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by Luis de Sousa On the 24th of March, Frank Biancheri, head of of the LEAP2020, published in the Financial Times the following open letter directed to the G20 leaders gathering in London on the 2nd of April:
An audio version of this log entry can be downloaded here.
Further detail of LEAP2020's analysis was given by Frank in an interview to the Guns and Butter radio show. There will be other issues discussed at the meeting: tax heavens, shadow accounting practices, reserve requirements, but the global reserve currency system, that, as was known during at least the last 40 years, seems to have ceased to exist, is the most important of all. How did it get here. The first attempt to reach a global monetary system was held at Bretton Woods in the US in the Summer of 1944, with the end of the Second World War in sight. An agreement was reached between 44 nations in the Allies' side, that enacted the IMF, the prototype of the World Bank and a new monetary system for commercial relations. This system (named Bretton Woods) established fixed exchange rates between currencies, defining narrow fluctuations of paper currencies against gold. This Bretton Woods system lasted for more than two decades along which countries kept on increasing paper currency supply, but managed to maintain gold prices under control by injecting reserves into the market. The system began to fail in May of 1968 when world wide panic closed down most gold trading markets. Investors had lost faith in central banks' ability to redeem the fiat currency they had issued. In the Summer of 1971, bending on the weight of increasing energy imports and the Vietnam war, the US was forced to pull out of the Bretton Woods system, abandoning the direct convertibility of the US dollar into gold. During the following months, with the dollar loosing half of its value against gold, most other countries abandoned fixed exchange rates against the dollar. A new system emerged, with major currencies used in international trade adopting floating exchange rates. Following came a period of about ten years between the first oil shock and the pinnacle of the early 1980s recession, when currencies slowly depreciated without much economic growth happening in the western world. During this time the foundations of the present system were launched. Perhaps the most important action towards it was the birth of the Carter Doctrine. As the economic crisis was overcome, a symbiotic relationship developed between the Midde East and the West, in exchange for military protection (conserving the ruling elites) oil producers provided easy oil that fostered economic growth in its turn reinforcing that military power. Oil producing countries stored their wealth in US Treasury bonds and other debt instruments becoming creditors of the military power that kept them safe; the flow of cheap oil allowed the economic growth that justified the faith on the US currency. This was the Petro-dollar system. While in a different stance, US allies in the NATO framework (also Japan and Oceania) ended up also benefiting from this new system. They couldn't export debt as the US did, but benefited both from the flow of cheap oil and of the rising protective military power at the western side of the Atlantic. Two decades of unprecedented economic stability and growth unfolded. But History is relentless. By the mid 1980s this system was being used chiefly in the Atlantic - Middle East trade, with the USSR and its allied still in place, and in a trade environment much narrower than today. As oil prices collapsed in 1985, events were set in motion that brought down the USSR both in political, military and economic terms; in 1989 the Berlin wall fell and in 1991 Russia detached from the former republics of the Warsaw Pact. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty created a new market of international dimension; in 1999 the Euro was born and in 2001 China joined the WTO, paving the way far a major, now liberalized, economy entering the world market. At the same time other important players emerged, with Russia becoming again the world's largest oil producer and a major energy exporter, not forgetting countries like Brasil or India. What started as a bonding scheme between two regions, became the system that prices global trade today. Not only the usage of the US dollar as reserve currency became global, it became much more intense with imports and exports having far greater weight in individual economies than 20 years ago. This scheme resulted into the US Federal Reserve setting monetary policy for the whole world, while in fact its targets and gauges are solely on the US economy. The recent years. After 2000 the US embarked on a monetary and fiscal policy expansion with little parallel in history: interest rates were brought down to the floor, the monetary mass grew in excess of 10% annually, an expansionary budget stimulated demand for goods and services, many of them imported from countries that accumulated US bonds and other forms of fiat currency. From 2002 to 2007 reserve currency held by central banks grew in excess of 20% annually. In parallel, lax financial regulations and reserve requirements helped creating a pile of invisible debt (out of balance sheets) on that expanding demand and monetary mass, according to some amounting today to more than the world's annual GDP. Did this incredible expansion ended because oil production plateaued? That's an interpretation, although other views are possible. Oil prices entered the rising phase in 2004, in 2005 were raw materials and 2006 food: no matter what the underlying reason, the supply side stopped following the demand expansion. When Ben Bernanke became chairman of the US Federal Reserve and tried to change course by raising interest rates, so that at least some strain would come to the monetary expansion, it was already too late: the US economy couldn't expand anymore in order to generate the wealth promised by all the debt issued in previous years. Without that physical growth, the result was simply default on debt. Without the proper leadership from either the US government or the Federal Reserve, panic took over last September and during two months the world assisted to one of the sharpest demand retractions in history. The awkwardness of the moment is that in order to stimulate demand once more the prescription in the US seems to be an expansionary budget and monetary policy. And here's the main problem: this policy threatens the value of US dollar reserves held abroad. There is another side to the present crisis worth observing: countries that followed alternate monetary policies to those set by the Fed seem to be suffering the most. Those that opted for high interest rates in order to fend price inflation and/or demand enjoyed an influx of foreign investment lurking for easy profits. When the crisis hit that investment simply vanished, examples were Iceland, and Russia to some extent. At the other end were countries like Japan that during this decade had been battling problems of employment or lack of internal demand, employing expansionist measures even sharper than the US; they are now facing an influx of currency that threatens to engulf demand and massively destroy employment. In conclusion: a regional currency running world trade had two main negative effects: impaired specific monetary policies in other regions, formating them to the issuing region, and pegged wealth in store to the economic health of a single region: the issuer. Exacerbating these problems is the hegemonic position the currency issuer gets, allowing it to leave beyond its means - what Frank Biancheri calls the reserve currency curse - the budget and trade deficits can apparently be expanded without limit, but at some point it makes foreigners wonder, and when that time comes the issuing region is engulfed in debt. A global economy running on a regional currency seems almost like a scheme designed to self destruct. The confidence wanes. The policies needed to bring the US economy back into contact with reality have thus the parallel effect of deriding the wealth stored by those economies that grew on exports during the past few years: be it expensive lasting goods (e.g. Germany, Japan), consumer goods (e.g. China) or energy (e.g. Middle East, Russia). The confidence on the US dollar as a reserve currency is severely demaged and as the LEAP2020 implies, it will probably never come back. No wonder then that China is openly calling for a new reserve currency system:
