In the Billmon post you link to:

I'm disappointed to see that even Martin van Creveld, whose work I admire, has fallen prey to the comforting delusion that the situation can be salvaged with ever more destructive applications of firepower:

The problem in Lebanon is not Israel's "excessive" use of violence. Quite the opposite, the real problem could be Israel's extreme reluctance to use a sufficiently high level of force to solve this problem once and for all.

Dr. van Creveld, more than most, should understand where that logic ends in this kind of war: defeat or genocide. For some time now, one of my biggest fears has been that the neocons and their helpmates will finally drag America into a situation in the Midlde East where those are the only choices.

You will remember this:

But the fact is that we lost in Vietnam, and today, despite our vast power, we are only slogging along--if admirably--in Iraq against a hit-and-run insurgency that cannot stop us even as we seem unable to stop it. Yet no one--including, very likely, the insurgents themselves--believes that America lacks the raw power to defeat this insurgency if it wants to. So clearly it is America that determines the scale of this war. It is America, in fact, that fights so as to make a little room for an insurgency.

...

This is a fact that must be integrated into our public life--absorbed as new history--so that America can once again feel the moral authority to seriously tackle its most profound problems. Then, if we decide to go to war, it can be with enough ferocity to win.

And Alan Dershowitz has moved on from redefining torture to redefining civilian, and is clearly on the path to redefining human.

Now tell me how the theory goes that democracies cannot engage in genocide?

Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman

Very,good analysis Colman.

I'll say something over at KOS.

And very perceptive comments also.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

I'd go with the demography, and that was a more conventional conflict, wasn't it? With armies in the field and all that as opposed to real guerilla warfare? Though South Lebanon is a bit of hybrid in that respect.

Right on. In fact, your analysis is more true than you realise: for NATO failed with its loftier original objectives.

First, the war plan was an air war increased in three steps in hope of the regime crumbling: first bombs on Serbian forces in Kosovo, then in all of Yugoslavia, then bombs to wreck the economic background (bombing bridges, refineries, administration buildings far away from Kosovo -- being closest, the senseless destruction of the Danube bridges in Novi Sad are most in my memory). But this plan didn't work out: stage 3 was reached in the first weeks, but still nothing happened, and NATO had no better idea than continue bombing, scrambling to find targets. Finally the regime moved when there was a threat of invasion by ground forces (which I then thought they should have done on day one).

Second, what NATO got from Milošević in the end was not more than what he offered himself in Rambouillet, before the KLA representatives made talks fail. The hoped-for crumbling of the regime as citizens blamed Milo for the destruction of their country didn't happen, in fact it was the opposition that was temporalily weakened, and permanently tainted: while the following in no small part European-shouldered effort to unite and prop up the opposition did result in Milo's overthrow a year later, NATO's bombardement made Yugoslavia more of an economic ruin and made nationalists' job of blame games much easier, resulting in today's mess.

Third, instead of preventing or stopping a genocide, the Serb regular and irregular forces turned a mostly anti-insurgency fight into violent ethnic cleansing after the bombs began to fall -- and KLA and ex-KLA forces began their own ethnic cleansing and murder campaign after the Serbian forces left.

Fourth, the NATO->UN->EU control of Kosovo is also a mess, they proved incapable of damming the ethnic cleansing and the build of organised crime (with Kosovan mafias later controlling a good chunk of European drugs and human smuggling and the modern slave trade called woman trafficking), as they too often resorted to force defence rather than intervene.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

