European Tribune

Soros on politics

by Migeru
Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 02:33:53 AM EST

I just read George Soros' latest book, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What it Means. My original interest was in reading about his theory of Reflexivity and his associated model for financial bubbles. Then I thought I would quote what he has to say about Market Fundamentalism and how the current Crisis might spell the end of it. But I think today I'll just quote him on what he calls "the Postmodern Idiom" and how it makes Popper's "Open Society" vulnerable.
Yet, in spite of my preoccupation with the concept of reflexivity, I failed to recognize a flaw in Popper's concept of open society: that political discourse is not necessarily directed at the pursuit of truth. I believe Popper and I made these mistakes because of our preoccupation with the pursuit of truth. Fortunately, these errors are not fatal because the case for critical thinking remains unimpaired and the mistakes can be corrected: we can recognize a difference between the natural and social sciences, and we can introduce the pursuit of truth as a requirement for an open society.


In the last sentence he's referring to Karl Popper's Unity of Method. Popper emphasised the concept of Falsifiability as the requirement for a theory to be scientific, and furthermore required that the same scientific method be applied both to natural and social science. Soros argues that social sciences, including economics, should be considered historical and so that the scientific method doesn't apply in the same way.

Reflexivity refers to the way that not only people react to their perceptions of the outside world, but also how their actions influence the very world they're responding to, introducing a feedback loop into social phenomena with unavoidable elements of error and uncertainty (since perceptions are necessarily imperfect) that sets them apart from natural phenomena. Soros argues that economics, in particular financial economics, fails to take this into account. I would say that social phenomena share with ecology an evolutionary character, but the reflexivity Soros talks about is present only in social events and so while ecology might be subject to the standard scientific method, sociology is not (and neither is economics). Soros claims that Sociology and Anthropology don't even try (and that is a good thing!) to be "scientific".

The postmodern attitude towards reality is much more dangerous. While it has stolen a march on the Enlightenment by discovering that reality can be manipulated, it does not recognize the pursuit of truth as a requirement. Consequently, it allows the manipulation of reality to go unhindered. Why is that so dangerous? Because in the absence of proper understanding the results of the manipulation are liable to be radically different from the expectations of the manipulators. One of the most successful instances of manipulation was when President George W Bush declared a War on Terror and used it to invade Iraq on false pretenses. The outcome was the exact opposite of what he intended: He wanted to demonstrate American supremacy and garner political support in the process, but he caused a precipitous decline in American power and influence and lost political support in the process.
The extent of the vulnerability of an "open society" to manipulation and propaganda seems to have been realised by Soros only very recently. In the book he says he came to wonder how it was possible for Orwellian propaganda techniques to be successful in a relatively open society without the need for the totalitarian repressive apparatus that Orwell imagined in 1984. The reality-based community episode is quoted in full to illustrate the nature of the problem:
In the summer of 2002, after I had written an article in Esquire that the White House didn't like about Bush's former communications director, Karen Hughes, I had a meeting with a senior adviser to Bush. He expressed the White House's displeasure, and then he told me something that at the time I didn't fully comprehend -- but which I now believe gets to the very heart of the Bush presidency.

The aide said that guys like me were "in what we call the reality-based community," which he defined as people who "believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality." I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. "That's not the way the world really works anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."

Soros has no qualms about identifying this "aide" as "presumably Karl Rove" and referring to Rove in the sequel every time he needs to personify a "postmodern" manipulation of reality with disregard for the "truth". This is the "Postmodern Idiom" that Soros says has supplanted the "Enlightenment Fallacy".
To guard against the dangers of manipulation, the concept of open society originally formulated by Karl Popper needs to be modified in an important respect. What Popper took for granted needs to be introduced as a an explicit requirement. Popper assumed that the purpose of critical thinking is to gain a better understanding of reality. That is true in science but not in politics. The primary purpose of political discourse is to gain power and to stay in power. Those who fail to understand this are unlikely to be in power. The only way in which politicians can be persuaded to pay more respect to reality is by the electorate insisting on it, rewarding those whom it considers truthful and insightful, and punishing those who engage in deliberate deception. In other words, the electorate needs to be more committed to the pursuit of truth than it is at present. Without such commitment, democratic politics will not produce the desired results. An open society can be only as virtuous as the people living in it.
Truisms, maybe, but it is important to realise that the Enlightenment and its political system (liberal democracy) have fallen victims to propaganda, maybe as a result of their own success.
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I'll return in the evening with more quotes from the book to clarify any points you may bring up in the comments.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 06:32:31 AM EST
European Tribune - Soros on politics
maybe as a result of their own success.

do you mean that the spread of cheap/free communication media permitted the more intense use of propaganda?

i've been wondering about soros, is he our friend?

his actions puzzle me sometimes,and his intentions are obscure, does he play both sides of the net?

"That millions of people share the same form of mental pathology does not make those people sane." Eric Fromm

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 08:11:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Also that the 'scientific' study of propaganda techniques is a result of the success of the Enlightenment project applied to the understanding of human communication.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 08:14:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Enlightenment never explicitly addressed morality. There were moral implications, but there has never been any notion of a 'moral method' which carries the same kind of weight as the 'scientific method.'

One of the moral implications is the perfect sovereignty of the individual, which leads naturally to late capitalism.

Unfortunately it's a doomed moral position. Perfect individual sovereignty isn't reality based, and leads to disasters on small and epic scales.

If there's going to be a re-Enlightenment it's going to need a morality of context and relationship which balances personal freedom with a rational awareness of consequences.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 08:37:40 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Enlightenment never explicitly addressed morality.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is supposed to be the pinnacle of Enlightenment Ethics. Whether the Categorical Imperative counts as a "moral method" is debatable. It certainly has not been attained the same widespread accceptance as the "scientific method".

Veblen traces liberal ethics back to Locke's idea of natural rights.

