The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011

by heathlander Sat Jan 7th, 2012 at 08:50:09 AM EST

Hungary's new constitution is a grim development in a Europe where democracy has already been suspended in Greece and Italy.

NOTE: This is an excerpt from an article by Carl Rowlands, published at New Left Project. I co-edit that site, and hence have permission to repost - the full article can be read there.

Since New Year's Day, Hungary is no longer officially a republic. Signs on the border crossings and all official documentation have been changed accordingly. The new constitution, with its talk of historical destiny and stated desire for continuity with Horthy-era Hungary, has been enacted in its entirety. This new `Fundamental Law' stands as the basis for a wholesale revision of the judiciary, media regulation, employment law, education and electoral system. It's a constitution which is notable for grand, immodest proclamations, with the drafters `being aware of our responsibility before Man and God.' It repeatedly refers to Christianity, the need for national and spiritual values, the predominant role of Hungary in the Carpathian Basin.

However, perhaps most importantly, it is open-ended, with countless references to future `cardinal acts.' So, not only is the constitution protected by a two-thirds majority - all of the associated law is similarly entrenched. In practice, this means the existing, regressive, tax system and inbuilt majorities of placemen in the governing councils of the state and judiciary are sheltered by a vague, overreaching fundamental law. As we now know, the new Hungarian state will be centralized, acquiring most, if not all, property currently held by municipalities. Any changes will require a two-thirds majority from an electoral system designed to perpetuate the governing Fidesz party. So far, so grim. However, the question might arise: why? Why would a government with an already strong majority attempt to lock the country into such a long-term, and potentially deadly, embrace?

Firstly, I suggest trying to follow the money trail for an answer. Since the mid-2000s, Orban's Fidesz have been the recipients of money from the `new' domestic capitalist class in Hungary, those who established enterprises during the transition to capitalism and the period following its arrival. In the confused and unaccountable period during the early 1990s, networks of new and well-connected businessmen emerged. Bankers inherited monopoly positions based purely on habit and tradition, which helped to funnel capital to the powerful construction magnates who had quickly established companies to benefit from money from the European Union's investment in infrastructure. Another key resource bloc for Fidesz are rentiers, those who accumulated property in the last twenty years. The result is that there are two coalitions of major moneyed interests battling for territory within the ruling Fidesz party, in addition to various local business interests. Fidesz politicians are under consistent pressure to provide for their `national capitalist' sponsors. The main prize is the allocation of government contracts, positions of influence in economic development roles and the opportunity to dispense EU funding to favoured clients and allies. The centralisation, social stratification and lack of oversight engendered by the new constitution and, most importantly, its associated cardinal acts, are designed to work well for those in positions of national economic pre-eminence.

Given the importance of money to the functioning of the new Hungarian state, the authoritarian nature of the regime at least partially exists to ensure a guaranteed flow of resources. The constitutionally-engineered imposition of a flat tax rate - absent from most editions of Mein Kampf - would appear to confirm that there is no classically fascist blueprint behind the regime being established in Hungary. However, aspects of the laws as applied may well contain elements of a generic totalitarian approach. The labour laws, for instance, aim to consolidate neo-feudalism, perpetuated by a set of educational reforms which will reestablish selection at the age of 10, and consign almost half of children to a limited, `vocational' education where unpaid labour in local small businesses is to be prioritised above learning anything about the outside world.

It's notable that, until recently, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, was pretty quiet on the subject of the highly undemocratic reforms being pushed through Parliament by the Fidesz majority. What made Brussels wake up, with a jump, was the proposed reform to the way that the Supervisory Council of the Hungarian National Bank is appointed. On the surface, this may appear less obviously totalitarian than other new laws. Yet the implications are enormous.

...more.

The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 | 91 comments (91 topical, 0 editorial, 0 hidden)

Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 3)

Hungary's new constitution is a grim development in a Europe where democracy has already been suspended in Greece and Italy.

To the best of my knowledge democracy has not been suspended in Italy no matter what Ed Miliband and sundry pundits claim. I'd say the same for Greece.

Hungary's definitely on the track to totalitarian democracy.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Sat Jan 7th, 2012 at 01:08:04 PM EST

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

was nazism a 'totalitarian democracy' too, or is this an historical first?

It's a fine line between homage, parody, and consumer opportunism. Jess Walter

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sat Jan 7th, 2012 at 06:18:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 8)

The Nazi dictatorship effectively did away with free elections as well as the checks and balance of parliament and the presidency with the Enabling Act of 1933. Hitler did not rewrite the constitution. He did just fine with the Weimar Constitution.

The actual situation is novel: the European Union will not admit candidate states that are not constitutional democracies. Berlusconismo sought to undermine these constraints with Berlusconi's monopolies of the strategic medias, his electoral law, and frontal attacks on institutions most notably the judiciary. In the final analysis he failed, due most likely to his personal obsessions with his legal tangles and his outright vanity. However, the greatest resistance came from Italian institutions and the balance of powers enshrined in the Italian Constitution.

However, the fact that Italy was a member of the EU greatly conditioned Berlusconi's actions. He sought to condition the state to his private interests within the Union's framework. In this is the novelty of his actions- the establishment of a tyranny that does not formally controvene binding European legal standards. Or in the case his laws did so, he exploited Europe's slow procedures and inability to applicate forcibly sanctions. Berlusconi simply stonewalled Europe on any European act or provision that would have jeopardized his power.

Hungary is a different case. The Constitution has been changed (but then the average life of a constitution since 1789 is 16 years) with a series of provisions that will reduce elections to a simulacre, eliminate checks and balances, and set the groundwork for a totalitarian ideology. Unlike Berlusconi, Orban is directly challenging the Union- and we'll see what happens. But I would never expect the Union to move quickly. It is rightly based on formal procedures.

As for "democracy" it has been reduced to a catch-all slogan. Ink stained fingers may indeed be a powerful image and a first step but democracy has been recognized since ancient Greece as the antichamber of tyranny. Democracy by itself is of no use to man. It must be reigned in by checks and balances, by "non-democratic" independant institutions and powers such as the press, by formal- and informal- practices.

Without constraints, pure democracy can easily go hand in hand with totalitarian practices. Is not North Korea a totalitarian democracy- perhaps a fitting model for Orban?

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 04:59:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

certainly russia is trying to approach this version of democracy.

thanks for a great reply, almost a diary there!

It's a fine line between homage, parody, and consumer opportunism. Jess Walter

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 07:49:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

I would say that the defining charactheristica of totalitarianism - that sets totalitarian regimes apart from your un of the mill dictatorship - is the demand that the population actively supports it. From this stems the need for mass organisations, elections and so on. All controlled top-down of course.

This can be contrasted with your early 19th century absolute monarchies in Europe where the idea of giving the population of Norway a vote in their post-Napoleon future was considered dangerous as it would create the idea that the subjects could have a say in who ruled them.

So far, I would say that Fidesz is moving towards a non-totalitarian constitutional non-democracy. No mass youth movement with mandatory membership for example, just that all power is moved away from elected assemblies in order to prevent the electorate from having a say in how they are ruled.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 10:03:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Can I presume that Hungary had non-federalist constitution? That one election could bring about such change, apparently a democratically elected government enacting very anti-democratic changes, indicates that the checks and balances must have been parliamentary rather than constitutional in nature. Even at the height of his power Bush 43 could not override most state laws and jurisdictions. About the only consolations are that Orban has not started mandatory, explicitly fascist mass organizations and that this is in Hungary, not Germany, France, Britain or the USA.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 11:32:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

Hungary had non-federalist constitution?

Yes, unlike Germany, Spain or Austria but alike the Netherlands, Sweden or Finland; but what's the relevance?

That one election could bring about such change, apparently a democratically elected government enacting very anti-democratic changes, indicates that the checks and balances must have been parliamentary rather than constitutional in nature.

No, this is only indicative of the finite strength of both parliamentary and constitutional checks and balances. No US President/party had a supermajority at which they could amend the US Constitution at will.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 05:28:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

Actually even if a party had a two-thirds majority in the US, it would still be very hard to pass a constitutional amendment in such a surprisingly brief time. In the US an amendment must also be ratified by 75% of the states, usually within a time limit.

As Berlusconi learned, it is very difficult to change the Italian constitution. He never ceased trying but got nowhere. (And on the side, this continuous harkening to change the Italian Constitution to this very day is extremely iritating, all the more so considering the stature of most of the parliamentary nominees.)

So what immediately catches the eye is why it was so easy for Orban to get away with writing up a new constitution practically by himself in such a brief time and promulgate it.

By the way, I've been looking for a decent English draft of the new Hungarian Constitution, and suppose this is the best translation as opposed to the official version. I presume this draft is not the final version.

It appears there are several misleading translations and omissions in the official English translation that have been pointed out by NGO's.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 07:05:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

In the US an amendment must also be ratified by 75% of the states, usually within a time limit.

IOW the supermajority needed is not two-thirds but three-quarters in some bodies (though isn't it lower in the Senate?), which would make the venture harder. It also helps that the US parliament is bicameral, Hungary's unicameral.

As Berlusconi learned, it is very difficult to change the Italian constitution.

He never had the required super-majority, or did he?

Constitution of Italy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In order to make it virtually impossible to replace with a dictatorial regime, it is difficult to modify the Constitution; to do so (under Article 138) requires two readings in each House of Parliament and, if the second of these are carried with a simple majority (i.e. 50%+1) rather than two-thirds, a referendum.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 02:14:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

Berlusconi's attempt to change the consitution through a simple parliamentary majority was shot down by the obligatory referendum in 2006 while a constitutional change proposed by the Olive coalition in 2001 passed by a large majority of citizens. The former was an improvised sectarian initiative designed mainly to please the Lega Nord while the latter was clearly in the interest of the nation. The Italian constitution has some provisional or transitional sections that were to be changed over time. Beyond the 2001 modifications, those reforms have yet to be undertaken.

Attempts were undertaken in the so-called Bicameral Roundtable in the late 90's. It was a political trap exploited by Berlusconi to give himself an aura of statesmanship. Once he had what he wanted in terms of positive public exposure and with elections around the corner, he simply walked out without an explanation. All the better given that the Left had made ridiculous consessions. And risk to continue to do so if ever in power again.