This backs up earlier calls from another major holder of reserve currency, Russia, that seems to be heading a group of nations with the same intent:
But China has not sticked solely to articles in the western press and meetings with other reserve currency holders. Ever since the country announced its intention to make the Yuan a reserve currency, several currency swaps have been announced with its main commercial partners, Argentina being the last of a list that includes South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Belarus. What could happen then if a new coordinated reserve currency fails to emerge? The answer is simple: the US dollar will stop being the world trading benchmark. A period will then unfold during which trading nations won't have a clear worldwide unit to value their goods, much less to store value for future trading. Possibly, some regional currencies might be tried on a geographically limited basis, and another alternative might emerge with a currency for which there isn't much policy to go about: gold. The consequences of such transition will be immense; an Hungarian mathematician called Antal Fekete, claims to already be getting signs in that sense, with gold futures entering backwardation late last year. This is a rather technical issue, way beyond the aims of this simple essay, but with or without backwardation, it is important to know what Fekete foresees [pdf!] in case the present system ceases to exist without a clear replacement:
Coming from a different perspective, this scenario ends up remarkably close to what Frank Biancheri calls "every man for himself": the break down of global commercial bonds, a drastic reduction in global trade and the emergence of several regions of influence deploying different economic and monetary policies, in a world resembling Europe in 1914. A small but important sign of this unfolding change of the world's monetary system is the recent news that the US sate of Montana is considering a return to gold and silver as means of payment and state accounting units. Europe. Europe has possibly the most complex stake in this meeting. On the one hand it is home to about one third of the world's reserve currency, having to some extent benefited from the advantages of being a reserve currency issuer (although in its case the reserve currency issued is a relatively small fraction of total currency in circulation). On the other hand, it holds the third largest foreign currency reserve in the world, being a major creditor of the US. Two other issues are worth nothing in Europe's stake, first, it is heavily dependent on energy imports, thus being highly vulnerable to world trade disturbances, and more so when its major fossil fuel suppliers are entering terminal decline: Norway, in the case of oil and gas, and Russia in the case of oil. Another important point is that about half of the world's reserve gold is in Europe, as so considerable sums in privately owned bullion and monetary jewelry. All things considered, Europe is possibly the region having most to benefit (or more to lose in the opposite case) from a new reserve currency system not reliant on a single regional issuer. Up front, for it would prevent serious impact on world trade and the possible consequent disruption of energy imports, but also because it would prevent the Euro from somehow becoming a substitute for the dollar, shifting the "reserve currency curse" to the eastern side of the Atlantic. Enter the Khaleeji. There is still another possibility to unfold if a new reserve currency system isn't put in place. After several years of talks and on/off reports in the press about its arrival, the Gulf Cooperation Council states decided in the wake of the present crisis to precipitate the creation of its common currency, the Khaleeji. This is another sign of the confidence break up in the US dollar as a reserve currency, from countries that so far had their currencies pegged to it. It is shaping up to be something like the Euro, governed by a Middle East Central Bank. Interestingly, there's only one country from this block attending the G20 meeting, Saudi Arabia. Speculation as come about on this new currency being backed by a physical entity, in contrast with the other fiat currencies of the main world trading blocks. Gold is the usual suspect, but that's unlikely, for the region doesn't hold much gold (compared to Europe) and a good part of what it has is non-monetary jewelry. The important thing about the Khaleeji is that it will be backed by the economic health of countries whose main economic activity is energy production and export. This makes it a real improvement over the US dollar, the Yuan or the Euro, and a potentially emerging reserve currency in case an agreement fails at the G20. Beyond a new reserve currency system. The last paragraph contains an obvious caveat: if the Khaleeji comes to be a fiat currency, its backing by energy is purely abstract, shakily built on confidence. And that is the main problem world leaders face today, irrespective of what role energy prices had on the crisis unfolding, one thing is certain: if the energy flow to the world economy can't grow anymore, then all abstract currencies are condemned as long term wealth storage media. Without economic growth to support their expansion, abstract currencies loose their main advantage over commodities: a supply totally detached from economic activity allowing for monetary policies supporting employment, wealth or international relations. As expansionary measures are put forward to revive an economic growth that might no longer be possible, paper currencies will rapidly deride in value, menacing public confidence invested on them. A new world reserve currency, resembling the old Ecu for instance, could indeed re-instate balance in world trade, but it won't be in any way a solution for the deriding value of abstract currencies and the policies founded on them. But it would at least bound international players together into finding a way forward. |
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London G-20 meeting: the last chance? | 24 comments (24 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)
London G-20 meeting: the last chance? | 24 comments (24 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)
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