The modern theories of property run back to Locke, or to some source which for the present purpose is equivalent to Locke; who, on this as on other institutional questions, has been proved by the test of time to be a competent spokesman for modern culture in these premises. A detailed examination of how the matter stood in the theoretical respect before Locke, and whence, and by what process of selection and digestion, Locke derived his views, would lead too far afield. The theory is sufficiently familiar, for in substance it is, and for the better part of two centuries has been, held as an article of common sense by nearly all men who have spoken for the institution of property, with the exception of some few and late doubters.

This modern European, common-sense theory says that ownership is a "Natural Right." What a man has made, whatsoever "he hath mixed his labor with," that he has thereby made his property. It is his to do with it as he will. He has extended to the object of his labor that discretionary control which in the nature of things he of right exercises over the motions of his own person. It is his in the nature of things by virtue of his having made it. "Thus labor, in the beginning, gave a right of property." The personal force, the functional efficiency of the workman shaping material facts to human use, is in this doctrine accepted as the definitive, axiomatic ground of ownership; behind this the argument does not penetrate, except it be to trace the workman's creative efficiency back to its ulterior source in the creative efficiency of the Deity, the "Great Artificer." With the early spokesmen of natural rights, whether they speak for ownership or for other natural rights, it is customary to rest the case finally on the creator's discretionary dispositions and workmanlike efficiency. But the reference of natural rights back to the choice and creative work of the Deity has, even in Locke, an air of being in some degree perfunctory; and later in the life-history of the natural-rights doctrine it falls into abeyance; whereas the central tenet, that ownership is a natural right resting on the productive work and the discretionary choice of the owner, gradually rises superior to criticism and gathers axiomatic certitude. The Creator presently, in the course of the eighteenth century, drops out of the theory of ownership.

I might have to go back and read Locke...

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 08:44:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is
I mean Critique of Practical Reason, of course.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 09:02:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Categorical Imperative has always been a bit of an ethical dodo. It begs too many questions, even in the original German.

It's certainly not rigorous, and the idea that there's such a thing as 'universal law' which applies equally to every individual in similar situations is really rather silly.

A more basic moral problem seems to be that a minority of individuals sees power as an end in itself, while a majority see mutual support as an end in itself.

Another segment of the population will happily follow whatever morality it's told to follow without questioning it.

It probably isn't possible to reconcile those positions. I'd guess the best you can hope for is creating a framework in which predators are forced to justify their existence by creating positive outcomes rather than disastrous ones.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 09:36:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So there has never been any notion of a 'moral method' because there cannot be one?

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 09:50:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not without explicitly defining practical aims, no.

'Democracy' is not a practical aim, it's an abstract ideal. Which is why it's so easy to hijack the word and make it mean 'Colonial rule by an installed thug' - and keep a straight face.

'Open access to policy influence without filtering by cash or caste' is more of a practical aim.

Of course it's not any kind of philosophical absolute. But it doesn't need to be - it just needs to create results which everyone can experience directly.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 10:09:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not without explicitly defining practical aims, no.

That, then turns ethics into a political problem because you need to get a large supermajority of the population to agree to the practical aims before they can agree on what constitutes ethical behaviour.

Individual sovereignty, however unrealistic and ultimately destructive, is an easy sell.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 10:16:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Migeru:
That, then turns ethics into a political problem

Ethics is always a political problem - abstract ethics become meaningless without practical relationships with other people and the environment.

Individual sovereignty, however unrealistic and ultimately destructive, is an easy sell.

Exactly. But it's inherently and automatically corrosive to practical relationships - unless it's tempered with some other more inclusive ethical basis.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 01:05:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But how do you sell an inclusive ethical basis without people defining themselves in exclusive tribal ways?

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 02:37:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
With a politics of relationships, rather than a politics of groups. If certain actions and kinds of relationships are seen as immoral, tribal groupings are less likely to matter.

One of those relationship types has to be a comprehensive innoculation against charismatic leader/follower relationships.

It would probably be better still to round up all the predators and keep a close and permanent eye on them.

If you deal with the predators effectively, I think everything else gets very much easier. It's the predators who parasitise tribalism, and without out them it becomes much less of a problem.

I'm not sure what 'deal with' would mean in practice. I'm certainly not proposing shooting them all - more some sort of formal oversight and rechanneling of energies, with limited freedom for those who can't contribute.

Of course this seems draconian, and it goes against our indoctrination into the mythology of perfect personal freedom. But it's less draconian than allowing Hitlers, Mugabes and Bushes to run things. Because all they'll do is round up people anyway - and probably kill them too, one way or another.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 05:21:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
If you deal with the predators effectively

problem being that to do that you need predators, of an incorruptible character, to boot.

then how do you keep them honest?

eliot spitzer comes to mind...

"That millions of people share the same form of mental pathology does not make those people sane." Eric Fromm

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Tue Sep 9th, 2008 at 04:27:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Don't expect your official predator of predators to be choirboys.  Hold them accountable for their public actions, but be aware that they may transgress on a personal level.  Easier to do for appointed rather than elected officials.  Police get cut a lot of slack for the  known effects of doing what they have to do.  Cultivate a public service ethic for these enforcers and be certain that the public face of such enforcement is always a career enforcer with civil service protection, not an elected official.  Tall order, but not impossible.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Tue Sep 9th, 2008 at 09:35:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
 Tall order, but not impossible.

i'd love to believe that, it would take genetic manipulation.

i hate it, the chinese do it, and we haven't for a while, (nuremberg notwithstanding) but execution would be the only fate that would put the fear of godde into them enough to stay on the straight and narrow, and even then some psycho risk-junkies would crap out, just to see if they could.

it's just so hard to eradicate selfishness and the corollary disprespect once it's installed in the person's OS from childhood, until we raise everyone with a conscience people will act out, and never so much as when they can gamble everything on it...

same reasons priests rape kids, the thrill of what's taboo, sociopathic urge to push the envelope in living a double life...

if you can't find /or have blocked out real, then the ache of life lacking meaning can give rise to a compulsion in some to go to the other edge, to live life with greater complexity and inner drama than what most accept more or less grumblingly...

that's what happens when adult bodies encase immature, unevolved value systems, it's fucked but there it is.

extreme fear would keep them straight, until we raise enough generations right, without implanting the terrible fears and insecurities, the existential dread that then gets covered up by anger, slow or fast-burning, because. their. life. should. be. better. than. this. they. got. gypped. and. someone. is. going. to. pay.

whoa this sounds like i'm channeling tony perkins on his way to the shower...

raise 'em right, or have to go medieval on 'em later.
cast secret ballots for who gets to be executioner, and of course cut him/her some slack over and above the fat paycheck (to pay for therapy?), hell they should have given eliot all the naughties he wanted, he was sticking it the Man, (as well as his 'escorts'!

semi-snark

"That millions of people share the same form of mental pathology does not make those people sane." Eric Fromm

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 05:40:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It would probably be better still to round up all the predators and keep a close and permanent eye on them.

