EROI, ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies

by ARGeezer Sun Dec 12th, 2010 at 11:46:41 PM EST

EROI = Energy Return On Investment. ROIIC = Return On Investment In Complexity†. The Collapse of Complex Societies by Joseph Tainter.

†See excerpts from Tainter quoted below the fold.

In a thread in a previous diary while discussing growth vs. sustainability question arose as to whether an argument being used conflated the issue of economic growth with that of social equity. This issue goes to the heart of the different approaches currently employed in "mainstream economics" and that employed in other social sciences, especially anthropology, archeology and sociology. My response outgrew the bounds I thought proper for a comment and that diary was already unwieldy, so I have made it into another diary, if somewhat belatedly.

Julian Simon had made the argument, cited by santiago:

-- that there is no reason to presume that human population growth actually be limited by merely linear projections of resource use and availability into the future because people can adapt to scarcity.

I responded:

....
The problems for the next two decades are likely to be learning to deal with declining marginal returns on the investments required to provide the energy to drive our cultures. Renewable energy sources provide positive marginal returns. I have seen figures of up to 20:1 for wind. But that may be inadequate to support systems that were built up during times of 50:1 returns.
My fear is that by denying the existence of foreseeable constraints we will run into them very hard and, instead of moving gracefully to a scenario in which we rely on 20:1 returns from renewables, we end up in a near total collapse of the culture. We have to consider that, by blindly following hopeful scenarios and denying the possibility of negative scenarios we could end up needing to rebuild all of our coastal cities on higher ground in a world in which 20:1 returns on investment are the best obtainable. And we could end up having to do that in a social context where a tiny minority possesses almost all disposable wealth and control of the apparatuses of government and has no interest in the survival of the bottom 90% of income earners in the society. But that might get us back to a population less than 10% of what we have today.

To this santiago responded:

There are two arguments being conflated here (and I don't mean just your comment). One is an efficiency (or growth) argument, and one is an equity argument.

My eventual response is that there are two arguments but they are not so much conflated as co-existent. The Growth/Sustainability argument is not dependent on maintaining equity. In fact decreasing equity would seem to go nicely with decline and collapse, and that certainly was the case with the Western Roman Empire. But then I paused to wonder if perhaps sustainability IS dependent on social equity And on the question of if and how it is reasonable to attempt to separate the economy from the society in which it operates and to disregard the effects of the operation of that economy on the society in which it is actually embedded. Julian Simon, meet Karl Polanyi.

From Tainter, Ch.4, p. 91, (My transcription. No online source available but recently a Kindle version has been made available):

Human societies and political organizations, like all living systems, are maintained by a continuous flow of energy. From the simplest familial unit to the most complex regional hierarchy, the institutions and patterned interactions that comprise a human society are dependent on energy. At the same time, the mechanisms by which human groups acquire and distribute basic resources are conditioned by, and integrated within, sociopolitical institutions. Energy flow and sociopolitical organization are opposite sides of an equation. Neither can exist, in a human group, without the other, nor can either undergo substantial change without altering both the opposite member and the balance of the equation. Energy flow and sociopolitical organizations must evolve in harmony.
Not only is energy flow required to maintain a sociopolitical system, but the amount of energy must be sufficient for the complexity of that system. Leslie White observed a number of years ago that cultural evolution was intricately linked to the quantities of energy harvested by a human population (The Science of Culture, 1949). The amounts of energy required per capita to maintain the simplest human institutions are incredibly small compared with those needed by the most complex....
More complex societies are more costly to maintain than simpler ones, requiring greater support levels per capita. As societies increase in complexity, more networks are created among individuals, more hierarchical controls are created to regulate these networks, more information is processed, there is more centralization of information flow, there is increasing need to support specialists not directly involved in resource flow, there is increasing need to support specialists not directly involved in resource production and the like. All of this energy is dependent upon energy flow at a scale vastly greater than that characterizing small groups of self-sufficient foragers or agriculturalists. The result is that as a society evolves toward greater complexity, the support costs levied on each individual will also rise, so that the population as a whole must allocate increasing portions of its energy budget to maintaining organizational institutions. This is an immutable fact of societal evolution, and is not mitigated by type of energy source.
....
It is the thesis of this chapter that return on investment in complexity varies, and that this variation follows a characteristic curve. More specifically, it is proposed that, in many crucial spheres, continued investment in sociopolitical complexity reaches a point where the benefits for such investments begin to decline, at first gradually, then with accelerated force. Thus, not only must a population allocate greater and greater amounts of resources to maintaining an evolving society, but after a certain point, higher amounts of this investment will yield smaller increments of return. Diminishing returns, it will be shown, are a recurrent aspect of sociopolitical evolution, and of investment in complexity. (Bold emphasis added. Italics from original.)

In the case of The Roman Empire of the West there never was a reliance on levels of energy utilization higher than that of harnessing the power of domestic animals and harnessing wind for sea transport. Social complexity involved differentiated spheres of knowledge and competence including settled agriculture, organized mining, road building, urban water supply and sanitation, a standing army, cheap water-borne transport and a differentiated administrative apparatus capable of performing censuses, surveying land and assessing taxes. In general, the low hanging fruit is picked first. The ability to organize citizen farmers into efficient fighting forces with which to conquer their neighbors combined with the divide and conquer strategy for incorporating the conquered regions into the Empire provided enormous returns on investment in social complexity during the Republic. The government could operate on the spoils of war and the wars more than paid for themselves. But this process peaked under Augustus. Subsequent conquests in the first and second centuries C.E. did not pay for themselves, but the Empire could coast into the second half of the second century C.E. on accumulated wealth.

The Empire enjoyed the benefits of the Pax Romana, a large trading area and predictable legal relationships throughout the empire. However, only trade in luxuries was profitable beyond about 100 km from water transport while agriculture provided 90% of the government's revenue.

By the time of Marcus Aurelius, (161-180) The governance of the Empire was coming under strain. There was no longer a surplus which could be tapped to meet emergencies. Yet under Marcus Aurelius the empire suffered a plague which reduced population by a quarter to a third and experienced threats from German tribes beyond the Rhine. From Tainter, Ch.5, Complexity and marginal returns in collapsing societies, pp 149-150:

Augustus' successors dealt with financial crises occasionally by selling their capital -- Imperial lands and treasures. This was obviously a limited solution. The more common stratagem was to defer the true costs of government by debasing the currency. This had the politically expedient advantage of shifting to some indefinite point in the future the cost of current crises. The inflation that would inevitably follow would tax the future to pay for the present, but the future could not protest. Viewed from the perspective of history, it is clear that by the time of the Principate, (27 BC - 284 AD), the marginal returns on investment in empire had declined considerably from the level of the later Republic. When the stresses impinging on the Empire grew, it would decline further still. What had once been a windfall had become a burden.
The weaknesses of the Empire that were exposed when Marcus Aurelius confronted the Marcomanni proved nearly fatal during the succeeding crises. The reduced marginal return on organizational investment left the Roman Empire without sufficient reserves to meet such emergencies. The only alternatives were to raise taxes directly, or to raise them indirectly by debasement and inflation. Both courses were adopted. And yet the crises of civil war and barbarian incursions required increased expenditures that yielded no increased return. The Empire was not expanded, no major booty was acquired, and there was no increase in agricultural output. The increased costs of the third century were incurred merely to maintain the status quo. Costs rose precipitously while benefits, at best, remained level. Axiomatically, the marginal return on investment in empire had declined.

By this time additional social investment in complexity were coming to provide decreasing returns on investment and, in the fourth and fifth centuries, they began to produce actual declines of output despite, or because of, the complexity which could no longer be supported.