There's nothing worse than a party that stoops to actuating the opposition's program.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 03:59:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

So indeed he had no supermajority. This is (another) good thing about proportional representation: one side would need almost an actual two-thirds majority of the vote to win two-thirds of seats.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 09:50:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 4)

It took slightly more than a year to ratify the 18th amendment. The 23rd took about 10 months, and the 26th took less than 5 months. It's become harder since then: the 27th (and last) took over 2 centuries...

by gk (g k quattro due due sette "at" gmail.com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 02:30:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

...and the ERA failed to be ratified by its deadline.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 03:42:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

Returning to the US parallel. For Fidesz's two-thirds majority, the key as winning almost every one of the single-member election districts in Hungary's mixed election system. In the US first-past-the-post system, a supermajority in a single election is possible with even smaller majorities. However, it would need the end of the bipartisan system for the situation to arise: either one party would have to alienate the majority of its voters enough to stay away from the vote (as more or less happened in Hungary) or split in two equally strong parts with weak geographical correlation and divide votes (somewhat similarly to the way Thatcher got her crushing election victory while Labour and the SDP-Liberal alliance split votes). Due to the non-simultaneous Senate and gubernatoral elections, most of the time, this situation would have to hold for two years for the other major party to win the supermajority in all three Constitution-relevant bodies. However, checking the current list, I see the half of the currently 20 Democrat governors are up for re-election (or replacement) in 2015. So would there be no shift favouring the Democrats until then and would the above charted extraordinary situation arise in 2014, the Republicans would have the opportunity to gain all the supermajorities in one year, even without winning over a single new swing voter.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 09:34:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

Amongst US states only Nebraska has a unicameral legislative body and all, I believe, have three independent branches - legislative, executive and judicial - generally mirroring the federal structure. In addition, all powers not specifically granted to the federal government are retained by the states. This preference for separation of powers, even in layers, goes back to the formulation of the constitution in the 18th century and draws on Montesquieu's Esprit des Lois, Livy and Aristotle as well as the history of every republic known to the founders.

I have often chaffed at the difficulty of getting any change enacted, but the constitutional system has stood up pretty well and I shudder to think what a new US constitutional convention would devise. In the USA, instead of rewriting the constitution the financiers simply bought most of the significant players in the system. As Montesquieu noted long ago any system will work when run by virtuous men while no system will withstand being overrun by evil men, or to that general effect.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 12:54:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

I think it was Mills who also adopted that argument and proposed a proportional system which would reduce the risk of state seizure by private interests. But as Berlusconi has shown the proportional system can be gamed also.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 01:03:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

On the other hand, the fact that real estate law has, since before the Constitutional Convention, been state law has made it very difficult for the financiers and their minions to totally obstruct justice regarding the criminal behavior regarding foreclosures and disregard of state law on conveyance of title. A few state Attorneys General can threaten the entire Mortgage Backed Securities business, which is enough to blow up the existing financial system. It turns out that the power to enforce the law is also the power to destroy.

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 01:14:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 3)

I would guess that this referred to the choice of a prime minister by the Bundesbank.

Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi

by Cyrille (cyrillev domain yahoo.fr) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 04:36:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

Abysmally ridiculous.

In Italy the president of the republic will charge a person to form a government. Once the person who has been charged - I use the term instead of "nominated"- has formed his government the government is sworn in by the president. Within ten days the government must present itself in parliament to receive a vote of confidence in both houses. Voting is by role call.

It is an informal practice guided by constitutional logic to first consult the parties in parliament as well as prominent public figures and other relevant institutional figures before charging a person with forming a government. No where is it written that the person charged to form a government must be a member of parliament. He could be my local butcher as far as that goes. Nor must the ministers belong to parliament. Obviously the goal is to have a majority approval in parliament to carry out a program.

Italy is not a premiership as Miliband erroneously presumed. There is no such thing as a premier. The person charged to form a government is simply the president of the council.

Berlusconi attempted to mask this with his electoral law which obliges the citizenry to vote only for a party or a coalition which also indicates a person that the coalition would like to see as president of the council. Berlusconi likes to sell this as a factual constitution based on informal practices. It is however in contrast with the constitution and can simply be scored off as a right to free speech. It is not binding. It's in the PR department.

By the same logic one could pass a law that all Chryslers can carry the Lamborghini logo. It wouldn't make a Chrysler a Lamborghini. Nor would anyone even bother with spare parts and insurance. Berlusconi was never elected premier. He can say it all he wants. It's free speech and snake oil at that.

But in the end he was one of a half dozen people who was elected to parliament. All the others were nominated by him or other parties. There is not a single member of the Italian parliament who can indicate by how many votes he won his election. Which is the real contention on whether there is or is not democracy in Italy.

As for the present government it was formed according to the constitution. Berlusconi resigned once it was apparent he no longer had the confidence of parliament. Napolitano simply followed both formal and informal procedure to insure that the state had a government. He did not even have to nominate Monti to the Senate as lifetime Senator in order to charge Monti with forming a government.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 05:39:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

People are very stupid about other peoples' forms of democracy.

Though you can argue that the Monti government lacks political legitimacy - and I'm not even sure that is true - it's legally legitimate.

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 05:46:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Political legitimacy comes through role call in parliament. Each individual member of parliament publicly motivates his vote before the presiding member of each house.

Monti's government received a comfortable majority of the votes (from MP's who were chosen by parties, not voters). More politically legitimate than that is hard to argue.

The primacy of political sovereignity is expressed in parliament. It is, fortunately after thousands of years of experimentation and the parenthesis of fascist dictatorship, not in the hand of the populist demos or those who erect themselves as the one and only true embodiment of the masses or the Nation.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 06:01:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

In my view a government that has clearly lost the support of the people isn't politically legitimate even though it may be legally legitimate.

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 06:07:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

Which would mean Berlusconi and Orban.

Monti and his government have high approval ratings despite the draconian measures taken by the Monti government, comfortably over 50%.

Beyond your personal opinion which is sacrosanct its implications would reek havoc with any state were the mere lose of support or approval to determine the destiny of policies and governments. It's precisely this chase after approval that has reduced the political class to mediocrity. Stature, competence and vision, the ability to seminate for future generations is very much lacking on the world stage.

After the sheer idiocy of Berlusconi we now have a Council President that by comparison evidences the mediocrity of Merkel, Sarkozy- and Cameron. It doesn't really make a difference for public opinion but Germany's lording it over is going to have to finally deal with someone who is more competent than she is.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 07:15:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

There's a balance point between responding to every whim of the opinion polls and totally disregarding public opinion. That current politicians are too far to one side of that doesn't mean that the other end of the scale - ignoring the voters completely until it's time to bribe them for the next election - is a good thing either.

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 07:31:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

One matter that may escape the foreign observer is the general insufferance of voters for the electoral law known as the Porcellum which disenfranchised voters of their right to vote for a candidate. No one wants to vote with the actual law save for De Pietro and opinion makers such as Marco Travaglio.

On January 11th we'll see if the Constitutional Court approves the holding of a referendum to abolish the present electoral law.

Thanks to that law, voters' preferences have been ignored for the past two national elections. Of course this does not diminish the formal legitimacy of the institutions. Institutions function according to law- in the name of the people- not to the whim of the people.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 08:19:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

The initial assertion doesn't refer to the legality of the Italian government. It is a reference to the lack of a democratic mandate. Whilst MPs and parties are elected to office, and once in, are governed by the rule of law, the popular mandate normally derives from a stated programme or standpoint, from which the government is to be conducted. No-one argued that the Snowdon/MacDonald involvement in the 1930s was illegal. People argued it represented a betrayal, from what these politicians had stood for, upon election in 1929. Such events create an interegnum - normally temporary - but I think the 'suspension' of democracy is a valid expression in such a circumstance.

by car05 on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 05:11:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Yes, even if the overwhelming majority of elected MPs voted for the Monti government, and opinion polls show support for Monti now, the voters who voted for these MPs didn't elect them after having seen the programme of the Monti government exposed to public debate in a campaign.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 02:23:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

By how many votes were each of those MPs and senators elected?

Tomorrow the Constitutional Court will hand down its decision on whether we'll have a referendum to abolish Berlusconi's electoral law. It's likely that voters will turn out to vote it out if the Court OKs it. Then we might consider talking about democracy in Italy, however you wish to define it.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 04:44:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Conspiracy Mongers at the WSJ (none / 1)

I would call Indira Gandhi's state of emergency a suspension of democracy for what she did during that period. It was of course a constitutional act that she abused.

I have difficulty accepting MacDonald's and Snowden's actions as a suspension of democracy, especially from an Italian viewpoint. After all the collapse of Prodi's government was simply due to MPs that had a price tag attached. In November 2010 after Fini left the Berlusconi coalition, a confidence vote was postponed for three weeks. During that time Berlusconi's emissaries bought opposition MPs and created an ex-novo party with the hilarious name "The Responsables' Party," somewhat funnier than MacDonald's "New Labour". Nor was it the only spontaneously generated party in parliament. Despite continuous calls by the President of the Republic to verify his mandate in parliament, Berlusconi dragged along an entire year without producing relevant legislation or policy.

The WSJ ignores this and misrepresents it as a sort of timed cryptic message launched by Napolitano so as to neatly package their cause-effect scenario. Napolitano was simply repeating himself. After all, with all these new parties Berlusconi was creating to keep himself in power, perhaps a little verification in parliament was in order.

If this meme on suspended democracy is to continue, just exactly when and by whom was it "suspended?"

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 06:04:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Conspiracy Mongers at the WSJ (none / 0)

If this meme on suspended democracy is to continue, just exactly when and by whom was it "suspended?"

Democracy was suspended by the European Central Bank the moment it began to take interest rate policy hostage in an effort to foist a list of highly partisan demands on member states.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Jan 14th, 2012 at 12:45:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

The considerable pressure that was exercised in the days prior to these events would make it seem less than crystal clear that Monti really was the choice deriving most naturally from the will of the people.