If you deal with the predators effectively, I think everything else gets very much easier. It's the predators who parasitise tribalism, and without out them it becomes much less of a problem.

The problem is that those you call "predators" are not a specific, predetermined category. Most of the people, including probably you and me can become a "predator" (or behave like one) in certain situations. And it is impossible to predict if somebody could become a "predator" or not. History is full of examples of people who started as selfless idealists and, once in power (or after a certain time in power) started to behave as "predators"...

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char

by Melanchthon on Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 06:50:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
'moral method'

In this sense "moral" or "morality" derives from the latin mores, which in some of its senses referred to what was right according to custom and was understood to vary from society to society: e.g. sexual customs were  known to vary from one group of people to another and what was right depended on the customs or mores of that society.  There was multi-culturalism even in Roman times!

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 01:10:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Montesque understood this clearly.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 01:10:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That's why I prefer ethics to morals. But as TBG points out, ethics is platonic.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 02:40:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And as currently applied, ethics has become compromised by ethno-centric morality to such an extent as to often make it an oxymoron.

We need a new term adequate to the task at hand.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 03:02:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
a minority of individuals sees power as an end in itself, while a majority see mutual support as an end in itself

That minority of power individuals looks pretty cooperative among themselves, while the majority does actually very little for mutual support. How much of their effort is not directed towards minute needs of themselves or serving the power minority? There seems to be little confidence that doing good to others is reasonable.

by das monde on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 10:07:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The idea that doing good to others isn't reasonable is, in part, a consequence of the adoption of (narrowly defined) economic rationality as a standard of correct behavior.

Dan Ariely's book, Predictably Irrational, among its other virtues, describes experimental behavioral economics results that reveal the fragility of social norms when these are forced into competition with market norms. It's a fascinating and sometimes profoundly disturbing book. I highly recommend it, even to those who have been casually following the literature in the area. (Fun to read, too.)

Words and ideas I offer here may be used freely and without attribution.

by technopolitical on Tue Sep 9th, 2008 at 02:57:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
A more basic moral problem seems to be that a minority of individuals sees power as an end in itself....

The Authoritarians.

Another segment of the population will happily follow whatever morality it's told to follow without questioning it.

The authoritarian followers.

....while a majority see mutual support as an end in itself

The proverbial 'good men and women who mustn't stand idly by whilst evil flourishes'.

Have you read any of the above linked Professors' book? Or did I hear about it here from you? It's pretty much an expounding of your comment.

by gioele (gioele(daught)sandler(aaaattttt)gmail(daught)kom) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 01:50:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's been the background to a lot of comments here over the last year or so.
by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 05:22:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The French Enlightenment and its American adherents appealed to the Judgment of Posterity.  What must be kept in mind while dealing with the effects of the Enlightenment is that it was a phenomena of elites.  It could function quite effectively in the world of the late 18th Century through the middle of the 19th Century, as elites were all that mattered to governance.

Enlightenment attitudes never penetrated very deep into the general population, in fact, well less than 50% by my estimate in our contemporary USA.  And the Enlightenment greatly over estimated the role and power of reason. That has led to an academic devaluation of the "soft sciences" which, due to problems of verifiability and falsifiability, are actually much "harder" to do, in some senses.

Cognitive scientists such as George Lakoff work against a "credibility gap" compared to physicists and chemists and brilliant synthesizers of the work of modern psychology, such as Ken Wilber and Integral Psychology go completely unnoticed.  Wilber's work shines a bright light on our current problems while unifying inner perception with the external physical and social worlds.  He also unifies psychological observations from the Vedas to the present day into a comprehendible whole while providing the best exposition of pre-modern to modern to post-modern I have found.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 05:30:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Enlightenment attitudes never penetrated very deep into the general population,

I beg to differ: enlightenment ideas disseminated widely in the XIXth century middle class as well as working class. A lot of more or less clandestine "societies" fed a lively debate about the future society. It led to the creation of both trade unions and co-operatives and, eventually of the socialist movement.

It stayed quite lively (with ups and downs) throughout most of the XXth century until the end of the 70s. The Reagan-Thatcher neo-liberal counter-revolution promoting selfishness and individualism clearly targeted it ("there is no such thing as society") and heavily damaged it. However, it still exists in many places.    

"Ne te courbe que pour aimer..." René Char

by Melanchthon on Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 07:03:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Forgive my ignorance, but I am unable to follow what you (and others) actually mean by the End of Enlightenment. Just what do you call the Enlightenment?

My understanding is that the Enlightenment is a label for a set of ideas which center on applying rational thinking to all aspects of the world. In this viewpoint, the modern world is as irreconcilably wedded to the Enlightenment as can be, and talking of the end seems nonsensical, no?

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 08:50:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In the USA in the late 1960s Time Magazine published an edition with "God is Dead" on the cover.  That didn't seem so unreasonable an assertion at the time.  But it deeply upset the fundamentalists and provoked a reaction. We know the problems with polls, but polls have been taken that show that a substantial majority of US citizens doubt that life is accounted for by evolution and prefer the story of divine creation.  The whole enlightenment project is under assault in the USA.

