CDO Paradiso

by afew
Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 03:57:51 AM EST

There's an excellent piece by Alan Kohler in Business Spectator that tells step-by-step the story of the synthetic CDO (collateralized debt obligation) and the threat the large numbers of these taken on by investors in the years between 200 and 2007 poses to the real economy.

The story is too long to be quoted in full here, but go on over there, it's a clear and easy read. Here's the meaty passage (my bold):

Business Spectator - A tsunami of hope or terror?

The bank’s sales people then hit the road to sell this SPV to investors. It’s presented as the bank’s product, and the sales staff pretend that the bank is fully behind it, but of course it’s actually a $2 Cayman Islands company with one or two unknowing charities as shareholders.

It offers a highly-rated, investment-grade, fixed-interest product paying a 1 or 2 per cent premium. Those investors who bother to read the fine print will see that they will lose some or all of their money if seven, eight or nine of a long list of apparently strong global corporations go broke. In 2004-2006 it seemed money for jam. The companies listed would never go broke – it was unthinkable.

Here are some of the companies that are on all of the synthetic CDO reference lists: the three Icelandic banks, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, American Insurance Group, Ambac, MBIA, Countrywide Financial, Countrywide Home Loans, PMI, General Motors, Ford and a pretty full retinue of US home builders.

In other words, the bankers who created the synthetic CDOs knew exactly what they were doing. These were not simply investment products created out of thin air and designed to give their sales people something from which to earn fees – although they were that too.

They were specifically designed to protect the banks against default by the most leveraged companies in the world. And of course the banks knew better than anyone else who they were.

As one part of the bank was furiously selling loans to these companies, another part was furiously selling insurance contracts against them defaulting, to unsuspecting investors
who were actually a bit like “Lloyds Names” – the 1500 or so individuals who back the London reinsurance giant.

Except in this case very few of the “names” knew what they were buying. And nobody has any idea how many were sold, or with what total face value.

It is known that some $2 billion was sold to charities and municipal councils in Australia, but that is just the tip of the iceberg in this country. And Australia, of course, is the tiniest tip of the global iceberg of synthetic CDOs. The total undoubtedly runs into trillions of dollars.

As Kohler points out, several big-name companies named on CDOs have already defaulted or, in the case of AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, part-defaulted. If the number of big-name defaults reaches nine, a huge amount of real money will fall due... to the banks. Which will be awash with capital that the global real economy will be deprived of.

h/t to Jérôme


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Except of course that the CDOs may fall due, but those investors may well not have the money to pay them out...
by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 11:15:58 AM EST
Indeed. Then again, many of them might. What the distribution is is anyone's guess, given that investors in these products are anywhere from private individuals to public bodies to banks themselves...

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 11:40:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The money is already funded upfront by the investors and locked into the CDO. The banks are "safe" (at least, to the extent . But the money is parked in treasuries in the mean time. People don't realize yet that when major tranches get hit, the SPV's will sell off those treasuries (of maturities matching those of the CDO) that are not already part of a collateral agreement with the CDS buyer, and without arbitrageurs to make markets efficient these days, the sovereign yield curve will be warped into outerspace.

Now the best parts:

  • some existing ARM are based on such treasuries
  • all new fixed-rate mortgages are based on such treasuries.

Of course, the "safety" of the banks is limited to the total amount that they locked into synthetic CDOs and CLOs (which I always thought were evil). But that amount is not so much, in the hundreds of billions of dollars, but certainly not in the trillions as the article seems to imply. So at some point, that cashpile may get exhausted too...

Pierre
by Pierre on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 03:25:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, Kohler does ask if activation of the terms of the CDOs might be the cure, as someone will be getting lots of money.  Who would those people be?  If tons of treasuries come onto the market as part of the resolution, this would likely trash the market for new debt in the USA.  Individuals and institutions may be able to play this for profit using inverse ETFs, but everyone else is likely to be screwed big time, especially if it happens before Obama and the new Congress take office.  Could that be why Paulson is sitting on $400 billion of the TARP?

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 03:08:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't think it is enough money to trash the ability of the treasury to issue new debt (they will trash it all by themselves over the years, they have shown they know how to do it).

What it will achieve, is that some dots in the 20-30 yrs part of the yield curve will jump up a weird 0.1-0.5%, no one will be there to smooth it, so long-term rate indices will go up may be 0.2% for the first half of 2009.

And so new fixed-rate mortgage rates will go up by the same amount (also some 20% of ARM who thought they were tied to a secure, non volatile rate index). And that will further depress the equilibrium point of real estate prices by 5%. The market will just never adjust if the target keeps moving. Add in the recession... As real estate keeps tanking, banks will keep sinking, etc, and the spiral turns the recession into depression.

