Clipping the wings of a judge

by Migeru
Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 03:34:35 AM EST

On February 9th a guilty sentence was handed down in the first of three ongoing trials of Spanish investigative judge Baltasar Garzón.

ElPais.com in English: Crusading Judge Garzón thrown off the court bench for 11 years

Specifically, the 56-year-old Garzón was convicted of breaching his duties and violating the constitutional rights of several public corruption defendants by ordering phone taps of their jailhouse conversations in 2009.

In a strongly worded 69-page ruling, the justices said that Garzón caused "a drastic and unjustified reduction in the defense's strategy" and trampled on the constitutional rights of alleged Gürtel corruption network ringleaders Francisco Correa and Pablo Crespo, and other suspects in the conspiracy.

Using the same words as in a preliminary inquiry by investigating Justice Alberto Jorge Barreiro, the Supreme Court also accused Garzón of "practices typical of totalitarian regimes."

Heavy stuff.

Judge Garzón is a flamboyant, attention-seeking judge who, by some accounts, happens to be a shoddy investigative judge when all is said and done. However, it would appear that he's being subjected to a judicial lynching. I am not a lawyer, but it would appear that none of the three cases he's undergoing actually have merit (I'll go into the salient features of each). Garzón has made lots of enemies along his judicial (and political, see below also) career, both on the left and on the right. This is therefore a fully bipartisan ejection from the judicial career.

What makes this situation rather serious in my opinion is that Garzón has been judged already by public opinion, which is divided mostly along partisan lines. The more radical left has gone as far as to go out on the streets today under the slogan ni respeto ni acato, i.e., "I neither respect nor abide" (by the Supreme Court's ruling). I think it is dangerous when a substantial portion of the population (including parlamentarians from the United Left and the left wing of the PSOE) decides that the Supreme Court is corrupt. There are even op-eds in ElPais (still the country's paper of record) saying as much (Google translate version). This at a time where the indignados continue to agitate (after 9 months) on the streets under the slogan no nos representan ("they do not represent us"), an explicit rejection of representative democracy as currently practiced in Spain. About 5 months ago, the Constitution was urgently reformed over the objections of all parties except for the PP and PSOE, which led to claims by parlamentarians that "the constitutional consensus" (of 35 years ago) was "now broken". Recently the newspaper El Mundo published a director's letter (i.e., a signed editorial - see google translation) suggesting that Garzón will eventually emerge as a populist leader for the indignado movement. I think that's off the wall, but equally I think the situation is becoming explosive, with the state institutions losing legitimacy before a large section of the population while at the same time the conservatives have a comfortable hold on power at all levels of government and may be quite ready to crack down.


First off, a little background. Spain follows the Roman Law and French Civil Code legal traditions, and under an inquisitorial criminal justice system criminal investigations are carried out by investigative judges called jueces de instrucción. In US American terms, they combine some of the functions of a Grand Jury, a judge, and a prosecutor. If and when the investigative judge wraps up their investigation and decides there is evidence of criminal wrongdoing, a separate trial judge takes over. That is, the investigative judge takes no part in the trial phase. There is a separate state prosecution office that takes part in both the investigation and trial phases. Garzón has made a name for himself as an investigative judge in Spain's Audiencia Nacional (National Court), a special jurisdiction created to try terrorism, corruption and other serious cases.

I claim above that Garzón is a notorious attention grabber. Regardless of the merits of the cases, I think this is a fair description of his prosecution of former Chilean Dictator Augusto Pinochet. Garzón thus became an internationally renowned advocate of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. He has been involved in prosecutions of Argentinean military officers, the US Government, and one of the three cases he's himself under trial for stems from his attempt at prosecuting crimes against humanity by Spanish Dictator Francisco Franco dating from the Spanish Civil War of 1936-9 and its aftermath. Yes, Generalissimo Franco is still dead, but things remain pretty damn well tied down as he left them (as we say in Spain, lo dejó todo atado y bien atado).

When I say that Garzón is a shoddy investigative judge, it's because it appears that his prosecutions have a tendency to either be thrown out or fail to lead to conviction when the cases get to the trial phase. However, I cannot speak to the details of this.

Garzón also had a brief but spectacular political career. In 1993, the Socialist government of Felipe González faced elections while in the throes of a number of corruption scandals. González drafted several judges for his election campaign, putting Garzón as number 2 on the Madrid party list which he himself was heading. Garzón didn't get to be minister of Justice, but Secretary of State in charge of fighting corruption. He resigned a few months after taking office, claiming González "didn't take the fight against corruption seriously". It was notorious that he had strong frictions with three other prominent judges that González had made minister and secretaries of state for other functions. Some of these grudges linger until today, and Garzón is seen as getting his comeuppance by his progressive enemies, who are actively involved in prosecuting him (don't think all the Supreme Court judges involved in these cases are conservative).

Now for the details of the judicial lynching. The unanimous sentence handed down today for illegal wiretaps and violation of attorney-client privilege has to do with a political corruption case in which Garzón had jailed some of the suspects pending trial (this was still during the investigative phase) and there were suspicions that some of the defence attorneys were assisting their clients in directing money laundering operations from jail (though the Supreme Court's decision stresses that there was no prior evidence of the attorneys' involvement which should have been gathered by other means - see here and google translation). However, the current law is explicit that only in terrorism cases can such wiretaps be allowed and a legal reform that would have extended it didn't come to fruition. The lawsuit was launched by a defence attorney of another indictee who was not jailed and who was not being subjected to wiretaps; the lawyer was recorded when he met with the wiretapped indictees who were not his clients (see this summary or its google translation). The defence alleges that the police had requested the wiretaps of the jailed indictees, the state prosecution office made favourable reports about them, the judge that took over the investigation of the case after Garzón was removed from it continued the wiretaps, and there was a dissenting opinion in the earlier Supreme Court decision to throw out the evidence gleaned from the wiretaps. The defence alleges further that Garzón scrupulously attempted to protect attorney-client privilege by instructing that any recorded conversations involving the defence lawyers be redacted in what related to the defence strategy in the case. All of these arguments have been rejected by the Court. In addition, in what smacks of selective enforcement, wiretaps are routinely ordered by investigative judges, and later thrown out as evidence without this leading to prosecutions of the judges that ordered them. In this respect also the Garzón case seems to be unusual.

