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Egypt, the revolution stumbles on

by A swedish kind of death Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 07:49:40 AM EST

In Egypt, things are getting interesting. Morsi is unseated but his supporters do not accept it. The military has installed a new government but its backing is falling to pieces. No common framework is established to settle conflicts, and the tourism economy is not doing well.

Now, I am no expert on Egypt, but if I jot down my impression of things, and you all chim in with comments, info and analysis maybe the picture will get clearer.

front-paged by afew


Morsi and the perils of power
Morsi was elected mainly on being the leader of the largest bloc from the revolutionary side. However once in power, the Brotherhood came into conflict on one side with reactionary forces in the judiciary and on the other front the rest of the revolutionary side over the rules of democracy. I don't know how much wiggle room Morsi had, considering that the expectations within the Brotherhood after all of these years in opposition must have been massive. But his presidency alienated the rest of the revolutionary side without reaching reconciliation with the military. So massive demonstrations to topple Morsi, and then the military stepped in again. Now the various parties are quickly distancing themselves from the new rule while Morsi's supporters are clashing with the military. The situation is far from stable.

Bread and power
Mubarak's rule was weakened by the high prices of food in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Since the structural insolvency in the financial world remained, speculators looked for safe places to keep their money so at least not to loose them, and food was one such place. Egypt had ran the classic neoliberal package in the 1990s and 2000s with huge fortunes for the rich and stagnation for the rest, and destroying the import-replacement industries in the process, leaving the country exposed to the good fortunes of international trade. With food prices and unemployment rising the situation got desperate and the usual suspects of unions and left-wing organisers got joined by huge crowds.

The crisis has since continued with fuel shortages and high bread prices.

Egypt imports both food and fuel. And since 2010 Egypt has been running a current account deficit, my guess would be tourism going down with the permanent financial crisis. So whoever inherits the current mess has few options of fixing the bread and fuel situation. The one I can see are:

  • International support. Loans to support continue running a current account deficit and possibly widening it gives the government some breathing space for actions to aleviate the situation. Depends on who is in government and comes with strings attached.

  • Hope and pray. If the international economic crisis turns around, then a rising economy may lift Egypt too. Not likely to happen anytime soon.

  • Internal redistribution. This is the 400 pound gorilla in the corner. With redistribution a government could provide for the population on the expense of the rich. But the rich includes the brass as the military is a large economic actor. And so far, anyone who rules does so with the tacit approval of the military.

The future
So how will it turn out? Your guess is as good as mine, please make them in the comments.

Display:
To chaotic to even try a poll.

As far as I can see, direct military rule will not work. That was what Mubarak had, and it broke when officers on the ground did not agree to crush the people at Tahrir.

Can't really see a civil war looming either, that takes at least two sides with guns.

My best guess would be a series of short lived governments until either an Egyptian government finds a patron with big enough pockets, international economy turns around or a coalition is formed between different elements that can pull of at least a partial redistribtuion (which includes a scale from Putin to Lenin).

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by A swedish kind of death on Wed Jul 10th, 2013 at 06:25:22 PM EST
And given past examples, somewhere in that scale surely includes Peronism.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 08:44:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes.

But now that you mention it, I have a hard time working out how to get there.

A re-distributive program with popular support but without a popular revolution needs the support of the military (or at least not active resisitance from them). The higher echelons of the military will be hit by a re-distributive program. Someone they trust could convince them that it needs to be done, so an officer (like Peron) or a security establishment figure (like Putin) would be a candidate. So far so good.

But since Egypt is import dependent I think the real issue is what the US finds acceptable. And I think a populist figure that performs redistribution would not be, while a conservative figure that does the same might be.

In a bit of a longer run, import substitution could lessen the trade dependency, today Egypts main exports are:

crude oil and petroleum products, cotton, textiles, metal products, chemicals, processed food

So by focusing agriculture more on feeding its own population and electrification and renewables (solar+wind, they already have plenty of hydro for balance) to decrease dependence on foreign hydrocarbons, they could make themselves less dependent on world trade, and thus get more liberty to choose direction. But that takes time that no government is likely to have.

Or that is as long as things stay relativly stable and Tahrir is the pivotal point in deciding government. If the military splits over a coup attempt, civil war could lead to a faction gaining power with social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty on the agenda (as wikipedia describes Peronism). Probably also wrapping themselves in religion. Having won a civil war they would probably not hesitate to use tanks on Tahrir if poeple gets restive while they suffer sanctions and waits for the programs to give results.

Of course, that goes the other way too. If there is a civil war and a conservative side wins, their military would also use tanks on Tahrir. Unlike Mubarak's commanders on the ground they would not refuse orders because they would see demonstrators as on par with the enemies they had just defeated. Pinochet style terror follows.

So tanks or Bismarck (if the US accepts it). Not any good options there.

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by A swedish kind of death on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 05:39:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
How is redistribution supposed to solve a problem with too much imports? To do that more foreign currency will be needed. Considering how important tourism is to Egypt, the tourism industry needs to be helped. A government based on political Islam is unlikely to be compatible with more western tourists.
by oliver on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 05:35:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Redistribution only directly addresses import dependence if the propensity to import lower down the income ladder is substantially lower than the propensity to import further up the income ladder.