You can often make a member of parliement vote differently from what would be his natural inclination. And I belive that many non Italian actors went way too far down that road -however much I hated the Berlusconi administration.

Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi

by Cyrille (cyrillev domain yahoo.fr) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 07:17:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

If I understand your comments, the considerable pressure exercised abroad led to Berlusconi's fall. Berlusconi had already fallen since November 2010 when Fini pulled out of his coalition. Throughout 2011 his government simply survived by day to day manoeuvering. His obsession with his legal hassles, young snatch, and vain trivialities combined with the arrests of all his key henchmen and close collaboraors on charges ranging from mafia association to bribery to covert conspiracy to rigging public tender, eroded his political power and approval long before Italy's grave economic crisis caused concern abroad.

Merkel and Sarkozy were only flogging a dead horse, a further humiliation for a government and a coalition in disarray, a coalition that no longer had the votes in parliament nor prestige in Italian households.

An interesting aspect of the whole story is that all those nominated MPs can actually exercise their right to vote in all conscious without the druggery of rubberstamping every whim of the guy who appointed them to parliament. It was precisely because Berlusconi no longer had his majority in parliament that he resigned. His MPs suddenly discovered that, according to the constitution, they can actually exercise their vote in freewill. And they voted with their feet despite all the promises of personal favours thrown their way. Perhaps this aspect of the fall doesn't come across abroad. My fault.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 08:41:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

If I understand your comments, the considerable pressure exercised abroad led to Berlusconi's fall.

And also to Monti's choice by Napolitano (who IIRC got phone calls) and his approval by parliament. Pressure coming both from politicians and markets. If the Monti government still has a high approval rate, then the majority or of the population either ignores the government's policies thinking that Monti is still better than Berlu or the other idiots, or must have been shocked to think that austerity and market reforms are the way out of crisis. I disagree, but, at least, Italy having significant exports (IIRC), maybe austerity won't be a complete disaster like in Greece or Portugal.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 09:11:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 3)

Or people have some respect for Monti and his cabinet. After all he was European Commissioner for 10 years. As far as I can remember, both he and Bonino enjoyed a good reputation as a result of their Commission tenures.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 09:18:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

I include that in "ignores the government's policies thinking that Monti is still better than Berlu or the other idiots". Respect for the man for his past deeds is one thing.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 09:36:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Rest assured that everyone has felt the effects of Monti's manoeuver. I'll judge his policies in the long run, as most citizens have chosen to do, certainly not on a single decree law dictated by the previous government's formal promises to the EU and Italy's grave economic crisis in both domestic and international contexts. Let's leave magic wands to politicians and pundits.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 10:22:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 3)

The problem is that the EUs and Italys grave economic crisis is made worse by the austerity, and that the demand that formal promises be kept is a tool that has been wielded before - remember how it was demanded that the Greek opposition signed of on austerity for Greece to receive their loans? It is used to enforce TINA, to remove options.

The Shock Doctrine has an example from Korea, how emergency loans were stopped until all presidential candidates had signed an agreement to enforce austerity.

Either Monti will lead Italy down the same path as Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain or he will at some point stand up to the ECB and refuse austerity. If not now, then when?

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 02:57:44 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

Regarding the foreign pressure, prior to Berlusconi's exit, there was this, too:

Deepening Crisis Over Euro Pits Leader Against Leader - WSJ.com

When the market rout worsened on Aug. 3, Mr. Berlusconi gave a defiant speech before parliament declaring that his policies "have been judged adequate by Europe."
Two days later, the ECB contradicted him in a secret letter. Italy's deficit-cutting plan was "not sufficient," ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet and his anointed successor, Mario Draghi, wrote to Mr. Berlusconi. The letter said Italy needed extensive economic overhaul to boost growth, and it set out detailed demands including greater competition, labor-market deregulation, reduced pension largess, a slimmer bureaucracy and deeper public spending cuts.
The implicit message: These reforms were the conditions for ECB intervention in the bond market.

Note that the ECB didn't just say that the planned budget-related measures aren't enough, but was dictating a specific set of policies which know no alternatives and go way beyond deficit reduction (policies Monti would then go on to implement). IMHO Italy, like Hungary, was between a rock and a hard place with Berlusconi and foreign economic blackmail.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 09:44:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Markets are run by the hypothalamus. They don't have higher order brain functions such as frontal lobe activity that could conceptualize and implement blackmail. They just strike at what moves or are driven by the smell of blood.

Re the specific policies [detailed demands including greater competition, labor-market deregulation, reduced pension largess, a slimmer bureaucracy and deeper public spending cuts], they have yet to be affronted save for a preliminary pension "reform."

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 10:36:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 3)

Markets are run by the Hypothalamus, but DoDo's quote is about the ECB and the rest of the article is about Merkel and others.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 10:42:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Is this the notorious article that alleges Merkel opined about the internal affairs of a state with the president of that state, suggesting a crucial course of action?

Is this the article that has people abroad flapping in the wind about a so-called lose of democracy in Italy? And here I thought it was poor Miliband and his provincial ideas on premiership.

With the exception of a few crackpots here, no one gave the article credence. Not even Gasparri and the PdL took it seriously, much less Berlusconi. Sorry, it's just not done.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 12:47:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

So are all those stories of secret ECB letters we heard over the Summer false?

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 01:15:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

I'll check out the ECB letter as I don't remember well. I probably wrote it off as journalistic fluff and didn't give it a thought.

There was a letter and the conversation but the content of the conversation as reported is simply untenable, just as the reconstruction of events in the article. Supposed coincidences are given the prestige of being consequential. It's flawed with fallacious reasoning at its marketed best.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 01:25:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

I find the ECB letter wasn't dug up by WSJ, it was already dug up by other media back in September. Corriere della Sera brought the original in English in its entirety.

(BTW, to bring the discussion back to the diary subject a bit, I discovered the quote from the WSJ article in an article in Hungarian media about what conditions the IMF and the ECB might pose Hungary's government for a loan.)

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 05:08:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Given the timing and the context of the letter, I can't see anything unique or particularly important in it. Even the Italian Left was mild in its comments, pointing out the BCE's emphasis on growth and fairly redundant call for "reforms." The indignados did attack the letter in a letter consigned to President Napolitano by their delegation.

I guess it goes something like this: Look our job is to defend the euro and since you've made shambles of your country's economy and a lot of broken promises, we'd like to help by buying sovereign debt on the secondary market without pissing off the Germans too much. All you gotta do is shape up with a few reforms, nothing staggering, show you're serious about stimulating growth. That way we can do our part.

That was the beginning of August. After three months of government paralysis and incompetence the markets had their say and the game got cruel.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 06:42:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Except that the ECB "reforms" with the claimed aim of providing growth will, in fact, do nothing of the sort. Because they are Hooverian quackery.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 10:07:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

I'll try to make this short because a full reply would merit a lengthy reply. As I argue, context is important. The reforms requested are in the Italian context "rose water." It's been going on since the late eighties and some reforms were undertaken thanks to "Clean Hands." The governments associated with civil society in the 90's (Ciampi, Amato, Prodi, D'Alema, again Amato) did undertake some reforms. The Berlusconi governments undid or sabotaged all reforms that got in their way of restablishing a status quo ante. The brief Prodi government 2006-2008 tried again to introduce a series of reforms, Bersani was the driving force at the time, which were once again neutralized by Berlusconi's coalition with his last government. It's no wonder Italy is an economic mess and I argue that the primary responsability can be laid at the feet of Berlusconi's coalitions.

The BCE has simply requested reforms that are long overdue and notorious. There's nothing particularly grave about them save for the fact that had they been undertaken by a responsible polity in the past two decades they would not have the traumatic effect they are now having.

As for your take on the BCE I'll have to read up on the diaries published here the past years since I don't have a full grasp of your position or of the other contributors who are far more well versed in economy and macroeconomic systems than I can ever pretend. Apparently there is a dim view of the BCE here that may go beyond its effective powers and what appears to be its toeing to the euromark.

One further note is that the letter was signed by Draghi and had a sort of casualness to it. It would not have been written in the same tone to another institutional head. The text recalls a series of measures that Draghi had often expressed while head of the Bank of Italy. As Head of the Bank of Italy Draghi systematically produced scientific studies of Italy's social-economic reality. These studies were constantly attacked,often with contempt, by Berlusconi, Finance minister Tremonti, Bossi and assorted government figures, since the studies were at logggerheads with Berlusconi's facile propaganda. Draghi was perceived as a menace to the government's power and a possible political rival. So the possibility of Draghi going abroad to the BCE was a welcome event. The plan was to put a Tremonti flunky once again in control of the Central Bank, as the previous Fazio, and with Draghi abroad, he wouldn't be a high profile rival to Berlusconi's power.

A long and sterile battle followed with the harping over Bini Smaghi and the government's refusal to follow formal procedure and undersign the candidate chosen by the Board of the Bank of Italy. This sterile battle, which lasted months, finally ended with the surprise compromise of Draghi's closest collaborator and ideator of the socio-economic studies that so irked the powers that be.

Berlusconi and Tremonti lost the battle and the war.

And that is the context of that letter.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 04:23:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 1)

There are three issues with the letter: first, the recommended economic policies; second, the recommendation of a specific set of policies as a solution to a problem, not leaving room for alternatives; third, the entire first point and parts of the others go beyond the mandate of the ECB. I think these are true even with the context you give about Draghi. Furthermore, as in Hungary, I think it is bad to think that if two sides battle then both cannot be wrong, also when one is a crook and the other respected.

The ECB letter's non-budget-related recommendations are pro-business and anti-labour throughout. It recommends large-scale privatization, in particular at local level (which was far from being entirely controlled by Belusconi) and in services. The budget-related recipes are ones that have been applied several times across the world, but usually only achieved a prolongation or (severe) worsening of a crisis, as the spending cutbacks also led to economic contraction which led to falling income.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 02:20:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Most of what you said has been going on for the past decade: anti-labour provisions, shoddy haphazard privatization, erosion of benefits, frozen incomes eroded by inflation and rising costs, deteriorating schools and services, indiscriminate cross-the-board spending cutbacks by Tremonti. Aggravated by an utter nyet to any program that might stimulate growth or attract investors. No wonder Italy has a mass braindrain diaspora working abroad. It's no wonder the ECB letter got such a cynical or non-plussed response here. We're already vaccinated.

