or series of diaries -- comparing and contrasting various such movements would be fascinating and really useful for these discussions.

As for the post-WWI and post-WWII separations, well I had thought of these, but I hastily assumed that conditions had changed, people had changed, to the point that where looking at more recent events -- i.e. the break-up of the USSR -- would be much more informative.  But now that you and Miguel have significantly dismantled that model of "peaceful" separatism, I'll go back further historically in the spirit of plus ça change....  (Also, a diary comparing and contrasting separatisms that only goes 20 years or so would be quite shallow.)

Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.

by marco (cowannar at gmail punkt com) on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 09:30:40 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I do not see any a priori reason why non-European examples should be treated differently than European examples.

I didn't say they should, I just chose to give European examples because (a) the diary was about Europe, (b) as I said, I know there were serious conflicts in Central Asian countries too, but I know much less about their background.

it makes me wonder whether the Soviet Union would have come apart less violently had he left the peoples of that country alone.

I thought about how to answer that when reading your previous comment, but I just can't. For me, the question is too academic. That is, would the Soviet Union even survived Stalin if he didn't do those things? What's more, would it even have been born? To what extent are Stalin's policies the industrialised versions of earlier policies both by Tsarist Russia and by Central Asian Khanates? Is the Russian Federation itself not a multi-ethnic state whose integrity should be considered?

Is this your own analysis, or a standard one among in history and/or political science?

Only my own :-) But based on knowing many examples near-by, I don't view it as a particularly deep analysis.

I hastily assumed that conditions had changed, people had changed

I submit this is true to some extent, but I would point to another angle: the results of the separations 80, 65 years ago still reverberate, they gave birth to long-lasting hates on people level and troublesome relations on state level, and can seed new conflicts over sparatist issues. (For example, in Romania in the nineties, there was serious fear of Transsylvania going the Yugoslav way.)

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 01:31:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I submit this is true to some extent, but I would point to another angle: the results of the separations 80, 65 years ago still reverberate, they gave birth to long-lasting hates on people level and troublesome relations on state level, and can seed new conflicts over sparatist issues.

Cyprus problems today are for example linked to the birth of modern Turkey and the flight of greeks and turks to their respective new homelands.

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 01:36:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
France fairs much better losing only Brittany, Normandy, Alsac-Lorraine, and Corsica.

I think Provence or at least its Mediterranean shore would be a much better candidate than assimilated Alsace-Lorraine. There are also the Basque lands. On the other hand, once these regions would leave, who knows, maybe Gascogne, Burgundy, Savoy would also go that way.

Belgium splits in three parts, Wallonia, Flanders, and the free city of Brussels.

Plus a fourth: the German areas in the East.

In Italy, Venice is a state once more, along with Padania, Aostia, Sud Tirol, Fruilla-Venezia...

Methinks if those go, Toscana would definitely break off Padania, and Trentino from South Tyrol (= Alto Adige = Südtirol). And later on, Padania and Toscana could again break up into city-states.

Even the Sami get their own state.

Unfortunately I can't see pictures on photobucket across my office internet filter, so I can't be sure you haven't already used these additions:

Netherlands: Friesians, Dutch Bible Belt.

Bavaria: Frankonia (North Bavaria).

Czech Republic: Moravia.

Slovakia: breaks in Western and Eastern halves.

Poland: stays largest country.

Baltics: Russian areas split off, remains of Latvia split in two.

Russia: all autonomous regions split off.

Georgia: autonomous republics split off for real.

Ukraine: splits first into Ukrainian-language-nationalist West, Kyev-centrist Centre and Russian-language Southeast, then into nine regions.

Moldavia: Dnjester Republic now officially, then Carpathian mountain regions.

Romania: splits into Moldavia II, Wallachia, Hungarian-Transsylvania and Romanian-Transsylvania.

Hungary: East splits off.

Croatia: Istria, Dalmatia.

Bosnia: first two, then three ethnic states, then Serbian and Bosnian parts split in two.