The second case being tried is for accepting bribes. The spanish judicial term for this is cohecho which refers to a public official accepting gifts prior or posterior to either carrying or failing to carry out their duties, as well as accepting gifts by reason of their office and not of their actions (the latter case is called cohecho impropio). So, Garzón stands accused of accepting bribes by reason of his office because he accepted an invitation as guest lecturer at an academic programme in the US which was partly funded by a Spanish bank which was involved in a separate case Garzón was investigating. Garzón's personal and family accounts have been scoured and there's no record of any payments, overt or covert. Presumably he travelled to the US as a guest speaker with expenses paid, but that's about it, from the academic programme that the Spanish bank was partly funding.

Ironically, the case which Garzón was investigating and which led to yesterday's sentence was related to a recently judged bribery case of two conservative politicians (formerly a regional president and his deputy). In their case, they had multiple bespoke suits tailored for free, the tab being picked up by the corruption and money-laundering network Garzón was investigating. The allegation is not that the suits were in exchange for favours, but purely by reason of the political offices the recipients were holding. The politicians were acquitted by a people's jury.

The third case is no less ridiculous. In a very in-character case of attention-grabbing, Garzón decided to investigate unaccounted-for deaths from the 1930s and 40s, on the grounds that they constituted crimes against humanity with no statute of limitations, and that since the bodies are not accounted for the crimes are ongoing as disappearances or kidnappings. As part of the investigations Garzón did some surprising things such as requesting Franco's death certificate. Anyway, at some point a far-right "union" and what's left of Franco's single party, the Falange, filed a lawsuit against Garzón for declaring himself competent to investigate deeds which his court had no competence to investigate. Now, here comes the peculiar feature of this case. The judge that received the original complaint, which was full of errors, should have thrown it out for defects of form but, instead, returned the brief to the plaintiffs with annotations so they could correct it and re-submit it so that he could accept it. Thus, the judge became "judge and party" to the prosecution of Garzón. Regardless of the merits of the complaint against Garzón, I am shocked that the Supreme Court hasn't thrown out the case and indicted the other judge. Incidentally, you would expect this to be a conservative judge, but it was actually a progressive one. Surely this has to do with Garzón "getting his comeuppance" from his brief political career.

In closing, to repeat what I said in the introduction, the most serious consequence of all this is that people are becoming polarised along partisan political lines and that most people to the left of the "serious" Social Democrats are becoming disenchanted about the legitimacy of the judiciary itself, this at a time when the indignado movement is questioning the social compact and the concept of representative democracy, and can't fail to gather strength given the 25% unemployment (and 50% youth unemployment) figures and the projections that the economic situation will get worse for at least a year before it starts to gets better. The same radical left already feels like the 35-year "national consensus" around the Constitution was broken when the constitution was reformed urgently and under pressure last September to introduce a "debt brake'.

I have a feeling this can't end well. What do you think?

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This is just a brain dump. I will be adding links to sources for various claims in the diary over the next few days.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Feb 9th, 2012 at 06:40:14 PM EST
great diary. interesting stuff indeed.

~Government budget deficits are not nearly as dangerous as the deficits we have created in vital and complex natural systems.~ Naomi Klein.
by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Thu Feb 9th, 2012 at 10:15:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Thank you. I was hoping to see this this morning.

The fact is that what we're experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. -Paul Krugman
by dvx (dvx.clt ät gmail dotcom) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 04:38:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I think you laid out the political and legal context quite good.

I didn't understand the wiretap charge quite. It seemed that he did violate the confidentiality of talks between detained and their attorneys . And I think that is very serious charge.
But then that is probably just my professional bias.

by IM on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:06:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I agree the charge is quite serious, and the Supreme Court's sentence is accordingly very harshly worded and intended as exemplary.

Some of the issues here have to do with inconsistent enforcement. For instance, there's this commentary today: an expected coincidence

En las escuchas, todo se basa en una interpretación legal del artículo 51.2 de la Ley General Penitenciaria que permite la intervención de las comunicaciones de los presos "por orden de la autoridad judicial y en supuestos de terrorismo". El juez atendió la petición de la policía y las dos fiscales anticorrupción al adoptar la medida y luego fue prorrogada por el juez del TSJ de Madrid Antonio Pedreira. Ninguno de ellos ha sido molestado, ni siquiera han comparecido como testigos.

En otros procesos, como el caso de Marta del Castillo, se escuchó a los presuntos autores del asesinato para tratar de encontrar el cadáver de la joven; en el del abogado Pablo Vioque, se escuchó a su letrada para prevenir el asesinato del entonces fiscal jefe antidroga Javier Zaragoza, para lo que el preso había contratado a un sicario. Ninguno de los casos tenía que ver con el terrorismo, pero tampoco ninguno de los jueces fue molestado.

On the wiretaps, it all hinges on the legal interpretation of article 51.2 of the General Penitentiary Law which allows intercepting the inmates' communications "by judicial order and in cases of terrorism". The judge heeded the request of the police and two anti-corruption state prosecutors, and it was later extended by the judge of Madrid's Superior Court of Justice Antonio Pedreira. None of them have been bothered, they haven't even appeared as witnesses.

In other processes, such as the case of Marta del Castillo, the presumed authors of the murder were listened on to try to find the young woman's body; in the case of lawyer Pablo Vioque, his attorney was listened on in order to prevent the murder of the then anti-drug Chief Prosecutor Javier Zaragoza, for which the inmate had hired a henchman. None of these cases had to with terrorism, but also none of the judges was bothered.

This appears to hinge on the logical interpretation of and in by judicial order and in cases of terrorism.

The other issue is whether the conversations of a lawyer with someone who isn't their client (but is a defendant in the same case) are protected. They don't seem to be protected by attorney-client privilege but only by general privacy of communications.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:57:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm pretty sure that conversations about organizing money laundering aren't normally privileged. Even if you are ostensibly the defense lawyer.

These weren't attorneys, they were (allegedly) criminal co-conspirators.