As for the ECB exceeding its mandate here and there, it would be nice to discuss if that is effectively the case.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 05:16:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Given that the ECB has no mandate what so ever to make recommendations on fiscal and structural policy of member states, it certainly is exceeding its mandate.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Jan 14th, 2012 at 12:39:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Right: Quirinale smentisce Wsj su Merkel: Non venne avanzata alcuna richiesta di cambiare Premier.

The Italian Presidency denies SWJ reports on Merkel: no request to change PM was made.

The WSJ claimed:

This Wall Street Journal reconstruction, based on interviews with more than two dozen policy makers, including many leading actors, as well as examinations of key documents, reveals how Germany responded to the dangers in Italy by imposing its power on a divided euro zone. Ms. Merkel, widely criticized for not dealing forcefully with the crisis in its early phase, was at the center of the action, grappling with personal tensions and Byzantine politics among the 17 euro nations.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 01:18:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (4.00 / 2)

Is this the notorious article that alleges Merkel opined about the internal affairs of a state with the president of that state, suggesting a crucial course of action?

No, it alleges that Merkel demanded, not "suggested," a certifiably insane course of action, not a "highly crucial" one.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 01:55:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic 1989-2011 (none / 0)

Corrected. The WSJ alleges that Merkel demanded the certifiably insane course of action of pretending Silvio's head in a hatbox just as the coroner arrived to pronounce him dead.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 06:59:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 4)

Firstly, I suggest trying to follow the money trail for an answer.

It is good to call attention to Fidesz's money-baggers, but the picture Carl Rowlands paints comes severely short. There are two main themes to add: one, the moneyed upper class not aligned with Fidesz, two, the fact that the relationship is not one-way.

A lot of the new capitalists "who established enterprises during the transition to capitalism and the period following its arrival" were actually the old communists. That is, the old bosses and partxy secretaries of privatized state companies, who were best placed both to know the opportunities and to game the system. In the previous system, these same people were the de-facto but not de-jure controllers of the means of production, so you could say that for them, the transition to capitalism was the legalisation of their property rights (also explaining the ease of transition). Later, when seeking political backing in the new system, some turned to right-wing parties, some tried to win favours on all sides, but a large group maintained existing networks to politicians within the Socialist party. This included many if not most of the bankers (all three PMs of the Socialist-led governments between 2002 and 2010 were CEOs in the financial sphere, two of them were in high Party positions before 1990).

As for Fidesz, when they set out to take government in the early nineties, they viewed the capitalists connected to the Socialists as a systemic advantage and their own lack of similar backers as a handicap. This was articulated quite publicly. So they did everything to create that new national-capitalist class who'd serve as a counter-weight to the 'communists'. A famous early episode was the setting up of fake companies to 'disappear' money Fidesz got as public subsidies, which became starting capital for the men who'd become Fidesz's first moneybaggers. Once in government in 1998, they continued this with much bigger state grants for companies then set up anew (that is, rather than serving existing interests, they created the new rich men), and won over a couple of notable existing businessmen. After they lost the 2002 elections, the pro-Fidesz capitalists were still inferior to those connected to the Socialists (not to mention foreign capital), but grew and gained influence in Fidesz. Still, the situation still runs both ways, Orbán et al aren't mere servers of capitalists but view them as tools on their route to hegemony.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 06:01:11 PM EST

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 9)

Hello, Carl here. Firstly, I'll just say that I was asked to write this piece by heathlander, I did it very quickly. I'm not an academic, I'm not a politician, nor a student. I have an office job, a family. A cat. Anything I write is amateur, amateurish. But honest to how I see things at the time. I like NLP and I wanted to help them. In this case, I'd just finished an article for Education Politics on the school reforms, so thought I could adapt it. But there are real Hungarian-politics-heads on this forum, and I'm glad to see it. To be honest I don't enjoy writing about Hungarian politics; although there are aspects of the crime thriller, I find it too intense. I'm happy to stand back and digest what I can. I'm a foreigner living in Hungary, and like all foreigners I know here right now, I'm trying to work out if I have to leave.

I defend what I wrote here but I don't have any pretensions about it as a full account of what's led Hungary to where it is. It's an update to an earlier article on the labour laws, also on NLP. In the many articles about Hungary there is an absence of consideration when it comes to the financial aspects of power. The article attempts to address this in terms of the new constitution, it's an attempt to describe the direction of travel. Yes, the Socialists were close to capital, especially to the domestic receivers of international capital. I've written one or two articles about the MSZP and in particular my favourite, Kapoly Laszlo for Tribune - the UK labour magazine - in the past. Anyway, it's another story.

The central relationship is between Fidesz and the - really big - domestic players, some of whom have hedged their bets in the past. In terms of national capital, one doesn't get bigger than OTP Bank, after all. So the flat taxes are one example, the labour laws are another and of course the failure to mount any kind of clampdown on Hungary's huge black/grey economy - all these indicate a 'wide-spectrum' engagement - or even a marriage - between Fidesz and the shopkeepers and entrepreneurs of 'Flashman' Hungary.

Orban went on record around the time of the election, indicating that 'people' who had previously backed the Socialists shouldn't be 'trapped under the wreckage' - in code, anyone with money or business interests are welcome, whether a small ABC or a big unethical employer like CBA. In terms of the moneyed class not aligned with Fidesz, I don't think there is that much going on now - a couple of big names still linked with the MSZP, but increasingly dubious of a return on their investment. Correct me if I'm wrong.

I accept Orban and co. are not merely servants of capital, but I regard capital as directly represented at the highest levels in Fidesz. To a certain extent, Fidesz IS now capital in all of its stupidity and greed. The emerging client state is a servant to these interests, inseparable to the assertion of legislative authority. The only distinction is with some of the multinationals, yet its worth noting that tax breaks for newly relocated companies persist, and that multinationals largely welcomed the flat tax which has done so much to ruin Hungary's fiscal condition.

DoDo also writes interesting comments on the creation of a Fidesz national middle class - as I have read similar comments on the Horn government's policies. There are many continuities between MSZP-Fidesz-late MSZMP. Perhaps this is one of them.

I guess an article that I'd really like to see would address all of this from a cultural perspective. Too often articles on Hungarian politics read like a list of party stances and rhetorical flashes. But underpinning all of this are factors which make Hungary - not Romania, not Bulgaria, not Slovakia - the most likely to slip into a dictatorship. Why? DoDo mentioned in another article the LMP's 'politeness and civility' - we can smirk about this for naivety - but there is something uniquely poisoned about the political discourse in Hungary - something that I don't believe Orban is directly responsible for, and which personal attacks on Orban (or Gyurcsany) tend to reinforce. My own experiences in meetings and events here reinforce this perception. Culturally, Hungary will never be Scandinavian, but does this mean it's condemned to never have a reasoned political discourse?

by car05 on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 01:56:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Welcome to European Tribune (n/t) (4.00 / 7)

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 02:15:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 3)

First, welcome to European Tribune! Second, your comment is so long that I'm bound to address it in parts (and, following my bad habit, from end to beginning).

all of this from a cultural perspective

That is a thorny question, because culture is a moving target, and current events influence it too, not just old traditions and heritage. Back in the nineties, political discourse was far from being poisoned to this extent.

there is something uniquely poisoned about the political discourse in Hungary

I don't know about that. There were periods of more and less poisoned political discourse in virtually every 'ex-communist' country in the EU, and I think at least Slovakia in the Fico era and Poland in the time of the Kaczyński twins were on a similar level.

something that I don't believe Orban is directly responsible for

Well I do. Or, to be more precise, even if Orbán is the unquestioned leader of Fidesz, I hold the rest of at least the leadership responsible, too.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 03:15:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

Adding to the last point here, too: this doesn't mean that I'd think Fidesz's political opponents didn't issue poisionous comments, but it wasn't them who launched the "full-pitch attack", relied on MIÉP for majorities, and sought the media support of far-right jackals like András Bencsik, István Lovas and Zsolt Bayer.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 05:25:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

Right, of course the sting in the tail here is that some of these people are Orban's mates - I guess he's the sort of person that doesn't have 'friends' - but Bayer is definitely a buddy. Someone to drink beer with, and riff on the subject of Hungary's betrayals.

I moved here 10 years ago, having lived in the UK up until that point (mainly around London). I'd heard racism of different forms, but up until 10 years ago, I hadn't ever heard different people talk of Hitler in an admiring way, hark back to the old days of the civil guard association who used to keep the gypsies in order, and on top of that piles, and piles, of shameless racism and national self-pity. I've had to listen to a lot of it, even at a time in the early 2000s where material prosperity was really kicking off.

Whilst the twins in Poland, and Meciar and Fico in Slovakia were grim, is someone like Bayer given the time on TV channels and newspapers anywhere else? Is racism so deeply ingrained, combined with such intense, yet deeply subsumed feelings of personal anxiety, manifesting itself in national self-pity? Do Czechs have such a lack of self-consciousness in their bigotry?

I don't know the answer to this, but I've always thought that people in Hungary would be wide-open to the appeal of 'restoring order' to the nation. Wide open.

Alexei Sayle's autobiography has a chapter in which he visits Hungary (in the late 1960s) and points out a particularly decrepit looking block of flats. He's told by the tour guide, that's where the gypsies live. Apparently the tour guide later arrives in Liverpool, and is shocked by the little houses and working-class lives of the comrades by the Mersey. Before I offend anyone else this morning, I'd conclude by saying Hungary under communism simply became classically opportunistic. There are no ideological constructs to analyse here. The implication is, that the Orban regime will survive until an opportunity exists for to come up with something which will make more people a bit richer and more powerful.

by car05 on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 04:40:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

I don't know much about Hungary, having only visited it during the transition in the late Eighties. I did however often visit family in Czechoslovakia from the Seventies to the fall of Communism.