One of the most disastrous unintended consequences of the Bill of Rights springs from the 1st Amendments bar on the establishment of religion.  In European countries which have or have had established religions religious belief has withered much more thoroughly than in the USA. Perhaps we should establish a state sponsored Church of the Living God in the USA and let all of the fundamentalists duke it out for control.  Then they would be so busy fighting about religion that they would have no time for politics!

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Thu Sep 11th, 2008 at 02:56:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
See Israel for a possible counterexample.

The effect of state sponsored religion on the non-religious is probably similar to what has happened in Europe. But the combination of state support and benefits, together with a high birthrate, is resulting in a gradual takeover of the country by the fundamentalists (which, like all unsustainable trends, can't go on for ever, but it's anybody's guess at what point it will stop). Do you really want to take the risk that the U.S would be more like Europe?

by gk (g k quattro due due sette "at" gmail.com) on Thu Sep 11th, 2008 at 03:34:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Truth be told, I am simultaneously being facetious and grasping at straws.  Were the same dynamic of deference to the fundamentalist by much of the still somewhat religious population occur in the US, as appears to me to occur in Israel that could be very negative.  However, the diversity of fundamentalists in the USA could make things more interesting here.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Thu Sep 11th, 2008 at 12:12:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You can't use the European example. In Europe, the secular branches of the states had just finished doing an Atatürk on the then-established church and were setting up a new one that would be firmly under the boot of the secular powers that were (at least in the parts of Europe where this gambit worked - it didn't do much good for the counter-reformed countries...).

There is a variety of reasons - most of them very good - that pulling an Atatürk on a modern, reasonably democratic society would be A Bad Idea.

- Jake

Ceterum censeo Chicago esse delendam

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Sep 11th, 2008 at 02:07:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What seems to be at its end is the commitment of the ruling elites to rationality.

Many of the 18th Century Enlightened philosophers were ministers to their respective kings, and the Enlightenment has been an elite project.

Nowadays, when the elite subscribes to Market Fundamentalism and the political class shows time an again an appalling ignorance of the scientific/technical underpinnings of the way our modern world is organised, it is just conceivable that "the modern world" might unravel through wrong-headed management.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 06:11:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I've often wondered how much the Enlightenment was really the political code for a war on theocratic Rome. 'Reason' and 'Freedom' were implicitly - and sometimes not so implicitly - opposed to authoritarian religion and its top down model.

Once the Market Fundamentalists co-opted those words they started to mean their opposites, and lost their potency.

This has actually been a semiotic war. There are plenty of examples of semiotic war from the end of the dark ages onwards, with people writing each other letters and arguing to define reality.

But the Market Fundamentalists have run one of the fastest and most successful semantic campaigns in history, completely debasing and perverting concepts which otherwise showed real promise and squeezing out competing narratives with terrifying effectiveness.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 06:39:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]
According to Koselleck's wonderful Kritik und Krise the (French) enlightenment was certainly an elite project, albeit of a bourgeois elite which lived – by way of the architecture of the absolutist (French) state – in complete ignorance of and uninvolved with the political sphere, whence their trenchant and condescending moralising.

So they were certainly not “ministers to their respective kings”, of which Koselleck writes that they were, on the contrary, to “agree with the king against their own agony”.

by Humbug (mailklammeraffeschultedivisstrackepunktde) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 05:26:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have to differ with you on that. I believe that the current ruling elites are very strongly committed to rationality, when it comes to their own affairs. As private persons, they trust their money to highly educated specialists (bankers, accountants...), they expect their kids to be exposed to the best learning institutions. In government, when it comes to their own military protection, the ruling elites prefer again and again to invest in extremely expensive technological solutions. The middle levels of government are staffed with many highly educated technocrats, who know their stuff.

I could go on, but you already see my point: whenever the elites act for their own benefit, they still prefer to surround themselves with experts, as a rule. This is not the case when they make decisions for others, and there is a lot more mismanagement there. We like to gripe about all our governments' failures in the Middle East, on health issues, retirement funds, etc., yet do those failures truly affect the elites as much as the rest of society? I don't think so.

The difference is not that great from the 18th century either. Kings' ministers didn't rule *for* the common people then, nor do they now. Social progress did occur, but it was paid for in blood. And today ministers have MBAs and PhDs, which admittedly didn't exist in the 18th century...

--
$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 01:19:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Enlightenment evolved out of necessity. It may indeed have had its philosophical and ideological concepts elaborated by the elite but it was to affront the evident shortcomings and bankruptcy of the absolutist models. If one inquires into issues such as the administration of justice, the waging of wars, the resistance of feudal concepts, recurrent popular uprisings and taxation for example, it is apparent that there was the humus and the need for change.

Louis XIV reactive absolutist reign owes much to la fronde upheaval that would have granted new powers to the parliament and the judiciary. The defeat of la fronde "exiled" progressive thought to the parlors (the salons) and the province. The fables of La Fontaine are political treatise, just as the careful extraordinary works of the Bordeaux landholder Montaigne.

It is fitting that Louis XIV left the state in shambles. His reign simply postponed an inevitable revolution.

I do find that qualifying any major intellectual movement as elite is reductive and somewhat a tautology. There are simple requirements for philosophical speculation in periods of repressive zeitgeist- education, free time, a minimum guarantee of livelihood, a tolerated or clandestine network for the diffusion of works, a knack for dissimulation. It is rare that a serf or peasant could fill the bill. In the rare occasions someone rose from the lower classes, usually through the Church, he or she became "elite."

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 08:03:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Rousseau is the most prominent exemple, although he didn't rise through the Church.

Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.
by linca (antonin POINT lucas AROBASE gmail.com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 09:05:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Another meaning of The End of Enlightenment is as follows. One of the central tenets of the Enlightenment is its universality (since it is based on reason and empiricism, it is independent of culture). It can be argued (and has been on this site) that the Enlightenment ended up undermining itself by showing this tenet to be false.