In low income food surplus nations, that is reasonably common, but I don't know whether its the case for Egypt.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 01:01:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
This is odd. The poor spend relatively more on food. If anything redistribution to the poor should mean more imports of food.
You might argue that the main problem is not food but fuel and that the poor have no cars and hence use less fuel. But then simply cutting subsidies or raising a tax on fuel would solve the problem.
by oliver on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 06:29:40 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If your CA deficit is driven by luxury imports (BMWs, TVs, etc.), then redistribution from rich to poor will drive down your CA deficit.

If your CA deficit is driven by food and fuel, then redistribution from rich to poor will drive up your CA deficit. OTOH, if your CA deficit is driven by food and fuel, then failure to redistribute from rich to poor is liable to get you a new constitution.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 07:12:48 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, that is why in food surplus nations, where the local poor primarily eat domestically produced food, it seems highly unlikely that redistribution would do anything other than improve the Current Accounts balance, since the propensity to import of the wealth is clearly greater than the propensity to import of the poor ...

... while with food deficit countries like Egypt, its not so cut and dried, and even if the balance is in the positive, the impact will still be substantially muted by the netting out of the increase food consumption of the poor.

You'd at the very least want to accompany it with programs to increase in domestic production of foods that are aspirational consumption items by the poor.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Jul 23rd, 2013 at 12:43:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Redistribution is intended to solve the problem of food  scarcity driven support for new revolutions. But how this impacts the trade deficit is a good point. Checking with CIA, the largest group of imports is machinery and equipment followed by foodstuffs. Among the largest import partners feature China, US and Germany with 25% of Egypt's imports. This is of course far from all BMW's and ipods, and includes supplies for industry but there should be some room for decrease of not so essential goods.

If anyone has a better breakdown of Egyptian imports it would be interesting.

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by A swedish kind of death on Wed Jul 17th, 2013 at 03:42:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
.
Egypt Trade, Exports and Imports plus recent charts

More insight in economic developments past decades ...

Economic Reform In Egypt In A Changing Global Economy - 1997 [pdf]

By the early 1980s, the Egyptian economy already largely depended on oil export revenues, Suez Canal dues and remittances from Egyptians working abroad to pay for imports of food and capital goods (see Table 2). Substantial investments were meanwhile made in highly capital-intensive industries, which obviously did not ease unemployment. The fall in oil prices in the mid- 1980s cut oil revenues and remittances and worked its way through the economy.

...
Egypt's participation on the Western side in the Gulf War in 1990-91 led to vast transfers of funds from Western and Arab donors and the promise of debt relief. The latter was conditional on the IMF's certification that Egypt had sound policies leading towards macroeconomic stabilisation. In turn, the IMF required Egypt to adopt a comprehensive economic and structural adjustment programme which, irrespective of the government's enthusiasm, led to economic progress. The Paris Club agreement has been part of Egypt's international economic relations since 1991.

...
Egypt's balance of payments on current account (Table 2) brings out its structural trade deficit, which averaged $6.2 billion a year from 1990-95 and shows no sign of falling. This is partly made up for by income from invisible transactions, mainly workers' remittances, tourism receipts and Suez Canal dues. In 1990-94, workers' remittances averaged $4.8 billion a year and receipts from tourism $1.7 billion.

In a typical year, Egypt's exports of petroleum and gas, tourism, official transfers, Suez Canal dues and workers' remittances add up to between a fifth and a quarter of GNP. These receipts are a sort of economic rent, deriving from Egypt's geological, historical and strategic situation. They are only partly influenced by domestic economic policies and tend to be volatile.

...
The policy of the European Community (later the European Union) towards Egypt has been typical of its policy towards non-member Mediterranean states. A trade agreement has given preferential treatment to Egypt's exports, while financial protocols have helped finance improvement in the country's supply capacity. The co-operation agreement of January 1977, which was updated as the European Community grew bigger, provides for broad co-operation and, being of indefinite duration, established a stable contractual framework for long-term programming decisions. Four successive financial protocols to the agreement covered the period 1977-96.

by Oui on Thu Jul 18th, 2013 at 04:40:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
.
Egypt's path to the future in a single comment? It's part of the developments in the Middle East ever since 9/11 and the flawed US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Iran gained significant influence through the Shia majority and the Maliki government in Iraq. Turkey has made major investments in Iraq's Kurdish north and wants to extend influence in the region (re: Syria). The Sunni monarchs of the Gulf states would not stand by idle to let this happen and have used their great wealth to influence Western powers and Arab uprising in the spring of 2011. The recent developments shows a miscalculation in Syria for Assad's overthrow. To regain foothold, John Kerry has dumped the failed policy of Hillary Clinton including her advisors from Bill's reign of the 1990's.

Egypt's 2nd people's revolution was a necessary adjustment to President Morsi's doing his MB party's bidding and alienated large masses of the population. Funds dried up ...

Read some of my diaries @BooMan Tribune ...

Egypt to receive $4bn in aid from Kuwait

CAIRO, Egypt (DailyNewsEgypt) - Kuwait, the oil-rich US ally, has announced an aid package of $4bn to Egypt, a day after neighbouring United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia pledged a total of $8bn in aid, one week after the ouster of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi.

According Kuwait's official news agency, KUNA, $2bn of the package will be in the form of deposit to the Central Bank of Egypt, while $1bn will be offered as a non-refundable grant. The Gulf state will also provide cash-strapped Egypt with fuel and petroleum products worth $1bn, KUNA's report said.

The UAE and Saudi Arabia announced that Egypt will receive an $8bn aid package; the KSA will contribute with $5bn and UAE will offer $3bn. Saudi's aid will be divided to $1bn cash, $2bn for petroleum products and another $2bn deposit. The UAE will contribute a $1bn grant and $2bn interest-free deposit with the central bank.