The answer about Serbian case is a little bit more complicated. It would take dissertation to just seriously start to understand it.
Serbs are not suicidal and in their history they learned that there is more then one way to win the war. That does not mean that they are not ready to die for their freedom and land. Have a look at WWI and WWII number of victims. And guerilla war is not unknown in their neck of the woods.
But they need really strong leader and clear goal. Milosevic tried to act as a strong leader (especially at the beginning until his weakness was not revealed) but from the beginning up to the end from his idiotic moves Serbs (or at least half of them) couldn't clearly see what is it that they need to die for...and kill for. Clearly there was no unity (common problem between Serbs), because there was no plan clearly exposed. On the other hand  in a way Serbs haven't finished their WWII civil war between communists and royalists in their heads yet , and Milosevic declaring his self as a communist , ha-ha , had no chance to unite Serbs.  First there was no clear plan in Slovenia and then more important Croatia and destruction of Vukovar have turned most of the nation off our "fight for freedom". It simply was obvious that this is going to be very dirty war on our part.
Serbs in Bosnia were much more successful (in their military effort) because they really felt at home and they had clear military targets. As for Kosovo as much as we feel attached fact is that we have lost most of the territories there by simple fact as birth rate is. So sooner or later we'll have to say goodbye to at least half of it because it's simply not praiseworthy to maintain. Too costly...
But make no mistake if Milosevic did not sign (like he always did sign worse proposal then he had at the first place) and if NATO solders let ground forces enter Serbia the guerilla war would be present till this very day. NATO bombardment managed to unite Serbs as Milosevic him self never would be able. That's why he stayed in power after that.  At the time of bombardment I remember talking to the people there by phone and e-mail and they prayed for Americans to come and fight "face to face" on the ground instead of cowardly "spilling" bombs from the sky. People are proud and hate occupation (like I assume most of other nations and a little bit more).I wonder what would be scenario if any of the western European nations (UK, France for example) would be attacked by NATO and abandoned by everyone else?
Serbs even made jokes during bombardment like when they manage to destroy that "invisible" plane (F16 or what ever was the name).
"Oooopppsss! Sorry we didn't see it"...was their answer. This kind of humor had helped  them to remain sane I suppose.
NATO war with Serbia is definitely not an example to compare with these wars of Middle East.
And Kosovo and Balkan wars are not over yet...they actually are endless...Too much blood has been spilled during centuries and there was never enough time between it for at least one generation to forget about it. I am not going to live long enough to see what if anything these EU memberships (in promise) for ex YU nations can achieve.  

I think it's misleading to talk about war in this way. War, traditionally, means a series of set-piece battles between uniformed soldiers.

I disagree. We have words for all these nuances: guerrilla war, militia, troops can be described as regular or irregular, we have insurgency... It's still war, and "fourth generation warfare" has been with us for 200 years at least. The problem is that sometimes one of the sides is waging the wrong kind of war. As in

We cannot win in Iraq, Hersh said. "We have no intel. We can't find the insurgents. When they bomb something, we only know about it afterward. We can't figure them out. Someone said, 'We play chess, they play Go.' All we can do is lose. All we can do is bomb."

Since Napoleon was kicked out of Spain in 1808-12 it's become increasingly clear that armies cannot beat guerrillas unless they are prepared to massacre the local population.

Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman

The definition of "war" is certainly unsatisfactory.

I don't however that potential embarrassment is sufficient to justify military tactics that both guarantees failure at the strategic level and happens to kill many times more civilians than "necessary".

There was a far simpler reason why the British won in the Malayan Emergency, namely that the Communist Terrorists were drawn exclusively from the minority ethnic Chinese population, and therefore had zero popular support among the Malay majority.

Strange, Mr. Lyon, I've been thinking along those same lines for about 2 years.

Where would you recruit the Colonial Army?

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

I think this is an inaccurate characterization of what is going on. Iran might be an example of a country that is not wanting to do "the bidding of the U.S." in your theory, but in fact it is doing exactly what the U.S. is most interested in.

Since the primary interest of the U.S. (and Europe; don't kid yourself that Europe has a significantly different set of interests than America) is to keep the oil flowing, the way that these small countries could distance themselves from America would be to stop selling oil. But they don't.

Is it not the case that the US armed forces recruit non American citizens from places like Latin America and the Philippines, with the promise of citizenship after 20 years of service (or whatever).

This is the same deal the Roman Empire gave to non-citizens within the Empire and barbarians from outside it. The Romans also threw in land in border areas or newly conquered provinces, as an added incentive for surviving veterans. Thus they filled the ranks of the army and strengthened pro-Roman elements in strategic places.