Pierre

by Pierre on Sat Nov 22nd, 2008 at 10:31:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I was against this a month ago, but more and more I'm thinking we should just renege on any contract that wasn't purchased directly as insurance against default.

In other words, if you invested money in one of these lenders, and then you bought a CDS, then you deserve to get your money out.

But for those who purchased the swaps without any stake in the bank itself, well, you go fly a kite.

Maybe we'll give you the fees back from the bank coffers.

But what were you doing in the first place buying these things when you had no stake?

That's on you.

I know this would cause quite an upset in the system, reneging on a legal financial instrument, but look where we are. The instrument itself was only made legal by the likes of shady dealers such as Phil Gramm who helped engineer the Enron scam.

by Upstate NY on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 11:46:39 AM EST
I also suggested canceling all derivative contracts back it seems like an eternity, but I believe it was late September.  Sort of like surgery with a meat cleaver.  Your approach is more appropriately nuanced.  Another idea would be to limit recovery by anyone from investment in these instruments to $100,000 or less  Most of the benefits went to the very wealthy.  The maddening aspect of this is getting anyone with real influence to consider something that might help.  

They know something is wrong and don't like it.  They know that it involves abuses of deregulation, or that some of that deregulation was itself abusive, but they seem unable to see that the whole neo-classical approach was only propaganda to cover systematic looting.  We need to break the spell and reject the entire frame--as a country--as a world economy--while there still are such things remaining to us.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 01:16:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Do it with a meat cleaver or a steak knife, just do it.

As I see it the main current problem is the transition phase we are in now where everyone is holding on to their chips and begging the bank - i.e. Paulson and his collegues around the world - for more.

I think we need transparency more then anything. Removing all these exotic crap is one way, another is forcing greater transparency (and thus faster bankrupcies) so that the new owners can take over, a third would be to put up new institutions of credit and clearly signal that old ones will not be propped up - again causing faster bankrupcies in insolvent companies.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 12:51:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But yeah, the main problem is how the hell we could stand any chance of getting any solution that sacrifices the fictive fortunes of the wealthy in order to create transparency. I have no idea really.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
by A swedish kind of death on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 12:53:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
bankruptcy. Taken wholesale, his idea is unworkable, because the bankruptcy courts would be overwhelmed, and they are slow and easily hindered already.

Targetted, though, it might work. One of the main tricks would be to find honest-broker bankruptcy courts with enough expertise to understand the root problems. It could be a good experiment to run, starting with General Motors, wherein there is enough mutual need among labor, management, politicians, and subsidiary industries to promote some level of unified solutions. Of course, stockholders would be the last served, but isn't there some sort of cliche about risk involved there?

paul spencer

by paul spencer (spencerinthegorge AT yahoo DOT com) on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 12:25:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Allow the choice of CDS either as a form of credit insurance, in which case apply the doctrine of

Insurable Interest

or as a

Contract for Difference

ie an out and out bet.

But not the bastard we have now.

Modern conservatives engage in one of man's oldest exercises in moral philosophy: the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness.Galbraith

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 01:40:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Applying the Insurable Interest doctrine here would seem the most appropriate.  It would seem to simply void a large part of the CDO market.  It would seem that this doctrine would be a natural part of the legal defense of individuals or institutions claiming to have been deceived as to the nature of the transaction.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 03:15:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Frankly I do not see the banks getting load of cash with the redemption of CDO : if that happens it will be because the Companies are bankrupt and therefore are unable to repay their liabilities to the banks.

I doubt the CDO will compensate for the write-off.

 

by fredouil (fredouil@gmailgmailgmail.com) on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 12:55:39 PM EST
and by the way, the trillions of $ to be repaid in case of massive redemption of CDOs, do not exist, banks will never see the cash.
by fredouil (fredouil@gmailgmailgmail.com) on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 12:59:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Agreed. The cash goes away in the crash. But they might take over the resources left.

I think it was the crash in the railroad sector in Germany (late 19th century) that made the banks huge industrial owners for a long time. And I know that the Krueger crash made the banking family Wallenberg industrial barons of Sweden.

And I do not think that in any of those cases they had a political class willing to give them lots of taxpayer money to buy up the real economy.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 12:42:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Asset deflation means that $ liquidity (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Chase, China, Saudi Arabia, etc.) goes further and further. All of this 'wealth'-transfer via the price inflation of the last few years, plus the current give-aways, has concentrated US$. Now the bursting of the bubble(s) clears the way for massive asset transfer.

paul spencer
by paul spencer (spencerinthegorge AT yahoo DOT com) on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 12:34:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
See Pierre's comment above.

