MLECTARPPPIF, Same Story

by afew
Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 11:46:09 AM EST

Round about now Timothy Geithner will be presenting his plan to save American finances, and Yves Smith sums up what a lot of commentators are already saying:

naked capitalism: Geithner Bank Bailout Plan: Fiasco

...here we have another scowling Treasury secretary, with a bit more hair than his predecessor, serving up the same fatally flawed approach as before: let's just throw money at the banks and hope they get better. This is tantamount to using antibiotics to treat gangrene. You waste good medicine and the progression of the rot threatens to kill the patient.

The plan is outlined by Reuters thus:

Overview of U.S. bank rescue plan | Top News | Reuters

1. To stabilize the system and restore confidence in our markets, for the first time ever federal bank regulators will come together to institute uniform standards to help clean up and strengthen banks, and conduct "stress tests" to ensure the nation's largest banks can withstand a worsening economy. Those banks that need it will be given a capital buffer to ensure they can keep lending to families and businesses until they can attract additional private capital and weather economic downturns.

Perhaps Geithner will present this in more convincing language. If not, here we have a case of the proverbial anchor in aspic. Those "stress tests" had better be good. And banks will be given - yet again - capital that they should lend out again. Except that they have every reason to hang on to whatever capital they can and avoid lending. As for hearing that they can "keep lending to families and businesses"... (shattered jaw on floor).

And one wonders what is the need for the second point of the plan, if the first point is to be a winner:

2. To revitalize lending and increase much-needed credit flowing to consumers and businesses, Treasury and the Fed are creating a new consumer business lending initiative to leverage up to $1 trillion to kick-start the secondary lending markets, which will bring down borrowing costs for responsible borrowers and help get credit flowing again.

But this is the one that knocks me out:

3. To get financial markets working again, we will create a new Public-Private Investment Fund which provide government capital and financing to leverage private capital to buy up the "toxic assets" that are dragging down lending. This would allow financial institutions to cleanse their balance sheets while letting private sector buyers determine the price for previously illiquid assets.

What? A PPIF to join the MLEC and the TARP as a bound-to-fail-in-advance initiative? We said it enough here on ET, last year, that Paulson and his golden team were not going to be able to shift those assets, even if they had the time to analyse them properly (many of those vehicles are extremely complex set-ups), because the banks would not accept the approximate real price. Those assets are at present a rotten figleaf for the banks' insolvency, simply because no price can be put on them.

And really, Geithner is going to tell us that "private sector buyers" are going to determine the price? Come again? Oh, OK. Private interests offer diddly-shit for the assets and the taxpayer makes the price up to a level where the banks don't take a hit. Great.

Evaluations of the black hole mentioned there vary, but very seriously at the moment run to upwards of $2 trillion. So the last point, actually attempting to help people, is comparatively minor in its scope:

4. To keep people in their homes and curb the housing crisis, Treasury will work with the Federal Reserve to commit $50 billion to reduce monthly payments and establish loan modification guidelines for government and private programs. The Financial Stability plan will also require all firms receiving federal funds participate in foreclosure mitigation plans to stem the housing crisis.


More from Yves Smith:

In fact, the state of affairs may be even worse that I thought. I had grumbled about the fact that the earlier leaks of this plan, like the MLEC and the TARP, seemed little more than a sketch, when its success or failure founder on key details.

The elephant in the room is how do we solve the heretofore insurmountable problem that the market price of the bad assets is well below what the banks are willing to sell them for? Paulson was unable to find a way to finesse the problem to get private investors to pick up even a cherry-picked portion of the junk in the MLEC incarnation; in TARP, he (presumably) planned to have Uncle Sam buy the paper at a price the banks would find acceptable but somehow camouflage the subsidy. He abandoned that course of action quickly, perhaps because the magnitude of the payment over market prices would be so large as to be politically explosive were the bagholder taxpayer ever to find out.

There is no evidence in the various elements leaked that this impediment has been overcome, which raises the real possibility of a Paulson-like seemingly bold advance followed by an equally hasty retreat. Inviting investors in with you on the buy side does not address the issue of the pricing gap, unless the deal with the investors is intended to help obfuscate the overpayment to the banks.

<...>

(We'll need to wait to see how this unfolds, but since the banks have no reason to part with bad assets and take a writedown, this is the scenario they are trying to avoid, we still have crappy assets being funded at fictive prices, but this time by you and me rather than by Citigroup). The failure to clean up the banks and write down bad assets was a big contributor to Japan's lost decade.

Something to look forward to.

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The PPIF. Lordamercy.

Mr DJIA down 290... 292 ... 10 YR is holding tight, white-knuckled.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by MarketTrustee on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 11:56:48 AM EST
We do love our acronyms in DC, don't we?

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!
by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:08:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Bad Asset Relief Fund - Krugman from Galbreath
by tjbuff (timhess@adelphia.net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:30:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Noon plus 30 minutes CA time.

DOW DOWN 375!  When will we see the 6000's?  Place yer bets!

I love the smell of roast chicken in the morning!

by THE Twank (yatta blah blah @ blah.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:36:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Now DOWN 400!  SELL !  SELL !  BUY GOLD!  I don't know.

I love the smell of roast chicken in the morning!
by THE Twank (yatta blah blah @ blah.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:47:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Geithner gets a lovely write-up from David Brooks in the NYT. (Warning: not to be consumed after a heavy meal).

There are extensive quotes from Geithner. Here's one:

Op-Ed Columnist - Showing Some Discipline - NYTimes.com

"I was very worried about us looking like we're vulnerable to the charge that we're overpaying as a way to provide disguised subsidies to banks."