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:59:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, but the complaint was filed by a defence attorney of a different indictee who was not in prison but who had his conversations with the imprisoned indictees recorded.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 06:01:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If you're interested in the legal arguments for Garzon's defence, here is a blog quoting (and linking) the State Prosecutor's brief to the Supreme Court in support of the legality of the wiretaps (in cluding quotes of Constitutional Court jurisprudence). All in Spanish obviously. Google translation: Can a lawyer be recorded when they talk to their client? (yes, when you see how Google garbled the headline, reading the legalese is hopeless).

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 06:22:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So what is PSOE and/or progressive judges thinking, to push these matters just during the term of a right-wing government?

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:15:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
These cases have been 2-3 years in the making. I think it's just coincidental that the sentence happened to be handed down in the first 100 days of a new right-wing government.

After all, the elections would normally have taken place in March, had they not been brought forward by Zapatero to get himself out of the Euro crisis.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:37:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
One of the few things Ireland still has going for it is a political culture which actively engages with the institutions of state whether it be local, national, or Presidential elections. Politicians generally, bankers, the Church and various other elite groups may have lost much legitimacy, but many have been replaced and most of the institutions have survived relatively unscathed. You tamper with such political legitimacy at your peril. The processes of politics and Justice are as important as the outcomes. The alternative is riots in the street, a descent into social disorder and an environment where the most violent thrive. Northern Ireland was too close to home for us to want to go there. I would have thought the ETA experience could have been similarly instructive. A government can lose legitimacy and be replaced relatively painlessly. The Judiciary not so easily...

Index of Frank's Diaries
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot dotty communists) on Thu Feb 9th, 2012 at 07:09:24 PM EST
I have a feeling this can't end well. What do you think?

My understanding is that he's going to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.

So what happens if they vindicate him?
What happens if they don't?

 

aspiring to genteel poverty

by edwin (eeeeeeee222222rrrrreeeeeaaaaadddddd@@@@yyyyaaaaaaa) on Thu Feb 9th, 2012 at 10:34:54 PM EST
He rejects the sentence and says he will use all the legal means at his disposal to fight it. This means either the Spanish Constitutional Court (separate from the Supreme Court) or the European Court of Human Rights.

I personally don't think Garzón could claim that his fundamental rights have been violated in this particular case. After all, the whole thing can be framed as a disagreement of legal interpretation. However, it appears they will claim that he wasn't allowed to defend himself as all his attempts at bringing evidence were rejected.

The case where the prosecutor drafted the plaintiffs' complaint for them is another matter, but this is not the case that was decided yesterday.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 04:13:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This might get interesting.

In the communique released by Garzón yesterday in response to the sentence he vows to fight not just his own conviction by the effects that the sentence may have as jurisprudence:

Esta sentencia, sin razón jurídica para ello ni pruebas que la sustenten, elimina toda posibilidad para investigar la corrupción y sus delitos asociados abriendo espacios de impunidad y contribuye gravemente, en el afán de acabar con un concreto juez, a laminar la independencia de los jueces en España.

Acudiré a las vías legales que correspondan para combatir esta sentencia y ejerceré todas las acciones que sean pertinentes para tratar de paliar el perjuicio irreparable que los autores de esta sentencia han cometido.

This sentence, without legal reason for it or proof to support it, eliminates all possibility to investigate corruption and its associated crimes by opening spaces of impunity and seriously contributes, in striving to finish off a particular judge, to erode the independence of judges in Spain.

I will take the resort to the appropriate legal means to fight this sentence and I shall exert all pertinent actions to attempt to mitigate the irreparable damage that the authors of this sentence have committed.



tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 06:48:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
He may be posturing to not make it appear a personal matter, but I feel he is right: the real problem might not be that Garzón got special treatment compared to other wire-trapping judges in the past, but that other judges might get the same treatment in the future. (What is the importance of precedent in Spanish jurisprudence?)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 04:56:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
As I linked earlier, there have been reactions from left-wing judges concerned about the chilling effect of the sentence.

As for jurisprudence, it tends not to be very important. In fact, judicial interpretation of the law is generally frowned upon. Some people have called the ruling an attack on judicial independence because it tells judges they may be indicted for interpreting the law. However, Supreme Court and Constitutional Court rulings do constitute jurisprudence.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 05:24:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I have a feeling this can't end well. What do you think?

I think winter is coming.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 01:30:10 AM EST


A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
by A swedish kind of death on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 04:51:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
No need to drag the right to arm bears into this.
by IM on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:08:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There is no right to bear arms in Spain, as in most of Europe.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:33:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Is there a right to arm bears?

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:35:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not exactly, but bears have been known to be loaded for political reasons.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:41:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Just a Jasper Fforde homage.
by IM on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:37:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
His estranged colleagues probably thought: A Lannister always pays his debts.
by IM on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:09:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Judge Garzón is a flamboyant, attention-seeking judge who, by some accounts, happens to be a shoddy investigative judge when all is said and done.

I got that impression from one case that did get to a sentencing: that of al-Jazeera journalist Tayseer Allouni.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:29:20 AM EST
Publico.es: Juristas avisan de que la sentencia es "increíble"
El efecto pernicioso que esta condena puede tener para el trabajo cotidiano de los magistrados es precisamente uno de los aspectos más subrayados por los juristas consultados por Público, que coinciden en calificarla de "increíble": "Lo que hay aquí es un mensaje para todos los jueces: cuidado con lo que hacéis porque si os saltáis el guión os arriesgáis a que se os considere prevaricadores", advierte Jaume Asens, de la Comisión de Defensa del Colegio de Abogados de Barcelona, quien considera que la sentencia, aunque emane del Alto Tribunal, es "un ataque a la independencia de los jueces".

...

"Lo que los jueces del Supremo han dejado claro es que es un peligro investigar a los poderosos. Y lo que ya es el colmo es que la sentencia coin-cida además con que el Poder Judicial esté investigando al juez que instruye la causa de Iñaki Urdangarin", concluye.

...

La mayoría de los juristas consultados coinciden en un punto: el juicio por las escuchas de la Gürtel debía acabar sí o sí en condena, más allá de los argumentos jurídicos, porque expulsar a Garzón de la magistratura por la causa del franquismo comportaría un "escándalo internacional". "De las tres causas simultáneas, esta es la que tenía más posibilidades de construir una sentencia condenatoria más técnica, aunque no haya rastro jurídico de prevaricación", apunta García Arán.

