|
by afew
Tue Sep 9th, 2008 at 05:43:01 AM EST
In the afternoon of the 18th of August, and on till the next morning, a French infantry patrol was surprised and surrounded by Afghan "taleban" fighters near a mountain pass. Ten French soldiers were killed and twenty-one wounded in the biggest strike against "coalition" forces in Afghanistan since 2001. On the 20th, a report was filed with military intelligence in Paris by a group on the ground in Afghanistan, the Frenic (French National Intelligence Cell). The report has been leaked to the Canard Enchaîné, and it makes depressing reading.
It was already known that the ambushed group was sent to scout out a pass at 2,000 metres, ahead of a hundred or so troops, French, Afghan, and some American (in charge of air support). The detachment was out for several days on an in-depth reconnaissance probe into the central mountains. They were sixty kilometres (less than 40 miles) from Kabul.
| Dans leur rapport, les officiers de la Frenic notent que les "fantassins" qui montent à pied vers le col, loin des blindés légers qui les ont conduits jusque-là, "sont ralentis par la poussière ... et par la lourdeur de leurs gilets pare-balles". Puis, quand "le piège s'est refermé", et que les tirs commencent, ils soulignent avec quel retard sont parvenus des renforts en combattants (une heure), en mortiers de 81 (une heure et demie) et en munitions (deux heures quarante). Encerclés au moment où ils parviennent près du col, les soldats français sont vite à court de munitions. Les insurgés, eux, "semblent bénéficier d'énormes réserves de munitions". <...> | | In their report, officers of the Frenic note that the "foot soldiers" climbing towards the pass, far from the light armoured vehicles that brought them to the area, "are hampered by the dust ... and by their heavy bulletproof vests." Then, when "the trap was sprung" and the shooting began, they emphasize the langth of the delay in bringing up reinforcements in men (one hour), in 81 mm mortars(an hour and a half) and ammunition (two hours forty minutes). Surrounded just as they were close to the pass, the French soldiers were quickly short of ammunition. The insurgents themselves, "appear to have enormous reserves of ammunition". <...> | | Alors que les combats faisaient rage depuis 15h30, arrivent des avions de l'OTAN, (F-15, AC-130, A-10, drones Predator, etc) guidés par des "soldats américains au sol" (qui ne participent pas au combats). Mais, les "insurgés et les forces alliées étant trop imbriqués", les bombardements sont très difficiles, voire impossibles. | | The fighting had been raging since 15h30, when NATO planes, (F-15, AC-130, A-10, Predator drones, etc.) showed up, guided by "American soldiers on the ground" (who didn't take part in the fighting). But the "insurgents and allied forces being so closely engaged," bombing was very tricky if not impossible. |
OK, what have we already said about this war? (See my Afghanistan Problem diary). That invading forces can, and have in the past, ally with certain tribes and hold Kabul, perhaps some parts of the country, but never subdue and maintain control of all the country; that tribal alliances shift quickly, and formally organized troops are at a disadvantage in little-known (to them) mountainous terrain. In the end, the invader leaves the country after having taken enough of a beating. This story of a reconnaissance column of considerable importance going into the mountains (only 40 miles from Kabul!) to check out what's going on there, and finding out that what's going on is that the local warriors know the terrain and how to fight in it, is a quotable example (though with no sense of schadenfreude) of the above.
What's worse is the apparent incompetence of senior command (specifically French, concerning the ambushed detachment), the lack of mastery of logistics, and the poor coordination between "coalition" elements. In further comments and questions in the Frenic report, the authors say (my quick translation):
During the fighting, where was the collective weaponry in support of the recce, and support groups to pin down the enemy? <...> where were the detachments of the Afghan National Army and the American special forces?
Is it normal that professionals engaged in in-depth reconnaissance for several days (and what's more in a convoy) should run out of ammunition at their first engagement?
How can we let operations like this be organized in this terrain, without a minimum of observation and surveillance ahead of the advancing units?
It sounds like there was little coordination between the French, Afghan, and American elements of the convoy, and logistics were slow-moving, inadequate, and inappropriate.
There was an opportunity to bomb stuff, though.
| Selon d'autres informations parvenues à Paris, un AC-130 américain "Gunship", bourré de canons (1 200 coups à la minute), a arrosé un village voisin des combats, sur lequel auraient été tirés des missiles Milan français. | | According to other reports reaching Paris, an American AC-130 "Gunship", stuffed with guns (1,200 rounds per minute), sprayed a village near the fighting, which is said to have also been fired on by French Milan missiles. |
Better and better. Screw up the organization and logistics, play into the enemy's strengths in his home terrain, and destroy villages in reprisal. It didn't work in Algeria, it didn't work in Vietnam, and never worked in Afghanistan. Never mind, keep repeating failed strategies.
Meanwhile, the French Minister of Defence, Hervé Morin, is digging in hard. Whatever happens he won't call this a war. What does this remind me of? Oh, right, Algeria again. France refused for decades to call the Algerian War a war. It was les évènements d'Algérie, the "Algerian Events" (hence my title).
What next? Why, we need more troops and weapons. Bush has just announced the decision to pull some troops out of Iraq, and increase the numbers in Afghanistan. Sarkozy is ready to follow suit, and, according to another article in the Canard, will announce this any day now.
| Mais les Américains sont loin de se montrer satisfaits... (Ils veulent que la France) expédie en Afghanistan des soldats, des hélicoptères, des drones, des mortiers de 120 et de 181, de l'artillerie de campagne et même des chars lourds. C'est beaucoup demander, et nos chefs militaires ont déjà fait savoir qu'un tel effort serait hors de prix, sinon impossible. | | But the Americans are far from satisfied ... (They want France to) send to Afghanistan troops, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, 120 and 181 mm mortars, field artillery and even heavy tanks. That is a tall order, and our military leaders have already indicated that such an effort would be unaffordable, if not impossible. | | Avec l'espoir de convaincre tous leurs alliés que l'avenir du "monde libre" se joue en Afghanistan, les Américains donnent en exemple la bonne volonté affichée par les Canadiens, les Britanniques et les Italiens. Les premiers vont louer des hélicoptères aux Russes (huit MI-8), à Boeing (six CH-47 Chinook), ainsi que des drones US et israéliens. Quant aux bons élèves britanniques et italiens, ils s'apprêtent, eux, à acheter des drones Predator au groupe US General Atomics. | | In hopes of convincing their allies that the future of the "free world" is being played out in Afghanistan, the Americans cite as exemplary the good will displayed by the Canadians, British and Italians. The former are going to hire helicopters from the Russians (eight MI-8), Boeing (six CH-47 Chinook), as well as U.S. and Israeli drones. As for the British and Italians, they are making ready to buy Predator drones from the U.S. group General Atomics. |
What was it again that NATO was all about?
|
|