The Enlightenment sought to apply the scientific method that had been so successful in Physics to all branches of knowledge. In the late 18th century saw the great Naturalists began the transformation from Natural History to Biology and Geology. But in the humanities you had people like Humboldt (also a naturalist) who also laid the groundwork for Anthropology. And the thing is, the success of cultural anthropology in the 20th century has been to realise to what extent culture influences the way we reason about and perceive the world (i.e., the rational and empirical basis of the Enlightenment approach are culturally determined). In this way, the scientific study of human culture shows that the Enlightenment is itself a culture and not universal. This is the truth at the core of the Postmodern reaction to the Enlightenment.

Now that people wedded to the Enlightenment values are beginning to realise what's going on, we might have a positive resolution that goes beyond both the Enlightenment and Postmodernism. Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis? That would be a Hegelian happy ending...

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 06:50:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Another approach to the End of Enlightement is that its unspoken assumption that with the spread of education and democracy, people will behave more ethically, was proven brutally wrong by the rise of Hitler and his use of the full arsenal of progress brought by the Englightement to control Germany, fight wars, and execute the Holocaust. This is what the 2002 winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature, Holocaust survivor Imre Kertész, contends.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
by DoDo on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 07:13:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Indeed, martingale contends in a parallel subthread:
Secondly, I don't see how the fact that a significant population is for all intents and purposes uneducated on these values can matter. In the 18th century (or 19th century for that matter), universal education was nonexistent, yet those are commonly associated with the Enlightenment. Surely, today's near universal levels of education in rich societies compares very favorably?
The value of democracy and universal education also features prominently in the writings of the 19th Century liberals such as John Stuart Mill.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 07:23:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I would suspect that values, whether national or universal, are more effectively inculcated through propaganda and repetition rather than education. While martingale notes that education had not reached present day levels in the 18th century Europe, the French citizen, for example, was systematically exposed to the words liberté, egalité, fraternité as slogans or signs. Their presence on monuments and buildings calls the formula to one's attention. Such signs became internalized and fundamental to public discourse. Perhaps one could call them "public axioms" such as the ubiquitous word "God" in the USA today.

While education is far more substantial in "fixing" ideals and values, cultural signposts serve to ground that knowledge as a shared experience. Without public recognition of values, they become a private experience. A sort of deregulation or outsourcing toward sporadic and local selfish charities.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 12:57:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Mig
One of the central tenets of the Enlightenment is its universality (since it is based on reason and empiricism, it is independent of culture). It can be argued (and has been on this site) that the Enlightenment ended up undermining itself by showing this tenet to be false.

It is easy to conflate the "Enlightenment" with "Modernity," which was one of its children.  Another Enlightenment value was that social status should be based on merit, not birth.  It is also easy to forget that "western liberal democracy" was not the only political offspring of the Enlightenment.  

The other notable political offspring was the Soviet State. They embraced the same universal values as the others.  It can be argued that they were much more effective in identifying and nurturing talent wherever it was found than were most "western democracies."  

Universality proved very useful to the governance of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society. They had no use for nationalism or racism with so many nationalities and ethnicities.  Religion was suppressed in the name of rationality.  I am, of course, referring to the official dogma, not actual practice.  Apples to apples, as it were.

Since 1989 we have seen a general retreat from universal values and a rise of nationalisms.  This has  become the context to the rise of market fundamentalism.  But these universal values were never too well rooted anywhere, and were repeatedly overwhelmed by nationalism and racism in the 19th and 20th centuries.

 

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 01:07:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The other notable political offspring was the Soviet State. They embraced the same universal values as the others.
It is ironic that we forget the Russians so easily, since their stubborn insistence on using Realpolitik for everything is such an obvious nuisance to our revered mass media commentators.

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 02:15:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This reminds me of something else you(?) wrote earlier, that the social sciences are examples of historical sciences rather than experimental sciences. The "hard" sciences have an advantage, in that reality is objectively measurable any number of times. There is no need for interpretation when observing the output of an experiment, although it is satisfying.

By contrast, historical sciences require interpretation, because alternative histories cannot ever be observed. It's obvious that interpretation has a degree of arbitrariness, which the postmodernists have rightly pointed out.

Yet in Physics, postmodernism has no place. The primary authority is the experimental result, and the interpretation is merely a convenient summary which can always be replaced or ignored. It is a second tool for answering questions, which complements the experiment, which can always be performed.

Does your Hegelian dialectic count as universal if it applies only to a subset of human knowledge? ;-)

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 01:56:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You exaggerate greatly when you say
The primary authority is the experimental result, and the interpretation is merely a convenient summary which can always be replaced or ignored.
Experiments need a theory to even describe what is going on, or if their result is surprising, why it is surprising.

But, in addition, the history of physics is as much the history of the theories as it is the history of the experiments. Or, in fact, more about theory than about experiment, with key experiments punctuating the transitions between successive theories. Don't get me wrong, I still agree with Sokal when he said

I confess that I'm an unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help the working class. And I'm a stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that there exist objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them. (If science were merely a negotiation of social conventions about what is agreed to be ``true'', why would I bother devoting a large fraction of my all-too-short life to it? I don't aspire to be the Emily Post of quantum field theory.)
and yet, and yet...

It is physics that represents a small subset of human knowledge. In fact, the more physics we know the less we need to know as the theories become more and more generally applicable. But for the last 30 years theoretical physics has become largely divorced from experiment. Instead of moving en masse to mesoscopic physics, theoretical high-energy physicists have marched onwards in pursuit of unification and quantum gravity with no experimental hints, with know (disastrous) results. The extent to which research in theoretical physics is directed by the likelihood of coming up with a publishable paper to put in one's CV for the next job placement 3 years down the line is positively postmodern.

Finally, "my" Hegelian dialectic is not about "Knowledge" but about structural narratives/frames/myths of a society.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 03:13:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Experiments need a theory to even describe what is going on, or if their result is surprising, why it is surprising.
I don't agree. The results speak for themselves, whatever they are. When observations are published for posterity in journals and reports, it is with the understanding that the theory which is also included with the data might turn out to be wrong, but the data itself can be trusted (within experimental limits etc) and may be reused by others in future.

