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Bear Raid - Pirate Capitalism?

by ChrisCook Wed May 14th, 2008 at 03:10:08 AM EST

This article

The Mother of all Inside Trades is worth publishing pretty much in full, not least because it includes a quote from Diary of mine on the subject of Bear Stearns.

I have my own ideas about what happened here, and no doubt ET'ers will be able to add more.

But on the face of it, it looks as though J P Morgan were able to recapitalise themselves essentially by buying Bear Stearns at a massive undervalue following one of the most egregious cases of market manipulation ever seen.

If this isn't a case for the Senate Sub-Committee on Investigations, I don't know what is.


[editor's note, by Migeru] Fold inserted

DID BEAR STEARNS FALL OR WAS IT PUSHED?
HOW INSIDER TRADING SAVED JPMORGAN
AND LOOTED THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER

Ellen Brown, May 12, 2008 [Le Metropole Cafe]

A little bit of history.......

The mother of all insider trades was pulled off in 1815, when London financier Nathan Rothschild led British investors to believe that the Duke of Wellington had lost to Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo. In a matter of hours, British government bond prices plummeted. Rothschild, who had advance information, then swiftly bought up the entire market in government bonds, acquiring a dominant holding in England's debt for pennies on the pound.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, N. M. Rothschild would become the biggest bank in the world, and the five brothers would come to control most of the foreign-loan business of Europe. "Let me issue and control a nation's money," Rothschild boasted in 1838, "and I care not who writes its laws."

In the United States a century later, John Pierpont Morgan again used rumor and innuendo to create a panic that would change the course of history. The panic of 1907 was triggered by rumors that two major banks were about to become insolvent. Later evidence pointed to the House of Morgan as the source of the rumors. The public, believing the rumors, proceeded to make them come true by staging a run on the banks. Morgan then nobly stepped in to avert the panic by importing $100 million in gold from his European sources.

The public thus became convinced that the country needed a central banking system to stop future panics, overcoming strong congressional opposition to any bill allowing the nation's money to be issued by a private central bank controlled by Wall Street; and the Federal Reserve Act was passed in 1913.

Morgan created the conditions for the Act's passage, but it was Paul Warburg who pulled it off. An immigrant from Germany, Warburg was a partner of Kuhn, Loeb, the Rothschilds' main American banking operation since the Civil War.

Elisha Garrison, an agent of Brown Brothers bankers, wrote in his 1931 book Roosevelt, Wilson and the Federal Reserve Law that "Paul Warburg is the man who got the Federal Reserve Act together after the Aldrich Plan aroused such nationwide resentment and opposition. The mastermind of both plans was Baron Alfred Rothschild of London." Morgan, too, is now widely believed to have been Rothschild's agent in the United States. 1

Robert Owens, a co-author of the Federal Reserve Act, later testified before Congress that the banking industry had conspired to create a series of financial panics in order to rouse the people to demand "reforms" that served the interests of the financiers. A century later, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (now one of the two largest banks in the United States) may have pulled this ruse off again, again changing the course of history. "Remember Friday March 14, 2008," wrote Martin Wolf in The Financial Times; "it was the day the dream of global free-market capitalism died."

There are two aspects to the Bear Stearns transaction: there is the takeover itself, and there is the matter of the price at which it took place.

The Rumors that Sank Bear Stearns

Mergers, buyouts and leveraged acquisitions have been the modus operandi of the Morgan empire ever since John Pierpont Morgan took over Carnegie's steel mills to form U.S. Steel in 1901. The elder Morgan is said to have hated competition, the hallmark of "free-market capitalism." He did not compete, he bought; and he bought with money created by his own bank, using the leveraged system perfected by the Rothschild bankers known as "fractional reserve" lending.

On March 16, 2008, this long tradition of takeovers and acquisitions culminated in JPMorgan's buyout of rival investment bank Bear Stearns with a $55 billion loan from the Federal Reserve. Although called "federal," the U.S. central bank is privately owned by a consortium of banks, and it was set up to protect their interests.2

The secret weekend purchase of Bear Stearns with a Federal Reserve loan was precipitated by a run on Bear's stock allegedly triggered by rumors of its insolvency. An article in The Wall Street Journal on March 15, 2008 cast JPMorgan as Bear's "rescuer":

"The role of rescuer has long been part of J.P. Morgan's history. In what's known as the Panic of 1907, a semi-retired J. Pierpont Morgan helped stave off a national financial crisis when he helped to shore up a number of banks that had seen a run on their deposits."

That was one interpretation of events, but a later paragraph was probably closer to the facts:

"J.P. Morgan has been on the prowl for acquisitions. . . . Bear's assets could be too good, and too cheap, to turn down."3

The "rescuer" was not actually JPMorgan but was the Federal Reserve, the "bankers' bank" set up by J. Pierpont Morgan to backstop bank runs; and the party "rescued" was not Bear Stearns, which wound up being eaten alive. The Federal Reserve (or "Fed") lent $25 billion to Bear Stearns and another $30 billion to JPMorgan, a total of $55 billion that all found its way into JPMorgan's coffers.