From my perspective here in Italy Orban's coalition seems a far more rabid version of Bossi's Lega Nord, a spearhead of the European Right. Of course it's no wonder that Berlusconi praised and praises Orban.

The only other take I could add was the facility with which the Italian mafia and its economic referents infiltrated Hungary in the 90's and I wonder idly about the impact of organized crime on Hungary's economy and its effective capacity to influence parties there. What is Hungary's situation regards Eurojust, corruption, relaundering.

Organized crime has a devastating effect on Italian society and economy. And it has always found a friendly ear in Berlusconi's governments. Does Orban's policies favour the illegal economy?

I'd conclude by saying Hungary under communism simply became classically opportunistic.

I noticed something similar in Czechoslovakia, a parallel economy based on exchanging favours. The Russians call it blat and it's been around since long before communism. It's a sort of an informal chum system in which all hang together through solidarity and blackmail to forward common interests and favours.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 05:17:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

There's certainly some evidence of Russian mafia activity in Hungary, but I can't say for sure regarding the Italian mafia. In terms of political figures, lots of people talked about the links around a former finance minister called Veres (under the socialists) who also incidentally, compared tax-dodging to driving without the seatbealt on.

by car05 on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 08:03:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

There was a strong ex-Soviet mafia presence back in the nineties, when Ukrainian-born Semion Mogilevich resided in Budapest, not even in hiding from the public. He wasn't arrested but left the country under circumstances we'll never learn (but allegedly he was warned ahead of FBI action from the very top of police).

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 02:46:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 3)

I moved here 10 years ago

So you only saw the end state of what Fidesz made, in particular the promotion and 'liberation' of the far right. (Were you already in Hungary during the elections, when virtually all billboards of the liberal party in Budapest were smeared with anti-semitic slogans?) Allow me to write in length on two elements of this which came up, and one extra first.

Fidesz first came touchy-feely with far-right elements when it swung behind a referendum campaign on land ownership by foreigners started by a far-right group in 1997.

One serious connection I mentioned was the use of MIÉP, the first far-right party to enter parliament in 1998, having just made it across the 5% limit. Under the then rules of parliament, MIÉP's faction didn't have the numbers to form a faction, which has the right to get seats in commissions. However, the Fidesz-led government majority approved their formation and their candidates anyway. Later, the issue was brought to the Constitutional Court, which ruled the parliamentary rule unfair, leading to a new regulation that even small parties can have a faction at the number of seats they enter parliament with. However, when MIÉP lost MPs, the Fidez-led majority still kept them. Why, you ask? Because the MIÉP delegates in party-proportional commissions and boards gave the Right a two-thirds majority, and of particular importance were the media boards. This was a virtual coalition, and with collusion came a non-aggression pact, and some presents. In particular: an already MIÉP-close Sunday magazine on public radio (Vasárnapi Hírek) got free rein, and government members (including Orbán himself) gave interviews between anti-semitic tirades. Beyond the very fact of an uncontrolled far-right attack on the Overton Window, it's worth to note the spillover effect of the lack of cordon sanitaire.

From 1998, Fidesz governed in de jure coalition with the centre-right MDF (the onetime leader of the 1990-1994 government) and the rural right-populist Smallholders' Party, and in de facto coalition with MIÉP. However, what they wanted was hegemony on the Right, and had successful schemes to take apart all three partners (none of them made it in 2002). Splitting leaders off MIÉP was less successful, but to draw voters away, Fidesz courted and won over a group of far-right journalists, of which the three most important are the ones I named. At the time, András Bencsik was a virulent anti-semite and Holocaust denier who ran the small MIÉP-close weekly Demokrata. (Like his equally abominable wife, Ágnes Seszták, he was a Party propagandist before 1990.) Bencsik swung behind Fidesz around 2001. Onetime Radio Free Europe journalist István Lovas is a spineless soldier of fortune with a shady past (the nastiest parts of his biography are a prison term for gang rape which he sought to wash together with his minor role in 1956, and marital violence against his wife in the USA which made him a fugitive of US justice), who returned to Hungary after having been rejected immigration to Israel, for which he took revenge in a special way, also on the pages of Bencsik1s paper. The third guy, Zsolt Bayer, is an original Fidesz member who first had the role of a follower to the other two, but had the zeal of the convert. In 2001, the trio came to fame and made competition for MIÉP's media bastions with the notorious TV show Sajtóklub (press club) on a cable television channel. Later, after the 2002 election loss, Orbán declared that Demokrata is among his favourite media and told his followers to buy it. (Still later, these three luminaries of Fidesz's in-house far-right had spats among each other and drifted further apart.)

is someone like Bayer given the time on TV channels and newspapers anywhere else?

Poland had (and has) the vehemently far-right media empire of Tadeusz Rydzyk, and in addition to the twins' own right-populist Law and Justice party, the Kaczyński government included the (Rydyk-supported) far-right party League of Polish Families, which was like a mix of MIÉP and Jobbik. In Slovakia, I don't know nationalist media personalities, but Slota and his party members did enough to poison public discourse and promote racism in public (let1s not forget that beyond Hungarophobia, Gypsies were a prime target there, too), while Fico was known for gross insults and was at a constant war with opposition media (resulting in a media law similar to the one Fidesz implemented). (And lest we forget, in the Mečiar era, political survival fight included abductions, secret service black ops and assassinations.)

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 04:20:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

none of them made it in 2002

Minor correction for the record: MDF made it, but only on a joint list with Fidesz. The internal conflict and the break with Fidesz followed only then.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 05:59:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

I made a point earlier about a cultural study, as the only way to understand the real dynamic... and this involves being able to follow Hungarian, I guess. Maybe such an approach would use discourse analysis, sifting through speeches to look at the dog whistles which have characterised political communication, at least since I've lived here.

Two aspects I think are important. It does predate my time here, but when the MSZP won heavily in 1994, I believe people voted for what they thought would be old-school social democracy, something similar to the non-communist threads of the old MSZDP in the brief period they had a sniff of power after the second world war. A Swedish-style welfare state, mixed ownership, a regulated economy. Something that the MSZP (or most of the leadership) both didn't want to deliver, and arguably, couldn't have delivered. To be fair, it seems to me Horn actually offered little other than technocratic solutions - and with the financial pressures in the period after the election, the left of the MSZP was pretty much finished. The political spectrum narrowed in Hungary, as it did in many countries - not to the exclusion of the far-right, but to the exclusion of the far-left.

It's possible to make the argument that everything that happened since 1998 has been a response to this almost total failure of meaningful social democracy in the new capitalist economy. In the light of this, the second aspect is the right-wing appropriation of leftist themes. Fidesz in opposition always based their appeal on a 'national social democracy' which, if anything, offered something for nothing.

As we know, the basis of post-war social democracy in Western Europe was lots of people working hard, for rather poor wages initially. The Attlee government actually had to reduce rationing after the second world war (partially to feed Germany and other allies). I hesitate to describe Hungarians as generally lazy, but neither do I regard them as generally having a massive work ethic. So there is a problem here, in promising a top-quality welfare state and infrastructure unless people produce top-quality work in a high-skill export environment. This is not to say Hungary's external circumstances are easy, post shock therapy, but none of the trends, towards the black economy and property speculation, have helped Hungary get a long-term basis for a decent welfare state.

by car05 on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 02:17:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

A Swedish-style welfare state, mixed ownership, a regulated economy. Something that the MSZP (or most of the leadership) both didn't want to deliver, and arguably, couldn't have delivered.

Actually, I think it was a minority of the leadership, and definitely a minority of party members, who didn't want a social state upon election victory in 1994. (For my view of the wings of the party, see this 2008 comment.) Problem was, they had no clue about the economy, were naive, and those in charge of the money at the time (to some extent the first finance minister László Békesi, but above all his successor Lajos Bokros, and of course foreign influences like the IMF) knew how to scare them. Even so they had some influence. On one hand, the austerity programme called the Bokros Package was not a classic IMF austerity programme: in addition to spending cuts and VAT raise that pushed millions into poverty, it included a one-off currency devaluation and import taxes, and the mass privatisation was at least not a fire-sale and was used for a significant debt reduction. On the other hand, there was a correction: the Bokros Package wasn't finished and he was made to resign (Horn opposed his plan to privatise healthcare). This was enough to regain a majority of voters by late 1997. Then came Horn's attacks against the liberals and his attempt to re-start the construction of the dam on the Danube at Nagymaros (stopping which was one of the key themes of the 1989 democratic movement). But, even that wasn't enough to lose the elections (though the record low turnout spoke volumes): the government parties and the Socialists actually won the first round; then came the televised debate between Horn and Orbán (Hungary's version of Kennedy-Nixon) and Fidesz's sweep in the second round.

In the light of this, the second aspect is the right-wing appropriation of leftist themes.

There was some of that in 1998, but I think it is necessary to connect Fidesz's appropiation of leftist themes since c. 2004 to more recent events.

First, the Socialist part of the Medgyessy government wanted a socialist government, and delivered in the form of several raised and restored benefits and a public sector wage raise. This economic policy failed, however, for multiple reasons: it was a purely consumption-driving measure, without a serious industrial policy; it was paralleled with an explosion of private debt (sowing the seeds of the foreign currency denominated credit crisis; though the Orbán government's housing credit reforms had their part too); and paired with tax cuts to please the increasingly neoliberal liberal coalition partner (retrospectively, Medgyessy identified the tax cuts as the main reason for his failure).