By this time the enormous returns from early conquest had been spent and yet the costs of maintaining the empire remained. There was usually enough revenue to pay for normal activities, but Rome had to spend more than it took in in taxes in the face of plagues and invasions, not to achieve new efficiencies, but just to hold on to what it had. Over the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. the cost of maintaining the complexity on which the empire depended increasingly devoured the very society in which the empire was based. When the costs of complexity could not be borne and provided no benefit over simpler forms of government, the empire collapsed. Life actually improved for many areas under "barbarian" rule -- absent the crushing burden of taxes needed to support the Empire.

Modern society is experiencing similar problems with the increasing costs of complexity and decreasing returns on investment in complexity. Health care is a prime example. Eradicating infectious disease provided a huge return in societal benefit on a rather small investment. Now society is paying huge costs for "lifestyle" drugs and our "war on cancer", while showing results, provides nowhere near as high a return on investment as did the development of the original antibiotics. But we cannot agree that we are spending too much money to extend some lives for a few more years. As a society, we cannot deal rationally with the fact of individual mortality. And this sort of decline on investment in social complexity is occurring in many areas of our societies.

This is bad enough, but we have an additional, serious problem. We have a highly complex society that has been able to develop previously unattainable levels of complexity based on exploiting cheap fossil fuels for energy. And now that we are starting to experience declining returns on investment in complexity we are simultaneously experiencing increasing costs for obtaining fossil fuel energy. So we are being hit with a double whammy. And it couldn't happen to a more enlightened and humane bunch of cultures.

I believe Tainter focuses too strongly on debasement of the currency in the case of the decline of Rome. Marginal return on investment in complexity did decline, but I would propose that is was due to unrecognized factors of political economy. The Roman Empire operated in the interests of the very wealthy, The members of the Roman Senate, local worthies and, of course, the Emperor. Power and wealth flowed to the top. The mob in Rome was feared and placated with bread and circuses, but there was no adequate means of social redistribution. Through the first century C.E. legionnaires could obtain land in newly acquired provinces, but this declined in effectiveness throughout the Principate. Emperors would award money to the people on occasions, but this did not serve to renew the base of the economy. To the extent that there was awareness of this problem, it took the form of nostalgia for the time of the Republic.

Had the Emperors implemented changes that would have re-created a thriving small to mid-sized farmer class and would have favored local merchants and handicraft manufacturers, had they found ways for the urban masses to be employed doing socially useful work that enabled them at least to pay their own way and not require bread and circuses, perhaps the Western Empire could have survived considerably longer. In the ancient near east, from Judea to Babylon, jubilees were used to maintain social cohesion. Debt forgiveness on the ascension of a new ruler or at stated intervals renewed the social fabric, providing continuing sources of independent farmers, which provided agricultural production, taxes and a source of soldiers in time of war. Michael Hudson has written on this subject. See THE LOST TRADITION OF BIBLICAL DEBT CANCELLATIONS This demonstrates that wealth redistribution has been employed in complex societies, even in ones that form part of "the Western Heritage"^TM

Karl Polanyi makes his point on the centrality of culture to productive economic activity by citing Margaret Mead on the effects of introducing a market economy into a subsistence culture, (The Great Transformation, p. 165)

Some who would readily agree that life in a cultural void is no life at all nevertheless seem to expect that economic needs would automatically fill that void and make life appear livable under whatever conditions. This assumption is sharply contradicted by the result of anthropological research. "The goals for which individuals will work are culturally determined, and are not a response of the organism to an external culturally undefined situation, like a simple scarcity of food," says Dr. Mead. "The process by which a group of savages is converted into gold miners or ship's crew or merely robbed of all incentive to effort and left to die painlessly beside streams still filled with fish, may seem so bizarre, so alien to the nature of society and its normal functioning as to be pathological," yet, she adds, "precicely this will, as a rule happpen to a people in the midst of violent externally introduced, or at leased externally produced change...." She concludes: "This rude contact, this uprooting of simple people from their mores, is too frequent to be undeserving of serious attention on the part of the social historian."
However, the social historian fails to take the hint. He still refuses to see that the elemental force of culture contact, which is now revolutionizing the colonial world, is the same which, a century ago, created the dismal scene of early capitalism. [The Great Transformation was published in 1944. ARG] An anthropologist* drew the general inference: "In spite of numerous divergences there are at the bottom the same predicaments among the exotic peoples to-day as there were among us decades or centuries ago...[The anthropologist] recognized that the cultural catastrophe of black society today [1944] is closely analogous to that of a large part of white society in the early days of capitalism. The social historian alone still misses the point of the analogy. [Actually, contemporary social history now very much gets the point, but Economics and Political Science rarely and less so. The more things change, the more some remain the same. ARG]
Nothing so obscures our vision as the economic prejudice. So persistently has exploitation been put into the forefront of the colonial problem that the point deserves special attention....Yet, it is precisely this emphasis put on exploitation which tends to hide from our view the even greater issue of cultural degeneration. If exploitation is defined in strictly economic terms as a permanent inadequacy of ratios of exchange, it is doubtful whether, as a matter of fact, there was exploitation. The catastrophe of the native community is a direct result of the rapid and violent disruption of the basic institutions of the victim...
* R.C. Thurnwald, Black and White in East Africa; The Fabric of a New Civilization, 1935

Polanyi proceeds to make the point that the entire history of the transformation in England was a struggle between first the Whigs and then the Liberals seeking to impose laws and institutions on British society that would suit it to being a market economy and spontaneous self-protective opposition to that process by opponents, from Owenism the Luddites, and the Chartist Movement to the Labor Party.

Polyani's thesis is that the process of transformation sought to make the society subservient to the needs of the economy instead of allowing the economy to serve the society, and that the success of the transformation, to the extent to which it can be so characterized, is the result of the limitations which were imposed on the transformation project, which if allowed to proceed to completion, would destroy the society in which it was based.

The whole project has always been about obtaining sufficient control of the state so as to create the sort of order that will facilitate the needs of those who are running the economy. The nature and composition of those running the economy has changed over time, with corporations coming to the fore first in the 1870s and the emergence of finance as a significant sector. From the 1980 onward the scope of finance has expanded in the USA and UK to the point that, in recent years, over forty percent of all profits generated in the society are generated in the financial sector -- the financialization of the economy. This process has, essentially, canibalized the manufacturing sectors in the USA and the UK to feed the profit needs of the financial sector, which has used those profits to obtain control of the governments.

The emergence of the financial sector and their grip on the governments is similar to the power that the Roman Senate and the oligarchs who composed that senate held in ancient Rome. There is extant in our societies enough understanding of this situation to guide us away from self destruction, but those with that understanding are remote from power.

Meanwhile, oil has again gone over $90/bl. and the EROI is steadily declining, as sadly demonstrated in the Gulf of Mexico since April, 2010. The political power of economic incumbents prevents us from moving more quickly towards renewable energy and from reforming the organization of the financial sector to reduce the drag it imposes on our economy and stop the destruction it is creating in our societies. The ineffective measures being employed by the Federal Reserve, the US Government and other central banks and governments are only allowing the financial crisis to grow and one effect is that the role of the $US as an international reserve currency is starting to erode. This is while costly imperial adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan are, at best, stalemated. As one of the reasons we have been able to afford the massive world presence of our military has been the fact that we issue the de facto world reserve currency, the real cost to the USA of being the global hegemon is ever increasing while the resources to support that effort are decreasing. Our approach to satisfying the profit needs of our elites appears to be near collapse and, in any case, is detrimental to the health of the societies in which those elites operate.

The intelligent approach for the USA is to move as quickly as possible to renewable energy, being thankful that we have the fossil fuel resources that we do, to retreat from global military engagement as quickly as possible, being thankful that we have one of the more self sufficient national economies, and to reform the structure of finance so as to make it once again support the economy and society instead of allowing it to feed off of both. This would require a sea change in attitudes which seems very unlikely, so instead we will likely experience catastrophic collapse. But can we do better even after a collapse?
Interesting comments from Ugo Bardi: Tainter's law: where is the physics? Joseph Tainter: talking about collapse

EROI, ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies | 82 comments (82 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)

But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 3)

... but rather the Social Democratic Nixon for the United States?