Jurists warn that the sentence is "incredible"
The pernicious effect that this sentence can have on the day'to'say work of magistrates is precisely one of the aspects most underlined by the jurists consulted by Público, who coindice in callint it "increíble": "Here there's a message for all judges: be careful what you do, because if you don't toe the line you're risking to be considered prevaricators", warns Jaume Asens, of the Defence Committee of the Lawyers' Guild of Barcelona, who considers that the sentence, even though coming from the High Court, is "an attack on judges' independence".

...

"What the Supreme Court judges have made clear is that it's a danger to investigate powerful people. And to add insult to injury this sentence coincides with the [General Council of the] Judiciary Power investigating the judge who's investigating the case involving [the King's son-in-law] Iñaki Urdangarin", concludes [Cristina Almeida].

...

Most of the consulted jurists coincide on one point: the trial for the wiretaps on the Gürtel [the conspiracy's codename when it was under investigation] must definitely have ended with a conviction, regardless of legal arguments, because to throw Garzón off the bench for the case of Francoism would have been "an international scandal". "Of the three simultaneous cases, this is the one which had more possibilities for constructing a technical convicting sentence, even if there's no legal trace of prevarication", indicates García Arán.



tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 06:43:59 AM EST
The Bunker in the Spanish Judiciary / El Búnker Judicial by Migeru on February 7th, 2007.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 06:46:46 AM EST
in particular the popular rejection of constitutional "reform"?

Nil aon leigheas ar an ngra ach posadh
by redstar on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 07:21:53 AM EST
Who cares, and why does he need to take a stand?

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 08:49:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]


Nil aon leigheas ar an ngra ach posadh
by redstar on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 09:29:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
As long as he doesn't speak about politics.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 09:53:51 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The King is never very explicit in his public pronouncements. One of the most recent ones is his Christmas Address (in Spanish):
Estabilidad y prosperidad, en el marco de nuestra Constitución, es lo que esta gran nación española ha sabido construir en paz y libertad a lo largo de las últimas décadas, junto con un Estado de Bienestar necesario para mantener la indispensable cohesión social que la justicia distributiva reclama.

...

Junto a la crisis económica, me preocupa también enormemente la desconfianza que parece estar extendiéndose en algunos sectores de la opinión pública respecto a la credibilidad y prestigio de algunas de nuestras instituciones. Necesitamos rigor, seriedad y ejemplaridad en todos los sentidos. Todos, sobre todo las personas con responsabilidades públicas, tenemos el deber de observar un comportamiento adecuado, un comportamiento ejemplar.

Cuando se producen conductas irregulares que no se ajustan a la legalidad o a la ética, es natural que la sociedad reaccione. Afortunadamente vivimos en un Estado de Derecho, y cualquier actuación censurable deberá ser juzgada y sancionada con arreglo a la ley. La justicia es igual para todos.

Stability and prosperity, in the framework of our Constitution, is what this great Spanish nation has known to build in peace and liberly over the last decades, alonside a Welfare State needed to maintain the indispensable social cohesion that distributive justice demands.

...

Alongside the economic crisis, I am also hugely worried about the mistrust that appears to be spreading in certain sectors of public opinion with respect to the credibility and prestige of some of our institutions. We need rigour, seriousness and exemplarity in every sense. All, and especially the people with public responsibilities, have the duty to keep an appropriate behaviour, an exemplaty behaviour.

When irregular conducts occur which don't keep to legality or ethics, it is natural that society reacts. Fortunately we live in a State under the Rule of Law, and any objectionable act must be judged and sanctioned according to the law. Justice is equal for all.



tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 09:02:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Positively oracular.

The fact is that what we're experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. -Paul Krugman
by dvx (dvx.clt ät gmail dotcom) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 10:01:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
El Pais: Los estamentos judiciales arremeten en tromba contra las críticas a la condena
[la portavoz del Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ), Gabriela] Bravo, que ha evitado valorar la decisión de los jueces, ha mostrado su "preocupación" por la imagen internacional de la justicia española que puede dar "la trascendencia mediática de esta sentencia" y ha arremetido contra las críticas. "Estamos a la cabeza de Europa como justicia garantista", ha defendido antes de agregar: "Entiendo  que parte de la ciudadanía no comparta la resolución, pero me parece intolerable que se les llame fascistas por eso".

La vocal del Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) Margarita Robles ha afirmado que la sentencia del Tribunal Supremo condena al juez Baltasar Garzón a once años de inhabilitación es "jurídicamente impecable" y se ha producido en el marco de un procedimiento "con todas las garantías". Tras criticar las "descalificaciones inaceptables en un Estado de Derecho" que ha recibido el Supremo, ha indicado que, aunque "entristece" la situación de Garzón, "la ley es igual para todos".

También el presidente del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco, Juan Luis Ibarra, ha asegurado tener "certeza" de que el juicio contra el juez Baltasar Garzón se ha producido "con todas las garantías" y sin que haya existido "indefensión". Además, ha reconocido que este caso es "un magnífico ejemplo de brecha social" entre la justicia "de las leyes" y la percepción de los ciudadanos. Lo mismo ha dicho el presidente del Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Murcia, Juan Martínez Moya, quien ha apuntado que "no se deben tolerar las descalificaciones" que se están produciendo contra la sentencia.

The higher echelons of the judiciary charge against the criticisms of the sentence
[the spokeswoman for the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ), Gabriela] Bravo, who avoided making a judgement of the judges' decision, showed her "concern" for the international image of Spanish justice that "the media transcendence of this sentence" and charged against the criticisms. "We're at the forefront of Europe as a justice with procedural guarantees", she defended before adding: "I understand that a part of the citizenry doesn't share the resolution, but I find it intolerable that [the judges] are called fascists for it".

The member of the CGPJ Margarita Robles claimed that the sentence of the Supreme Court convicting judge Baltasar Garzón to 11 years of disqualification is "juridically impeccable" and took place in the framework of a procedure "with all the guarantees". After criticising the "unacceptable disparagement in a State under the Rule of Law" that the Supreme Court has been subjected to, she indicated that, although Garzón situation "saddens", "the law is equal for all".