At this time, Fidesz's propaganda wasn't leftist, far from it. I remember they criticised 'spending excess', but focused on Medgyessy's counterintelligence past (you'll remember D-209). However, there was also Fidesz's need to explain its 2002 election loss. While among supporters, they allowed free rein to the movement claiming an election fraud (do you remember this?), for themselves, they identified the economically inactive benefits-receiving voter: see Orbán in the Wikileaks. (They might have been influenced by Zsolt Bayer in this, who introduced the idea in hate speeches during the campaign; Fidesz leader László Kövér, although falsely credited with the authorship of the expression panelproli = plattenbau apartment block prolearian, picked up railing against the Socialist-supporting "proletarians" later in 2002.) From the identification of a group of voters as the reason for their loss follows the need to win them over. Fidesz could then switch to social populism when Gyurcsány came in, and with him, the least inspired neoliberal discourse. (As far as I followed right-wing media, the stealing rhetoric from the Western European and Latin American Left was pioneered by István Lovas, BTW.) Fast forward to the spending promise escapades of the 2006 campaign, the hospital privatisation referendum, etc.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 09:01:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

A friend of mine points to a number of changes made during the first Orban government, which appeared to indicate a more welfarist approach than the MSZP. I see Medgyessy's promises as a response to this, rather than a genuine re-invigoration of social democracy.

Really interested to read your take on the MSZP, yet it is hard to say that the core of the MSZP - shall we call it "Kobanya-Kispest Nyugdijasok" are really socialists, I would simply call them Party loyalists. The results can be hilarious - I remember seeing a particularly stern Gyurcsany speech on TV, with a backdrop of what seemed to be 5000 old ladies, many of whom appeared to be drifting off to sleep or knitting, only to be roused by the need to clap enthusiastically, once in a while. My enduring memory of the period is how from 2004 the MSZP really did become a one-man show, with Feri dominating the circus. There were no serious opposing poles, no serious counterarguments, just a few people who had personal resentments.

In my naivety I was quite shocked that a member party of the PES had so little social, intellectual and cultural capital .. is this all there is? I also remember the MSZDP making noises at the time - of course, a quick chat put paid to all talk of rebellion from the pocket party. In conclusion, I found the MSZP to be quite a different beast to Labour or the SPD in Germany - it really is a post-communist party in habit. In this regards Fidesz are correct, even if their conclusions following this are wrong. The Hungarian left have been poorly served by the MSZP and if Fidesz do dismantle it, this could actually be a positive thing in the medium term. Not sure if a combination of 4K and Szolidaritas would have the answer.

by car05 on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 10:20:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

My problem with the retrospective lists of Fidesz's so-called welfare measures is that many items aren't what they are presented as, there is a lot of smoke and mirrors. Some of these:

Politically speaking, the biggest own goal of the Horn government in the Bokros Package was the introduction of tuition fees: intended as a signal of an equal sharing of burdens, they drove the politically most active segment of society into Fidesz's arms. So the Orbán government's number one act to demonstrate a break with the prior policies was to abolish tuition fees. Well, not really: only the general tuition fee was abolished while special tuition fees were expanded greatly, and the effect on student income counterbalanced by a holding back of stipendium growth by inflation. (For full disclosure: I was a student throughout this time, including participation in the failed anti-Bokros-Package student protests.)
The poor tend to have more children than the well-off. The right-wing solution is not to end poverty (because poverty is the poor people's own fault), but to provide incentives to the well-off and disincentive the not-so-well-off. This was achieved with a combination of income-independent family benefits at a frozen level (not following inflation), tax benefits for parents with income up to a limit (leaving out the truly well-off and the jobless), and the disproportional increase of the lowest income tax bracket.
Another supposedly social measure was the provision of housing credits. This was a Thatcherite ownership society measure. While not directly aimed at the upper class, credits are certainly something aimed at the better-off, at the credit-worthy. In the particular case of the Orbán government's housing credits, there was the extra perversity that it was tailored for the children of the well-off, in requiring other homes as collateral. While not directly aimed at the upper class, credits also benefit the financial sphere (as I wrote earlier, this was one of the seeds of the currency crisis).
In addition to the not-so-social measures remembered as social measures, there are the forgotten anti-social measures. For example, pensions were held under what a Horn-era law mandated, and Fidesz pioneered the idea of hospital privatisation (2001 attempt by Szeged's Fidesz major followed by the law named for then health minister István Mikola, which was thrown out in the first days of the Medgyessy government; though soon they would do a 180 degree turn and prepare their own version).

If the spending spree of the 2002 Socialists was in reaction to something from Fidesz, then not to Orbán's non-welfare welfare policies (which were obvious enough to anyone with a tighter bourse), but Fidesz warnings in the campaign that the Socialists will restore parts of the Bokros Package.

are really socialists, I would simply call them Party loyalists

I certainly don't disagree with your low opinion of Gyurcsány and the stupidity and low intellectual capital of his supporters, but I don't see a mutual exclusion here. People can be damn superficial even if ideologically committed, as demonstrated by the millions who sticked to Gyurcsány role model Bliar in successive elections despite the government breaking all 1997 election promises. (At least a lot of German Social Democrats split off the SPD and joined Left Party predecessor WASG when Schröder was into Agenda 2010 and Harz IV at the same time Medgyessy was implementing his spending promises.)

The Hungarian left have been poorly served by the MSZP and if Fidesz do dismantle it, this could actually be a positive thing in the medium term.

The MSzP can sure go to hell, but Fidesz will find a framing for demonisation against everyone, and for the Left, IMHO, Jobbik (which now took the role of the misappropiator of leftist rhetoric) and Fidesz are now greater problems than MSzP or even DK not just on the short term but the medium term too.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 12:58:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

I really appreciate all this fantastic detail, it's helping my understanding enormously. The period 2002-2006 is also quite interesting for me, considering what has happened since.

Having been generally appalled at the direction of travel of the Blair government, Peter Medgyessy was a welcome relief at first, and I remember feeling quite happy when he scraped in. Though he was a bit flaky on a number of issues, and lacked a direction of travel after the first year, arguably his first year in office was the closest encounter I've had to a social democratic government since 1979! (I'm that kind of geek). Of course, Medgyessy is an unlikely hero figure. In the second year he was already into mini-austerity measures - which eroded his popularity to a large extent. Erzsebet Szalai has written that 'big capital' orchestrated his replacement with Gyurcsany through placemen in the SZDSZ. Is there truth in this, do you think? As I remember the MSZP had a set of bad results in European elections and were easily panicked.

Instances spring to mind from 2002... angry arguments on trams. People carrying flags, going to Fidesz rallies shouting at people drinking beer at cafes, asking why they are ashamed to be Hungarian. Lots of small shops selling pretty shit produce, talking right-wing politics all day. Ooops sorry, the last one is happening all the time. But you get the picture. It was almost as if Fidesz was the angry sweating man in the room, somehow emptying the oxygen. The rhetoric needs serious deconstruction, similar to that which Norman Fairclough did with 'New Labour, New Language?' I know there have been critical books written about Orban - but maybe not the right ones.

by car05 on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 02:09:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

Speaking of Erzsébet Szalai, already back in September (before the final push of laws and before the market attack), in a longer piece on the development of the elites in Hungary (touching on the big capitalists as well as generational issues), she notes that Fidesz's dear national capitalist class is not able to create growth and may even commit capital flight.

A politikai rendszerváltás utáni több mint húsz évben Magyarországon másfél millió munkahely szűnt meg - és a beáramló multinacionális cégek, valamint a magyar burzsoázia együttesen sem voltak képesek e munkahelyeket pótolni. Sőt tevékenységükkel még gyorsították is a leépülést. Orbán Viktor és csapata ezért hamar felismeri, hogy bár a magyar burzsoáziának és az ,,embereknek" egyaránt szánt nacionalista retorikája alapvető tényezője volt átütő választási győzelmének, a magyar nagytőke továbbra sem lesz képes beindítani a gazdaság szekerét. (Már csak azért sem, mert megrettenvén a tökéletesen bizonytalanná váló hazai gazdasági közegtől, amelyik nagyvállalkozó csak teheti, külföldre tart.) Ezért, ha sikeres akar lenni, óhatatlanul gesztusokat kell tennie a külföldi befektetők (autógyárak behozatala) és a mindenki reménységének számító kínai vezetés felé.		In the more than twenty years after the political system change, one and a half million jobs were lost in Hungary - and even the incoming multinational companies and the Hungarian bourgeois together were not able to supplement those jobs. What's more, they have even accelerated the degradation with their activity. Hence, Viktor Orbán and his team quickly realizes that, although its nationalist rhetoric aimed at both the Hungarian bourgeoisie and "the people" was a fundamental factor of its punch-out electoral victory, Hungarian big capital still won't be able to kick-start the cart of the economy. (If anything because, frightened of the domestic economic medium becoming perfectly uncertain, any big entrepreneur that can is moving abroad.) Thus, if they want to be successful, inevitably, they need to make gestures towards foreign investors (bringing in carmakers) and the Chinese leadership which counts as the hope for everyone.
Orbán kiépülő, nyíltan diktatórikus rendszere ezért nem lehet kizárólag a magyar nagyburzsoázia érdekkifejeződése -ma már helyesebb, ha egy olyan rendszernek tekintjük, melyet egy ,,nagy nemzetfelemelő vízió" megfogalmazói a nagy céltól vezéreltetve az erőszak legszélesebb eszköztárával építettek (és jelenleg is építenek) ki.		For that reason, Orbán's in-construction openly dictatorial system can not be an expression of the interests of the domestic big bourgeois only - today, it is more correct to view it as a system that has been (and still is) built by the drafters of a "great nation-raising vision" under the direction of the great goal with the broadest arsenal of violence.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Fri Jan 13th, 2012 at 04:27:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

Yes, I was referring to this article, some of which I found really interesting, other parts which left me a bit bemused. For example, I think there's a danger of hyperbole and exaggaration around Orban's regime - not to overinflate myself, but I've been in many demonstrations in London, with miners, peace protestors and anticapitalists. I see no broad arsenal of violence of play in Hungary, and no great goal either, as Orban pulls levers and pushes buttons on a machine of state that just clanks and splutters. He may own the whole machine, but it's still a crap one - let's not exaggerate the capabilities of the Hungarian state. I didn't get Erzsebet Szalai's generational references entirely either, but I think the main premise and analysis was pretty sound.

by car05 on Fri Jan 13th, 2012 at 04:44:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

Yes, I was referring to this article

I notice I forgot to link: it was in Népszabadság. I think the one you referred to was her 2005 piece, however (no mention of SzDSz here).