Montenegro: two separate mountain regions (one Muslim, another pro-Serb) and South corner (Albanian) split off.

Serbia: Kosovo, then Vojvodina, and both the Monenegrin and Macedonian border regions, then Kosovo and Vojvodina splinter.

Macedonia: Albanian parts.

Greece: Athos mount, maybe North/South split.

Bulgaria: Turkish South, maybe Black Sea coast.

Turkey: Kurdish regions, maybe Centre/West split.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 04:50:17 AM EST
The only serious contenders in France would be Corsica (and then again, I doubt the majority over ther would support it) and the Basque area (linking with the Spanish region) - with the same proviso.

The others are a joke. Alsace-Moselle has been adressed elsewhere in the thread (by lacordaire and me), Brittany autonomy is pushed by just a few people, and I've never even heard of any kind of movement or position in Normadny, let alone Burgundy or Gascogne. Savoie might be a slightly more serious contender, but not by much.

I just don't see any breakup of France, even in a pan-European remapping scenario.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:26:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
How about the Rosillon with Catalonia?

Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:40:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I just don't see it.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:44:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I doubt the majority over ther would support it

Majorities may change with time. Did so in Yugoslavia.

Brittany autonomy is pushed by just a few people

I think you underestimate (at lest the potential) of Breton nationalism. In this poll, though only 19% of those in Bretagle (and paradoxically, 30% of those in Loire-Atlantique) are favorable to Brittany's independence, that's more than in Corsica (14%), while 49% want obligatory language education, and absolute majorities support more regional autonomy in all but one field.

What's more, 42% of the inhabitants of Brittany (and 24% of even Loire-Atlantiqueans) see themselves as Bretons first, 24% of those in Brittany (32% of those in Loire-Atlantique) identify with local commune, and only 26% with France. (I didn't even know: a wide majority of both départements would like to see them joined.)

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 06:55:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Normandy? If there are Norman nationalists, they all live in Quebec.

I speak as a Norman de souche, as if this counts for something.

Freiheit ist immer Freiheit der Andersdenkenden

by redstar on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 10:54:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
France was very hard.

The French state is highly centralized, and the department line rarely coincide with actual ethnic boundaries, which makes using a NUTS-2 map to create the map I've done above much harder.

I would not dismiss the Bretons, nor a limited Alsatian state.  

I don't think that the Basques in France would ever be serious contenders for linkage with a Basque state.  Once upon a time theres was a French Basque terrorist group called Iparretarrak.  ETA use France as a staging area for many years, and they still do things like store explosives in Bayonne, and so on.  ETA was not amused by Iparretarrak  because they wanted to avoid provoking the French.

One of the untold stories of the Basque country is the role that France played in looking away when ETA was planning terrorist attacks from the late 60's to early 90's.  It was only in the 90's that French and Spanish police began to cooperate, and ETA still uses France as a staging area.

We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Tue Nov 28th, 2006 at 12:30:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't think that the Basques in France would ever be serious contenders for linkage with a Basque state.

That doesn't preclude separatism. Your map (which I had only briefly a chance to look at at home last evening) seems to show you believe too much in separatists wanting to join 'the home country'. But separatists might find autonomy preferable to becoming an unimportant province within anothjer larger country. Upthread I already pointed bruno-ken towards the example of Romania and Moldavia; I think Kosovo is destined to be another example (i.e. won't join Albania). Maybe Transdnistria is yet another example, I don't think they would want to join the Ukraine (from which Stalin cut the area off when taking Moldova from Romania).

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Wed Nov 29th, 2006 at 08:24:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In Italy, Venice is a state once more, along with Padania, Aostia, Sud Tirol, Fruilla-Venezia...

Can't see it, no real feeling for secessionism in current Italian politics.  Everyone-but-everyone is localistic but 99% of the feeling is "campanilismo" = "belltowerism": "our town and its belltower-glorious history-traditions-food-culture-etc is better than the n