America burns way too much oil. We're wasteful, while Europe is efficient. But if the supply of oil drops due to turmoil in Iran, the U.S. could become more efficient, quickly, by some simple changes to behavior. It would be hard, but perhaps the U.S. would not be in as dire of a situation as Europe. As far as I know this has not been discussed here.

Also there is the problem of Europe having borders with both Iraq and Iran, while the U.S. is several thousands of miles away. What happens when the conflict spills over into Turkey, then Greece, then Bulgaria? Will the Moors return to Spain? I doubt it, but it's a bigger threat to Europe than to the U.S.

If we make it to the end of this year without starting WW-III, and if the Democrats get a majority in Congress, then there is a good chance (I think) of a newly isolationist foreign policy.

Firstly, Iran's civil nuclear programme is some thirty years in the making - the plan that is being worked to was initially developed under the Shah in association with Westinghouse. Whilst there was a cessation of planning in the early years of the Islamic Revolution, the programme was revived in the late eighties and has been gathering pace ever since, in spite of repeated attempts in the early to mid nineties to stymie it.

Iran's own justifications for the programme are plausible and rational - its hydrocarbon reserves are finite, its domestic energy demand is growing, and it makes sense for it to diversify its energy supply system o that it can maintain its stream of export revenues at a time when oil prices are on an ever-upward trajectory. The nuclear industry - and the technical, scientific and managerial skills required to develop it - are key markers of "state modernity", and this is something to which Iran aspires; there is nothing suspect in this.

The key to the dispute is the mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle - which has a dual-use capacity. Iranian officials are quite consistent in their rejection of weaponisation, but they are also quite honest about the strategic benefits of having the capacity to weaponise so as to counter threats ( ie the USA ); this is a purely defensive response and could easily be mitigated if the Bush administration were to repudiate its regime change objectives and sit down at the negotiating table.

As regards the Telegraph story, it is of course possible that the Lynx was downed by a SAM; however, it should be noted that Iraq had thousands of SAM's that were looted from arms dumps, along with a vast array of other weaponry. US and UK officials have been making statements regarding Iran's supply of materiel to insurgents ( unlikely ) and Shia militias ( likely ); they also have a tendency to repudiate many of these statements - the most notable example of late was Rumsfeld saying that they had proof of IED kit being transferred from Iran, and then being explicitly contradicted by Peter Pace, standing at his side, during a Pentagon presser.

The problem with the "finding a pretext" approach is that the Iranians actually have to do something that gives you a pretext; this is just not going to  happen. There is doubtless a dirty war going on in the shadows - bombs go off in Ahvaz or Khorramshah and a few days later MoD squaddies get targetted in Amara or Basra - but this all falls within the realms of covert ops with plausible deniability ON BOTH SIDES.

The UK and US are playing a very dangerous game with this - the Iranians have explicitly said that they have evidence of US and UK involvement in attacks within Iran, and their ability to produce a rabbit out of the hat ( like the 2 SAS men badly disguised as Mehdi army caught in Basra last autumn ) should never, never be underestimated.

In the broad sense, there is no coalition for a war against Iran, that has the potential to escalate wildly out of control very quickly and will, de minimis, cause severe damage to the global economy.

The only country that really wants to do this is Israel ( they've been working on the US to do it since 1991 ) and they have the support of a faction, that is in political difficulty, in Washington. Without a coalition that willingly and overtly involves Iran's neighbours ( ie Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait the UAE, Qatar, Pakistan and other ) and the operational basing/airspace corridor rights that would be necessary, a military strike becomes very, very complicated and highly uncertain in achieving its objectives ( and at this stage you cannot even get a coherent clarification of US objectives with regards to Iran beyond "we'll do anything to avoid talking to them" ).