Several businesses have launched the 306306 "Support Egypt" campaign, announced in a statement issued by the central bank on 7 July. Contributions to these bank accounts were not limited to businessmen; several syndicates have also showcased their support by providing donations.

McCain calls Morsi ouster a coup d'etat, would block the U.S. sending $1.5bn annual aid

by Oui on Thu Jul 11th, 2013 at 01:09:30 AM EST
That's all? Qatar had given or promised around $20bn to the Morsi government.
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Thu Jul 11th, 2013 at 02:37:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
May think differently as MB's Supreme Guide may join Morsi in "protective custody." Perhaps some investments  may be diverted to PSG? Excellent PR and close to Hollande and the Elysée? Qatar didn't communicate well it was funding AQIM in opposition to the Mali government.
by Oui on Thu Jul 11th, 2013 at 03:08:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My impression is that the Emir was toppled and replaced by his son in order to bring Qatar in line with Saudi foreign policy.

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by A swedish kind of death on Thu Jul 11th, 2013 at 03:58:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
According to The Guardian, the old emir planned his abdication for at least a year and actually delayed it a bit due to events in Syria and a kidney transplant.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 02:57:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Thats what I get for trusting Internet rumors.

Qatar emir hands power to son in rare peaceful transition | World news | guardian.co.uk

Gulf sources say Sheikh Tamim is less keen than his father on the Brotherhood, but most observers predict continuity on key policies. "Tamim has matured a lot," said a family friend. "He will continue what his father started. He is a military man, and he is disciplined."

So the Saudi/Qatar rivalry might continue. Indeed, from Al Jazeera's editorial line it does not look like Qatar is backing down from supporting the Brotherhood.

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by A swedish kind of death on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 05:44:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The new emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, 33, was educated at the English public schools Harrow and Sherborne before graduating from the Sandhurst military academy.

Sheikh Hamad made no mention of the public face of Qatar's assertive foreign policy, prime minister and foreign minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim, a veteran politician who had been expected also to step down. The FM not only lost his job as influential minister, he also lost his position as head of the Qatar Investment Authority.

Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani: Meet the man who bought London

Al Qaradawi role in Tamim's Qatar sparks debate
Qataris defend the new emir's embrace of controversial cleric

MANAMA, Qatar (Gulf News) - The old man was assisted by an aide as he walked up to the former and new emirs of Qatar to offer his congratulations on the peaceful transition at the top of the state and the hand-over of power.

The Emiri Court in Doha was filled with well-wishers, but Shaikh Yousuf Al Qaradawi [point of view ADL] was taken directly to Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani and Shaikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, the outgoing emir and the new emir.

The father promptly moved forward and kissed the frail-looking man in a gesture that indicated the deep trust the two men have developed over the years. The scholar then moved to the son, 33, the youngest ruler of an Arab country. Shaikh Tamim planted a kiss on Al Qaradawi's head and then his shoulder.

His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani Emir of the State of Qatar

by Oui on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 06:23:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So two pieces of Kremlology going in different directions with resepct to what foreign policy Qatar will follow. Guess we will have to wait for actions to see.

Passing on the crown as inheritance does have the inherit weakness - compared to electoral systems - of getting a new ruler that nobody knows much about. Kropotkin had a quip about how the crown prince was always liberal, but the tsar was always conservative. My take on it is that the ideas of the crown prince reflected the hopes of the population, while the tsar reflects the realities of power.

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by A swedish kind of death on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 06:44:09 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That may be a quite general phenomenon, I've seen the same thing in historical Korean soap operas.

Part of the phenomenon is that whatever the newly crowned king pursues as his highest priority for reform will require concessions on other things that he might also have wished to change ... and the first step to pursuing that reform is to convert his formal position into real power, in the process of which any reforming zeal can often be lost in the weeds.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 01:06:46 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Al Qaradawi role in Tamim's Qatar...(is functionally similar to Al Wahabi role in Saudi Arabia.)

Al Qaradawi is not a regular religious scholar or a simple Friday mosque preacher. Over the years, the Egyptian-born cleric has acquired a special status on religious, social, economic and political ideas and talks. Doha-based Al Jazeera channel, the most viewed station in the Arab world, helped take him into the homes of millions of viewers, particularly through a weekly one-hour-long talk show in which he shared views and offered advice.

As a prominent supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, he helped propagate their ideology and views on everything and, mainly in the last two years, on political matters. He spoke freely about political developments in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria and pushed his stances through the spoken word following decades of writing books.

He was clearly against former leaders Zine Al Abidine Bin Ali, Hosni Mubarak, and Muammar Gaddafi and never hesitated to show his dislike for Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, urging the use of force to oust him from power. He supported the Arab Spring and wanted a much greater role for Islamists in power.


Part of the tension between Qatar is rivalry between the Saudi Wahabi and the Qatari Al Qaradawi, despite both having very similar political/religious orientations.  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 09:56:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If I understand the situation with Egypt's Current Account had a deficit of about $8bn in 2012. And this spring the government rationing:

Bakers become latest victims of Egypt subsidy cuts | World news | guardian.co.uk

For decades, the state has subsidised the cost of food and fuel - essential in a country where around one in four live below the poverty line. But a severe economic crisis has forced the Islamist-led government to not only cut subsidies but also to introduce rationing. On Tuesday, ministers announced plans to introduce a smart-card system that limits each citizen to three small loaves a day.