It was a very good deal for JPMorgan and a very bad deal for Bear's shareholders, who saw their stock drop from a high of $156 to a low of $2 a share. Thirty percent of the company's stock was held by the employees, and another big chunk was held by the pension funds of teachers and other public servants. The share price was later raised to $10 a share in response to shareholder outrage and threats of lawsuits, but it was still a very "hostile" takeover, one in which the shareholders had no vote.

The deal was also a very bad one for U.S. taxpayers, who are on the hook for the loan. Although the Fed is privately owned, the money it lends is taxpayer money, and it is the taxpayers who are taking the risk that the loan won't be repaid. The loan for the buyout was backed by Bear Stearns assets valued at $55 billion; and of this sum, $29 billion was non-recourse to JPMorgan, meaning that if the assets weren't worth their stated valuation, the Fed could not go after JPMorgan for the balance.

The Fed could at best get its money back with interest; and at worst, it could lose between $25 billion and $40 billion.4 In other words, JPMorgan got the money ($55 billion) and the taxpayers got the risk (up to $40 billion), a ruse called the privatization of profit and socialization of risk. Why did the Fed not just make the $55 billion loan to Bear Stearns directly? The bank would have been saved, and the Fed and the taxpayers would have gotten a much better deal, since Bear Stearns could have been required to guaranty the full loan.

I covered the apparently manipulative trading in my recent Diary.....Bear Faced Effrontery

The Highly Suspicious Out-of-the-Money Puts

That was one of many questions raised by John Olagues, an authority on stock options, in a March 23 article boldly titled "Bear Stearns Buy-out . . . 100% Fraud." Olagues maintains that the Bear Stearns collapse was artificially created to allow JPMorgan to be paid $55 billion of taxpayer money to cover its own insolvency and acquire its rival Bear Stearns, while at the same time allowing insiders to take large "short" positions in Bear Stearns stock and collect massive profits. For evidence, Olagues points to a very suspicious series of events, which will be detailed here after some definitions for anyone not familiar with stock options:

A put is an option to sell a stock at an agreed-upon price, called the strike price or exercise price, at any time up to an agreed-upon date. The option is priced and bought that day based upon the current stock price, on the presumption that the stock will decline in value. If the stock's price falls below the strike price, the option is "in the money"and the trader has made a profit. Now here's the evidence:

On March 10, 2008, Bear Stearns stock dropped to $70 a share -- a recent low, but not the first time the stock had reached that level in 2008, having also traded there eight weeks earlier. On or before March 10, 2008, requests were made to the Options Exchanges to open a new April series of puts with exercise prices of 20 and 22.5 and a new March series with an exercise price of 25. The March series had only eight days left to expiration, meaning the stock would have to drop by an unlikely $45 a share in eight days for the put-buyers to score. It was a very risky bet, unless the traders knew something the market didn't; and they evidently thought they did, because after the series opened on March 11, 2008, purchases were made of massive volumes of puts controlling millions of shares.

On or before March 13, 2008, another request was made of the Options Exchanges to open additional March and April put series with very low exercise prices, although the March put options would have just five days of trading to expiration. Again the exchanges accommodated the requests and massive amounts of puts were bought. Olagues contends that there is only one plausible explanation for "anyone in his right mind to buy puts with five days of life remaining with strike prices far below the market price": the deal must have already been arranged by March 10 or before.

These facts were in sharp contrast to the story told by officials who testified at congressional hearings on April 4. All witnesses agreed that false rumors had undermined confidence in Bear Stearns, making the company crash despite adequate liquidity just days before. On March 10, 2008, Reuters was citing Bear Stearns sources saying there was no liquidity crisis and no truth to the speculation of liquidity problems. On March 11, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission himself expressed confidence in its "capital cushion." Even "mad" TV investment guru Jim Cramer was proclaiming that all was well and the viewers should hold on. On March 12, official assurances continued. Olagues writes:

"The fact that the requests were made on March 10 or earlier that those new series be opened and those requests were accommodated together with the subsequent massive open positions in those newly opened series is conclusive proof that there were some who knew about the collapse in advance . . . . This was no case of a sudden development on the 13 or 14th, where things changed dramatically making it such that they needed a bail-out immediately. The collapse was anticipated and prepared for. . . .