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 02:04:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Today I got turned on to the best explanation of how the CDO's exceeded -vastly- in number the mortgages that supposedly underlied them.
A great article, a great but scary story. Relates directly to the story told above. One I needed to understand what's happened.

Have you ever shorted stock?
Shorting involves a technical purchase of a stock.
If you believe a share in a company will decline in price, you can short sell it. You don't own it- but you buy (borrow?) "imaginary" shares, and sell them at the current price. Money from your sale of shares goes into limbo, but at a future time, you will need to purchase the shares, (buy to cover) to give them back to the borrower (original owner, sort of) and hopefully sell them at the current(lower) price, (if all this works), and pocket the difference.
Here's a totally different view of a short sell--one in which the shorter actually creates a market for dog shit.  It goes a long way toward explaining not only how we came to give Paulson a trillion or two, but the psychology that leads to stories like the one above.
The End


You have to understand this," he says. "This was the engine of doom." Then he draws a picture of several towers of debt. The first tower is made of the original subprime loans that had been piled together. At the top of this tower is the AAA tranche, just below it the AA tranche, and so on down to the riskiest, the BBB tranche--the bonds Eisman had shorted. But Wall Street had used these BBB tranches--the worst of the worst--to build yet another tower of bonds: a "particularly egregious" C.D.O. The reason they did this was that the rating agencies, presented with the pile of bonds backed by dubious loans, would pronounce most of them AAA. These bonds could then be sold to investors--pension funds, insurance companies--who were allowed to invest only in highly rated securities. "I cannot fucking believe this is allowed--I must have said that a thousand times in the past two years," Eisman says.

His dinner companion in Las Vegas ran a fund of about $15 billion and managed C.D.O.'s backed by the BBB tranche of a mortgage bond, or as Eisman puts it, "the equivalent of three levels of dog shit lower than the original bonds."
investors in this thing."

Whatever rising anger Eisman felt was offset by the man's genial disposition. Not only did he not mind that Eisman took a dim view of his C.D.O.'s; he saw it as a basis for friendship. "Then he said something that blew my mind," Eisman tells me. "He says, `I love guys like you who short my market. Without you, I don't have anything to buy.' "

That's when Eisman finally got it. Here he'd been making these side bets with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the BBB tranche without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to make the bets. Now he saw. There weren't enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product. The firms used Eisman's bet to synthesize more of them. Here, then, was the difference between fantasy finance and fantasy football: When a fantasy player drafts Peyton Manning, he doesn't create a second Peyton Manning to inflate the league's stats. But when Eisman bought a credit-default swap, he enabled Deutsche Bank to create another bond identical in every respect but one to the original. The only difference was that there was no actual homebuyer or borrower. The only assets backing the bonds were the side bets Eisman and others made with firms like Goldman Sachs. Eisman, in effect, was paying to Goldman the interest on a subprime mortgage. In fact, there was no mortgage at all. "They weren't satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money to buy a house they couldn't afford," Eisman says. "They were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! That's why the losses are so much greater than the loans. But that's when I realized they needed us to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?"


Read the article. A prize.

Grabbing what you can, as John Ruskin said, isn't any less wicked when you grab it with the power of your brains than with the power of your fists.
by geezer in Paris (risico at wanadoo(flypoop)fr) on Wed Nov 19th, 2008 at 02:24:58 PM EST
Thanks Geezer.

I always enjoy reading Michael Lewis.

Great find!

I reread Liar's Poker, starting in late September.

It's sitting on a piece of furniture, four feet behind me, as I type this.

It's the best book on American investment banking and brokerage in the 80s that I have ever read.

And it seems a very appropriate read in these times.

"When the abyss stares at me, it wets its pants." Brian Hopkins

by EricC on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 06:06:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Second the recommendation.  It enables you to much better understand the scope and nature of the current problem, as well as its origin.  And it is very sobering.  That is why it is important that we get good people in charge of the legal system before this financial tsunami hits.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 03:23:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]

An excellent complement to Michael Lewis's article above is a multipart series by John Sakowicz on the US economy. It's impossible to find them all in one place, so I made a table of contents on my blog. Make yourself a cup of tea, put your feet up, and enjoy (?)



We're trapped in the belly of this horrible machine, and the machine is bleeding to death.
by davel on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 04:13:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks for the link, davel. I'll be reading Sakowicz.

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Thu Nov 20th, 2008 at 04:17:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
See also Michael Hudson in the Nov. 17 CounterPunch, excerpted in ET here.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer on Fri Nov 21st, 2008 at 02:02:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]


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