So that isn't going to happen. Private capital is going to come in and buy those assets at fair value. Hallelujah.

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:01:18 PM EST
Forgot to tip my hat to tested in the comments on naked capitalism.

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:04:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]

"I was very worried about us looking like we're vulnerable to the charge that we're overpaying as a way to provide disguised subsidies to banks." David Brooks

The Village in one sentence:


worried about looking like

Again: it's apeearances that matter, not the actual substance

But it's not over


looking like we're vulnerable to the charge

that's appearances squared

But wait, it's not over


...as a way to provide disguised subsidies to banks.

We now have appearances cubed of ... subsidies.

Like nobody noticed subsidies were given to banks.

No wonder we're fucked if it is these people that influence policy.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:57:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Brooks is quoting Geithner. So it's the guy who makes policy who's speaking. Oh, just having a cosy chat with an influencer...

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:04:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
because the banks would not accept the approximate real price

They can't.  If the assets were sold at market values, the banks would go bust.

Could we please just nationalize them and stop fucking around?

4. To keep people in their homes and curb the housing crisis, Treasury will work with the Federal Reserve to commit $50 billion to reduce monthly payments and establish loan modification guidelines for government and private programs. The Financial Stability plan will also require all firms receiving federal funds participate in foreclosure mitigation plans to stem the housing crisis.

Why not do what Obama proposed yesterday and pass a bill in Congress granting bankruptcy court judges cram-down power?  That way, the banksters and the housing gamblers both take a hit.

Could we please, oh please, stop pouring renters' tax dollars into schemes to "rescue" homeowners?  Everybody should have the right to a roof over his or her head, but nobody's entitled to ownership of a house.

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!

by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:06:47 PM EST
the banks would go bust.

For sure. That's why I called the assets a figleaf.

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:10:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... THIS CONGRESS? You are a braver man than I, Gunga Din.

I'll note that the conditions that they placed on the banks bear a striking similarity to the conditions in my October Beautiful Financial Rescue Plan ... but rather than 50:50 between financing Baker's Own to Rent plan for mortgages under water and the Wall Street bail out, and the Wall Street bail out being 50:50 Preferred Shares and acquisition of toxic debt with convertible warrants on the realized losses, its much less than that in a doomed to fail plan to fix the foreclosure crisis, and there is no tie between the sale of Toxic Assets and the purchase of Senior Preferred shares in banks.


Utsukushikereba sore de ii

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:32:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
1. To stabilize the system and restore confidence in our markets, for the first time ever federal bank regulators will come together to institute uniform standards to help clean up and strengthen banks, and conduct "stress tests" to ensure the nation's largest banks can withstand a worsening economy. Those banks that need it will be given a capital buffer to ensure they can keep lending to families and businesses until they can attract additional private capital and weather economic downturns.
Perhaps Geithner will present this in more convincing language. If not, here we have a case of the proverbial anchor in aspic. Those "stress tests" had better be good. And banks will be given - yet again - capital that they should lend out again. Except that they have every reason to hang on to whatever capital they can and avoid lending. As for hearing that they can "keep lending to families and businesses"... (shattered jaw on floor).
I don't think this is "the first time ever federal bank regulators will come together to institute uniform standards to help clean up and strenghten banks". To wit:
On March 5, 1933, the day after Roosevelt's inauguration, he called a special session of Congress which instituted a mandatory four-day bank holiday. This act provided for the reopening of banks after federal inspectors had declared them to be financially secure.


Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:23:00 PM EST
How exactly does one defibrillate a bank that fails a stress test, anyway?
by tjbuff (timhess@adelphia.net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:32:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There's always the FDIC...

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:36:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
A kick up the assets?

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:50:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
However, the defibrillator that they plan to use seems to be the bulk of the Tarp 2.0 Money.


Utsukushikereba sore de ii
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:34:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Except that that intervention worked, and it is highly unlikely that this pathetic attempt will.
This is tantamount to using antibiotics to treat gangrene. You waste good medicine and the progression of the rot threatens to kill the patient.
There is no substitute for honesty and integrity, starting with acknowledging the true value of "assets."  This would precipitate the collapse of the worst of the institutions that created this mess--NBBooks has listed them elsewhere.  Let Sheila Bair do her work.  This would undoubtedly produce a spasm of selling in the stock and bond markets, but like FDR's actions, it would enable eventual stability in banking.  It is four months past time to deal effectively with this situation.  Financial antibiotics are only serving to spread resistance to the antibiotics.  Time to amputate and cauterize.  

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:37:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The plan requires all banks with more than $100bn in assets to submit to a Federal audit of their balance sheets. Only then they can get a "capital buffer" in the form of "preferred convertible equity".

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:39:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Correct me if I'm wrong: Convertible-preferred stock is stock that pays a fixed income but that can be converted to common stock at a fixed price if the common stock is more valuable?

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!
by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:42:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Apparently.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:48:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... an amount of common shares based on the face value of the Preferred shares and the current market value of the common shares.

The terms of the conversion are specific to the specific issue of Preferred shares.

It seems likely that that is the process for retiring the Preferred shares ... the banks have to try to get their common share price up to the point where they can buy back the Preferred shares by swapping them for common shares which the Trustee can sell on the open market.

The Trustee, of course, stands the risk that the bank goes on to fail anyway. That is why a critical point that they have omitted to mention is the dividend rate on the Preferred Shares ... what is the penalty rate over the cost of the Treasury Bills to fund TARP 2.0, and is that a reasonable risk premium over the losses to be expected on Senior Preferred Shares from likely bank failures down the track.

