The European Council, a (previously informal, undefined in the treaties) meeting of the heads of state and government that had taken place once or twice a year since 1974, grew with the increase in member states to fifteen into a more complex and important occasion that made vital overall policy decisions, yet with little in the way of system or formal structure. The old format of refined dinner-parties and fireside chats was clearly outdated, yet a more businesslike organization had not replaced it. Frustration grew with poorly-prepared haggling sessions, reaching its peak at Nice in 2000.

Blair calls for change after Nice 'circus' - Europe, World - The Independent

Tony Blair demanded sweeping reforms to the way European Union leaders take big decisions yesterday after a shambolic five-day summit in Nice finally approved a new governing treaty for the EU.

...

The fractious Nice meeting ended at 3.25am yesterday, when the 15 EU leaders buried their differences over their voting power and agreed changes to the union's decision-making process to allow it to admit 12 new member states.

With another full-scale review of the EU already looming in 2004, Mr Blair sought to capitalise on the disarray and chaotic late-night wrangling displayed in Nice. "We cannot do business like this in future," he said bluntly, adding that changes were essential to ensure a more rational decision-making system.

That "we cannot do business like this in the future" was pumped through the media as Blair marked demand for change with his brand. There was a generous subtext there of businesslike Brits needing to knock some sense into the hopeless Continentals, and it wasn't only meant for home audiences. However, there was general agreement that the European Council would not be able to face the challenge of enlargement to 25 then 27 member states without serious organizational change. The six-monthly rotating presidency that was responsible for organizing European Council meetings simply couldn't rise to that challenge, given that the government of the member state currently holding the presidency had other matters of importance to deal with in its own country, that the number of European Council meetings and the importance of their agendas was increasing, and that meetings would run to upwards of sixty negotiators round the table. A six-monthly change in the presidency also meant a lack of time to prepare and to follow up on meetings, a lack of familiarity with the dossiers, a lack of perspective.

The need for redefinition of the EU's decision-making structures led to a decision at the European Council of Laeken (Dec 2001) to hold a Convention that would make proposals for a new treaty. The Convention began its work in February 2002. By that time, the idea was going around that the six-monthly rotating presidency should be replaced by a fulltime president elected by the European Council for five years. The French were in favour, both President of the Republic Chirac and Convention chair Valéry Giscard d'Estaing: the idea fits with France's presidential régime (in which the Prime Minister is appointed by, and takes her/is orders from, the president - there was a possible parallel there with the position of the Commission president that some did not hesitate to draw, whether for or against). Apart from the efficiency theme, the "presidential theme" had its backers:

Philippe de Schoutheete*: Integration (pdf)

A separate argument given was the need to have some permanence, at the highest level, on the international scene if the Union wanted to "shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation" and to become "a stabilizing factor and a model in the new, multipolar world" to use the words of the Laeken declaration.

(*Philippe de Schoutheete, former Belgian permanent Ambassador to the EU, member of the think tank Notre Europe, author of excellent historical analysis of the institution of the European Council, is a signatory of the Stop Blair! petition.)

Italy was favourable (Berlusconi had become PM in mid-2001), though Romano Prodi as Commission President was reserved. Above all, Aznar and Blair (an extremely "presidential" prime minister) backed this idea of a "big" president who would knock the EU's proceedings into shape and symbolize Europe to the world.

There were opposing views:

Philippe de Schoutheete: Integration (pdf)

Arguments against were based on the risk of upsetting the institutional balance, by strengthening the intergovernmental pillar, identified with the European Council, to the detriment of the supranational pillar, namely the Commission and its President. The innovation was perceived as a presidential system à la française, which is alien to the political tradition of other countries. More implicitly there was the fear that a new structure of this sort would, in practice, be dominated by a group of bigger member states, and the fact that those states were all in favour of this proposal seemed to confirm that suspicion.