I see no broad arsenal of violence of play in Hungary

I found that off, too, but Szalai being a sociologist, she may not be thinking of physical violence.

generational references

Forgive me if you know this already, but the nagy generáció = "great generation" in Hungary corresponds to the "baby boomer" in English context, or (with more direct political allusion) soixante-huitards in French context, resp. Achtundsechziger in German context. What she wrote on this caught my eye because I'm well aware of this generational conflict from Germany, but didn't think much about it in relation to Hungary, although it's even more obvious here (with most of the famed liberal intelligentsia of the system change belonging to the 'great generation', and Fidesz to the next that rebelled but without a generational ideology [and I belong to the even more underachieving and even more nihilistically 'rebelling' generation after Orbán's, but that's another thing]).

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Fri Jan 13th, 2012 at 05:05:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

I found her description of the 3rd, 4th and 5th paragraph to refer to the SZDSZ, but you're right, it could equally be referring to the MSZP at the time. I wonder if the SZDSZ' obvious ties to business was partially exploited by the MSZP to distract atttention from their own - 'oh it's those darned liberals again, demanding the privatisation of the health system' ...

by car05 on Sat Jan 14th, 2012 at 02:20:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

the 3rd, 4th and 5th paragraph

The 3rd mentions Tamás Kolosi by name. He is the head of economy researcher, think-tank and later pollster Tárki, which started out in 1985, became a Fidesz supporter/subsidy receiver in 1998-2002, then switched sides, and was certainly pro-Gyurcsány. However, I don't recall direct ties to SzDSz (but I may have missed them). That paragraph also mentions a turning away of big capital from MSzP; in 2005, she was more specific and wrote that big capial turned to Fidesz. As to whom she may think of, I think these two:

Sándor Demján: the construction business magnate who had a key role in the spread of malls, and was actually switching back and forth between Fidesz and MSzP;
Gábor Széles, an industrialist who built his empire of former state companies by gaining good relations with both MDF (when he got electronics company Videoton) and MSzP (he gained bus maker Ikarus under Horn), and who, after switching to Fidesz, built up a media empire (ECHO TV, Magyar Hírlap), infamous in particular for employing Zsolt Bayer.

the SZDSZ' obvious ties to business

My view of SzDSz at the time was more as useful idiots for big capital than paid tools. If you look back to 1989, SzDSz still had a strong social-liberal wing (including Ottilia Solt who died in 1997 and Erzsébet Szalai herself), and civil rights were their main platform until Bokros. Around 2002, it was my feeling that the party leadership drew all the wrong conclusions from the far-right attacks (well that begun with the promotion of Gábor Kuncze back in the Horn era): they almost completely abandoned civil rights as signature theme and switched to a completely neoliberal economic platform,hoping to win the entrepreneur votes Fidesz gained. This was on full display in 2006 when they campaigned for a flat tax (something former SzDSz leaders forget to mention now that Fidesz ruined the budget with the same), and the party suicide was sealed when they saw their saviour in a spineless and uninspiring neolib and former yuppie businessman promoted under Gyurcsány, János Kóka, and made him party boss in 2007.

With all that said, I'm not saying that all of SzDSz was merely useful idiots back in the Medgyessy era: I'd count then economy minister István Csillag as the main placeman for big business. And he was indeed the key to Medgyessy's resignation (Medgyessy wanted to replace him but SzDSz threatened a break). I thought you may have read of that in an earlier article.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Sat Jan 14th, 2012 at 06:30:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

You could maybe argue that the SZDSZ were the epitome of the Third Republic, a promising start, but gradually corroding over time. As one kicked the bucket (or became that most Hungarian of organisations, a zombie party of the undead) the other couldn't survive. I normally ascribe the mentions of co-operatives in the previous constitution to the presence of the SZDSZ, as no doubt many of them had some idea of a mixed social economy at the time.

Kuncze was a kindof hero to a certain type of polgari ember. A friend of mine once remarked that all 3 main political parties in the UK could safely exist in the SZDSZ and Kuncze was very much in the mould of a UK Tory for me, with the same sense of self-confidence and overall self-satisfaction. The legacy for Hungarian politics is that more muscular forms of social liberalism only briefly registered with the electorate, if at all, as MSZP politicians have proven either incapable of communicating on a cultural level, or have played dog-whistle themselves (eg Szekeres comparing Trianon to the Holocaust).

I've read that corruption and the SZDSZ had a relationship that really got going in the mid-1990s, some rumours about the Ujpest local government, perhaps? Of course, Fidesz produced the big Wikipedia to document some of them, including the Strabag affair, etc. In any case, I've also heard hair-curling allegations against senior MSZP politicians going well beyond simple financial misdemeanours - whether or not it was an attempt to prove that shit sticks, I will never know, but I've never looked at these people the same way since.

All of this has made LMP's job a difficult one - I note that you think there's a chance that LMP would support a Bajnai candidacy - is that where they will end up, do you think? I'd be very surprised, but I don't know how the internal battles are playing themselves out. One thing in Hungarian politics - it seems that the smaller the party, the greater the internal divisions...

by car05 on Sat Jan 14th, 2012 at 11:51:40 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

(A late reply)

very much in the mould of a UK Tory for me

I must admit I don't even know if the stereotype I think Kuncze embodied and was chosed to embody (jovial countryside bourgois with two feet on the ground, as such a counter-point to the liberal stereotype of the dour cosmopolitan intellectual speaking from an ivory tower) has any parallel in British political life (the FDP would have [had] elements like that in the German system which I know better). That sense of self-confidence and overall self-satisfaction... is a more widely shared (and transmitted) attitude over here :-(

some rumours about the Ujpest local government

I'm not sure what you mean, because there are several rumours about the local government of Újpest [for others: a quarter of Budapest], most of them centered on mayor Tamás Derce (and I note I could add one myself). However, Derce was an SzDSz member only until 1994, and gathered his infame in the following time. (There were other, true-blue SzDSz mayors who were implicated in corruption affairs, the mayors of districts VIII, XIV and XIX. However, they were juniors compared to MSzP moneybaggers like Boldvai, Schmuck, Zuschlag, Hagyó, or possibly Csintalan who switched to Fidesz.)

whether or not it was an attempt to prove that shit sticks, I will never know

At one point I gave up trying to figure out what is genuine corruption scandal used by Fidesz media and what is minor irregularity blown out of proportion or baseless smear created by Fidesz media (but there were certainly all of those). I did note, however, that they haven't been all that successful in proving allegations before court even after their takeover, for example against Gyurcsány (and they really tried: I saw an email to my higher bosses with my own eyes in which a ministry guy asked for any information on business ties with the companies of Gyurcsány).

I note that you think there's a chance that LMP would support a Bajnai candidacy

Who knows where LMP will go now, after this amateurish display of internal divisions and spiteful reactions in public. (Now resigned leader András Schiffer says there was no support for his idea of an independent party line, well I'd rather call what LMP tried in the first 18 months a sad excuse for triangulation rather than independent party line.) But, Schiffer's attacks against Gyurcsány were not ideological but mainly along the 'moral' line in connection with the "we lied" speech (naively enough to be a useful idiot for Fidesz in approving quite politicised and biased parliamentary reports, for example on the 2006-7 police violence) and for a specific instance of alleged corruption, same with the Socialists, and Bajnai is IIRC not even a member. That's not a strong enough basis for the future rejection of a PM Bajnai or a government with the policies represented by Bajnai for me.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 23rd, 2012 at 11:15:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 3)

Yes, the dominance of Jobbik+Fidesz is the main problem, but in tackling this, the real question surrounds the situation of the opposition. Without someone else to vote for, I can't see a way to present any kind of alternative.

Unfortunately things appear not to be good within the LMP, which has always had some hopeful aspects, despite a rumoured informal proximity to Fidesz, and an oft-quoted SZDSZ inheritance. As there seems to factional infighting, verging on civil war, by the time of the next election, LMP might not really be offering much of an actual alternative.

Considering the condition of the MSZP - including their finances - it isn't clear to me if Fidesz will face any serious challenge at all from the current parties in 2014. In such circumstances, a centrist bourgeois organisation, possibly headed by Gordon Bajnai might be the main option. And this, in my view, isn't a good option at all, playing Prodi to Orban's Berlusconi. Bajnai's spelt his ideas out recently, and whilst of course they're preferable to Horthyism, there's a lot missing, and a lot which is simply neo-liberal.

It's not totally hopeless. Solidarity looks very promising, and the MSZP's monopoly on the left is truly broken...

by car05 on Fri Jan 13th, 2012 at 04:31:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

Among the scenarios I drafted in a comment to my own diary, there was this one:

Maybe the liberal intelligentsia will manage to prop up Gyurcsány or another neoliberal as saviour at least atracting urbanite voters and re-establish the old Republic, repeating Poland's recent history but with greater upheavals.

..but I didn't imagine then that Bajnai will pop up. (For the uninitiated: Bajnai, a financial sector yuppie without 'communist' background whom Gyurcsány knew as business parter, was brought in to be the PM of a fake "expert" and de-facto Socialist minority government in the last year before Fidesz took over, one which conducted yet another austerity programme. He claimed upon taking office that this one year will be all the time he spends in politics; but this week, he released a critique of the Orbán government's one and half years that sounds like an announcement of leadership competition.) Now that he did pop up, I'm not surprised that all the main non-right-wing media are jumping on-board. Paradoxically, Bajnai is less discredited than his predecessor Gyurcsány, which gives me the bad feeling that propping him up as the Socialist-DK-LMP(-IMF-ECB) candidate will be less difficult... Milla and Szolidaritás should strive to outshine him.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Fri Jan 13th, 2012 at 04:45:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

(Another long comment I started to write up last night but got to finish only now)

In contrast to the poisoned discourse, the situation of the Roma is one point where I do think it's worthwhile to look back over a longer timespan for causes and cultural trends.