I read that Paulson put a rate of 5% on the Senior Preferred Shares, compared to Buffet putting a rate of 10% on the deal he made to inject equity into one of these big institutions ... I'd be very surprised if Geithner had a rate more like 10% than 5%, and in the meantime the cost of funds has risen.


Utsukushikereba sore de ii

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:41:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Geitner's dividend rate is "to be determined". On a case-by-case basis, presumably.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:22:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
"X% over the most recent 10 year Treasury bond rate"

Done, everyone knows where they stand. "Open and transparent".

It seems like it takes more than a cabinet level post to take the student of Larry Summers away from the Wall Street insider operating assumptions.

Utsukushikereba sore de ii

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:50:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Only then...

Only then what? They get a "capital buffer" just because they submitted to the audit, or because the audit says they're OK? If the former, the audit is a pure formality, if the latter, the walking-dead banks will still be walking dead.

In any case, are we to suppose that this audit will do what others have failed to do up to now, evaluate the toxic junk?

 

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:59:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If you decide you can't value an asset on a balance sheet you might still be able to estimate the exposure and require that that exposure be capitalized. The banks don't have the capital because the whole point is that they used off-balance-sheet vehicles to avoid having to capitalize in the first place.

What exactly is the problem here? Someone has to pronounce the dead banks, dead. And banks with more than $100bn in assets don't get to opt out of the audit of their balance sheets so at least the Federal Government will know what's on those balance sheets.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:06:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... Tarp 1.0 and Tarp 2.0 ... the Bush administration didn't want to know how bad the problem was, they just wanted to kick the can down the road.

Utsukushikereba sore de ii
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:43:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
banks with more than $100bn in assets don't get to opt out of the audit of their balance sheets so at least the Federal Government will know what's on those balance sheets.
But possibly not what are the off-balance sheet liabilities?

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:54:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Why then do I have this gnawing fear that the required Federal audit of balance sheets will gloss over or totally ignore off balance sheet liabilities, which is where most of the true black holes have been stashed?  The rule should be that ANY liability not brought forward at the time of the audit shall first be paid with the personal assets of the corporate officers of the institution and then creditors can go pound sand.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:46:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Those off-balance-sheet liabilities have come back onto the balance sheets already. Otherwise we wouldn't be having this conversation.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:53:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Those off-balance-sheet liabilities have come back onto the balance sheets already.
Some of them, but all?

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:57:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Enough of them to make the banks insolvent already...

But, really, I don't think any of those SIVs or off-balance-sheet "conduits" can still be standing after the last 18 months in the money markets.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 06:00:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I pray you are right.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 07:27:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ARGeezer:
Let Sheila Bair do her work.

is she the washington madam?

:)

If'Madness is the absence of work'(Foucault), then Sanity is the presence of play..

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:17:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Technically the head of FDIC.  But I take your point.  We should have her and her agency regularly examined for, uhm, disease.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:47:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm proposing a different scheme next to Geithner's.  It will be called the Executive Amortization Trust for Subprime Housing Inventory Transactions & Doubling of Investment Efforts.

Hereafter know by its acronym.

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!

by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:32:06 PM EST
My concern is that WE will get the meal you suggest but not the result.  Instead, this will become the new normal diet.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:38:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Remarks as prepared for Sun Worship | US Treasury | 10 Feb 2009

Instead of catalyzing recovery, the financial system is working against recovery. And at the same time, the recession is putting greater pressure on banks. This is a dangerous dynamic, and we need to arrest it. It is essential for every American to understand that the battle for economic recovery must be fought on two fronts. We have to both jumpstart job creation and private investment, and we must get credit flowing again to businesses and families. ...

We believe that access to public support is a privilege, not a right. When our government provides support to banks, it is not for the benefit of banks, it is for the businesses and families who depend on banks... and for the benefit of the country. Government support must come with strong conditions to protect the tax payer and with transparency that allows the American people to see the impact of those investments.

We believe our policies must be designed to mobilize and leverage private capital, not to supplant or discourage private capital. When government investment is necessary, it should be replaced with private capital as soon as possible.  ...

Our work begins with a new framework of oversight and governance of all aspects of our Financial Stability Plan. ...These new requirements, which will be available on a new website FinancialStability.gov will give the American people the transparency they deserve.

um ... BWAHAHAHAHHAHAHAHA. 'K.

Under this framework, we are establishing three new programs to clean up and strengthen the nation's banks, bring in private capital to restart lending, and to go around the banking system directly to the markets that consumers and businesses depend on. ...

First, we're going to require banking institutions to go through a carefully designed comprehensive stress test, to use the medical term. ...assessment about the risk on balance sheets ...access a new funding mechanism that uses funds from the Treasury as a bridge to private capital. The capital will come with conditions....

Bad Bank: three parts Ch 11 (RFC), one part Ch 7 (yer RTC).

The Treasury's investments in these institutions will be placed in a new Financial Stability Trust.

Second, alongside this new Financial Stability Trust, together with the Fed, the FDIC, and the private sector, we will establish a Public-Private Investment Fund. This program will provide government capital and government financing to help leverage private capital to help get private markets working again. This fund will be targeted to the legacy loans and assets [?!!] that are now burdening many financial institutions. ...We believe this program should ultimately provide up to one trillion in financing capacity, but we plan to start it on a scale of $500 billion [oops], and expand it based on what works.

Fresh coat of paint for Geithner's FRBNY babies, birthed by TALF. To mix metaphors.