The arguments are more fully set out here:

De Schoutheete, Wallace: The European Council

The merits and shortcoming of the six month rotating presidency are being sharply debated, notably at the Convention, and arguments can be put forward in various directions. In the case of the European Council, however, the options for change are limited. It is not reasonable to suppose that an incumbent head of government could exercise the presidency of the European Council for a much longer period of time, say two and a half years. National tasks and responsibilities, at that level, are too constraining. They can, with difficulty, be combined with European tasks and responsibilities for a short period. To prolong a period of absorption in European affairs, involving a distanding absence from national politics, would in many cases amount to political suicide. And of course presidency tasks will be more demanding in an enlarged Union: more contacts, more travel, more problems, more external obligations. This means that the system of "team presidencies", favoured by some, whereby presidencies would be shared out between a group of countries for a period of several years, could not be applied at the highest level, because no incumbent head of government could undertake the presidency of the European Council for a long period of time.

In practice that leaves two options open for the presidency of the European Council:

• To appoint a president who has been, but is no longer, an incumbent head of government.
• To keep the present rotation, but to accept that the role of the president would be limited to that of a chairman

The idea initially put forward by Chirac, and supported later by Blair and Aznar, of electing a full-time President of the European Council, chosen from among former heads of government and for a period of, say, five years, would certainly enhance efficiency, visibility and authority. The President would have time adequately to prepare meetings through numerous contacts and preliminary work. S/he might chair coordinating meetings of the GAERC in order to focus on follow-up work. S/he would ensure continuity, acquire an extensive knowledge of issues and personalities, and develop the skills needed when chairing a large group of prominent political figures. S/he would give a face to the European Union both in the Union itself and to the outside world.

But difficult issues arise.

The first concerns divergences in political culture: the personalization of power, which is implicit in a presidential, or quasi-presidential, system of this sort, is a political fact in some major countries in Europe, but it is not prevalent in the majority, specially in the smaller ones, where coalitions are the rule, and parliamentary assemblies play a major role. Linked to suspicion that the President would always be chosen from a big country, this proposal could exacerbate the divide between bigger and smaller member states. Some preliminary reactions to the proposal are indicative of this danger.

The second concerns the impact on the institutional balance of the Union and specially the relationship between the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission. The proposed system would elevate to the highest level the sort of tension which is known to exist between the functions (not the persons) of Patten [Commissioner for External Relations] and Solana [High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy], and which most observers think should be remedied. If, as would seem probable and desirable, the President of the Commission were to receive more democratic legitimacy from, or through, a vote of the European Parliament, we would have a conflict. Supranational legitimacy from the European Parliament versus intergovernmental legitimacy from the European Council. Europe, it seems to us, needs to combine and reconcile those two legitimacies, not to oppose them.

The last objection would fall if, as suggested by some (Grant 2002), the President of the Commission, appointed by the European Council, were also to chair that body. Given that the President of the Commission is the only member of the European Council dealing exclusively with European affairs, that s/he is also (with the exception of the Belgian Prime Minister) the only one to reside permanently in Brussels, s/he would have the time, occasion, technical knowledge and infrastructure to exercise this presidential task. Dynamics in the system would increase because leadership would flow from a very formidable political figure, combining both forms of legitimacy, able to call on support from the European Council, approval from Parliament, independence and technical know how from the Commission. How would this impact on the collegial character of the Commission ? Would this help or hinder the capacity of the Commission to steer forward major policy reform packages? Are member states ready for this sort of step?

On the last point, Charles Grant:

CER Policy Brief

WHO SHOULD CHAIR THE European Council? Jacques Chirac wants the heads of government to elect a senior figure - such as a former prime minister - as `European President'. Tony Blair is sympathetic. Chirac argues that in a crisis, the EU lacks a credible figure to speak for it at the highest level, as the equal of Bush or Putin; and that such a president would show that democratically elected governments, represented in the European Council, were in charge. However, the Commission already has a president and the creation of another might lead to confusion and rivalry among the institutions. The European President would also be likely to compete against the High Representive. In any case, the smaller countries and Germany see this idea as an attempt to weaken the Commission and may well block it.

The heads of government should think seriously about allowing the next Commision president, due to take office in January 2005, to chair the European Council. So long as they, rather than the Parliament, continue to choose the Commission president, the heads of government could probably accept a more prominent role for this figure. Such a change would help to ensure that the various EU institutions pulled together.

Grant was not alone in proposing the merger of the functions of Commission president and president of the European Council: the idea drew backing from, among others, former Commission president Jacques Santer.