I forget where I read it, perhaps here, perhaps Docudharma, but ...

After an administration of (Republican: Eisenhower, Democratic: Clinton) rule that accommodates but attempts to mitigate what it sees as the worst excesses of the prevailing (Democratic 1950's, Republican 1990's) political climate of the day, a (Democratic: Kennedy/Johnson, Republican: W. Bush) administration enters office with high hopes and wins a Landslide (re-election, election), but due to misguided foreign adventures entered into in the first term, leaves their party at a low point.

They are replaced by a (Republican: Nixon, Democratic: Obama) President who wins a substantial but not landslide victory in the first term, but in the eyes of their party base, engages in unforgivable dalliance with the ideology of (Keynesianism, Trickle-Downism). However, the opposing party nominates a radical (Democratic Anti-Cold-War Liberal in McGovern, ?? Tea Party favorite in Palin or XYZ), and the Presidential candidate romps home to victory.

The (Republican: Nixon) administration cracks under its internal flaws, to be replaced by a caretaker, defeated by a hopeful centrist (Democratic) reformer, who appears to be out of touch with the tenor of the times, and is replaced in a coalition reset election which established the (Republican) party as the party growing in influence while the opposition (Democratic) party tries to hold onto the victories of the coalition that has already been eclipsed.

So if this is 1970, the Obama administration is a false dawn of a Progressive President (and, like Nixon, continuing to pursue the wars he was perceived as promising in his campaign to bring to an end ~ Peace With Honor = Peace When We've Dismantled Al Qaeda, Winning the Hearts and Minds = ... oh, yeah, Winning the Hearts and Minds, still) ... then coming up in 1980 is the genuine Progressive Coalition reset.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 12:33:47 AM EST

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

Perhaps.

But I could also tell a different story, one in which Bush the Lesser is Coolidge and Obama is Hoover. The fact that Obama has a D after his name is, in this story, an accident of the electoral schedule. But a highly significant one, because all the potential Roosevelts also have Ds after their names, so there is no credible alternative to the Coolidge-Hoover policies. Which would mean that whatever happens next election, you'll have another 4-12 years of Coolidge-Hoover policies ahead of you. That would put you well into the Coyote part of the oil production forecasts, with no credible substitution policy.

That would be... painful.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 03:57:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

In both scenarios you have to wait until 2020 for a truly progressive President.

Is there a 40-year period here? The 1930s is the decade of the Great Depressionm the 1970s the decade of Stagflation and the 2010s another Lost Decade.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 05:01:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

"Memory serves the same purpose as the SEC. And, on the record, is far more effective." - Galbraith

30 years is long enough for the last lost decade to pass out of Die Seriöse Leute's collective memory. 40 + 30 = 70 years is enough for the lost decade before last to pass out of living memory.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 09:54:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

The previous lost period having been 1875-1900, associated with the bank panic of 1873, and with another 30-year gap between its end and the Great depression...

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:02:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 3)

But that was just one of those things that happens sometimes.

No one could ever predict that a capitalist economy might not grow steadily in perpetuity.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:24:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 4)

This is now on my to-buy list...

Princeton University Press: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. (Reinhart, C.M. and Rogoff, K.)

Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. This book proves that premise wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned.
Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts--as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur.
An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps.

"This time is different" being another version of "nobody could have foreseen".

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:27:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

Sold.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:30:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

From the Amazon page:

I would say that her [Carmen Reinhart's] book with Ken Rogoff on debt crises and financial crises is an extraordinary piece of work. -- Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, speaking before the House Budget Committee (6/9/2010)

Better late than never, I guess.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:34:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

Yeah, I got a chuckle out of that one.

Of all the ways of organizing banking, the worst is the one we have today — Mervyn King, 25 October 2010

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:40:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

Mig:

"nobody could have foreseen" BECAUSE "This time is different".

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:38:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

The previous lost period having been 1875-1900

From Polyani it would seem that what made 1900 or the first decade of the 20th century the end of a 30 year lost period was the commencement of fresh protective measures to limit the scope of classical liberalism. Henry George was a leading proponent of such changes, but did not live to see them instituted under Theodore Roosevelt, including establishment of the FDA, the National Parks system and the trust busting activity.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:42:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 4)

Yes, we repeat the mistakes of our fathers and the catastrophes of our grandfathers.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:22:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 2)

Tis the same story, isn't it, as what would be a believer in progressive state intervention who bought the Republican fairy tale on how the economy worked be ...

... which would be the analogue of a believer in Republican Cold War reakpolitik who bought the Democratic belief in macroeconomic management ...

... except, well, an early 21st century version of Hoover, the Great Humanitarian, who thought that Wall Street had gone to excess and so got his money out of the stock market before the Great Crash, but who believed to the soles of his feet that deficit spending would bring economic disaster.

However, that is just the story on the Presidential stage. The Congressional story might not be in sync to the same dynamic.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 07:50:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

All of the scenarios you propose involve the existing elites continuing their dominance of the system, which includes control of not just the official levers of power but also a grip on the appointments of professors in economics and other power related disciplines at universities and control of the national mass media. This is almost inherently a recipe for stasis, "staying the course" and running full speed off the cliff. Further, it is, in its details, essentially unknowable at the present. The more significant question is how can or how could this stasis be perturbed so as to move the course of our civilization into a more survivable trajectory? Is that a one in a billion shot?

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:14:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 3)

No, they rather do not, since if they do, the Progressive Change Coalition never happens at all.

But in terms of thinking that multiple movements have to be built and that ...

CHANGE
{ooh} {aah}

... won't be as easy as sweeping descriptions of the challenges that we faced combined with timid little steps, sometimes in the right direction and sometime in the wrong ... yes, change will be harder than that and we definitely will not accomplish that change in advance of the shit hitting the fan.

There something not accidental in the serious crisis of sliding down the Oily Coyote slope in the timing of the cracking of the ramparts of the status quo, as there are inevitably challenges to be faced, and enough decades of wishing that they go away will ensure that some few of them will hit a serious crisis point.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:13:32 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 4)

Sadly, we seem determined to fully explore all of the doomed approaches before considering one that might work. The thing that the doomed approaches have in common is that they protect the interests of the economic incumbents and their ideology.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 12:39:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

Even sadder, we probably will not have sufficient time remaining to even start to explore all of the possible doomed approaches.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 12:40:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]

The establishment will pursue ... (4.00 / 3)

... what made it the establishment with minor tweaks and variations until it cracks and can't keep it up anymore.

That's why it is important to cast a large number of seeds of possible non-doomed alternatives, and nurture and cultivate those that appear to be taking root. When the shit hits the fan, much of what happens next will be determined by what seeds for change have already been planted.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:25:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The establishment will pursue ... (4.00 / 3)

Very true.
But the establishment reacts to those seeds that seem likely to flourish as if they were a pathogen, crushing them mercilessly, then rewriting the history of their potential success into the "failure" demanded by their tame ideologues. There are ample example, just throughout Central America, for example, over the last century or more- stories from which we might have learned a lot. But they were rewritten, like the fraudulent "success" of the Pinochet dictatorship.
If the experiments that show the potential to avoid the explosive growth of predation and chaotic complexity are made invisible, we cannot learn from them.

Capitalism searches out the darkest corners of human potential, and mainlines them.

by geezer in Paris (risico at wanadoo(flypoop)fr) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 11:45:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 2)

Recapitulating the US political history from 1970-2008 is impossible. The economic structures of the US, and world for that matter, is too different.

Ever since I learnt about confirmation bias I've started seeing it everywhere

by ATinNM on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:11:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

But the chief beneficiaries of that political history will be the last ones to admit that the situation has changed, except where they can see a way to profit from that change.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:34:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

But recapitulating US political history from 1930-1970 just might be possible.