Of course, that was due to the demands of IMF:

Bakers become latest victims of Egypt subsidy cuts | World news | guardian.co.uk

The government has little choice but to implement its financial reforms. Egypt's foreign reserves have more than halved since 2011. The IMF is refusing to make good on a much-needed and much-delayed loan worth $4.8bn until Egypt reduces its subsidies - which make up around a quarter of its annual budget.

"Frankly, they're stuck," said Bassiouny of the government. "They don't have much room."

So as I see it, unless the international economic situation turns around (which is unlikely), this level of support package is needed annually only to keep the situation from deteriorating. And that is if the donors has the good sense to demand that Egypt does not follow IMF's advice, instead of the opposite. But the food and fuel situation as it is, is not a good situation for any stable government. I don't know what level of subsidies would be needed for an Egyptian government that can do something significant about the food situation (through subsidiesed food or redistribution to the poor). Anyone wants to take a stab at guesstimating that?

The 306306 "Support Egypt" campaign is interesting as it is basically volountary redistribution (if the incoming government chooses to use it so). It points towards a redistributive solution being possible with support from the business community. Essentially Bismarckian welfare (pay the poor before they revolt). However, I don't know of any government succeeding in such a solution during an economic downturn, the two exampels that comes to mind - Bismarck and Putin - introduced theirs after the immediate crisis had passed.

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by A swedish kind of death on Thu Jul 11th, 2013 at 04:50:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
An article I read argues that the GCC support for the overthrow of Mursi is rooted in the monarchs' fear of democracy: the Brotherhood was seen as a potential inspiration for domestic Islamist movements demanding elections.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 02:48:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The Saudi family has, historically, been acutely aware of the potential danger to it from uncontrolled religious movements if they got involved in politics.  Part of the family's history involves a alliance between Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and  Muhammad bin Saud, ruler of Diriyah, just west of modern Riyadh, in the mid 18th century. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab supported Muhammad bin Saud in matters of religion and al-Wahhab supported al Saud politically. The Wahabi reformers gave the Saudi a political-religious mission that led, eventually, to the modern Saudi State.

The alliance with the Wahabi continues and that family dominates the ulema. During the unification Abdulaziz also used the Ikhwan, or Brotherhood, composed of traditional tribal warriors, to help him unite the peninsula into its current form. But Brotherhood leaders criticized Abdulaziz for modern innovationa and did not respect treaties negotiated by Abdulaziz, attacking Jordan and Kuwait. Abdulaziz employed modern weapons  obtained from the British, including two airplanes flown by British pilots, to defeat the Ikhwan. The leaders were killed and the remainder were incorporated into the Saudi military.

I don't think it is reasonable to conclude that any of the Gulf States have any particular view of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but that all of them have good reason to be cautions about empowering such groups. I would expect them to relate to them on a tactical basis, depending on the needs of each state at any given time.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 11:16:30 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I should have said "to conclude a priora" about Gulf States views of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Obviously, in the case of Qatar, they have partnered with Al Qaradawi who has been very supportive of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. But things can change:

New Qatari Emir Dumps Muslim Brotherhood, Banishes Qaradawi, Hamas   Daniel Greenfield   Frontpage Mag  (Source posted July 4, 2013

Qatar has stripped prominent Muslim Brotherhood cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi of his Qatari citizenship, has ordered Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal (who took refuge in Qatar after it was no longer palatable to be sheltered by Bashar al-Assad) out of the country, and has withdrawn support from the Muslim Brotherhood as a result of Wednesday's events in Egypt (link in Arabic).

I am unfamiliar with both the author and the site, but all links I've found searching the headline go back to a lone Orthodox Jew from Boston blogging in Israel.

Then there is this:
Al-Qaradawi returns to Egypt from Qatar  June 30, 2013 Daily News Egypt Mahitab Assran

According to Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's official Facebook page, the Muslim cleric will attend demonstrations at Rabaa Al-Adaweya Mosque in support of President Morsi on Sunday at 5 pm. The shiekh landed in Cairo International Airport Saturday night, amid rumours that Qatar's new Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani had asked him to leave. Al-Qaradawi's official Facebook page denied these reports.

"These rumours are spread  by media outlets in support of Syrian president Bashar Al- Assad in an attempt to taint my image" he said Al-Qaradawi on Facebook.

Al-Qaradawi, considered a prominent spiritual leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, has been openly critical of Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad, urging Muslims across the world to engage in jihad against him.


The Egyptian Army removed Morsi the night of July 3.

Then there was this:
Egypt crisis: Fall of Morsi challenges Qatar's new emir   Bill Law - Gulf analyst,  BBC News

The strategy of support for Mr Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood looked a shrewd one just a year ago. Egypt had emerged from its Arab spring revolution to hold its first fair and open presidential election. Mr Morsi won a slight majority. Key to his election victory was the promise to revitalise Egypt's moribund economy. The Qataris positioned themselves to prime the pump with massive transfers of cash, some $10 billion (£6.5bn) since Mr Morsi came to power.

....

But this was not a charitable giveaway. It was in the nature of an investment. A Qatari economist told the BBC: "We couldn't stand by and let Egypt collapse", but the billions came with an expectation - "I'll give you the money, show me the outcome," he said....The thinking was that with a functioning economy and a grateful nation, Qatar would be in pole position to capitalise on a resurgent Egypt.