Also the president of the High Court of Justice of the Basque Country, Juan Luis Ibarra, claimed to be "certain" that the trial against thejudge Baltasar Garzón took place "with all the guarantees" an without "indefension". Moreover, he has admitted that this case is "a magnificent example of the social breach" between the justice "of the laws" and the perception of citizens. The same was said by the president of the Higher Court of Justive of Murcia, Juan Martínez Moya, who pointed out that "one shouldn't tolerate the disparagement" of the sentence that is taking place.

Two comments: it almost as if the "social breash" between the law and the public perception were a good thing. And Margarita Robles is one of the judges who were Secretaries of State alongside Garzón in 1993, and is widely perceived as a personal enemy of Garzón.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 10:41:43 AM EST
I know that it's deeply impolitic to say this, but Garzon needed to have his wings clipped.By going after crimes committed during the Civil War and dictatorship he was acting in contradiction to the legal code he was supposed to be enforcing.

The secret of the Spanish transition to democracy is continuity.  Because the present democratic regime emerged from the institutions of the dictatorship, the country was able to avoid the instability that kills democracies in their cribs.  Consider what's happening in the Arab world now.

In twenty years, Morocco will probably be more democratic than Egypt.

Why?

Because Egypt opted for revolution instead of reform.  The point of Tahrir was to challenge the authority of the state.  Which is liberating in the short term.  But, when a country's politics consists of seeing who can shout loudest the inevitable result is that things fall appart. Contempt for the old regime easily becomes contempt for any authority at all.  Chaos ensues, and authoritarians fill the vacuum.

Spain avoided democratic collapse precisely because legal continuity between dictatorship and democratic regime meant that the authority of the state was always there. Questioning that deal now tries to impose some vague liberal notion of universal rights and wrongs that exist only in theory upon an agreement made by flawed men who sought a pragmatic solution that would work in reality.  

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 11:42:36 AM EST
ManfromMiddletown:

In twenty years, Morocco will probably be more democratic than Egypt.

Why?

Because Morocco has a relatively benevolent and forward-looking dictator. The Egyptians didn't have that luxury.

It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II

by eurogreen on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 11:48:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Democracy takes time. Expecting that you can have street demonstrations, toss the dictator out, and have elections the next week is a fantasy.  Transitions to democracy that stick involve making deals, some of them quite ugly, and they take time. Egyptians did have that option by spring of last year, but they didn't.  The utter lack of organization on the part of the opposition didn't help.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:04:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
 >Expecting that you can have street demonstrations, toss the dictator out, and have elections the next week is a fantasy. >

Yes, but that is actually what happened in eastern europe.

by IM on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:09:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No it isn't.

Solidarity was active from 1979-1980.  The first free elections didn't happen until 1989, and they did because Solidarity participated in the round table discussions.

As a general rule the shorter the period of popular protest at the end of the communist era, the more violent the transition.  The extreme example of this being what happened in Romania.

Let's not forget that the underming of the Communist regimes through protests that challenge the authority of the state has produced fragile democracies.  Look at what is happening in Hungary.


And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:26:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Ah no. Hungary of all states was the most maanaged and least revolutionary. They followed your prescription most closely. Others were a lot more revolutionary. Poland is rather unusual.
by IM on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:41:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
My point is that state authority broke down in Eastern Europe because people refused to recognize that the government had a right to be in charge, eg Adam Michnik and the "as if" mentality.

The problem is that this mode of democratic transition produced a lasting antipathy to the idea of state authority and a legacy of anti-politics.  

What's happened in Hungary is the culmination of that.    

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 01:41:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
State authority broke down because the gerontocrats lost the plot and had no longer the ability to disrupt opposition movements before they could grow with secret service and propaganda, nor the guts to send in the tanks like in 1956 or 1968 once things got out of hand. I don't think there ever was a sea change on people's recognition of a government right to be in charge.

I'm not sure what you mean with "a lasting antipathy to the idea of state authority". What failure to use state authority do you see in the region, and that throughout the past 22 years? I get "legacy of anti-politics" even less: the 1989/90 changes were anything but anti-politics, and the spread of anti-politics came only later with disillusion.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:43:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But that doesn't fits with the facts. Revolutionary Poland or the Czech republic have stable enough state and even political system. Evolutionary hungary, where the party was still in a quite strong position 1989 compared to other countries, is now in crisis. But that even that wasn't pre-ordained. That Poland is now more stable then Hungary wasn't clear in 1995 or 2000.
by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 12:13:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Romania after the 1989 Revolution would be a good example for MfM's theory.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:31:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's not really my theory.  I'm repeating something I read in this book.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:36:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
According to that theory the abortion of the November revolution was lucky and enabled the steady growth of democratic institutions in Germany, right?
by Katrin on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 03:17:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yeah, and Hitler was democratically elected...

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:32:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
By the German Empire?

Post war Germany supports the argument that I am trying to make.

There wasn't institutional continuity between the Empire and the Weimar Republic.  And there was always a strong society, weak state there.  This was recognized by the Weimar government.

Hitler, of whom you invoke Godwin, was not the founder of the Nazi party.  He first came to a Nazi meeting because he was there because he had been ordered to as a member of the military.   After WWI, the military had an active surveillance program against a number of potentially disruptive political groups.

When you ask how Hitler came to power, I think that you will find that social disorder is the answer.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 10:52:06 AM EST
[ Parent ]
When you ask how Hitler came to power, I think that you will find that social disorder is the answer.

I blame the likes of Kurt von Schleicher, who spend the entire decade of the 1920s plotting to subvert the Weimar Republic from within the State apparatus. And, as you point out, Hitler joined the Nazi parti because he was a government  snoop infiltrating extremists groups.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 11:12:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I blame Brünning.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 11:47:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes. Definitely von Brüning more than von Schleicher. And don't forget these guys.
by Katrin on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 12:20:07 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That was after Hitler came to power, I shall note (with historians debating to what extent the support was voluntary).