Except there won't be another Marshall plan to disguise industrial subsidies, because radioactive craters don't lend themselves nearly so well to swift reconstruction as shelled-out factory buildings.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 03:12:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 2)

There's a major difference.

In the 1930-1960 period the US had more productive capacity than domestic demand justified. In 2010 the US has less. Also the logistic and support 'network' necessary for an industrialized economy existed from 1930-1960; since 1960 it's been steadily removed under "Post-Industrial" fantasies.

Ever since I learnt about confirmation bias I've started seeing it everywhere

by ATinNM on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 05:16:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

Both of these factors provide opportunities for stimulative capital expenditures to make the USA more self sufficient and sustainable but for the mind-set that led to the disaster. Of course it is necessary for that mind-set and those presumptions, especially about economics, to change in order for new productive capacity to be profitable. We would have to start pricing in the cost "externalities" such as of regulatory arbitrage and social safety-net arbitrage, and we would have to limit the scope of finance. We simply have to think the unthinkable.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Dec 14th, 2010 at 10:51:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

We have to definancialize, the equivalent of a whale breaching to slap off the barnacles.

The barnacle on our testicles, unfortunately.

Align culture with our nature.

by ormondotvos (ormond no spam lmi net no spam) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 07:14:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

The solution for that would be greenfield cities -- when there are again green fields.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 05:18:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

I'm not worried about finding green fields. Plenty of isotopes glow green in the dark.

Oh, you meant chlorophyll...

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 05:23:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

"Oh, you meant chlorophyll..." :-)

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 07:37:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (4.00 / 2)

not Chernobyl.

by njh on Tue Dec 14th, 2010 at 01:30:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 0)

bbbut think of the tourism possibilities!

It's a fine line between homage, parody, and consumer opportunism. Jess Walter

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 03:30:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: But what if Obama is not the SD Reagan, ... (none / 1)

Glow in the dark teeshirts!

by njh on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 06:55:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Medicines (4.00 / 4)

European Tribune - EROI, ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies

Health care is a prime example. Eradicating infectious disease provided a huge return in societal benefit on a rather small investment. Now society is paying huge costs for "lifestyle" drugs and our "war on cancer", while showing results, provides nowhere near as high a return on investment as did the development of the original antibiotics.

We are even destroying the effectiveness of antibiotics by over-use. Read recently a critique of the system of medicine financing in that it rewards (by patents) research and then maximising sells over 25 years (which we all pay for through insurances and taxes). Destroying the common value by privatising the gains from it. When it comes to new antibiotics we would like to pay for new ones and keeping usage down to a minimum in order to maximise the value.

I think it is less about not being willing to accept death, and more about directing the medical resources to keep the wealthiest and most powerful alive as long as possible, while giving the largest profits to the rich and powerful and thus sustaining their power.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 05:04:21 AM EST

Re: Medicines (4.00 / 2)

From Polyani's point of view this follows from the fact that the control of the society has fallen to those who want to make the society serve the needs of the economy. They define the "needs of the economy" as 18% returns for the financial sector, which controls the economy and the society. They have already thrown high wage manufacturing in the USA and UK into the financialization machine to sustain their profit margin. This will continue until, like the Elbonians in Scott Adam's Dilbert, they have sold off the crust on which they live down to magma and have to emigrate, or they are removed from power.

The Neo-Liberal agenda really has no agenda other than return on investment for the elite. This, as Polanyi described, is inherently destructive of the society in which it operates. It has been operating longest in the UK and the USA, so the damage is greatest there.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:24:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Medicines (none / 1)

I think it is less about not being willing to accept death, and more about directing the medical resources to keep the wealthiest and most powerful alive as long as possible, while giving the largest profits to the rich and powerful and thus sustaining their power.

Agreed, but the inability of the mass of the population to deal rationally with death provides the elite with an easy means to confound any discussion of their own role in perpetuating this situation. Just trot out "Life is sacred".

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:54:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies (4.00 / 2)

Call it what you will, but I strongly suspect that to survive we must embrace a form of socialism -- one that treats the economy as the servant of the economy, rather than vise versa. Call it The Final Reform. Unfortunately, most political parties that call themselves "Socialist" have bought the assumptions of the Neo-Liberals and their Neo-Classical Economic world view. Thus, in their language, "Reform" is the road to debt serfdom.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 12:12:47 PM EST

Re: ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies (4.00 / 2)

Debt serfdom has ALWAYS been a strong part of the post-WW 2 system. It's been kept out of sight in the Third World. (Mostly) Now it is necessary to impose it on the First World for the system to keep chugging along.

Ever since I learnt about confirmation bias I've started seeing it everywhere

by ATinNM on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:18:29 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 0)

Socialism "treats the economy as the servant of the economy, rather than vise versa?"

Think that second "economy" should be "people," me duck.

:-D

Ever since I learnt about confirmation bias I've started seeing it everywhere

by ATinNM on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:22:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies (4.00 / 2)

Well, I had intended the word "society", or the collective interests of individuals. I think we have quite enough of "individualism" in the USA.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:29:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 0)

Only being a P/N, PITA.

Ever since I learnt about confirmation bias I've started seeing it everywhere

by ATinNM on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 01:38:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: ROIIC and The Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 1)

No, more like bringing my attention to my blind spots. :-)

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Dec 14th, 2010 at 10:54:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Roman history tangent (4.00 / 4)

Your Roman history point brings to mind a tangential issue that's come to mind recently as I've been teaching Rome in World History class. Namely, Roman slavery. Commonly cited factors in the final decline of the Western Empire include things like depopulation of Italy and declining harvests, but somehow never seem to look at the complete transformation of the economy to a slave-based system as a potential causal factor.

The patrician class grabbed up all the land and turned it into slave-based latifundia, or plantations. The manufacturing economy, such as it was, was also largely dependent on slave labor. I don't think these are exactly controversial positions, but little reasoning seems to be made from them - or at least, little reasoning I've come across.

Roman slavery did not produce a self-sustaining slave population, as it has in other societies in other times. Rather, slaves tended to be viewed as replaceable, and thus worked to death, or to be household members who could buy their freedom. So maintaining the slave population depended on foreign imports - war captives, etc.

Further, with the free population locked out of any chance for productive work, supported on what amounted to welfare, and encouraged to migrate if at all possible, is it any surprise that Italy's population collapsed? People have kids when there's a reason for them, when it's immediately anticipated that there will be an economic place for them. Thus free peasant societies tend to have high birthrates, as there's a lot of work to go around.

Depopulation, combined with absentee landlords who don't give one whit for agriculture and haven't done anything beyond whipping their slaves for 300 years, and with perhaps a dose of climate change thrown in, do a much better job of explaining declining harvests and the collapse of the agricultural economy than the old chestnut of "exhausted soils." Soils are worn out by bad practice, and few systems seem more suited to bad practice than slave plantations run by absentee landlords.

by Zwackus on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 05:53:08 PM EST

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 2)

Indeed what replaced the Roman system during the middle ages was an emerging feudal system with serfs bound to the land. Tainter makes the point that as early as 200 C.E. there was significant land that was left fallow for lack of labor to farm it, among other reasons. The Empire had suffered a loss of one quarter to one third of the population due to various plagues from about 165 forward and, due to the tax demands of the state, the personnel needs of the military and decreases in general security there was never again a time when conditions were favorable to growing populations.

Other reasons included a tax system that exacted high fixed taxes on lands regardless of their productivity, which drove marginal land out of production. Small farmers lost their land due to an inability to pay taxes and have enough left to live. They often found life better working the land for a wealthy landowner who could protect them from the tax collector.

Marcus Aurelius, (161-80) had difficulty filling the ranks of his legions and resorted to settling defeated Marcominni within the borders of the Empire on condition that they supply recruits. Landowners were required to furnish recruits and often did so by paying barbarians to join so they could keep their agricultural workers.