Third, working jointly with the Federal Reserve, we are prepared to commit up to a trillion dollars to support a Consumer and Business Lending Initiative. This initiative will kickstart the secondary lending markets, to bring down borrowing costs, and to help get credit flowing again.

In our financial system, 40 percent of consumer lending has historically been available because people buy loans, put them together and sell them. Because this vital source of lending has frozen up, no financial recovery plan will be successful unless it helps restart securitization markets for sound loans made to consumers and businesses - large and small.

This lending program will be built on the Federal Reserve's Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility, announced last November, with capital from the Treasury and financing from the Federal Reserve. ...

Our focus will be on using the full resources of the government to help bring down mortgage payments and to reduce mortgage interest rates. We will do this with a substantial commitment of resources already authorized by the Congress under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.

Especially the Secretary's gaping discretionary powers to value and to spend $1.5T on "troubled assets".

The success of our financial stability plan is going to require an unprecedented level of cooperation, here in the United States and around the world. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, FDIC Chair Sheila Bair, John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency, and John Reich the head of the Office of Thrift Supervision, are here today. I want to thank them for helping to shape this plan, and their commitment to making it work.

Expanding membership of the President's Working Group (PWG). See "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure." Short-term Recommendations concern standardizing mortgage products, establishing fed reg and licensing of insurance products, then consumer revolving and other primary market contracts; securitized domestic debt for sale in global capital markets.

Sad.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by MarketTrustee on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:33:58 PM EST
We believe that access to public support is a privilege, not a right. When our government provides support to banks, it is not for the benefit of banks, it is for the businesses and families who depend on banks... and for the benefit of the country. Government support must come with strong conditions to protect the tax payer and with transparency that allows the American people to see the impact of those investments.

We believe our policies must be designed to mobilize and leverage private capital, not to supplant or discourage private capital. When government investment is necessary, it should be replaced with private capital as soon as possible.

Easy: any money injected into banks should be in the form of equity (newly issued shares). If the government acquires a large interest in a abnk in this way it can get on the board of directors and thus impose "strong conditions". And if the bank recovers, those shares can be sold to private capital.
First, we're going to require banking institutions to go through a carefully designed comprehensive stress test, to use the medical term. ...assessment about the risk on balance sheets ...access a new funding mechanism that uses funds from the Treasury as a bridge to private capital. The capital will come with conditions....
So, the Treasury will audit the private banks? Is that it? Good!

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:45:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Willem Buiter has a good discussion on his FT blog Maverecon:

FT.com | Willem Buiter's Maverecon

Many (probably most, possibly all but a handful) high-profile, large border-crossing universal banks in the north Atlantic region are dead banks walking - zombie banks kept from formal insolvency only through past, present and anticipated future injections of public money.  They have indeterminate but possibly large remaining stocks of toxic - hard or impossible to value - assets on their balance sheets which they cannot or will not come clean on.

This overhang of toxic assets acts like a tax on new lending.  Banks are required, by regulators or by market pressures, to hoard capital and liquidity rather than engaging in new lending to the real economy.  The public financial support offered in the form of capital injections (in the US mainly through preference shares and other non-voting equity), guarantees for assets and for  liabilities (old and new), insurance of toxic assets (as provided to Citigroup by the US sovereign) and possibly in the future through direct purchases by the state of  toxic assets (using TARP money in the US) and the creation of one or more publicly owned `bad banks' has been a complete failure.

The  bad bank proposals the Obama administration and other governments are considering are non-starters, for the simple reason that they require the valuation of assets whose true value (even on a hold-to-maturity basis) can only be guessed at. 

He backs the idea of the State creating new institutions - "good banks" - rather than nationalise the old bad banks.

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:02:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In that scenario the old "bad banks" will eventually fail and will have to be taken over by the FDIC. A distinction without a difference.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:09:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I strongly suspect that the reason they refuse to even consider a "new banks" solution is that they know that this would be the death knell for the worst offenders amongst their dear friends.  It would have very little negative effect on most of the 8,000 banks and savings and loan institutions, but the positive effect would be rather like that a quick cure for the Black Death would have had on the economy in Europe in the middle ages--a paralyzing maisma would be lifted.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:59:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
the old "bad banks" will eventually fail and will have to be taken over by the FDIC

Remember the spate of confusion in the interboobz, when MSM introduced the word "conservator"? Suddenly commentator were investigating the word "receivor", but abandon any discursion of the word "restructure"? Receivor and conservator are legal terms. The fiduciary duties of these agents are quite different with respect to remediating a bankruptcy determination ("fail").

Historically, that is until the criminal bush began to legislate, the FDIC's function was always receivor of bankrupt FDIC-insured deposit institutions. In the event of failure (Ch 7 determination), FDIC liquidates all the banks operating and financial assets to pay ("to resolve") creditors' claims (including FDIC advance to account holders), and transfers deposit accounts to another deposit bank. Unmarketable financial assets such as securities may be held to close the books but, ultimately, charged-off to end litigation. The RTC was a special purpose entity of the FDIC created especially to manage the massive number of S&L bankruptcies; operations ceased 1994.

These procedure pretty much changed when Bush Treasury instructed FDIC to "take over" the Pritzker family S&L in 2001. FDIC is still managing Superior Bank FSB operations -- above and beyond action to satisfy outstanding settlement.

By contrast Mr Bush appointed Mr Lockhart conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddi Mac, pursuant to execution of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. His duty is to "restructure" these corporations' debt obligations despite contradictory directions by WH and FRB executives to the management of those two organizations. That is mitigate risk exposure by sale or maturity within a specified period versus increase spending on whole and securitized high LTV jumbo mortgages.