So opposition was partly based on small countries' fear of loss of influence as the majors took aver an increasing share of power - and the Seven Dwarfs (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Portugal) were adamant in their rejection of the creation of the presidential post. Those countries were attached to the rotating presidency, which gave even the smallest countries an equal slice with the big, in terms of institutional and media joy, allowing them to showcase their countries by hosting European Council meetings and show their home electorates that their country was more than just a cipher in the EU scheme of things. And, in general, they were suspicious of the growing intergovernmental axis of power in the EU, preferring to support the supranational elements, Parliament and Commission, where they were better represented than on the shifting diplomatic ground of government-to-government relations, where the majors more easily got their way.

It happened that Germany's view was, for somewhat different reasons, also in favour of Parliament and the Commission. The classic German view of the EU is (was?) federalist, favouring a parliamentarian system with strict delimitation of competence (cf Länder). The European Parliament and the Commission should work together on legislation, the Commission deriving its legitimacy from Parliament (election of the Commission president by the EP). The European Council might be useful, but in this scheme it should not become preponderant. The "big president" idea did not fit with German ways of seeing things.

These positions held throughout 2002, while the Convention avoided institutional issues because they were the ones most likely to inflame. So that in the end (de Schoutheete, Integration):

the institutional debate in the Convention , including matters which had been hotly debated in previous intergovernmental conferences and had led to laborious and convoluted compromises, was limited to a few plenary meetings held in an atmosphere of increasing time pressure.

It wasn't the Convention that would settle the question of the presidency of the European Council, it was intergovernmental bargaining between the two historic majors, France and Germany. Chirac and Schröder met in January 2003, and decided on a halfway house regarding their different options. Schöder accepted the notion of a presidency of the European Council as long as it did not diminish the role of the Commission President. Chirac accepted a restatement of the central position of the Commission and the Commission president's election by QMV of the European Parliament.

It was all over bar the bluster. The Convention plenary that followed was largely anti:

From a UK House of Commons research report

At the end of the debate the Chairman, Hanja Maij-Weggen, estimated that, out of the 91 speakers, 12 supported the Franco-German proposal, 64 were against and 15 had serious reservations.

The Commission too spoke against the creation of two executive posts. By spring 2003,

UK House of Commons research report

On 1 April 2003 the Heads of State of seven small EU Member States (the so-called "seven dwarfs": Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria, Finland and Ireland) held a summit in Luxembourg to prepare their common position on institutional reform, with a view to submitting a contribution to the Convention. The seven governments aimed to create a united front to try and prevent the larger Member States from dominating the future Union. They initially rejected proposals for an EU president, which was regarded as one of the reasons why Denmark had not been invited to join the group (Denmark supported the proposal).

By the Athens European Council on 16 April 2003, 16 of the smaller Member States and accession states had signed up to a paper entitled Reforming the institutions: Principles and Premises.10 This called for the maintaining and reinforcing of the `Community method'. It took a firm stand against "any arrangements which sought to establish a hierarchy of Member States"11 and was against establishing a permanent Council president. To prevent large state dominance the small countries want to maintain the current six-month rotating Presidency, to which they attach symbolic importance.

But, within a month, the Benelux countries had shifted their position, and the front did not hold as far as preventing the institution of a "permanent" president of the European Council goes. Just as a little game, here's the Franco-German agreement of January 2003 (UK House of Commons report, Appendix 3):

1. European Council

• A stable presidency to give the leadership of the European Council continuity, stability and a higher profile.
• A five-year full-time elected president or a term of two and a half years with re-election.
• President would prepare, chair and organise the proceedings of the European Council and ensure its decisions are carried out
• President would represent the Union on the international arena at meetings of the heads of State or government, without prejudicing the responsibilities of the Commission and its President. The European Minister of Foreign Affairs would conduct the day-to-day business relating to the CFSP.

Here's the text of the Lisbon Treaty, (which is that of the "Constitution" treaty):

5. The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. (...)

6. The President of the European Council:

(a) shall chair it and drive forward its work;
(b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council;
(c) shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;

(...)