Diocletian, who became Emperor in 284 C.E., responded to the impending breakdown by expanding the army and increasing the complexity and capability of the governing apparatus. This began the period referred to as The Dominate, Dominus being Latin for lord. The Emperors were always strapped for cash and the incomes of imperial officials had been set long ago. Inflation had rendered those incomes totally inadequate, but, lacking money to pay more, civil service positions were made hereditary as a means to insure a supply of administrators. Military service and employment in the imperial weapons factories was also made hereditary. The Guilds were made responsible for furnishing recruits and Municipalities charged with the duty to see than land was cultivated by laying the tax on the municipality.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 08:41:22 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 5)

Taxes being the boogeyman of the day, it's not surprising that taxes play such a big role in Tainter's story, but somehow I just don't buy it. Taxes were as high as they were because the owners of the big estates didn't pay taxes to begin with, and thus focusing on what happens to the shrinking minority who does pay taxes misses the story of what's happening on the big estates which already own most of the good land.

The fact is that Rome's parasitic patrician class was were more interested in maintaining their social position as slave-owning lords of absentee plantations than they were in insuring any sort of agricultural productivity or functioning economy, and the Emperors never had the guts to break them. Depopulation and the collapse of the economy was the result. A simple land re-distribution may well have solved several problems within a generation - again, functioning peasant economies generate explosive population growth. But, owning everything was more important.

by Zwackus on Mon Dec 13th, 2010 at 10:46:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

I thought that was implied, at least, in what I wrote. The Emperors taxed who they could as hard as they could. This had never included the very powerful. In fact, from the late Republic on Italy had become accustomed to not being taxed and the urban populations were provided with cheap grain and free bread to the poor. This did not substantially change until the Dominate.

There is a lot of good information in Tainter, but there is also some difficult to substantiate assertions that could well be his views or, possibly, be in part due to the fact that he is less critical of his sources than he might be. He certainly buys the idea that a major reason for the collapse of the Western Empire was the debasement of the coinage, but he doesn't deal with why that failed to cause the downfall of the Empire in the East and I have substantially discounted that argument. His interpretation is no doubt attractive to the libertarians and the gold bugs, but that does not mean it is without value.

My own sense, as I noted above, is that greater emphasis should be placed on the political aspects and the political economy. Rome was always an oligarchy and it was structured so that wealth flowed to the top. This had the effect, in time, of smothering the base. But his point about the declining return on investments in complexity is his major contribution.

Rome was a victim of its own success. For three or four hundred years, until Augustus, it could grow by plundering its neighbors. The plundered wealth more than made up for the cost of acquisition. But with those acquisitions came fixed costs that continued in perpetuity. This really began to bite about the time of Marcus Aurelius and was compounded by plague, which cut the population base, and by having to defend the empire from invaders, which was pure expense with no return.

If anyone has a summary of the political economy of Rome that is even a quarter so concise, please note it. Else it is back to original sources, Gibbon and all the other works describing the subject, of which his bibliography provides a good guide, at least to work before his date of publication.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Dec 14th, 2010 at 12:44:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 3)

I would guess that establishing trade routes all over the empire - even for luxuries only - contributed to spreading plagues.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Dec 15th, 2010 at 03:40:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

That and having to move military units about.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Dec 15th, 2010 at 08:03:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 2)

The fact is that Rome's parasitic patrician class was were more interested in maintaining their social position as slave-owning lords of absentee plantations than they were in insuring any sort of agricultural productivity or functioning economy, and the Emperors never had the guts to break them.

Agreed. This was a significant part of the problem but only part. Revenue also declined due to population loss and land going out of cultivation. This got to be such a problem that when the Franks settled in Gaul they could settle on uncultivated land. As to the oppressive exactions of the Empire causing land to go out of cultivation, in North Africa when the Vandals took over a province, land went back into cultivation and prosperity increased. The Vandals had a much less complex and expensive administration. Then when Rome reattached the province the land went back out of cultivation. At least this is what Tainter got from his survey of prior work.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Dec 14th, 2010 at 12:55:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 4)

Henry George argues in "Progress and Poverty" that latifundia expansion and raising inequality in land ownership was a fundamental cause of the Roman decline:

By the power with which the great attracts the less, small family estates became part of the great estates -- the latifundia -- of enormously rich patricians. The former owners were forced into slave gangs, or became virtual serfs. Others fled to the cities, swelling the ranks of the proletariat, who had nothing to sell but their votes. As a result, population declined, art sank, the intellect weakened, and once splendid civilizations became empty shells.
The hardy virtues born of personal independence died out, while exhaustive agriculture impoverished the soil. At length the barbarians broke through; a civilization once proud was left in ruins. During Rome's grandeur, such a fate would have seemed as impossible as it seems to us now that the Comanches could conquer the United States or Laplanders desolate Europe.
The fundamental cause was tenure of land. On the one hand, denial of the common right to land resulted in decay; on the other, equality gave strength. Every family in the German villages was entitled to an equal share of common land. This impressed a remarkable character on the individual, which explains how small bands of barbarians overran a great empire. Rome perished from "the failure of the crop of men."

As for runaway complexity, I see it as a symptom of gross inadequacy of social, political organizations to changing or critical conditions. When you try to patch multiplying problems with a limited set of orthodox means (and behavior variety and flexibility is suppressed), organization gets desperately complex and blind.

by das monde on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 08:15:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 3)

The treatment of slavery in antiquity is probably worth a monograph. Prior to the Civil War southern authors and statesmen extolled slavery as a mark of civilization precisely because of the slave based nature of Greece and Rome. After the Civil War it became a fraught subject. Henry George and Karl Marx were free to see it as they did and write of such subjects as they did because they were not a creature of academia or the establishment, although Marx became the establishment philosopher of the Soviet state.

I think the complexity argument is valid but also think that the burdens of complexity are multiplied when a society is blind to major causes of problems, such as the distribution of wealth. There is a charitable foundation in the USA which underwrites some National Public Broadcasting programs. Their by-line is "finding and seeking to cure the causes of homelessness"! I rather doubt they would find redistribution of wealth an acceptable solution.

When a society cannot or will not see major problems, such as those posed by the financial sector today their ability to survive is impaired. Attempts to treat the symptoms only further drain resources. This is tantamount to saying that at some point the cost of increasing complexity begins to produce a decrease in output. But one has to consider that Tainter wrote in 1988 and current problems were much less clear and extreme then.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 12:01:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 2)

Gee, I wonder what effects human nature had on the wishful thinking of those who postulate human nature as they wish it to be, not how it is.

Collapsed civilizations can be no more than the inefficiencies of social patch on social patch because of bad coding in the cultural assumptions about human nature. Once established, stupid assumptions about human nature never seem to go away.

That, of course, is human nature.

And that's why cognitive science scares the hell out of the political science department.

Align culture with our nature.

by ormondotvos (ormond no spam lmi net no spam) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 07:34:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

Like so many thinkers of the past, one wonders what their view might be today.

Capitalism searches out the darkest corners of human potential, and mainlines them.

by geezer in Paris (risico at wanadoo(flypoop)fr) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 11:55:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

das monde:

. Every family in the German villages was entitled to an equal share of common land.

germans do have more civic sense, i wonder if this history is connected...

It's a fine line between homage, parody, and consumer opportunism. Jess Walter

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 03:28:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

Commonly cited factors in the final decline of the Western Empire include things like depopulation of Italy and declining harvests, but somehow never seem to look at the complete transformation of the economy to a slave-based system as a potential causal factor.

This is an interesting question. I don't believe I have anything on this subject in my library. From Wiki:

The experience of slavery depended heavily on the general type of labour to which a slave was assigned, which had a great range. For slaves, assignment to mines was often a sentence of death. Farm slaves (familia rustica) would generally fare better, while household slaves of rich families in Rome (familia urbana) likely enjoyed the highest standard of living among Roman slaves, together with a more intricate social experience. Though their room and board would be of a significantly lower quality than that of the free members of the familia, it may have been comparable to that of many free but poor Romans.