But as Mr Morsi stumbled from one failure to another, the promised economic recovery never got off the ground. On Wednesday that cost Mr Morsi his job and left the Qataris busy attempting damage control. Al Jazeera, based in the Qatari capital, Doha, and funded heavily by the royal family, carried a statement from what it called a foreign ministry source that said in part "Qatar will remain a supporter of brotherly Egypt". And the new Emir Tamim sent best wishes to the interim Egyptian President Adly Mansour.


And then there was this:
Top cleric Qaradawi calls for Jihad against Hezbollah, Assad in Syria  Al Arabia  Sunday, 2 June 2013

And, finally, this:
Qatar Expels Muslim Brotherhood Spiritual Leader Sheik Qaradawi

by sheikyermami on July 5, 2013
Posted by Jim Hoft on Friday, July 5, 2013

The emirate of Qatar reacted to Wednesday's events by stripping Sheik Qaradawi, the Britherhood's spiritual leader of his citizenship, closing down all Brotherhood offices and expelling Qaradawi and Hamas leader Khalid Mesha'al from the country.

According to Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's official Facebook page, the Muslim Brotherhood leader attended demonstrations at Rabaa Al-Adaweya Mosque in support of President Morsi last Sunday.

He will not be allowed back into Qatar.


P.S. From Winds of Jihad homepage: "This blog supports Geert Wilders"

Perhaps someone can find some better sources.  :-)
   

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 05:36:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Sheikh reacts to the nonsense on his personal website in Arabic [Google translation]:

Qaradawi on his summer vacation and will return to Doha early September

Did not respond to get caught up to respond to such nonsense, and those rumors peddled by media belonging to the Syrian regime, in order to create confusion about the Shaykh, for his advocacy of the Syrian issue.

He left Sheikh Qaradawi in Doha, heading to Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the meetings of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, after the peace on Prince parent Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and Prince Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Emir of the country, congratulating him on the beginning of his reign as Emir of Qatar.

He then traveled eminence of Bosnia and Herzegovina heading to Cairo on the morning of Saturday, 29.6.2013 to spend his summer vacation usual, interspersed to perform Umrah in the last ten days of Ramadan, that eminence accustomed to their performance, hosted by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

Wikipedia: European Council for Fatwa and Research

Wary of Mursi, Gulf Arabs keen to appear neutral in Egypt crisis - Reuters July 3, 2013

Yousuf Al Qaradawi: Mohammad Mursi overthrow 'invalid' - Gulf News July 7, 2013

by Oui on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 08:05:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Perhaps the outcome will be that Qaradawi remains, for him to leave would be very difficult for him personally, will continue to express his opinions as always, but that the new Emir will allow somewhat more distance to come to be seen between the actions, and especially the funding, of the state of Qatar and the opinions and expressions of Qaradawi. The entire situation surrounding the Brotherhood in Egypt is difficult. What is needed is a way for them to contest and win elections without the danger that they will use that victory to the disadvantage of all but their followers. The protection of the rights of minorities where there are strong differences is the most difficult part of anything that might be described as a democracy. The important thing just now is that Brotherhood leaders not be executed or tortured. That would just feed the cycle of revenge, and that is bad enough as it is.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 09:15:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
A brief overview of developments between Egypt and the GCC states over last decades and the role played by MB in Qatar.

Al Jazeera and Qatar: The Muslim Brothers' Dark Empire?

(JCPA/ Jerusalem Post) - There has been a significant presence of the Muslim Brothers (also known as the Muslim Brotherhood) in Qatar since the second half of the twentieth century. The first wave came from Egypt in 1954 after Nasser had smashed their organization. The next wave came from Syria in 1982 after Hafez el-Assad bombed their stronghold in Hama. The last group arrived after September 11, 2001 - from Saudi Arabia.

...
Qatar is a different story.

The Brotherhood set its mark on the small Beduin country more than half a century ago when a number of militants, fleeing Nasser's vengeful hand, found refuge there. At the time most of its revenue derived from pearl fishing. The Beduin welcomed the newcomers who were willing to adopt Wahabism and its strict rules. The Brothers devoted themselves to their new home, setting up a Ministry of Education and a Ministry of Religion to mold the youth.

It was at that time that Youssef al-Qaradawi, who was to become the leading religious authority of the movement, arrived in Qatar. He set up two important institutions: the World Union of Islamic Sages, whose function is to explain his religious edicts to the faithful throughout the world, and the European Council for Fatwa and Research. The council is meant to help Muslim minorities living in the West preserve their religion in a non-Muslim environment.

Qaradawi's weekly program on Qatar's Al Jazeera channel, Shari'a and Life, develops his extremist views for the benefit of millions of listeners.

by Oui on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 01:07:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
UAE: Gulf must tackle Muslim Brotherhood threat

ABU DHABI, UAE (JPost) Oct. 8, 2012 - Gulf Arab countries should work together to stop Islamist group the Muslim Brotherhood plotting to undermine governments in the region, the United Arab Emirates' foreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahayan said.

The UAE, a major oil exporter and business hub, has arrested around 60 local Islamists this year, accusing them of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood - which is banned in the country - and conspiring to overthrow the government.

"The Muslim Brotherhood does not believe in the nation state. It does not believe in the sovereignty of the state," Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahayan said at joint press conference with the Ukrainian foreign minister.

There were individuals within the Muslim Brotherhood who would be able to use their "prestige and capabilities to violate the sovereignty, laws and rules of other states," Sheikh Abdullah added.