Finally, Lehman was never a (demand, commercial, retail) deposit bank insured by FDIC or an FRB reserve bank establishment. It's business was securities brokerage, and even Bernanke cannot be such a colossal, demented asshole to insure ex post the value of its trades.

Knowing all this, somehow, the US Treasury most certainly could implement plans to establish a "good" bank with deposit accounts and performing loans for the simple reason that the premise of confidence in the full faith and credit of the US is not for profit.

OTOH, commercial bankers would never stand idle by USG  market power and competition for profitable clients. And that reality is  also one of the greatest barriers to USG entry into medical insurance, i.e. single-payer. Politicians are skeered of assissination.

Which is why Barry will pass a rich ol' man.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by MarketTrustee on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:09:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Finally a "Serious Person" endorses the obvious solution to "getting credit flowing."  Were Geitner to use even $100 billion for creation of new banks and even if a 6% capital reserve were required, he would create $2 trillion of new, unimpaired loan capability.  It is quite obvious that the focus is on saving the salvageable financial institutions responsible for this mess than on alleviating the credit crunch.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:50:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What is wrong with saving the salvageable?

Or did you mean "salvaging the unsalvageable"?

You saw what good it did letting Lehman go bust.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:56:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The problem was not letting Lehman go bust - that was actually a good decision. No, the problem is that the Villagers decided, after that episode, that they could not let any other financial institution fail. That's the real problem: they circled the wagons.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:59:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The whole thing was schizophrenic from the fall of Bear onward.

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!
by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:06:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Lehman is going to be a hell of a bankruptcy to go through... I have read estimates that it will take at least 6 years.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:19:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Grr, "unsalvageable."

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:00:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Were Geitner to use even $100 billion for creation of new banks and even if a 6% capital reserve were required, he would create $2 trillion of new, unimpaired loan capability.

That's right, over time. After all the jackass did commit $500B ($150B more than the TARP balance) PLUS another $500B ("we are prepared to commit up to a trillion dollars to support a Consumer and Business Lending Initiative" whatever that's suppose to entail) PLUS continued risk exposure created by FRB credit facility operations in order to service bad, bad banks' debt load.

10% of that would make a sweet start-up carburator.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by MarketTrustee on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:40:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Feh. The goal is to protect the financial monopoly owned by Wall St, at - literally - almost any cost.

Wall St runs the world, and if Wall St shows weakness the US is finished as a superpower.

Rescuing the little people from ruin is a nice, but optional, bonus.

This is a pasty over-fed finger stuck into a leaking dam, not an attempt to deal seriously with the imminent threat of flooding.

Any other response is - literally - inconceivable.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:01:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]

This is a pasty over-fed finger stuck into a leaking dam, not an attempt to deal seriously with the imminent threat of flooding.

And the 2009 Nobel Prize for economic analysis goes to...  

Skennah Kowa

by Crazy Horse on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:26:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The goal is to protect the financial monopoly owned by Wall St, at - literally - almost any cost.
Even that would sorta be o.k.---if it would work!  I, personally, have zero confidence that, with the current approach, they can save either the economy or Wall Street.  I don't think Wall Street can be saved, even if the economy is sacrificed to that end.  Opps, even if the economy continues to be and eventually is totally sacrificed to that end.  The only real question is how much more damage will be inflicted and how deep the hole will be before anyone removes their head from their ass and tries something that can work.  Obama's dilemma is that he is a creature of the establishment but the only way he can conceivably succeed in his first term and get a second term is to turn on that establishment in order to do what must be done.  

Geitner and the Big Six banks should comprise the subjects of the first great auto da fe of the clean-up.  Then they need to create a significant investigatory and prosecutorial entity to go after all of the miscreants, down to the level of the office managers of mortgage broker offices and the vice presidents of banks that originated and then sold sub-prime and option ARMs in L.A., Miami, Las Vegas, etc.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:45:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well - that's what the goal is. No, it's not likely to work, but even framing the problem as a last ditch attempt to save Wall St in its current form makes survival of the US as a country unlikely in the longer term.

If states are already considering going their own way now, what happens a year from now when there's even less money to go around at street level, unemployment is even higher, and there are no obvious prospects for improvement?

There's a point where the cancerous bloat eats the victim to the point where both die. Wall St is a tick which has just popped. Trying to put the flying body parts back together again doesn't seem like a useful pastime.

I'm more interested in what happens next, and how long it's going to take.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:36:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Geitner and the Big Six banks should comprise the subjects of the first great auto da fe of the clean-up.

It's all about show trials...

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:56:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yeah, Watergate was such a disaster, why try again.

If sanity be culturally normative, then by the norms of this culture I claim insanity.
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer at eurotrib.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 06:01:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
1. To stabilize the system and restore confidence in our markets

The first point is that to stabilise banks only stops the bleeding of credit that is visible.

It doesn't stop the internal bleeding of the shadow banking system of Investors which was in fact largely responsible for inflating the Bubbles in property (deflation well under way) and private equity (just beginning, and with a knock on effect on employment and hence on property....)

European Tribune - MLECTARPPPIF, Same Story

And banks will be given - yet again - capital that they should lend out again. Except that they have every reason to hang on to whatever capital they can and avoid lending.

Second point is that in fact, they don't lend out capital. They create credit on the basis of it.

They are avoiding lending because they see very few credit-worthy prospects due to falling asset prices, and borrowers with increasingly rocky prospects.

This reluctance will continue until asset prices and employment stabilises, and we have  along way to go on that IMHO.