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Mon Feb 13th, 2012 at 04:23:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, I found the list of participants practical. And in February Hitler still needed a lot of funds, which they provided: voluntarily, because they profited from the destruction of the left which Hitler promised in that meeting.
by Katrin on Mon Feb 13th, 2012 at 07:52:20 AM EST
[ Parent ]
>There wasn't institutional continuity between the Empire and the Weimar Republic.>

Now that is really wrong. There was a very strong institutional continuity between the Empire and the Weimar Republic. In the administration, the justice system, the military, also the party system. That this continuity wasn't shaken up more was exactly the problem.

An Hitler was mostly brought to power by the great depression.

by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 12:18:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There was institutional and personal continuity: what I called the aborted revolution. I'm not so sure if the depression brought Hitler to power or if it was the other way round: the depression was brought about in order to install authoritarianism and to prevent a completion of the revolution.
by Katrin on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 12:24:04 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It is true that the depression did hit a already weak political system with expecially the parties of the center-right and right weak and ripe for the picking. And the crisis of early 1930 that ended the great coalition was partly engineered by members of the coalition who wanted to remove the social democrats out of government.

That said, the depression was real enough and Brüning reacted according to the conventional wisdom of the economists of the time. Hoover and the british politicians after all did the same.

And even after the relative success of the left in the 1928 election there wasn't really a continuation of the revolution on the agenda.

by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 01:27:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
For instance Woytinsky, Tarnow, Baade. There were economists challenging the "conventional wisdom" of the time. I am not talking of another revolution, I am talking of the struggle within the Weimar Republic. Shifting income to the class that spends it and shifting some political power in the same direction.  
by Katrin on Mon Feb 13th, 2012 at 07:53:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I think this imputes too great foresight to the austeritarians.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 01:33:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You think it is the undermined authority of the previous state that makes a democracy fragile? That glosses over several other factors and events in the intervening 20 years. You would have a better argument with a less developed democratic culture: the unwritten rules of political interction, the respect for checks and balances, something that grew out of altercations of quite harsh political repression in Britain and the development of which involved a major civil war in the US. Though, in the case of Hungary, that still ignores such factors as austerity regimes, nationalism, the reckless ambition of a select few individuals, and the implosion of one major party.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:30:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not ignoring what you are saying.

But to try to present my own argument more cleary.

  1. Governments which can't create peace and order are unlikely to persist regardless of whether they are a dictatorship or democracy.

  2.  Governments create the rule of law in two ways:

     a. Legal authority.  Most people follow the rules because they feel it is the right thing to do.

     b. Coercion. People follow the rules because they fear the consequences if they don't.

  1.  Non-violent revolutions destroy legal authority, meaning that in order to create the rule of law the government has to fall back on coercion.

  2.  The governments which result from non-violent revolutions often make the decision to allow the rule of law to slip rather than deal with the conflict that results from imposing it on society.


And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg
by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:46:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That's too general for me to understand what you mean. What slip of the rule of law are we speaking about in the case of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, and specifically Hungary?

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 03:00:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You live in Hungary.  Visit a Roma camp and it should become pretty clear.

The protections that are supposed to exist and they ones that actually do are quite different.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 03:11:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What does this have to do with disrespect of state authority stemming from 1989? Selective lack of protection (or, as it is, even active discrimination) of civil rights is an issue with existing state authority (also see "institutionalised racism"), not a lack of state authority. (I should also mention that there was a difference between protections that are supposed to exist and they ones that actually do before 1989 already.)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 03:32:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Let me re-state this in more explicit terms. If non-violent revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe destroyed legal authority (your point 3), and legal authority means people following rules because they feel it is the right thing to do (your point 2.a), then can you name rules which people followed pre-1989 because they felt it is the right thing to do but ceased after 1990?

I think the traditional argument that the hypocrisy of the old regime (telling people what is right to do but doing something else itself) undermined some concepts necessary for a healthy democracy (like the common good, trust in your co-citizens, government by the people and for the people) with a lasting effect bears more water. Then again, even that theory ignores that the 'communist' regimes weren't the only hypocritical regimes in the recent past of these countries (the connected subect mentality also goes back earlier), and also that the 'shock therapies' executed by the new freely elected governments more or less voluntarily had their own perverse way of undermining the very same concepts.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 04:04:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The more I think about this idea in general terms, the less I like it. It sounds like a neocon premise to me: that you can just impose things by force. An attempt to impose a rule of law on a society by force, however, can actually result in a delegitimisation of power and further disintegration of the rule of law. An example would be the use of police to quell riots in Hungary in 2006-7. Meanwhile, what is established by force, I wouldn't necessarily call a rule of law, even if those imposing it call it such: if the powers that be do what they want, it isn't a rule of law but a rule of force.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 03:47:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's Hobbesian, rather than neocon.

Or just that neoconservatism was a brand of Hobbesianism.

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:31:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Or even just realist (in the realpolitik sense).

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 05:33:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
As I understand it, Hobbesianism assumes that people are evil by nature and a power vacuum leads to evil, while neocons go beyond that in rejecting liberal and tolerant government policies as appeasement of evil. The picture I see emerging is one of the latter, though I'm still not sure what MfM resp. Stephen Kotkin and Jan Tomasz Gross see as slip of rule of law (and haven't read that book). I can only speculate that there could be an argument based on Central European conservative-liberal views of the emergence of populism in the region; that is, a(n IMHO illusionary) view that an authoritarian clampdown on in defense of individual liberties as well as capitalism would have prevented the rise of populist forces.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 05:13:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I can only speculate that there could be an argument based on Central European conservative-liberal views of the emergence of populism in the region; that is, a(n IMHO illusionary) view that an authoritarian clampdown on in defense of individual liberties the then contemporary allocation of property and privilege as well as capitalism would have prevented the rise of populist forces.

Fixed that for you.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 05:40:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Nnnno, in a Central European context, individual liberties as liberal concept aren't constrained to the economic sphere, especially where the opposed populist forces were Catholic-ultraconservative chauvinists. Then again, IIRC the present conservative-liberal powers-that-be didn't think much of, say, the Warshaw Gay Parade, either.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 05:50:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yeah, but all the non-property civil rights tend to go away when you start with the authoritarian clampdowns. That being, after all, what "authoritarian" means in the context of clampdowns.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 06:05:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Let me come back to the point of negotiated transition vs. peaceful revolution. Where do you draw the line?