Muslim Brotherhood is 'a grave danger to Gulf security'

DUBAI, UAE (Gulf News) June 25, 2013 - Lt General Dahi Khalfan Tamim, Commander in Chief of Dubai Police, warned that the Muslim Brotherhood is posing a grave danger to political stability in the Gulf as they tend to seize power and implement their ideology. Their interference in internal affairs of Arab Gulf countries was quite obvious in recent months, which is completely unacceptable for the states in the region.

The MB Axis Egypt - Turkey - Qatar Faces Defeat

by Oui on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 04:30:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I've read some interesting stuff about this, which I don't quite have at my fingertips at the moment and thus can't link.

First off was the attempt by Al-Jazeera to push an interesting narrative, that this was a coup sponsored by the US.  However, their efforts have been pretty widely panned due to the fact that their evidence is based on a logical fallacy.  The US government had sent money to some pro-democracy, anti-Mubarak activists before the uprising.  Those same people are now in the new, post-Morsi government.  So, obviously, the US sponsored it.

By several accounts, the credibility of Al-Jazeera in Arabic has been seriously damaged as a result, though it has been suffering pretty consistently since the old new director was forced out and replaced with a member of the Qatari royal family.

I read another rather interesting article on Morsi and his flaws by an Egyptian activist, whose main point was really about the hardening us vs. them attitude in the pro- and anti- camps, and how neither side is willing to talk, or even acknowledge the existence of evidence that goes against their preferred narrative.  Nothing new in the history of world events, I suppose, but it was an interesting discussion.

Finally, I also read a piece by another Egyptian, this time an academic I think, whose basic argument was that Morsi was not simply incompetent and tone deaf, but that the Muslim Brotherhood was sufficiently insular at the top (especially after purging the majority of its youth leaders 5 or 6 years ago, many of whom are involved in the anti-Morsi protests now - according to yet another article I can't source) that a move towards proper authoritarianism, if not fascism, was quite plausible given his moves towards the end.  

by Zwackus on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 05:39:45 AM EST
I find it unsurprising an authoritarian religious-centric political organization attempted to install an authoritarian religious-centric State.  

She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
by ATinNM on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 12:31:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
First off was the attempt by Al-Jazeera to push an interesting narrative, that this was a coup sponsored by the US.

Wasn't there a suggestion somewhere - and I have no idea where - that current US strategy was to keep the entire ME permanently destabilised, to avoid any danger of all those annoying little countries discovering they might have a common enemy?

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 12:34:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Part of the line of Al Jazeera (Arabic) was to emphasize opposition to US influence while distracting from the fact that Qatar has granted the US rights to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the construction cost for which was borne by Qatar.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 10:04:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Al Jazeera might have been on firmer ground if the claim was this was a coup green-lit by the United States.

There is a silly semantic argument in the US whether or not it is a coup, since there are things written in US law that are supposed to be done to regimes that take power through a coup. Obviously it is a military action to overthrow one government and put another (in this case a temporary working arrangement) in its place, so its obviously a coup d'etat, or golpe de estado in the more common US second language. And just as obviously, the legally required responses to "a coup" are written with one overly-narrow stereotype of "what happens in a coup" in mind.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 08:52:19 PM EST
[ Parent ]
... the a massive majority in a country can agree on toppling the government in place, without having even a plurality available regarding what should be put in its place.

In the Grenadian case, the majority of New Jewel supporters at the time of the putsch led by Bernard Coard were supporters of Bishop and wanted his killers thrown out; those who had supported the New Jewel overthrow of the Gairy regime but wanted a transition to Democracy wanted Coard clique gone as the worst of the New Jewel leader, and of course the old Gairy supporters had been praying to the heavens to be rescued from the New Jewel government for five years. And that was in rough terms a third of the adult population each.

Cobbling some working majority together between the secularist minority, the progressive wing of the Islamic Youth movement, the continuing supporters of the Islamic Brotherhood, those who fell away from the Islamic Brotherhood over incompetence and corruption, and those who never supporters or who fell away from the Islamic Brotherhood for being insufficiently hardline may well prove an impossible task for years to come.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Jul 13th, 2013 at 09:12:07 PM EST
Redistribution wont fix the trade deficit. Egypt has to either grow a lot more food, or grow a major export industry so that it can afford to buy it. Redistribution might be useful for doing that but it would be more accurately described as "forced investment" and "dirigism". Available resources: A lot of desert, a lot of people, and a location on a humongous sea trade route. Uhm. Looked at like that, this is workable.. I mean, if you want to build a gazillion seawater green houses there are all those idle hands that would be happy to do that, and moving materials in and produce out is quite doable..
by Thomas on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 05:10:22 PM EST
 food for local development, energetically self-sufficient, with pisciculture to fertilise the fruit and vegetables- organic medjool dates, pistachios, pomegranates, persimmons...

i hope egypt's new leaders will see along these lines too!

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 08:34:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Of course the whole Nile valley could use freshwater greenhouses. The good move would be for Gulf Coast Council states to provide capital that is used to set up manufacturing in Egypt for the materials. The problem is keeping Western capital rent seeking out of the process which Gulf state money could do by following Islamic Finance, which would make Muslim Brotherhood types happy. Actually, that might be a good way to use their organizing ability in a productive way.