European Tribune - Comments - MLECTARPPPIF, Same Story

3. To get financial markets working again, we will create a new Public-Private Investment Fund which provide government capital and financing to leverage private capital to buy up the "toxic assets" that are dragging down lending

Thirdly, I've been advocating a PPIF for a while -but not exactly what they have in mind.

  1. Create First Toxic Bank LLC

  2. Transfer all assets and liabilities to a Custodian member of the LLC (the local Fed?)

  3. Put all the shares in First Toxic Bank Inc into trust on behalf of the management and staff. This is the Manager member of the LLC

  4. Finally, existing shareholders and government money as necessary become the Investor member of the LLC, in return for transferring assets and liabilities to the Custodian.

The gross revenues (ie the difference between interest received and interest paid) is then shared in agreed proportions between the Manager (ie Labour) and the Investor (Capital). If the Manager makes savings, then it splits these with the Investor so that the proportions remain the same.

Defaults are shared proportionally between the Investors

So that if private investors had (say) $5bn nominal share capital, and the government puts in (say) $15bn, then losses would be shared 25%/75%.

If new capital is needed, it then simply dilutes existing capital proportionally.

European Tribune - Comments - MLECTARPPPIF, Same Story

4. To keep people in their homes and curb the housing crisis, Treasury will work with the Federal Reserve to commit $50 billion to reduce monthly payments and establish loan modification guidelines for government and private programs.

Finally, people get to stay in their homes through the use of "Unitisation", not debt forgiveness or refinancing. We must change the quality of the financial obligations, not the quantity.

ie transfer distressed properties to the Custodian; set affordable index-linked rentals; divide the resulting pool into Units, and simply sell them to pension funds.

For Occupiers it's a new form of "rent to buy"; for Investors it's an index-linked, property-based, low risk (because "affordability" = "certainty", by definition) investment.

Right! That's sorted out the US property market, what about energy? ;-)

Modern conservatives engage in one of man's oldest exercises in moral philosophy: the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness.Galbraith

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 12:53:08 PM EST
Doesn't a PPIF assume a god-awful number of moronic hedge fund managers?
by tjbuff (timhess@adelphia.net) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 01:33:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Why Obama's new Tarp will fail to rescue the banks

If Mr Obama does not fix this crisis, all he hopes from his presidency will be lost. If he does, he can reshape the agenda. Hoping for the best is foolish. He should expect the worst and act accordingly.

Yet hoping for the best is what one sees in the stimulus programme and - so far as I can judge from Tuesday's sketchy announcement by Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary - also in the new plans for fixing the banking system. I commented on the former last week. I would merely add that it is extraordinary that a popular new president, confronting a once-in-80-years' economic crisis, has let Congress shape the outcome.

The banking programme seems to be yet another child of the failed interventions of the past one and a half years: optimistic and indecisive. If this "progeny of the troubled asset relief programme" fails, Mr Obama's credibility will be ruined. Now is the time for action that seems close to certain to resolve the problem; this, however, does not seem to be it.

Ouch.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:21:45 PM EST

Why then is the administration making what appears to be a blunder? It may be that it is hoping for the best. But it also seems it has set itself the wrong question. It has not asked what needs to be done to be sure of a solution. It has asked itself, instead, what is the best it can do given three arbitrary, self-imposed constraints: no nationalisation; no losses for bondholders; and no more money from Congress. Yet why does a new administration, confronting a huge crisis, not try to change the terms of debate? This timidity is depressing. Trying to make up for this mistake by imposing pettifogging conditions on assisted institutions is more likely to compound the error than to reduce it.

That point about self-imposed constraints is a pretty fundamental one - and it's a rather good sign that the point is made by such an acknowledged "Serious Person."

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 02:25:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Please (readers) do not underestimate this point about self-imposed constraints, as it goes to the underlying rationale for the bailout.  In other words, here is the first clue as to motive.

Skennah Kowa
by Crazy Horse on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:30:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What if the goal is not to rescue them but to nationalise them?

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:18:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That would be extremely clever, but politically extremely unlikely.

Is there a realistic way from here to there? And why not just nationalise them immediately, if that's the aim? The political fall out won't be any less dramatic if it happens a couple of years from now rather than next week.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:39:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And why not just nationalise them immediately, if that's the aim?

Because they don't want to expropriate them - they would have a massive lawsuit in their hands.

Look at it this way. If zombie banks have managed to postpone the day of reckoning for 18 months, they might still take another two years to fall over. Instead you pass an Act of Congress mandating a Federal audit of large banks and maybe not next week, but maybe you'll know next month that a particular bank is insolvent.

Note also how they are not saying "audit" - they are saying "forward-looking stress-test".

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:52:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Okay, but then you have a situation where zombie banks - which at a guess includes all of the serious ones - are declared insolvent in public, with the sternly worded suggestion that perhaps private money might want to buy them after all - whatever's left of them.

If a lot of banks fail the audits - which they will if the audits are honest - you have Lehmann II, III, IV, all the way up to an interesting but indeterminate double digit number. Market confidence won't be improved by this. All you're getting is a very expensive political pretext for a possible nationalisation program which would have to be vast and sweeping to have any effect at all.

But the catch is that after signalling insolvency after an audit, a fatal run on those banks is almost guaranteed.

We've already seen today what that would mean, and how precariously balanced confidence is.

If the audits are dishonest, no one is going to be better off because the toxic assets will still be toxic, and there will still be the nudge-wink implication that the government will be the lender of last resort.

Either way, all you've bought is the illusion of some breathing room while the sludge continues to accumulate. As the depression bites, 'proper' lending done with due diligence, will be decimated to the same extent that sub-prime has been, because formerly safe loans will turn bad as people lose their jobs.

