If capital gains are taxed at 70%, there is an enormous incentive to hold onto assets; at 50%, less so; at 25% less so; at 15% much less so; and at 0%, money goes to the most productive assets.

At 0% money goes to the assets expected to be most lucrative, which is by no means the same as the assets that prove to be most lucrative, and given the varying shares of both public and private benefits and public and private costs, even investing and gaining the most lucrative investments is certain to be different than the most productive allocation.

And this is all in the part of the financial system that merely passes money around ... you are talking about pure financial intemediation. In a monetary production economy, depository institutions are able to generate new purchasing power, and so depository institutions (principally commercial banks) can provide finance directly if there are credit worthy borrowers and the central bank is not throwing monkey wrenches into the system in pursuit of an antiquated monetarist ideology.

In the end, new purchasing power must be created in order to finance the mobilization by commercial enterprise of new productive resources in order to expand productive activity, and new purchasing power is created either by government deficit spending to expand the supply of fiat currency or by increase leverage of credit-money created by banks on fiat-currency held as reserve assets, or a combination of both.

No amount of dollars chasing shares or dollars chasing corporate debentures in the US is going to make up for the massive current account deficit (past 5% of GDP in 2005 on a five year moving average and still plummeting down) which is destroying domestic purchasing power faster than breakneck on-book and off-book deficit spending can create it. And escalating indebtedness as a share of GDP is steadily undermining the overall quality of the aggregate commercial bank asset base.

A 70% capital gains tax is a red herring in discussions in the US, where capital gains taxes reached their peak at just under 50% in the late 70's and were all the way down to 28% by 1992, before the radical right wing attack on public non-military spending got underway in 1994. So take a level of 30%.

You have three pure coin toss, purely speculative investments, which therefore yield no income except through capital gain. One yields a gain of 9% on tails and 11% on heads. A second yields no gain on tails and and 20% on heads. The third loses 10% of its value on tails and gains 30% on heads. The expected return in all three cases is 10%.

Since these are purely speculative investments, if there is any risk aversion at all, these are not stable payoffs, and stock demand=supply adjustments result in a shift in those returns so that the higher the downside risk, the greater the average return.

Does this represent the most productive financial intermediation for the economy as a whole? Of course not. Those who are induced to hold the riskier positions not only accept the higher volatility of return, but they also impose greater risk of insolvancy on the system as a whole.

We therefore should lean against the wind in these markets. We should increase the inducement to hold the lower risk investment, and reduce the inducement to hold the higher risk investment, to reflect the systematic bias in social risk exposure.

And evidently, the more these assets are held by large  Ownership Unions with lives of indefinite extent, the more it is necessary to lean against the wind, since a large Ownership Union is able to diversify its financial holdings and reduce its exposure to stochistic risk, which permits it to adopt a profile that exposes the national economy to substantially higher levels of systematic risk.

Now leave the radical right wing wet dream of returning to the 1920's in blind faith that it does not entail returning to the early 1930's, and put capital gains taxation of 30% in place. The first two flips have equal value, a 7% gain, but the 1:2 10% risk of a loss is no longer compensated by a 1:2 opportunity of a 30% pre-tax gain, when that is a 10% loss against an aftertax 21% provides an average 5.5% return. The greater the risk the speculative invester exposes the economy to that he or she will lose his or her shirt, the greater the penalty imposed on that anticipated pattern of returns by the capital gains tax.

The flaw in the capital gains tax, of course, is that of taxing the capital base due to inflation. Given that the rapid turnover of assets imposes greater social costs than lower turnover of assets, and given that this is a penalty that compounds over time, I am strongly in favour of permitting indexation of capital assets for all assets held five years or more.


Utsukushikereba sore de ii

New equity investment into the company is investment in real assets, precisely when it is used to acquire real assets.

However, most "investment" does not finance the acquisition of new real assets ... most nets out inside the financial sector, with a holder of a financial assets swapping with a holder of money: neither an increase in financial assets nor an increase in liquidity, just a change in the distribution of an existing stock.

These are all neoliberal fantasies, repeated to provide ideological cover for the "promotion of saving", and to distract attention from the fact that on average, those that have money to save have more money than those that do not have money to save, and that "inducements to save" are a fancy way of saying welfare for the rich.

The Japanese acquire the services of very clever people to perform their financial capital allocation, just as the pommies and we yanks acquire the service of very clever people to perform our financial capital allocation. However, rather than paying them a slice off the top of the sums they are managing, they pay them a comfortable upper middle class income working in a Ministry, and they get that clever capital allocation for a small fraction of the cost that we pay for a casino system that allocates capital with a minority of its time and effort.


Utsukushikereba sore de ii

An actual, real, funded pension is based on the underlying fact that the organization holding the pension liability cannot simply issue new money, but must intermediate money already in existence in order to meet its contractual obligations.

The government is under no such finance constraint with respect to its own fiat-currency. Its domestic constraints are real, not financial ... the ability and willingness of others to produce goods and services in return for purchasing power, for one, and the impact of its actions on employment, price stability, national economic development, distribution of opportunity, and distribution of income.

Thus when the government holds in one hand as an asset a liability on itself, which it promises to pay out of the other hand with a financial asset consisting of its own liability of a different kind, it is on the one hand not funding anything, in any real sense, and on the other hand there is in itself no intrinsic financial harm to the interests of the future beneficiaries (unlike the Enron analogy), since it is not in the position of requiring an asset base.

Social Security is PAYGO on its own functions direct transfer between the current generations paying in and the generation(s) receiving payment. Since the 1980's, it also collects a surplus on top to shift the tax burden from progressive corporate income taxes to regressive payroll taxes.

And it does so because the top 20% of income earners have more than 50% of the annual income, and since they have more than 90% of the total financial wealth, on average it seems likely that they have more than 90% of the income available to be saved (including of course the income from holding wealth which creates a self-perpetuating aristocracy of wealth). And with that comes the ability to buy the policies that allow them to take a free ride on everyone else.

Certainly under the current US regime's economic underdevelopment policies, with a current account deficit exceeding 6% of GDP, there is not an abundance of aggregate Saving available to offer the entire population the opportunity at wealth accumulation, and given Corporate income earners first crack at retaining earnings for corporate savings and wealth-income's inside track on being recycled into wealth accumulation, there is very little Aggregate Saving available annually to the remainder of the population to allow them to acquire financial wealth.


Utsukushikereba sore de ii