Why publish actual data otherwise? It would be sufficient to publish the theories, and just claim that they work.

However, you're entirely right that the choice of which experiments are significant (and therefore are the ones that should be carried out and published) depends on the theories of the day. So the succession of experiments is guided by the history of the theories. Is that what you mean?

It is physics that represents a small subset of human knowledge. In fact, the more physics we know the less we need to know as the theories become more and more generally applicable. But for the last 30 years theoretical physics has become largely divorced from experiment.
Now I think you're exaggerating too :) Physics is certainly a tiny subset of knowledge, but it's far from clear that we're close to a GUT. And if we were, so what? We still wouldn't be able to calculate a lot of systems for fundamental mathematical reasons. Paraphrasing Arnold: theoretical physics is the part of high energy physics where experiments are cheap.

The extent to which research in theoretical physics is directed by the likelihood of coming up with a publishable paper to put in one's CV for the next job placement 3 years down the line is positively postmodern.
Publish or perish is not just an issue in theoretical physics, yet even so good papers (though not all) will be cited, while the trash gets forgotten.

Finally, "my" Hegelian dialectic is not about "Knowledge" but about structural narratives/frames/myths of a society.
My calling it "your" dialectic was only intended as a light jab. However, I still don't see what postmodernism has to offer to experimental sciences.

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 04:17:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
At the risk of repeating myself, this diary is not about the experimental sciences, it's about the dominant narratives of society.

good papers (though not all) will be cited, while the trash gets forgotten

When you do a literature search properly you quickly encounter the reality of the plagiarizing of reference lists. Papers are not quoted because they are good, but because they are quoted by other papers. Then again, you're right, just because they are listed in the references doesn't mean they have been read by the authors so, yes, the trash is forgotten.

for the last 30 years theoretical physics has become largely divorced from experiment.
Now I think you're exaggerating too :)
Not one bit.
it's far from clear that we're close to a GUT. And if we were, so what? We still wouldn't be able to calculate a lot of systems for fundamental mathematical reasons
We don't need a GUT - we just need the standard model with a right-handed neutrino. And the fact that we can't calculate is why I said people needed to have left en masse towards mesoscopic physics.
The results speak for themselves, whatever they are.
No, the results of the LHC experiments don't speak for themselves except after a massive, massive theory-based massaging. And it is the theory that allows a narrow experiment to have a broadly applicable meaning.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 04:45:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
At the risk of repeating myself, this diary is not about the experimental sciences, it's about the dominant narratives of society.
Well I'm not trying to change the topic of this diary, so I don't mind leaving this thread for another time and place. We clearly don't agree on a number of things though.

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 05:32:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm much more cynical about science than I once was.

But, seriously, most modern experiments make no sense without a theory.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 05:33:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If an experiment is repeatable, the repeatability cannot depend on theoretical interpretations, surely? But no matter. I'm sure we'll have plenty of other occasions to settle this. Good fun :-)

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 05:51:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, but what does the experiment mean? Science is more than a collection of isolated facts. And knowledge is more than disorganised information (in, fact, doesn't a completely random signal have the most information? And must any information or entropy measure be computed with respect to a reference prior/null probability distribution?).

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 06:06:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And must any information or entropy measure not be computed with respect to a reference prior/null probability distribution?

(key word missing...)

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 06:10:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, the experiment only means that you've interacted with the world. It's the model which has a meaning, namely the interpretation it induces on the actual observations.

Information theoretically, the meaning is in the prior and the likelihood. The amount of surprise is, too, since entropy is an explicit function of the model, and for a given datapoint it can take any value as soon as you vary the model.

Is knowledge more than a collection of facts? Yes, but I would say it's a construct built on facts. If we lose the theories and the models, we can rebuild them, or substantially equivalent ones, from the facts. If we lose the facts, we can't just simulate new ones and call them real.

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 07:20:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
What about observations which are not repeatable?

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 07:26:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That's the crucial difference between historical and experimental sciences, isn't it?

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 07:32:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Right. So "repeatability" is a special quality that applies to a subset of human knowledge. It's not that "postmodern" "textual analysis" doesn't apply to physics, it is that when studying physics one has to take into account the repeatability. And, to a certain extent, stationarity and ergodicity are model-dependent features. Within physics you have astrophysics or cosmology which are also historical.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 07:39:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Within physics you have astrophysics or cosmology which are also historical.
That would be a reasonable statement.

And, to a certain extent, stationarity and ergodicity are model-dependent features.
As a rule, stationarity and ergodicity are directly observable on experimental data if you have it, and vice versa. It's by no means a given in all theoretical models, but it's a real observable phenomenon regardless of subjective prior assumptions.

It's not that "postmodern" "textual analysis" doesn't apply to physics, it is that when studying physics one has to take into account the repeatability.
I never claimed it couldn't be applied to physics, rather I fail to see its value when an oracle exists which spits out facts for any well chosen question. Thus physics is not limited by the insights of postmodernism.

So "repeatability" is a special quality that applies to a subset of human knowledge.
Another good word is "interactivity". In an experimental science, we can choose the questions we want to ask, and receive answers from the world. In a "historical" science, we must accept the answers we are given, with little or no choice in the questions. In physics, much effort is spent designing experiments to isolate the bits we care about, in archaeology we cannot ask what the ancient Greeks would have been like if they had had television.

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 08:10:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thus physics is not limited by the insights of postmodernism.

No, it is limited by the extent of repeatability.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 08:11:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I agree.