If greenhouse agriculture provides a net savings of freshwater that savings could be used for irrigation of cotton crops. Then relatively modest investments in used cloth looms and sewing machines yields a domestic clothing chain. Keep that up, undo two centuries of imperial economic domination, and Egypt's economy might get well. But the current US dependent military is unlikely to be enthusiastic about this unless it got the green light from Washington - which is doubtful. However a lot of progress could be made by staying under the radar and using Islamic finance. Just don't call it that when talking to Westerners.  

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."

by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Sun Jul 14th, 2013 at 11:19:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The first problem in manufacturing for either import or export substitution is competence.

Iran under the Shah had substantial import substitution programs. Jane Jacobs reported visiting Iran, and having an Iranian show here Iranian made knives ... which had the handle fall apart from the blade. I don't know the details myself, but my first guess would be a situation where loyalty to the regime is sufficiently suspect that those advocating changes in the spirit of the instinct of workmanship are translated for higher ups into malcontents against the regime.

And that is not something that can be imported from some higher income country, as the means that higher income countries use to promote competence are adapted to their own cultures ... witness the struggles that Japanese senior management can have operating in Germany, and those are two cultures that in their own way are highly effective at encouraging competence.

How to effectively promote competence in the context of Egyptian society is something that has to be arrived at by the Egyptian people themselves. Now, surely, given that but a misguided economic development strategy they can still fail, but failing that the best economic development strategy in the world is likely to fall short.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 01:25:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I found this, this and this on the subject of manufacturing competence in Egypt. It seems the problem is not insurmountable.


"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 10:27:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Note that the first is proposing how to address an existing problem of lack of competence in textile manufacturing.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Jul 16th, 2013 at 12:14:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And this article should be quite reassuring to Muslim Brotherhood types. :-)
Given the unemployment levels even for university educated young adults in Egypt it should be possible to develop several local industries.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 10:38:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]
How complicated would it be to transfer and start a used wind turbine manufacturing line? Because of high winds smaller turbines, which don't sell in Europe, might still be useful in Suez.
by Jute on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 11:01:35 AM EST
.. ha. ha. ha.

Okay, that was mean, but.. wind turbines worth a damn are apex mechanical engineering. One reason I went "seawater greenhouses!" is that the design is cunning, but the manufacture would not require anyone to suddenly wake up one morning with a masters in mechanical engineering and areodynamics nor a workforce with a gazillion years of shopfloor experience.

by Thomas on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 01:30:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
This might be a way to recycle older wind turbines via refurbishment and re-manufacturing. It would probably require that a substantial number of experienced key management and manufacturing personnel be retained on a three to five year basis while local talent was brought up to the required level of expertise. There are a significant number of such turbines still in service in California alone. There appear to be excellent wind resources in and along the shores of the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. Crazy Horse would likely have the best take on the feasibility of such a scheme. But it might make more sense to install the most cost effective of current production units. Reliable local power could be a great boon to the small towns along these shores. Tourist attractions are currently dependent on diesel generators for power and fuel is intermittent.

   

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jul 15th, 2013 at 04:10:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
For Egypt, I would think photovoltaics would be a more logical choice. Combined with diurnal-cycle storage, for which pumped hydro would be the logical choice --- Lake Nasser? The Qattara Depression?
by mustakissa on Tue Jul 16th, 2013 at 01:10:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Given 2.1 Gigawatt capacity at the Aswan High Dam, simply shifting around the scheduling of hydropower energy production could well compensate for a substantial amount of diurnal swings in solar power production ...

... but windpower production in the high value wind resources would also likely reduce the scale of storage required.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Jul 16th, 2013 at 04:07:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You're right... you don't actually have to pump to get 'pumped' storage.
by mustakissa on Tue Jul 16th, 2013 at 05:08:02 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And by the time that Egypt hits the threshold where it may need some actual pumped storage, it can be added incrementally at the Aswan High Dam.

I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sat Jul 20th, 2013 at 12:33:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
.
Activists protest perceived infringement on Egypt's traditional share of Nile water

(Ahram) May, 2013 - Ethiopia's 'Renaissance Dam' project- one of four planned hydro-electric power projects - has been a source of concern for the Egyptian government, amid ongoing sensitivities regarding the project's possible effects on Egypt's traditional share of Nile water.

According to the state-run National Planning Institute, Egypt will need an additional 21 billion cubic metres of water per year by 2050 - on top of its current quota of 55 billion metres - to meet the needs of a projected population of some 150 million.

Will Ethiopia's 'grand' new dam steal Nile waters from Egypt?

by Oui on Sat Jul 20th, 2013 at 11:32:34 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It can be very disruptive while the dam is filled, but it does not have to be. All depends on how fast the dam is filled and how well this is coordinated with the needs downstream.

Given the importance of the issue and that both countries militaries are US-aligned I am still expecting a US-brokered deal. Taking their time though.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sun Jul 21st, 2013 at 02:27:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Ethiopia would be the ideal place for combining the Millenium Dam with photovoltaics. During the wet season the reservoir is full; during the dry season when the sun shines, there are often blackouts due to the water running out. The dam has a capacity factor of only 33%, for a nominal power of 6 GW. PV would be the ideal way to stretch the water supply and eliminate the intermittency.
by mustakissa on Tue Jul 23rd, 2013 at 10:22:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
great synergy, mustakissa. use the army to help install the PV!