I would classify both the Polish and the Hungarian transition of 1989-90 as negotiated transition, whatever the scale of street protests. In both countries, the regime sought to defuse protests by starting talks with opposition movements with the offer of limited power-sharing. Also in both countries, these talks and the resulting agreements did reduce street pressure, but the opposition could use both to gain much more influence than the regime intended.

There was a difference in the endgame.

In Hungary, where longtime leader Kádár was toppled in an internal coup in May 1988 already, the transition was a negotiated process throughout. The regime agreed to and enacted itself all the major reforms before the freely elected government (rehabilitation of the 1956 revolutionaries in the summer of 1989, adoption of a re-written constitution and change to republic in October 1989, dissolution of the Party militia and workplace Party organisations, free elections in March-April 1990). The only reform that wasn't directly legitimised by the old regime was one point of a referendum in 1989, which prevented a continuity in power rather than legal matters: the Party reform wing hoped to hold on to the position of President in a direct election on account of the much higher recognition of their candidate than any opposition figure, but that direct election was rejected by a thin majority. But, still, the regime allowed, didn't hinder, and accepted the result of this referendum.

The difference in Poland was that the regime tried to gain legitimacy while retaining power with a limited election in June 1989, but the success of Solidarność in that election was of such punch-out quality that the effect was the opposite: the regime was deserted by its own, thus Solidarność could gain power in spite of he limited elections, and enact reforms even against President Jaruzelski, who resigned in the end. Still, I think none of the key changes were a direct result of protests, it was more the case that concessions in negotiations proved much costier for the regime than intended.

The only cases of peaceful revolution in 1989 I can think of are the fall of the Berlin Wall in East Germany and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. In the latter, even though there would be a negotiated process until the first free elections seven months later, the regime ceded all the top positions of power and changed the constitution as a direct result of truly massive mass protests. (Czechoslovakia is also the only example of a post-communism order without a post-communist party as a major party that can lead governments.)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 04:52:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If either of these counts as a peaceful revolution, I would classify Sweden's transition to democracy as a peaceful revolution. Though I would prefer to reserve revolution for processes that include some form of institutional breakdown in transition from one government to the other, either by a storming of the palace or by the existing government sneaking out the backdoor leaving the revolutionaries without a government to topple.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
by A swedish kind of death on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 03:31:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Egyptians certainly didn't have the option of making any deals. The dictator proved to be incapable of making any concessions to legitimate demands, and had to be tossed by his military base when he ordered them to fire on the nation.

And the lack of organization of the opposition was due to the systematic suppression and destructuring of any opposition by the regime's goons, over decades.

The preconditions for a gradual transition to democracy did not exist.

It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II

by eurogreen on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:16:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The preconditions for a gradual transition to democracy did not exist.

If we seriously take that to be the case, then revolution is the alternative.  The problem with trashing the notion of the authority of the state is that this means you have to reimpose authority under the new regime.  And that means cracking a lot of heads.

Once you lose the ability to create peace and order because people behave as the the law tells them that they should, then the only way that the law regains authority is by forcing people to behave in accordance with it.  That means using force.

The alternative is that you have a democratic system of government in which the state has questionable authority. And that's when people start looking for a strongman.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:36:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ManfromMiddletown:
The problem with trashing the notion of the authority of the state is that this means you have to reimpose authority under the new regime.  And that means cracking a lot of heads.

Revolution, of the sort seen in central Europe and in north Africa, is certainly not a matter of trashing the notion of the authority of the state (and this is why your whole thesis doesn't hold water). It's a matter of contesting the legitimacy of the current holders of state authority.

As you note, a regime can only govern by consent or by constraint. But in your version, it seems that if the people no longer consent to be governed, it's the fault of the people and not of the government! (so presumably the government should dissolve the people and elect a new one).

Oddly enough, the right recognised by the US constitution (if I have understood correctly) to rebel against unjust government, is associated with the right to bear arms. This, surely, is a recipe for disaster, and a very different thing to the implicit (inalienable human) right to overthrow unjust governments through peaceful protest.

It is rightly acknowledged that people of faith have no monopoly of virtue - Queen Elizabeth II

by eurogreen on Mon Feb 13th, 2012 at 09:11:59 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There's a critical difference between law and authority used as tools for sharing consent + limiting the actions of toxic individuals who are perceived as a threat to the common good - 'criminals' - and l+a used stand-ins for power gained and maintained through violence.

Greece has made explicit what Western democracies have been pretending isn't the case - we live in cultures where we pretend the former and deny the reality of the latter.

The North African revolutions were an attempt to move from the latter to the former. But there are always toxic individuals in government who use authority, symbolic violence and sometimes physical violence as tools for personal benefit. So it's extremely difficult to create a revolution that actually works - unless you also propose a radically new social contract which makes implicit power-sharing explicit.

The issue for most populations is that they have no personal stake in government or in policy. Big Man government only becomes attractive when there's a perceived external threat and no perceived personal solution.

The real problem is always internal - functioning democracy assumes policy participation, which in turn assumes more of a personal stake in policy than a visit to a voting booth every few years.  

One of the interesting things about OWS is the move towards shared participation and shared responsibility. When you consider that no Western country has ever had a constitution that works in this way, it's possible the legacy of OWS is going to be much more impressive than a few relatively token occupations.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Mon Feb 13th, 2012 at 09:51:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, democracy takes time.  A time that is not only longer than one week of revolution but also one year of negotiations. If you include the development of a culture of practising democracy, it takes decades. And that time most often includes at least one revolution, often more, and it is naive to think that it can be avoided by negotiations in every case.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:21:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I don't think that negotiated transitions work in every case.

But I think that you can't seperate violence from revolutions.

Once you've destroyed the authority of the state to govern, restablishing that is rarely a peaceful process.

And in many cases, non-violent revolutions produce periods in which state authority ceases to exist after they are completed.

Lassiez faire.  It's a paradise of the powerful.  In the absence of legal authority, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

There's a heavy cost to non-violent revolutions like this, and it's rarely if ever honestly acknowledged.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:35:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Once you've destroyed the authority of the state to govern, restablishing that is rarely a peaceful process.

Neither is sustaining the authority of the state to protect a negotiated transition. In Egypt, that's what the military does. Worse, that protection of authority and violence may be aimed at stopping the transition entirely.