Note that the situation is bad in basically all countries with significant Roma populations. It is most perverse in the Czech Republic. Most of the original Czech Roma population perished in the Holocaust, the present population is the result of re-settlement by the 'communist' regime, and that's how most of them were made stateless when Czechoslovakia broke up (also see this comment of mine). Czech city Ústí nad Labem was also the first to build a wall to separate the Roma ghetto (1999), and in the past year, there has been serious conflict in villages near the German border (see for example this Salon comment). In Slovakia, where the situation is more similar to Hungary, there was the only case of Roma launching riots I'm aware of, in late February 2004. In Kosovo, Roma were collectively accused of collusion with the Serbian regime by Albanian nationalists and hunted away under NATO's guard. At one time, European Tribune was visited by a class of students of a Bulgarian college, and you can read what attitudes are common even among educated people in the diary Bulgarian Gypsies (Counter Argument)! and its comments. On ET the situation of Roma in Greece was covered by user deviousdiva, for example in Votanikos Today. What IMO ties most of these cases together is the more distant past of the forced settlement of an originally nomadic population, in particular in the 18th century and in the 'communist' era (I wrote about this too in Rádió ©); and the more recent past of the effects of capitalist reforms and austerity on both the Roma population (primarily on the jobs front) and the underclass within the majority population (supceptibility for xenophobic arguments).

Then again, before anyone in other parts of the world thinks that current events follow straight from endemic social problems specific to a region and long-term and near-inmutable local cultural characteristics stemming from them, it's worth to recount some events: the Burnley riots preceded the 'War' in Sajóbábony; police investigating the mostly West German attacks of the NSU (see Another far-right terrorist group under the radar) assumed mafia connections on the part of the victims instead of a racist motivation five years before Hungarian police did so after the first attacks of the Gypsy-hunters (on whom see Hate crime: cell phones and arrests and Hate crime: erring policemen and erring terrorists); the 2005 car-burning riot by recent African-origin underclass youth across France and the recent British riot were on a bigger scale than the 2004 Roma riots in Slovakia; and the location of the deadliest attacks during the xenophobic attack wave in Germany in the early nineties, Mölln and Solingen, was in West Germany rather than East Germany.

So I'd differentiate three levels:

There is institutionalised racism, which is tolerated/approved on some level by majorities (from looking away to active hate).
There is the issue of how openly and confidently (free of fear) racist sentiments are discussed in public. This is something that changes faster in time (and the popularity of specific racist views changes with them). IMO this is less related to the flavour and strength of the institutionalised racism, and more to political context which involves specific decisions by specific people (e.g. Hungary under Fidesz, the rise of Jobbik, Poland under the twins, Slovakia under Fico).
Outbreaks of violence are even more connected to a smaller set of people responsible for stirring the pot.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 07:47:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

Roma has low status in Europe in general. Sweden is no exception with a long history of forced migration followed by forced settlement. And forced sterilisations continued well beyond WW2. Eugenics was seen as a necessary component to the welfare state by all parties (or at least all except the commies, but that is only because the commies was so marginalised that I do not know there position) as otherwise bad elements would breed and swamp the systems.

Recently read an article in a Swedish paper with some interviews with young Romani. Though formally equal and with legal protection against discrimination, being Roma is not something they mentioned when trying to get a job or an appartment, because if they did their chances dropped like a stone.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 08:27:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

This reminds me to add that more virulent forms of anti-Roma racism popped up in Western European states upon significant influx of Roma from new EU members, too: I'm thinking of the state-supported assault on the Roma in Naples and Rome back in 2008 (for an account see Italy: Government Wages War on Roma; on ET there is probably a long de Gondi comment on this somewhere I can't find), and the 2010 deportations from France (see Colman's Cry me a river. Try to resist herding immigrants into it.for example).

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 09:08:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

...but is that really anti-Roma racism or anti-immigrant, or some combination of both?

What I'm talking about is people in Hungarian villages who have lived near the Roma all their lives, who know them, and yet speak warmly of Hitler's final solution. I've heard this more than once. I don't think this is exactly equivalent to Western European fears of immigration...

by car05 on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 01:37:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

I've heard this more than once.

I did, too. It's one issue that there are people who think so, and another that you can hear it (it's not just mumbled to oneself or close friends in the back of a pub). I distintly remember when I first heard such talk in public (at a camp in 2000).

I don't think this is exactly equivalent to Western European fears of immigration...

I didn't say it's equivalent. On the other hand, those killed in Solingen and Mölln and those attacked in Burnley weren't recent immigrants, in fact you could say for the young attackers that they attacked people who lived near them all their lives; and even when not, I don't see not living beside the victims all their lives as mitigating factor when xenophobic fears turn into aggression.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 02:04:57 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

I think Romani people has it in generally worse in Eastern Europe then in Western, but how much is a function of culture and how much is a function of the poorest being poorer in the east is a good question.

Roma has lived in most of Europe since before Enlightenment and is in general not accepted as "one of us". When I was a little kid in Sweden I somehow knew that Gypsies drank, stole and always carried knifes - creating a fear and resentment towards the few that actually went to my school. Not that I ever dared to talk with any of them. Don't think many would agree that they should be genocided, but I don't think it would be to hard to find people who would want to throw them out of the country (where Romani has lived for centuries).

So I would still argue that it is a matter of degree.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Jan 11th, 2012 at 02:41:01 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (4.00 / 2)

all these indicate a 'wide-spectrum' engagement - or even a marriage - between Fidesz and the shopkeepers and entrepreneurs of 'Flashman' Hungary.

I don't debate such a marriage, just question the impression this leaves of just serving a clientele. Take the flat tax, for example: this is not some new policy for new friends, Orbán got this from the Dzurinda government in Slovakia, whom he praised for it and this was way back in 2006. The marriage with the 'economically active' part of the population is inseparable from Orbán's ideology and fixation on the destruction of the 'ex-communists', as reflected in this Wikileaks cable:

Cable Viewer

Âś3. (C) Enthusiastically parsing the electorate, Orban described the typical Fidesz voter as committed politically, married, better-educated, employed, home-owning, not dependent on state largess, and wanting more economic freedom. The typical Socialist voter, according to Orban, is largely apathetic politically, not as well-educated, from a lower socio-economic class, and dependent on the state whether for a pension or an unemployment check. The problem the Socialist party leadership, whom Orban derisively called "billionaire ex-Communist nomenklatura," faced was how to mobilize and energize their base.
... Âś5. (C) Displaying his go-for-the-jugular political instincts, Orban vehemently seconded, "Yeah, we'll crush them," when his senior foreign policy advisor, Janos Martonyi, predicted that the Socialists would only get between 15 and 25 percent of the vote and perhaps disintegrate as a political party. The Socialists' demise, Orban said, would be for "the good of the country," since the party only reflected the interests of former Communist party elite.
...He vowed he would not compromise
with the Socialists once he attained power. "We (Fidesz)
stand for values. My base would never support any deal with
the (ex)Communists."

The new government also didn't shy away from some measures that hurt capital and the ownership class but served its interests: the private pension funds nationalisation (to plug budget gaps), the major raise of the minimum wage (to counter-balance voter loss due to the flat tax), and the tax raise on self-employed payying themselves the minimum wage. And ever since the then biggest bank boss Gábor Princz's fall in 1998, even the biggest capitalists cannot be sure that Fidesz won't finish them off even if having received support.

Orban went on record around the time of the election, indicating that 'people' who had previously backed the Socialists shouldn't be 'trapped under the wreckage'

Could you help narrow this down (in time or with a more specific quote, perhaps in Hungarian)? I failed to find it.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 04:46:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

I failed to find it.

Perhaps I should add that I do faintly recall something like that, but don't remember any nuances.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 05:18:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

Here is an anecdote connecting to two points above. One, that vision of Orbán's of the typical Fidesz voter definitely reached its target (in line with what you say). A few months ago I had a hair-raising discussion with a well-educated young company sub-boss, who by then was disillusioned with a lot of what Fidesz did, but insisted that Orbán's focus on labour as duty was right and the number one problem for the coutry is the too high number of inactives, which must be because of benefit cheats. I had to confront all the bullshit I knew from US Republicans about welfare queens and more. Then, one reason for his disillusionment with Fidesz was that the tax reform didn't really relieve companies the size of his, with the special taxes and minimum wage hike, a situation which he told prevents his company from hiring more people.

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 05:47:20 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 0)

Orban is a great neo-liberal in many ways. Declaiming the right to social security to a few and using this as a wedge between working and not working, whilst tapping into state funding to help his allies in every way possible.

For sure, he's done some things which aren't obviously on behalf of all of the bourgeoisie. The sub-boss you're talking about had a problem with the rise of the minimum wage. I wonder if that implies that many of the employees were within the grey economy. It sounds like it might be. In the absence of a determined and aggressive effort to bring people into the proper economy, a real demographic time-bomb will explode in Hungary as people of their 30s and 40s start to go into the last 20 years of employment with almost no prospect of social security. It's this sort of slow 'drip-drip' - almost inaudible - which makes Hungary an inevitable prospect for insolvency at some point. And I wonder if sooner wouldn't be better, in some ways.

by car05 on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 04:53:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

One last comment on the first paragraph: no need to be apologetic, on this blog opinions collide :-) For some background, I am a citizen of Hungary who feels completely alienated from local political streams and has more affinity for politics in Germany...

_{*Lunatic*, n.

One whose delusions are out of fashion.}

by DoDo on Mon Jan 9th, 2012 at 04:55:46 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall of the Third Hungarian Republic (none / 1)

Yes, I think most British people who've experienced the German system of democracy first-hand generally prefer it.

The article on the education reforms is now online at http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/01/turning-back-the-clock-hungary-reverts-to-selective-education/

by car05 on Tue Jan 10th, 2012 at 05:13:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Re: The Fall (4.00 / 2)

I'm in the middle of "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" at the moment, and the coincidence of the events in Hungary gives me the shudders. But since I'm no longer a ten-year-old, I also no longer expect people, politicians especially, to follow any lessons from history.

'tis strange I should be old and neither wise nor valiant. From "The Maid's Tragedy" by Beaumont & Fletcher

by Wife of Bath (kareninaustin at g mail dot com) on Sun Jan 8th, 2012 at 11:26:54 PM EST

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