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Tue Jul 23rd, 2013 at 02:10:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I would think soft credits should do the job. That, and good information. But in Ethiopia everything is harder than it seems... even access to the Internet is still a state monopoly
by mustakissa on Tue Jul 23rd, 2013 at 03:09:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
At least it looks like they are not yet a victim of Neo-Liberal policies and economics.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Tue Jul 23rd, 2013 at 09:29:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yep, you cannot even go to McDonalds there, from what they tell me
by mustakissa on Wed Jul 24th, 2013 at 07:14:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Horror! How can people live like that?

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Jul 24th, 2013 at 09:52:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It's like that in Trento too. Not just McDonalds. No Burger King, KFC, Quick, or Starbucks either.
by gk (gk (gk quattro due due sette @gmail.com)) on Wed Jul 24th, 2013 at 01:54:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In Eritrea, run by a previously allied group (EPLF) to the group in power in Ethiopia (TPLF), Coca Cola Eritrea is the soda monopoly with some kind of split of profits between Coca Cola international on one hand and the state/party/president on the other (questions about exact division are not encouraged).

No McDonalds though, last I heard.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Wed Jul 24th, 2013 at 02:11:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Egypt will need an additional 21 billion cubic metres of water per year by 2050

Reduction in demand for hydroelectric power through development of wind and solar could provide some of that additional water, especially at times of low flow, as more water would be available given the same input from up stream. Another possibility would be any effective measure to reduce silting behind the dam, (which will be reduced by an upstream dam).

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jul 22nd, 2013 at 03:33:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
What Next for Muslim Brotherhood?   Bassem Sabry   Al Monitor

After discussing current Brotherhood tactics which include continuing an occupation of Rabaa Square, gradually escalating Brotherhood rhetoric and "to adjust the PR message and the sit-in from being "pro-Morsi" to being "anti-military coup" and "pro-democracy" Bassem Sabry moves to the more important question:

Is the reinstatement of Morsi still a possibility or even desirable for the Brotherhood?

 Theoretically, two broad scenarios exist for Morsi's return. The first is through massive international pressure, which is growing less likely as more and more of the international community seem to have accepted the new reality (even Doha) and are keen to move pragmatically forward. US Deputy Secretary Of State William Burns visited in Egypt (where, notably, the Salafi Nour Party and Tamarod declined to meet him). But even if that did work, there would be resistance from the military, which has wide public support, especially since the public  is also quite increasingly distrustful of the international community and the United States, and amid local portrayals of the Brotherhood being an ally of an unpopular US administration.

This would lead, in turn, to Egypt growing more isolated internationally but generously supported by the Gulf, and even rendering extraordinary measures by the authorities against the Brotherhood and Morsi easier to undertake. The second way is through massive, overwhelming popular protests that dwarf June 30, coupled by a split or internal pressure in the military, or both. Both seem unlikely. A split in the military could lead to widespread civil upheaval that could end up further reinforcing a military grip on power or push Egypt off the cliff. The best scenario would be a referendum on Morsi's return to power or immediate presidential elections, both of which Morsi would almost definitely lose, further stripping him and the Brotherhood of clout and claims to broad support. It would generally be wiser for Morsi not to stand for elections again, not only because of the slim chance of victory but also to allow the Brotherhood and Islamists in general a fuller chance at better rehabilitating their image.

But even if Morsi did forcibly return to power, there would also almost be no chance of him going on without neutralizing all pockets of resistance. That would mean most of the leadership in the military and the police, much of the judiciary (those three being of substantial current popularity), virtually all predominant private media, the state bureaucracy, an even more fierce opposition, all potentially coupled with a volcanic public uprising likely larger than June 30, and more. It would seem impossible to confront it all without effectively bringing down the Egyptian state in a Samson-like manner, likely ending in either a second ousting of Morsi or Egypt descending into chaos.



"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Jul 17th, 2013 at 08:32:53 PM EST
So what options remain to the Brotherhood? From Bassem Sabry:

First, it could suddenly just decide to call the bluff and immediately announce it's just joining the current road map in one form or another. The main risk here for the Brotherhood is that this would render a powerful implosion likely [presumably of the Brotherhood organization]. On the other hand, it would alternatively be giving it the highest defense and protection against any unwarranted persecution, would put everyone else on the other side of the spectrum on the spot, and would ensure the fastest return of the democratic process while making official the Brotherhood's reintegration. The second option is to continue to (intelligently and peacefully) maintain pressure until the Brotherhood can extract some sort of victory under the current situation it can sell to its supporters (for example, Morsi's release, strong assurances of inclusion) and grow confident of the organization's integral unity while ensuring it's sufficiently protected from any possible witch hunt.

In any case, it's highly unlikely this is going to be 1954 all over again, when Nasser abolished democracy as it stood and obliterated the Brotherhood. This is a different time and a different world. The Brotherhood, instead of blaming everything and all its failures on outside forces, must realize its failings and missteps, accept them, evolve, and even consider a sweeping internal change in leadership, both for the sake of internal unity and for improving chances of public re-acceptance. And it's also unlikely this is the end of political Islam, as some have been too quickly heralding.

The Brotherhood thrived for decades under pressure, and the idea of surviving the "mehna" (ordeal) is a key element of Brotherhood ideology. Egypt's current leadership must realize that the country's largest political force will not disappear, its followers will not vanish, and that the most dangerous thing to do is to corner a desperate man without giving him a viable way out.

Inclusion and an honest desire for reconciliation remain key.


Revolutions often proceed in somewhat protracted stages and play out over years. That may be the case with Egypt.

"It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Wed Jul 17th, 2013 at 08:42:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]


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