So the problem is that even if this is a genius plan for nationalisation by the back door, it doesn't do enough to deal with the real problem - people without jobs and with mounting debts who could be doing something useful and getting paid for it - and it also creates an audit mechanism which will destroy confidence before it can do anything to improve it.

Maybe I'm missing something, but that doesn't look like a win to me.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 06:26:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
An Audit destroying confidence? At least we'll finally know what the balance sheet of these banks are!

There need not be a run on the banks, the FDIC is taking part in the audit. And a run on the stock should be the least of our concerns.

The banks won't go bust like Lehman because the Treasury is there ready to recapitalize the banks. But not to buy their toxic waste at a fictitious price.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 06:40:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm thinking of a rerun of the institutional run which was mentioned today, not a mom-and-pop-savings kind of run - although you might have both.

FDIC's capitalisation is limited, and any support above and beyond would have to come straight from the Treasury.

For the rest - I thought the plan was to push a private sector solution for recapitalisation?

And if you're going to recapitalise banks which would die anyway, why not avoid the drama with a First National Bank of Not Actually Everyone Else's Shitpile, and use that to lend directly to the people who need useful credit?

The point for me is that audits don't deal with the Financial Uncertainty Principle. And Geithner seems too much of an ideologue to push for the kind of clarity that's needed. E.g.

The Ticker - Is Geithner To Blame For Today's Market Plunge? - Economy Watch

Rep. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) was upset to learn that some companies receiving bailout money are offshoring jobs to save money. He wondered if the government shouldn't require that such companies employ Americans, in addition to the limits on executive compensation they're now facing.

"I do not believe we can put ourselves in position of raising the prospect where government comes in and directly manages at great detail the choices [companies] make," Geithner said. "Ultimately, we will end up costing the economy and taxpayers much more."

Geithner said that he is "deeply offended" by "many of the judgments" top executives have made, clearly referring to big bonuses and other perks. "But the important offsetting obligation we have is to not create the prospect that the government is going to come in and make decisions for institutions that want to remain in private hands," he said.

In other words - fuck you, Mr Little Guy.

And also

The Ticker - Is Geithner To Blame For Today's Market Plunge? - Economy Watch

Trying to figure out how much to pay for this assets -- which once had a value, now are virtually worthless and probably will have a value at some point in the future -- is a tough task.

Geithner just said there's a couple ways to price them: A) The government can set a price or B) The government can use an independent economic model to price them.

"We were concerned that neither of those two would give us the level of comfort" we want, Geithner said.

Instead, that's why he came up with the public-private funding mix: The government will use the private money as a kind of guide dog in entering this market, as the private sector has a better sense of the value of the toxic assets than the government does, and the private money knows it can invest without taking the whole risk on its shoulders, owing to the taxpayer co-investment.

At least that's how it's supposed to work.

Many traders are calling out for the government to set a price on the toxic assets -- any prices -- so they can get started at cleaning up the mess.

That longer paragraph looks completely insane to me.

Guide dog? The private sector knows the value, but it can invest without taking the whole risk?

Really - wtf? What could possibly be clearer about the real aim here - privatising profit and socialising risk, as usual?

Co-investment? Where? Most of this money will come from profit on loans, so - er - that will be interest paid by businesses and ordinary people.

Paying tax to Wall St on taxpayer's money, in other words, in some vague as yet undefined proportion which will be based on some vague guide dog element of private investment, probably.

Nothing has changed here. It's the same game, and the outcome will be similar. The can is just being kicked slightly further down the road.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 07:24:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The risk is shared, but the price is set by a private sector investor (who puts money on the table at that price, along with public money).

You're supposed to make a proper risk analysis whether you put in 20 or 100M - that(s what the government is counting in. and what it brings is more money to invest, alongside.

That's a failry basic risk allocation and sharing mechanism, there's nothign wrong with it per se - as long as public and private investors take the same risk pari passu.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (jeromeguillet@yahoo.fr) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 04:11:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If a lot of banks fail the audits - which they will if the audits are honest - you have Lehmann II, III, IV, all the way up to an interesting but indeterminate double digit number. Market confidence won't be improved by this.

Well, yes and no.  Certainly I think we're going to find ourselves looking at some pretty horrifying losses.  And there's a risk that a good chunk of the public sees Treasury declare BofA or Shitibank or whatever to be insolvent and responds with a run on the bank.  (I don't think it's a very big risk, honestly, especially not if met from the beginning with assurances that deposits are protected no matter what they find.)  But it's going to do a lot more for confidence over even the short term to know what's what.

The plan at least seems to get that right.  And the plan doesn't, so far as I can tell, seem to involve Geithner simply running out to buy toxic shit at hyper-inflated prices like Paulson did.

Clearly Geithner and Obama are being chickenshits, politically.  (Referring to audits as "stress tests" makes me wonder if Mark Penn and Frank Luntz edited Geithner's paper for him.)  But they do seem to be cracking the back door open on nationalization, while obviously running away from saying anything about nationalization.

And I think Mig probably makes a fair point about the reaction to this on Wall Street and in the press.  (You really should've seen CNBC erupt with Geithner Derangement Syndrome when this was released.)  I don't think it's insignificant that investors got the hell out of financials.  And I do think the blogosphere may have jumped the gun a bit.  It might still wind up being right, but I'm just sayin'.  

Much of it is, as Krugman said, subject to interpretation.  "The Rorschach Plan," as he called it.  So, once more, I declare, "We'll see."