And:

Conditions for slaves working in the Roman cities were often not as difficult as those who laboured in the fields. Female slaves were usually put in charge of domestic tasks, and male slaves often worked as personal servants, craftsmen, shopkeepers, or even business agents for their masters. Slaves who were able to work in atmospheres close to their owners lead much better lives than slaves who performed labor tasks that disconnected them from their owners.

And:

Slaves in Rome had no legal status, however several emperors began to grant more rights to slaves as the empire grew. It became prevalent throughout the mid to late second century to allow slaves to complain of cruel or unfair treatment by their owners.[17] Claudius announced that if a slave was abandoned by his master, he became free. Nero allowed for slaves to have the right to complain against their master in a court. And under Antoninus Pius, a master could no longer execute a slave without just cause, or else the master could be tried for homicide.[18] Legal protection of slaves continued to grow as the empire expanded.

I would be interested in any evidence in Rome for the type of slave breeding programs that became common in Virginia after the suppression of the slave trade but before the Civil War. But I have seen claims that most slaves were males, which would limit childbearing.

It seems likely that the portions of slave vs. free labor increased significantly as a result of Ceaser's conquest of Gaul, and even more by the end of Augustus' reign. This almost certainly represented a great change from the situation two hundred years previously.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Dec 14th, 2010 at 01:33:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 3)

When I read the introductory course in history slavery was cited as the most important reason for the fall of western Rome. Heavier demands on remaining free population drove not only agricultural labourers but also craftsmen to the latifundias, moving the economy from city-centered money-based to latifundia-centered product-based. Attempts to bind peasants to the soil (serfdom) and binding free sons to their fathers trade (basically castesystem, origin of guilds) did not stop the trend. When the empire fell the social institutions of the middle ages was already in place.

Eastern Rome (the old, rich centre of Greek civilization) was apparently not as dependent on slave labour or at least did not follow the west as far down the road.

Admittedly I took history at a rather marxist history department (means of production, means of production, means of production).

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Dec 15th, 2010 at 03:46:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

That view is substantiated, if not made directly, in Tainter's work.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Dec 15th, 2010 at 02:19:00 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

The craftsmen and farmers moving into the protection of the latifundias fits both with the imperial decrees making professions hereditary, with the onerous impositions on the cities to farm fallow land in their hinterland and the debasement of the coinage. Tainter cites references in original sources complaining about all of the above and cites numerous instances where, especially in the provinces, the common people appealed to and/or welcomed barbarians for the relief they provided from taxes as well as the improved security they offered over what was previously available.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Dec 15th, 2010 at 08:15:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 3)

And this argument seems to directly contradict the notion that complexity was the problem. The problem was not complexity exceeding the energy returns possible from a particular agro-technical base. Rather, the problem was that bad political decisions led to an economic pattern which destroyed the agro-technical base on which the society was founded. At that point, OF COURSE there aren't enough resources to go around - the society is poorer, as a whole.

In general, arguments based on energy returns, technological advancements, and ecological limits are interesting in the close attention they pay to factors overlooked. However, to the degree that they take attention away from what were (in my opinon, at any rate) purely political decisions, or the outcomes of fights between political and economic elites, they are a serious distraction. In a way, they seem part and parcel of the same project that underlies much of economics, to remove a large part of human life from the realm of agency and choice, and reify it as a force of nature.

by Zwackus on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 07:27:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 2)

It was not the complexity per se, but the cost of that complexity that came to be unsustainable. When wealth yeilded by the conquered provinces no longer exceeded the cost of conquest the situation began to change. This was a centuries long process. And with the end of expansion came the end of plentiful slaves. That was a major energy input to the empire. When those slaves died of old age, the plague or overwork they could not readily be replaced. But there was a time lag involved and the market for slaves did not disappear but did become more expensive.

But meanwhile the costs of of the systems that had to be supported rose but income did not. The empire still had to be defended, but that defense no longer generated a surplus. Rome still needed grain to feed the urban masses. Roads and aqueducts still needed to be maintained.

To me the argument is reasonably clear. The Western Roman Empire ran largely on slave labor. That slave labor was cheap when the Empire was expanding but got progressively more expensive and scarce after the time of Augustus. The military, the civil engineering and the administrative apparatus had all been developed when slave labor was cheap and abundant. They became more difficult to support as slave labor became expensive and less abundant, but the needs did not change. This was especially problematic during emergencies, such as barbarian invasions, when large amounts of money were needed. In order to meet these challenges, the Empire essentially turned to cannibalism and began consuming its base in a downward spiral that led to collapse.

To say that the problem was that the emperors made bad political decisions is a facile non-answer. The basic pattern of Roman society had been set during the middle of the Republic when the conquests began. Policies such as not taxing provinces in the Italian Peninsula may have been unwise in the long term, but they were eminently practical politically at the time and by the time the problems struck home such practices were traditions dating back hundreds of years, longer than the USA has existed. Likewise with slave based agriculture, domestic service and handicrafts.

The emperor required some acceptance from those he ruled. To overturn traditions and privileges dating back a hundred years or more into the Republic and imposing taxes on people unused to taxes, imposing taxes on the most powerful men in an historically oligarchic society, overturning the social basis of the society by uprooting its slave basis, etc. was simply a non-starter. A thousand years later the Norman Kings of England and the Kings of France, Spain and Portugal, with varying degrees of success, began the process of breaking down the power of the nobles, a process that took the better part of another millennium.

But perhaps I am misreading your comment. What better political decisions would you suggest that they have made and how do you suggest they could have carried them out?

To me the analogy between the problems of the emperors with the aristocracy and the problems we currently have with the financial sector seems familiar. As does the problems with a massive increase in the cost of the energy source on which our civilizations have been built. But I believe we have a better chance of changing those aspects of our society than did the Romans. Our population is vastly better educated and the existing system is less well entrenched, not explicitly included in the Constitution and of more recent origin than was the case with Rome. And while no energy source now available offers the EROI of $2/bl. oil, which provided ratios of over 50/1, ratios of 20/1 are available, if we can embrace them. And better resources may still emerge.

Or our current elites can continue on their pigheaded path, devouring the basis of the US economy for their short term profit, until everything collapses and then they may prevent the emergence of anything better. But I believe we are less doomed than was Rome, but perhaps not by so much as we would wish.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Dec 16th, 2010 at 11:22:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 2)

Why, I'm surprised you failed to notice a polemic! :=)

I'm not saying that they had real institutionally viable alternatives. Your point about How Institutions Think makes sense. However, putting aside fundamental political decisions such as "the elite will not pay taxes" and "slave labor will be promoted with no limit" as if they are on par with the laws of thermodynamics, beyond human control and unchangeable, seems a serious cop out, and a way to skirt the fact that it was stupid elite decisions to promote their own greed that destroyed Roman society.

Having already cut off both their feet, it's not surprising that they failed to win the footrace. But taking that mutilation as a given, setting it aside, and then focusing on their crawling strategy as the main cause of failure is missing the point.

by Zwackus on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 04:31:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 3)

As usual, I don't think it's either/or.

Emperors were nominally the decision makers. But after Diocletian, who was possibly the last emperor willing and able to invent and implement a strategy for the empire as a whole, the job became a placeholder. Emperors had the perks - the wealth and ostentation - but in practice they were owned by the army factions that originally sponsored them.

The post became a kind of ironic democracy with figureheads "elected" by one faction for immediate financial benefit, expected to fight off challenges from all other factions, and regularly "unelected" - fatally - if the power balance shifted or if a performance review suggested that performance was unacceptable.

Even if the army chose someone with real vision and talent - and there was no reason why it should - the turnover was brutal, and long-term management became impossible.

So Rome drifted along with zombie traditions and institutions. It wasn't a case of emperors making bad decisions, but of emperors being unable to plan and manage at all.