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$
by martingale on Sat Sep 13th, 2008 at 08:18:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Nonsense; your definition of experiment is overly restrictive. The observable universe is finite, but the number of stars, galaxies, clusters and so on is very large.
Just like the number of hadrons available for high speed collision, or elements to chemically combine, or bacterias to cultivate are technically finite, too.
Astronomers don't just point their scopes up randomly and write down what they see. They also design experiments. Some don't even require pointing a telescope, they just reuse existing images for analysis; see Galaxy Zoo.  Some experiments try to capture ephemeral events, see gamma ray burst: just because you don't decide when the event is going to happen doesn't make the experiment any less experimental. The results are reproducible, just not within a predetermined timeframe.
It is therefore fundamentally different from History, as a discipline; no matter how long you're willing to wait, you won't be able to reproduce a French Revolution. However, social psychology (see Miller, Cialdini ...) shows that you can obtain reproducible results by deriving abstractions and then designing experiments to test them. In other words, you can do science about anything as long as you're willing to get off your ass and do some real work.


A 'centrist' is someone who's neither on the left, nor on the left.
by nicta (nico@altiva․fr) on Thu Oct 2nd, 2008 at 10:36:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It may depend on the country to which one is referring.  The Masonic Orders were one vehicle for the spread of Enlightenment in Europe and the USA.  But they were so damaged by an incident in New York State in the mid 19th Century, where a group of Masons, including police and judiciary, demonstrably protected their own. This led to a massive reaction that virtually shut down the lineal descendants of the Lodges of the founding fathers. When they were resurrected later in the 19th cent. they were much more socially conservative.  Unions were a factor, but only the trade unions were of any significance in the USA until the 1930s.  The IWW, or Wobblies, were crushed militarily in the USA.

In the USA I would guess, and it is a guess, that no more than two to three times the number of college educated people had any significant exposure to enlightenment thought.  Prior to WW II and the GI Bill that was a rather small portion of the population.  And by no means did all of those so exposed become exponents of enlightenment values, particularly among the parsons and ministers.  And many of the educated were so involved in furthering their own interests that any concern about enlightenment values took a decidedly second place in their concerns.  Think lawyers, factory owners, plantation owners, judges, etc.  

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 09:03:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Let me rephrase the question. What core values represent the Enlightenment in your eyes?

Secondly, I don't see how the fact that a significant population is for all intents and purposes uneducated on these values can matter. In the 18th century (or 19th century for that matter), universal education was nonexistent, yet those are commonly associated with the Enlightenment. Surely, today's near universal levels of education in rich societies compares very favorably?

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 09:27:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Martingale, your 8:50 post was apparently made while I was composing my 9:03 post, and I have only just seen it.  To your last question: following Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the 18th Century Philosophers:

1) World view: The Enlightenment was primarily a change in world view which came to see and explain the world in naturalistic terms rather than in religious terms.  It incorporated the humanistic emphasis of the renaissance, "man is the measure of all things." with a newly found confidence in the ability of the human mind to understand the workings of the natural world.  

The development of science from Copernicus to Newton provided the foundation for this shift.  Voltaire, among others, assimilated an understanding of Newton and an appreciation of his impact while cooling his heels in England in the early part of the 18th century. Locke provided a rationale for governmental authority separate from Divine Right, which had been the prevailing view.  This was a practical necessity in England after the beheading of Charles I.  

The Enlightenment Project, so called, came to include replacing all arguments from authority and all explanations involving Divine Intervention with naturalistic ones.  This was Adam Smith's great contribution.  He developed a comprehensive account of moral and economic organization and behavior that was independent of any Divine Supervision.  These were set forth most notably in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations  Smith did for the social sciences what Newton had done for physics.  

In all spheres of knowledge men sought to determine the Laws of Nature.  The nature of God changed from that of a theistic divinity to which one prayed directly to a deistic divinity who, if he really existed, had created, or was embodied in, the Laws of Nature.  This was known as The Clockwork Universe.  God created it, wound it up and let it go.  He retired from the world.

It came to be assumed, among the educated, that The Laws of Nature could be studied and apprehended by man.  This was a profound change from a world view in which God was the immediate author of all things and man was assumed to be incapable of understanding his inscrutable ways.  But this process was hesitant and proceeded over a long period of time.

2) Reason and History. The worship of reason during the French Revolution became infamous.  Most of the Philosophers sensed the inadequacy of reason alone as a guide to man in society.  In their heart of hearts they might have believed that there was no God, but Hume, Diderot and others refused to publish some of their best works during their lifetimes: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in Hume's case and Le neveu de Rameau in Diderot's case.

Reason showed them the absurdities of religion and led them to doubt the existence of God, but they had little confidence that they had an adequate replacement. They could see that an omnipotent, omniscent and omnibenificent deity was an absurdity, given the state of the world, but they had no satisfactory replacement. It was as though God had absconded during the night, leaving mankind in the lurch.  Hume said of his work: "It is true, but men cannot live by it."

Hume turned from philosophy to the study of history, economics and politics. They came to study useful arts and sciences and to compile these into Diderot's Encyclopédie and in England the Encyclopedia Britanica.  Experience had to supplement abstract reason.  As Priestly said: "Without history the advantages of our rational nature must have been rated very low."  Gibbon, Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu and Herder all produced histories.  These histories were written to teach by example.  They sought to see through history the universal nature of man.

Per Becker, what they really did was to create a new religion. "The essential articles of the religion of the Enlightenment may be stated thus: (1) man is not natively depraved; (2) the end of life is life itself, the good life on earth instead of the beatific life after death; (3) man is capable, guided solely by the light of reason and experience, of perfecting the good life on earth; and (4) the first and essential condition of the good life on earth is the freeing of men's minds from the bonds of ignorance and superstition and their bodies from the arbitrary oppression of the constituted social authorities.

3) The uses of posterity:  The philosophers saw the future as a better world they were building and they looked to posterity for justification for their actions.  They sought to reclaim the world from the misery into which they saw Christianity as having sent it.  "For the love of God they substituted the love of humanity; for the vicarious atonement the perfectibility of man through his own efforts; and for the hope of immortality in another world the hope of living in the memory of future generations."

This is but a poor Cliff Notes of Becker's work and already too long.  The great virtue of Becker is his brevity, 168 pages.  The Heavenly City was written in 1932 and there are newer works available, notably by Peter Gay. But I believe Becker remains the best introduction to the subject.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Thu Sep 11th, 2008 at 02:34:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Thanks ARGeezer, that's very helpful. I'm a science graduate, so I recognize your description of the worldview quite well(*), whereas the other aspects are less familiar.