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!

by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 07:00:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Mig's interpretation after scanning through it initially was much more favorable than anything else I read, and Paul Krugman has now updated on it with a resounding "We'll see":

The Rorschach plan (wonkish, or at least hard to read)

An old joke from my younger days: What do you get when you cross a Godfather with a deconstructionist? Someone who makes you an offer you can't understand.

I found myself remembering that joke when trying to make sense of the Geithner financial rescue plan. It's really not clear what the plan means; there's an interpretation that makes it not too bad, but it's not clear if that's the right interpretation.

The plan deserves praise for what isn't in it, at least as far as I can tell. There doesn't seem to be provision for mass purchases of toxic waste at premium prices; there also doesn't seem to be a massive "ring-fencing" guarantee against private losses on bad assets. In that sense the plan is better than what the last few weeks of leaks led us to expect.

What is in it, in reverse order:

  1. Super-TALF: a big expansion of the Fed's quantitative easing, with Treasury backing. I'm OK with that.

  2. Private-public purchases of questionable assets; as I understand it, private investors would be the junior partners, so this is probably not a big giveaway (unless there's huge public financing, in which case it amounts to ring-fencing after all). I also suspect it wouldn't accomplish much, but no harm, no foul.

  3. Stress test: everything depends on how this is actually implemented. What happens if, or more likely when, a major money center bank is stress-tested and found to have negative net worth? One possibility is that the auditors are told to come up with a different answer; that's a big concern. The other is that the bank is effectively nationalized; as I read the language that could be achieved as part of the public capital injection.

So what is the plan? I really don't know, at least based on what we've seen today. But maybe, maybe, it's a Trojan horse that smuggles the right policy into place.

The same thought occurred to me reading what Mig had to say.  Are they setting up these audits and mechanisms as a back-door nationalization policy?

Need to know more.

Might explain why the CNBC crowd immediately began screeching after the speech....

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!

by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:03:42 PM EST

(unless there's huge public financing, in which case it amounts to ring-fencing after all)

Second clue.

Despite feeling like i'm having my pocket picked again, and despite feeling more comfortable living in Europe, i will add without detailed explanation what is so obvious from the comments on this thread and others...

[System.Is.Broken Alert]

Skennah Kowa

by Crazy Horse on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:33:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, it's a diplomatic way of presenting things.

Shorter point 2 : depends to what extent private investors determine the price they're willing to pay, and the taxpayer comes up with the rest;

Shorter point 3 : depends on how the audits are run and what consequences they are allowed to have.

(Both points I made less diplomatically, in the story, and in response to Mig.)

I'll go along with Martin Wolf more on this one:

Yet why does a new administration, confronting a huge crisis, not try to change the terms of debate? This timidity is depressing.

Yes, why the need for a Trojan horse?

When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:41:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Obama on ABC:

ABC News: Obama: No 'Easy Out' for Wall Street

PRESIDENT OBAMA:Well, you know, Wall Street I think is hoping for an easy out on this thing and there is no easy out. Essentially what you've got are a set a banks that have not been as transparent as we need to be in terms of what their books look like.

And we're gonna have to hold out the Band-aid a little bit and go ahead and just be clear about some of the losses that have been made because until we do that, we're not going to be able to attract private capital into the marketplace. And so, you know, I think that you have two choices in this situation: you can prolong the agony and shareholders will be happy until they're not happy, and that could be a year from now or two years from now, or in the case of Japan, eight years later.

Or you can just go ahead and acknowledge that yeah, there's, there's a lot of work that has to be done to put these banks back on a firmer footing.



When locusts move on, they leave nothing behind
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:20:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not sure what any of that means.  It strikes me as a stereotypical politician's answer -- that is, three paragraphs of nothing.  He might as well have said, "Well, look, this kinda sucks, aaaaaaand the solution, um, I think, is going to suck one way or another."

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!
by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:32:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
FDR would have said:

"Today we have established the Civilian Energy Bank, to finance near-term renewable energy security.  We will syndicate project finance to the sick banks, in the hope we can turn their balance sheets around.  But if not, the CEB, will go forward with the peaceful equivalent of the warfare footing of WWII, and fund putting people to work on their children's sustainable future.

We will begin by funding service technician programs in community colleges across the windy plains, in addition to the existing portfolios of quality developers."

In reaction, Wall St was down 7%, which didn't account for the people partying in the streets.  

Skennah Kowa

by Crazy Horse on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:40:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]


Hey, Grandma Moses started late!
by LEP (rafifoon@yahoo.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:29:21 PM EST
Mr DJIA down 420.

On the bright side, maybe none of the traders worldwide have learned that the Senate passed its version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, S.336.

Tomorrow they may rally with Mr Bond.

Ha.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by MarketTrustee on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 03:52:18 PM EST
You're such an optimistic person Mme. Market Trustee..  :-))

Hey, Grandma Moses started late!
by LEP (rafifoon@yahoo.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 04:14:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
OMFG, how did you know? Pollyanna is my middle name.

BTW, I had a hilarious depo with ma da on Abe Levy and Fusco LLC circo '64.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by MarketTrustee on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 06:21:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
naked capitalism: Geithner Bank Bailout Plan: Fiasco

It's not a bailout.

Overview of U.S. bank rescue plan | Top News | Reuters

It's not a bank rescue.

It's a mandatory audit.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 05:58:43 PM EST
Mig, if you don't mind, I'd like you to stop paying your taxes so that we can nominate you to replace Geithner. ;)

WHEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE!!
by Drew J Jones (myfriends@thisispancakes.com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 06:38:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
See my diary.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Feb 10th, 2009 at 06:41:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]


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