What I'm saying is not that one route is better than the other. A decades-long road to democracy may include both types of failures multiple times.

Further, I wonder to what extent one can speak of a choice here. Once tens of thousands of people desperate enough to risk their lives are on the streets, I don't think a revolutionary road can be held up (those who try will lose authority). If protests dwindle down during protracted negotiations and the regime reneges on its promises in the end, there won't be a revolutionary alternative anymore.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 02:55:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
>Once you've destroyed the authority of the state to govern, restablishing that is rarely a peaceful process.

 And in many cases, non-violent revolutions produce periods in which state authority ceases to exist after they are completed.>

Once again , that is not what happened in eastern europe. And no, you can't just jump to Hungary today and ignore the intervening twenty years.

What you sketch out here did happen up to point in Romania, but that was very much a violent revolution.

But apart from that, I don't think a cessation of state authority did happen anywhere in eastern europe.

by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 01:34:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Apart from Romania and the Soviet Union, there were only partial and temporary cessations of state power. I would count the temporary cessation of border controls on the night from 9 to 10 November 1989 in Berlin (they would resume until New Year's Day), the 1988 strikes in Poland which led to the Roundtable Talks, and the strikes during the Velvet Revolution peaking in the 27 November 1989 general strike. Furthermore, even though there was a negotiating stage during the Velvet Revolution, it took place while the authority of the regime was already disintegrating: there were several resignations and desertions (including the media) and legal concessions even before the formal start of negotiations, and handed power to the opposition well before the elections. In other words, while formally, there was a continuation of state authority, de-facto, it melted away for a few weeks.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Mon Feb 13th, 2012 at 04:46:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
By going after crimes committed during the Civil War and dictatorship he was acting in contradiction to the legal code he was supposed to be enforcing.

Are you saying stuff like this shouldn't be investigated?

tens of millions of people stand to see their lives ruined because the bureaucrats at the ECB don't understand introductory economics -- Dean Baker

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:00:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
There is a difference between investigation and prosecution.  

The simple fact of the matter is that there was an amnesty.  

You can be disgusted by it, but if we start saying that laws should only be enforced when we like them and the rest can be ignored, the rule of law disappears.

Remember that if we can ignore the laws that we don't like, so can the people who we disagree with.  

Democracy without the rule of law doesn't last because it creates insecurity.

Eventually people just want to be secure, and they'll acquiesce to a strongman if that's what it takes.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:18:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Wouldn't it be more appropriate to compare Spain with Chile? After all, Garzon's classifying missing people as ongoing kidnappings, not covered by the amnesty, is copied directly from Chile.
by gk (g k quattro due due sette "at" gmail.com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 12:13:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
On the other hand, leaving the old shit mouldering under the surface seems to be a bad plan too. Everyone knows it's there and it spreads. We're busy working out the consequences of our civil war and the ensuimg fucked up state here, damn near a century later.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 01:17:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
True enough.  But then again there's a point for something like a truth and reconciliation commission where the point isn't prosecution but clearing the air.

Arguably, the point in relation to Garzon is that efforts like that of the Foundation for Historical Memory to locate and catalogue mass graves so there is a record are more important than prosecuting old men.

And I'll give my consent to any government that does not deny a man a living wage-Billy Bragg

by ManfromMiddletown (manfrommiddletown at lycos dot com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 01:29:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Truth and reconciliation is great for the run-of-the-mill apparatchiks you need to make the bureaucracy run. But prosecuting old men can have a value of its own if they are sitting on substantial wealth, media power or other commanding heights of policymaking

Having unrepentant Nazis running several major employers' unions well into the 1960s certainly did not improve German labour relations.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Feb 10th, 2012 at 06:34:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
>Having unrepentant Nazis running several major employers' unions well into the 1960s certainly did not improve German labour relations.>

As far as I know that didn't have any influence at all. German Labour relations were quite good during that period and as far as there was conflict, I don't think the origin of that or this functionary mattered.

by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 01:38:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Sorry, my bad. It was well into the '70s that you had unrepentant Nazis running German employers' organisations. And, well, colour me biased, but a guy who learned labour relations from the Bohemian Occupational Command strikes me as, eh, not the sort of leadership a major employer's organisation needs in a time of crisis like the '70s.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 02:12:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I almost suspected that you meant that case. But the RAF did not really care about labour relationships. And there is no indication that the rest of the leaders of the employers associations, some of them had a past, some not, had different views.  
by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 02:19:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Of course the RAF didn't care about labour relations. But that doesn't mean the world wouldn't have been a better place if the Russians had caught him before he hightailed it out of Warsaw.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 02:24:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I am sure that wouldn't have changed the position of the employers associations and labour relations in west germany one whit. You don't believe in the (great) men make history theory either, do you?
by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 03:05:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No, but I don't believe in historical determinism either.

Political actors act within the space that their time offers them. But they do act.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 03:11:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, but Schleyer was only a not that remarkable functionary. Not e. g. Beitz or springer or Mohn. His influence on the course of the employers association was somewhat limited.  
by IM on Sun Feb 12th, 2012 at 04:07:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ManfromMiddletown:
I know that it's deeply impolitic to say this, but Garzon needed to have his wings clipped.By going after crimes committed during the Civil War and dictatorship he was acting in contradiction to the legal code he was supposed to be enforcing.

I would rather say that the original compact of transitioning from dictatorship and let everything stay buried in exchange for democracy and rule of law henceforth always included paradoxes. That Garzon followed a thread that threathened to unravel the tapestry does not excuse (from what I understand) very selective enforcement. Indeed, equal treatment is part of the rule of law, so if the Supreme Court aimed to save the compact they failed spectacularly.

When it comes to transition to democracy, I would say that some 20 years after the transition it is more risky for the democracy to protect pre-democratic actions then to let legal challenges to run their course. Or perhaps, if it is less risky to protect the pre-democratic actions, then it can be questioned if there actually has been a transition to democracy.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Sat Feb 11th, 2012 at 03:42:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If he wants the laws on francism changed, he ought to run for parliament. Judges, being near unaccountable, must obey restraints.
by oliver on Wed Feb 15th, 2012 at 10:09:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]


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