With an imperial court that was indifferent to most of the population, and with self-aggrandisement the official state religion (as it always had been) concentration of wealth and power became inevitable.

The underlying problem was that Rome had absolutely no ethic of mutual aid. There were patron/client relationships, obvious nepotism, and the lingering remains of an ethic of heroic military self-sacrifice.

But the idea of advancement was purely personal and tribal. It was a purely Hobbesian culture, with no concept of government as a collaboration that might place limits on personal ambition.

The Hobbesian approach worked while there was territory to gain, but it was a disaster once the physical limits of empire were reached and the battle turned inward, like a political cancer.

And yes - the US clearly shares the same ethics, and is headed for the same outcome.

It astonishes me that more people don't realise that the two huge fasces in Congress aren't just there for show - or even that they're there at all.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 05:07:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 2)

By the time of Diocletain, though, things were too far gone to be salvageable. The Gracchus brothers had the right ideas, at the right time, and they were killed for it, and nobody really revisited the issue of land distribution again. That is the sort of political choice I'm talking about - just because an emperor did or didn't do something doesn't mean that that the limits of political choice were reached. Every economic arrangement, unconscious or not, is a political choice, and every day it is chosen again. The fact that it's not commonly addressed, and is often forgotten about, does not make that point any less salient.

As far as the point regarding mutual aid, does anybody really have it?

by Zwackus on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 05:13:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

There have been and still are cultures and communities that have strong communitarian traditions. Barn raisings.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 10:45:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

In Finland there is the ancient, but still active custom of the Talkoot

I've been in least 5 of these this year.

You can't be me, I'm taken

by Sven Triloqvist on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 10:50:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Potlatch (4.00 / 2)

Activity in Talkoot is highly valued.

You can't be me, I'm taken

by Sven Triloqvist on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 10:52:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

Tainter actually makes a point on a different subject that is relevant here. He notes that some have complained that the Romans never developed technology. He then goes on to argue that the question is not why Rome failed to develop technology but why Europe did over a thousand years later. (He does not seem to have been aware of the incipient industrial revolution in Ming Dynasty China.) The same argument can be employed for the question of why the Romans accepted slavery and why they established the tax policies that they did, even if there are more and earlier precedents for abolition of slavery than for industrial revolutions.

The US Constitution borrowed extensively from the Roman Republican constitution. But we already had slavery in most of the colonies at the time of the Revolution. Vermont abolished slavery first, in 1777, and Massachusetts in 1783. Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and New York all adopted gradual measures prior to 1800 that lead to an eventual end of slavery. But south of the Mason-Dixon Line it was a different story.

Is there a commonly accepted explanation as to why slavery is accepted or abolished? If so, I am unfamiliar with it. Now that I think of it that seems surprising.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:03:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (4.00 / 2)

Is slavery economic?

Of course it depends on the price of getting slaves, if they can be captured cheap enough (or sell themselves as indentured servants) it will almost always be economic (because they can literally be worked to death), but if slaves has to be given a subsistence-level of food, clothing and housing, their conditions has to be compared to poor free people.

As I understand it most agriculture is most efficient in family-sized holdings (actual size dependent on technology) because at least long-term managing soils and animals is a lot about judgement and care. Taylorism seems to work only with certain crops like cotton where you had fairly uniform movements. So in most agriculture it would not be economical to keep slaves if they are not captured cheap enough.

Note that the north-south divide starts at the time when the cotton gin has recently been invented, Britain has destroyed Indian production of textiles and moved it to Britain. Britain has also lost the US colonies, banned slave trade, and enforcing that ban on others. When the divide reaches conflict the South has 75% of the worlds cotton production.

On the other hand institutions has a strong path-dependency so slavery in the south can very well be explained with it already existing, going back to the triangle trade. If slavery had not existed, poor labourers would probably had sufficed just as well. As they did after the abolition.

So I would postulate that slavery is instituted on a large scale when there is an abundance of slaves and stays until it is uneconomical and some shock causes the institutions to change.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 06:55:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

That is a plausible explanation for the origins of slavery. There is a well known cross-cultural survey in anthropology from the '70s, IIRCC, that might include slavery as one of the surveyed characteristics of the societies shown. I may even have parts of it in one or more of the books in my library, if I can find it.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 10:49:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

Actually, I was more thinking about slavery as a big institution. Slavery as such is more problematic as slavery/serfdom/prison labour/poverty tends to blur in the edges.

I think it has been with us about as long as other property. Is slavery modelled on chattel or the other way around?

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 12:36:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

Domesticated livestock probably precedes slavery, because slaves are smarter than cattle. So you need to have sufficient force multipliers available to make the slaves to slavers ratio economical. That means weapons, organisation and other things that are normally associated with sedentary cultures.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 01:01:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

Chattel and cattle both derive from the same late latin root: capitale.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 03:01:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

As in capitaleists.

by njh on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 05:31:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 1)

Slavery seems to go back around 4,000 years. Those who study proto-Indo-European have deduced dosos as the PIE word for slave.

Ever since I learnt about confirmation bias I've started seeing it everywhere

by ATinNM on Sat Dec 18th, 2010 at 01:14:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Roman history tangent (none / 0)

In general, arguments based on energy returns, technological advancements, and ecological limits are interesting in the close attention they pay to factors overlooked. However, to the degree that they take attention away from what were (in my opinon, at any rate) purely political decisions, or the outcomes of fights between political and economic elites, they are a serious distraction. In a way, they seem part and parcel of the same project that underlies much of economics, to remove a large part of human life from the realm of agency and choice, and reify it as a force of nature.

I agree that any approach can be used to distract from rather than illuminate a problem. But the political decisions, IMO, have to be viewed in the terms of How Institutions Think, as described by Mary Douglas. I have written on this subject in comments that TGB turned into a diary: Malleable social reality. One of the comments in that diary has a portion of Douglas' argument quoted. Christianity was an available option as a state religion in the time of Constantine, so he could make it and official religion by decree. An effective alternate understanding and organization of Roman society in the Western Empire was not similarly available to my knowledge. That is a major reason to push alternative organizations of contemporary societies and economies into the public sphere today - so they are familiar and available to be considered in case the opportunity arises.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 02:10:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 1)

Excellent point, to be remembered while listening to the endless gassing of economists of all stripes. If they don't start by plugging FAIRNESS into their mumblings, they are ignoring human nature, and setting up a system bound to fail (failure defined as overturning their system)

In general, arguments based on energy returns, technological advancements, and ecological limits are interesting in the close attention they pay to factors overlooked. However, to the degree that they take attention away from what were (in my opinon, at any rate) purely political decisions, or the outcomes of fights between political and economic elites, they are a serious distraction. In a way, they seem part and parcel of the same project that underlies much of economics, to remove a large part of human life from the realm of agency and choice, and reify it as a force of nature

Align culture with our nature.

by ormondotvos (ormond no spam lmi net no spam) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 12:25:29 PM EST

Re: Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 1)

Over at "Naked Capitalism", Yves Smith has a good interview that relates strongly to where we began this, and to the sometimes blurry line between abstraction and reification, and hard politics.
Good discussion, on the hard politics side of the relationship.
In an attempt to illuminate the relationship between extreme inequality and social collaspse, they wander into this neighborhood.