The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Apart from the "day-to-day business" language in the Franco-German agreement, that seems to diminish the role of the "Minister" (now reverted to "High Representative" because the Brits thought "Minister" made it sound like the EU was a country with a government, shudder), there's not much difference between the two. So what we have to define the roles (that will in all likelihood come into conflict) of the three top permanent members of the European Council, is a rough-and-ready compromise that Schröder and Chirac knocked together to show willing, and that has gone through the following treaty-writing processes essentially unchanged.

The anti-presidential camp might all the same consider the glass was half full rather than half empty. Jean-Claude Juncker in summer 2003 (thanks to DoDo for the translation):

Jean-Claude Juncker: Wissen nicht, wohin die Reise geht		Jean-Claude Juncker: We don't know where this is taking us
Profil: Der Zwergenaufstand der kleineren Länder gegen die großen war erfolglos. Ist dieser neue EU-Ratspräsident noch zu verhindern?		Profile: The "dwarf uprising" of the smaller countries against the big ones was unsuccessful. Can this new EU Council President still be prevented?
Jean-Claude Juncker: Wir haben ja diesem im Anflug befindlichen Riesenvogel, der den Europäischen Rat präsidieren soll, massiv die Flügel gestutzt. Zumindest ist jetzt auf dem Papier klargestellt, dass der Kommissionspräsident der eigentliche Spielmacher in der Europäischen Union bleibt und der Ratspräsident nicht zum Vorstandssprecher der Europa AG werden kann. Allerdings muss man eines klar sehen: Wenn es einen Kommissionspräsidenten geben sollte, der seine ihm durch Vertrag gesicherten Rechte nicht voll ausnützen würde, und parallel dazu einen gewählten EU-Ratspräsidenten, der seine Rechte auf Kosten des Kommissionspräsidenten auszuweiten versucht, dann werden wir Konflikte an der Doppelspitze haben. Das wird zu einer weiteren Unleserlichkeit der europäischen Politik beitragen.		Jean-Claude Juncker: Well, we have massively cut the wings of this approaching giant bird which is to preside over the European Council. At least on paper, it has now been clarified that the Commission President remains the real playmaker in the European Union, and the Council President can not become the management board spokesman for Europe Inc. However, one must see one thing clearly: if there is a Commission President who would not exploit the rights guaranteed to him by the [Lisbon] Treaty in full, and in parallel, an elected Council President who is trying to extend his rights at the expense of the Commission President, then we will have conflicts of the dual leadership. This will lead to further illegibility of European politics.
Profil: Wer wird denn eigentlich die Union nach außen hin vertreten?		Profile: Who will really represent the [European] Union externally?
Jean-Claude Juncker: Leider ist die äußere Vertretung der Europäischen Union durch den Konvent mitnichten klarer geworden. Die Europäische Union wird nach außen hin vertreten vom gewählten Ratspräsidenten, vom europäischen Außenminister und vom Kommissionspräsidenten. Dann werden drei Europäer über den Laufsteg spazieren, über den George W. Bush alleine marschiert. Was daran klarer, effizienter, zielorientierter sein soll, konnte mir bis heute niemand erklären.		Jean-Claude Juncker: Unfortunately, the external representation of the European Union was made by no means clear by the [European] Convention [the drafter ofthe failed EU Constitution]. The European Union is represented externally by the elected Council President, the European Foreign Minister, and the Commission President. Then, three Europeans will walk on the catwalk walked by George W. Bush alone. What is supposed to be clearer, more efficient, and target-oriented about that, [is something] no one has been able to explain to me up to now

Half full, half empty? The interesting point is that Juncker considers that the "giant bird" big president option has been seriously trimmed. It would seem, all the same, that that will depend on who gets in there first to shape the post in the absence of precise treaty definitions. If Juncker, it will be a president who seeks to make the European Council work more efficiently while looking for the least friction with the Commission president and the High Rep. If Blair, it will be the "giant bird" option all over again - nothing, in Blair's past as authoritarian British PM, or world grandstander, allows one to conclude otherwise.

And this may have an influence on the outcome of the election within the European Council. How many small countries will (after their defeat on the issue) be willing to back a candidate who is not only from a "major" country, but is likely to give the post the highest possible profile? What will be the German attitude (if Merkel really cares)?

However, Blair may well turn out to be the hungriest (if not the only) candidate and will force his way through. A dangerous outcome for the balance of power in the EU's institutions.