Yet upon reading your comment, I do not feel as if the current world is leaving Reason behind, which was my impression from some of the comments in this diary.

Technologically and scientifically, the world is essentially the same, only with less philosophy and more practical application.

The importance of education remains both high and widely recognized to be high. Throughout the world everybody, especially the poor, sees education as key to success.

There are comparatively few societies left around the world in which social status is rigidly based on blood or caste, as opposed to merely wealth.

It's true that religion remains a formidable motive force in the world, as it always has been. However, the number of nonbelievers remains significant and shows no sign of actually vanishing. This is a net "win" for Enlightenment given how it started.

It's easy to lose sight of the big picture though, from the bleatings of the media, which likes to scare us with terrorism, war with enemy empires, and assorted religious issues of the day. So I'm still unconvinced that we have entered a post-Enlightenment world.

(*) somewhat off-topic, but you might find this interesting if you don't know it already: Newton's contribution was, in various ways, a dead end for physics. Without taking anything away from his achievements, his ideas about forces are in most cases unworkable, and must be replaced by ideas about fields and least energy, which were actually proposed as alternatives by thinkers on the continent.

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$E(X_t|F_s) = X_s,\quad t > s$

by martingale on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 02:42:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Technologically and scientifically, the world is essentially the same, only with less philosophy and more practical application.

There is or was a tag line: "Our knowledge has exceeded our wisdom."  Gains in technical knowledge, unless classified, are described in technical journals and or patent applications and thereby become relatively permanent in nature. Many can see and apply the advances.  With the social sciences and the humanities is is very different.  

There have been advances in the social sciences, but they have not been adopted on the basis of their usefulness to society at large, but rather on the basis of their utility to those occupying the seats of power.  Worse, they often are no more accessible to the average citizen than are the findings of the hard sciences.  

One of the great weaknesses of  Enlightenment thought which persisted into the Enlightenment's child, Modernity, is the over valuation of the importance and power of reason. This is not to diminish the importance of reason, but to put it into perspective against the scope of the problem facing those of us who are awake.

Reason has so little scope in the effective decisions of so many people that the consequences are, or should be, frightening.  Consider Germany in 1932 or Russia in 1918.  There were people who understood what was happening and tried to do what they could to bring about a good outcome.  They were like leaves in a hurricane.  So often, especially in times of crisis, society at large is more like a vast ocean of unreason.  I am reminded of the prayer from the Anglican Book of Common Prayer: "Lord, thy ocean is so vast and my boat  is so small!"  Our reason is like a boat upon the ocean, but one that was not designed for ocean going voyages.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (argeezer a in a circle yahoo dot com) on Fri Sep 12th, 2008 at 10:08:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I realised yesterday that Soros is nearly 80 years old...

I don't know what he plays at. I think he genuinely believes in the Open Society. Too bad it took him until now to realise that there was a missing element in his blueprint for it.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 08:17:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, there is something touchingly (?) naive here. He and Popper were so concerned with the pursuit of truth that they didn't realize not everybody was? That the pursuit of truth has never been a recipe for worldly success and the obtention of power, less yet for holding on to power, and that very considerable manipulation of perceived truth was feasible for those who have power to hold on to?

The open society is indeed a post-Enlightenment ideal like free markets and the invisible hand, derived from the fallacy of the state of nature and natural law. There is no state of nature in human society. So, of course,

social sciences, including economics, should be considered historical and so that the scientific method doesn't apply in the same way.

What else?

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 09:09:40 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, there is something touchingly (?) naive here. He and Popper were so concerned with the pursuit of truth that they didn't realize not everybody was?

I think that is a common failing of Enlightenment philosophies. You could say that the Rovian aide slaps Ron Suskind out of the Enlightenment dream in the infamous reality-based-community incident.

I think a number of us on this site are also trying to figure out after the Enlightenment, what? given 1) our self-professed commitment to rationality and "truth"; 2) the realisation that the Enlightenment programme has probably (successfully) run its course and (destructively) exceeded the limits of its applicability.

I mean, after reading Altemeyer's the Authoritarians, whither Democracy?

Maybe public accountability becomes more important than universal suffrage.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 09:28:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Machiavelli was an important precursor of Enlightenment. Perhaps we are just starting to realize practical applications of reason.

It is not so that the Rove guys are completely ignorant of reality. They are just working hard to obstruct or manipulate perception of the same reality for others. That looks rather rational from post-social-Darwinian perspectives.

by das monde on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 10:01:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They're not ignorant of reality, they use communication to manipulate the public.

As we know, the father of the Neocons, Leo Strauss, is an explicit advocate of the Noble Lie: people need to be lied to for their own good.

A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Sep 8th, 2008 at 10:09:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
They even work rather well on people's rationalization capacities. Their wingnuts are pretty confident that they are rational!

What the Thinker thinks, the Prover proves!
 
On communication: progressives seem to recognize mostly rational communication (reasons, valid implications, information). But our souls probably trust other communication (symbolic, or emotional) better.
by das monde on Tue Sep 9th, 2008 at 01:45:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Giving up the Enlightenment really just means giving up detached Platonic absolute ideals - 'democracy', 'freedom', 'the invisible hand', 'reason', and so on.

In the enlightenment world view these - paradoxically - become gods which you're supposed to worship without question, and in return they'll look after you.

It's really quite a theocratic view of the world, and like all theocracies it makes it easy for parasites to hitch a ride on the ideals for their own personal benefit.

Postmodernism created an anti-absolute which demolished the absolutes without putting anything in their place.

I suppose a reality-based democracy would explicitly acknowledge the mechanisms by which people think and reason morally (which isn't usually all that moral or reasonable) and create systems of guidance and participation accordingly.

What's frightening is that the right has already done this, with huge success. It's repulsive to the left because on the left we like our absolutes, and it's crushing