Krugman says that he used to dismiss talk that inequality contributed to crises, but then we reached Great Depression-era levels of inequality in 2007 and promptly had a crisis, so now he takes it a bit more seriously.
The problem, he says, is finding a mechanism. Krugman brings up underconsumption (wherein the working class borrows a lot of money because all the money is going to the rich) and overconsumption (in which the rich spend and that makes the next-most rich spend and so on, until everyone is spending too much to keep up with rich people whose incomes are growing much faster than everyone else's).
Robert Reich has theorized for some time that there are 3 causal connections between inequality and crashes:
First, the rich spend a smaller proportion of their wealth than the less-affluent, and so when more and more wealth becomes concentrated in the hands of the wealth, there is less overall spending and less overall manufacturing to meet consumer needs.
Second, in both the Roaring 20s and 2000-2007 period, the middle class incurred a lot of debt to pay for the things they wanted, as their real wages were stagnating and they were getting a smaller and smaller piece of the pie. In other words, they had less and less wealth, and so they borrowed more and more to make up the difference. As Reich notes:
Between 1913 and 1928, the ratio of private credit to the total national economy nearly doubled. Total mortgage debt was almost three times higher in 1929 than in 1920. Eventually, in 1929, as in 2008, there were "no more poker chips to be loaned on credit," in [former Fed chairman Mariner] Eccles' words. And "when their credit ran out, the game stopped."
And third, since the wealthy accumulated more, they wanted to invest more, so a lot of money poured into speculative investments, leading to huge bubbles, which eventually burst. Reich points out:
In the 1920s, richer Americans created stock and real estate bubbles that foreshadowed those of the late 1990s and 2000s. The Dow Jones Stock Index ballooned from 63.9 in mid-1921 to a peak of 381.2 eight years later, before it plunged. There was also frantic speculation in land. The Florida real estate boom lured thousands of investors into the Everglades, from where many never returned, at least financially.
Wall Street cheered them on in the 1920s, almost exactly as it did in the 2000s.
But I believe there may be a fourth causal connection between inequality and crashes. Specifically, when enough wealth gets concentrated in a few hands, it becomes easy for the wealthiest to buy off the politicians, to repeal regulations, and to directly or indirectly bribe regulators to look the other way when banks were speculating with depositors money, selling Ponzi schemes or doing other shady things which end up undermining the financial system and the economy.

"In a way, they seem part and parcel of the same project that underlies much of economics, to remove a large part of human life from the realm of agency and choice, and reify it as a force of nature."

TBG's oft-returning emphasis on the psychology of bad decision-making seems closer to the mark to me.
I'm tempted to say that it's useful and enjoyable to search for the Deus ex machina, but if there are natural limits to complexity, to growth, they will be related to the well-known but oft-denied malthusian relationship. It's a finite planet.
But within that still-vast space, better decision-making still has the potential to fix a lot of stuff.

Capitalism searches out the darkest corners of human potential, and mainlines them.

by geezer in Paris (risico at wanadoo(flypoop)fr) on Fri Dec 17th, 2010 at 10:54:24 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 0)

That seems tautological, unless you have a specific action in mind.

Align culture with our nature.

by ormondotvos (ormond no spam lmi net no spam) on Sun Dec 19th, 2010 at 04:56:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 0)

Nah. Just pointing out that it could be that we are discussing a symptom, to some extent, rather than the disease here, and other things still work.
A lot of the apparent systemic complexity may be superficial that is to say peripheral.
On the other hand, just finished reading The Limits to Growth 30-year Update, and I tell you, THAT will cause a positive feedback loop of terror to run to completion in your spine.

Capitalism searches out the darkest corners of human potential, and mainlines them.

by geezer in Paris (risico at wanadoo(flypoop)fr) on Wed Dec 22nd, 2010 at 11:15:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 0)

I think Krugman's identification of the fourth cause is obviously dead on and I am glad to see it appear in print under his name. Well past time for truth telling.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Dec 23rd, 2010 at 08:49:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 1)

Is a Tainter-Style Collapse in Our Future? naked capitalism

Quite a few readers have taken to mentioning Joseph Tainter's classic, The Collapse of Complex Societies, in comments, a sign it might be worth discussing formally. Tainter, an archeologist, developed his thesis out of his considerable dissatisfaction with prevailing collapse theories, which he duly enumerates and shreds.
His argument is straightforward:
1. Human societies are problem solving organizations
2. Sociopolitical systems require energy for their maintenance
3. Increasing complexity carries with it increased cost per capita
3. Investment in sociopolitical complexity often reaches a point of declining marginal returns
This section gives a good overview:

There are two general factors that combine to make a society vulnerable to collapse when investment in complexity begins to yield a declining marginal return. First, stress and perturbation are a constant feature of any complex society, always occurring somewhere in its territory. Such a society will have a developed an operating regulatory apparatus this is designed to deal with such things as localized agricultural failures, border conflicts, and unrest. Since such continuous, localized stress can be expected to recur with regularity, it can, to a degree, be anticipated and prepared for. Major, unexpected stress surges, however, will also occur given enough time, as such things as climactic changes and foreign incursions take place. To meet these major stresses, the society must have some kind of net reserve. This can take the form of excess productive capacities in agriculture, energy, or minerals, or hoarded surpluses from past production. Stress surges of great magnitude cannot be accommodated without such a reserve.
Yet a society experiencing declining marginal returns is investing even more heavily in a strategy that is yielding proportionately less. Excess productive capacity will at some point be used up, and accumulated surpluses allocated to current operating needs. There is, then, little or no surplus with which to counter major adversities. Unexpected stress surges must be dealt with out of the current operating budget, often ineffectually, and always to the detriment of the system as a whole. Even if the stress is successfully met, the society is weakened in the process, and made even more vulnerable to the next crisis. Once a complex society develops the vulnerabilities of declining marginal returns, collapse may merely require sufficient passage of time to render probable the occurrence of an insurmountable calamity.
Secondly, declining marginal returns make complexity a less attractive problem-solving strategy. When marginal returns decline, the advantages to complexity become ultimately no greater (for society as a whole) than those for less costly social forms. The marginal cost of evolution to a higher level of complexity, or of remaining at the present level, is high compared to the alternative of disintegration.
Under such conditions, the option to decompose (that is, to sever the ties that link localized groups to a regional entity) become attractive to certain components of a complex society. As marginal returns deteriorate, tax rates rise with less and less return to the local level. Irrigation systems go untended, bridges and roads are not kept up, and the frontier is not adequately defended. Many of the social units that comprise a complex society perceive increased advantage to a strategy of independence, and begin to pursue their own immediate goals rather than long-term goals of the hierarchy. Behavioral interdependence gives way to behavioral independence, requiring the hierarchy to allocating still more of a shrinking resource base to legitimation and/or control.
As much as this argument is very persuasive, Tainter rejects explanations that rely on cultural factors (he takes the anthropologist's view that preferring more complex societies for their cultural achievements is a form of chauvinism and has no place in good social science). But some cultures promote cooperation and lower legitimatization costs. Look at how Japan has endured a reversal of fortunes with far more grace than America would take a similar period of stagnation.

I had intended to quote some more of Tainter in this diary, but Yves has done the transcription for me. :-)

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Jan 5th, 2011 at 03:07:02 PM EST

Re: The Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 0)

There are two general factors that combine to make a society vulnerable to collapse when investment in complexity begins to yield a declining marginal return. First, stress and perturbation are a constant feature of any complex society, always occurring somewhere in its territory. Such a society will have a developed an operating regulatory apparatus this is designed to deal with such things as localized agricultural failures, border conflicts, and unrest. Since such continuous, localized stress can be expected to recur with regularity, it can, to a degree, be anticipated and prepared for. Major, unexpected stress surges, however, will also occur given enough time, as such things as climactic changes and foreign incursions take place. To meet these major stresses, the society must have some kind of net reserve.

I guess this highlights why I have a hard time with his argument:

Why does he believe that non-complex societies have greater reserves to spare for such macroscopic upheavals? Isn't it simply the case that less complex societies usually don't get to experience such large upheavals, because they go tits-up from the small upheavals that more complex societies deal with as a matter of course?

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Jan 6th, 2011 at 02:51:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Collapse of Complex Societies (none / 0)

He actually deals with the collapse of a smaller society as well, the Chacoan in the US Southwest. But there is no written record, only archeological evidence. I'll have to finish the book in order to respond. :-)

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Thu Jan 6th, 2011 at 11:04:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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