"Apparently it is claimed that some people have the ability to start false rumors about Bear Stearns' and other banks' liquidity, which then starts a `run on the bank.' These rumor mongers allegedly were able to influence companies like Goldman Sachs to terminate doing business with Bear Stearns, notwithstanding that Goldman et al. believed that Bear Stearns balance sheet was in good shape. . . . The idea that rumors caused a `run on the bank' at Bear Stearns is 100% ridiculous. Perhaps that's the reason why every witness was so guarded and hesitant and looked so mighty strained in answering questions . . . .

"To prove the case of illegal insider trading, all the Feds have to do is ask a few questions of the persons who bought puts on Bear Stearns or shorted stock during the week before March 17, 2008 and before. All the records are easily available. If they bought puts or shorted stock, just ask them why."5

Indeed. Those who bought these clearly manipulative options should be examined as to their reasons for the trade.  "Unacceptable market manipulation" is a felony: a friend of mine in the regulation business always pointed out that this means there must be such a thing as "acceptable market manipulation"....

Suspicions Mount

Other commentators point to other issues that might be probed by investigators. Chris Cook, a British consultant and the former Compliance Director for the International Petroleum Exchange, wrote in an April 24 blog:

"As a former regulator myself, I would be crawling all over these trades. . . . One question that occurs to me is who actually sold these Put Options? And why aren't they creating merry hell about the losses? Where is Spitzer when we need him?"6

This brings to mind a "Curious Incident of the Bear in the Night-time" - to steal from Arthur Conan Doyle's "Silver Blaze"


Gregory (detective): "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"

Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."

Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time."

Holmes: "That was the curious incident."


Why is it that no-one appears to be complaining? It's not just a matter of who gained: who lost?

The phrase "A Sprat to catch a Mackerel" comes to mind. In other words, it could be that this was a relatively small loss which generated massive profits in another transaction - ie the takeover at an undervalue which resulted.

This is precisely what happened on the International Petroleum Exchange in the late 90's when traders were routinely manipulating the daily settlement prices of IPE Brent Crude Oil contracts through abuse of the "Settlement Trade" facility.

The relatively minor losses they made "on exchange"  to individual "local" IPE  traders (who called these happy moments "grab a grand") were minor compared to the profits they were making "off-exchange" in contracts which used the manipulated settlement prices as a reference.

I made the mistake of describing this market abuse as "systematic" (taken to mean a few traders doing it most of the time) rather than as "systemic" (most traders doing it some of the time) and I got crucified for it.

If proven, my allegations (as a former Director of Compliance, they had to be seen to take them seriously) would not only have savaged the newly de-mutualised IPE's profits but also, and more to the point "brought the market into disrepute": can't have that, Old Boy - the Establishment covered up in finest British tradition. They buried the manipulation, and they buried me, professionally.

But I digress.

The point is - who actually sold the options?

Not only do JP Morgan have historical "form". According to one market commentator they also had an imperative motive.

In an April 23 article in LeMetropoleCafe.com, Rob Kirby agreed with Olagues that it was not Bear Stearns but JPMorgan that was bankrupt and needed to be "recapitalized" with massive loans from the Federal Reserve. Kirby pointed to the huge losses from derivatives (bets on the future price of assets) carried on JPMorgan's books:

". . . J.P. Morgan's derivatives book is 2-3 times bigger than Citibank's - and it was derivatives that caused losses of more than 30 billion at Citibank . . . . So, it only made common sense that J.P. Morgan had to be a little more than `knee deep' in the same stuff that Citibank was - but how do you tell the market that a bank - any bank - needs to be recapitalized to the tune of 50 - 80 billion?"7

Kirby wrote in an April 30 article:

"According to the NYSE there are only 240 million shares of Bear outstanding . . . [Yet] 188 million traded on Mar. 14 alone? Doesn't this strike you as being odd? . . . What percentage of the firm was owned by insiders that categorically did not sell their shares? . . . Bear Stearns employees held 30 % of the company's stock . . . 30 % of 240 million is 72 million. If you subtract 72 from 240 you end up with approximately 170 million. Don't you think it's a stretch to believe that 186+ million real shares traded on Friday Mar. 14? Or do you believe that rank-and-file Bear employees, worried about their jobs, were pitching their stocks on the Friday before the company collapsed knowing their company was toast? But that would be insider trading - wouldn't it? No bloody wonder the SEC does not want to probe J.P. Morgan's `rescue' of Bear Stearns . . ."8

If real shares weren't trading, someone must have been engaging in "naked" short selling - selling stock short without first borrowing the shares or ensuring that the shares could be borrowed. Short selling, a technique used by investors to try to profit from the falling price of a stock, involves borrowing a stock from a broker and selling it, with the understanding that the stock must later be bought back and returned to the broker.

Naked short selling is normally illegal; but in the interest of "liquid markets," a truck-sized loophole exists for "market makers" (those people who match buyers with sellers, set the price, and follow through with the trade).

Even market makers, however, are supposed to cover within three days by actually coming up with the stock; and where would they have gotten enough Bear Stearns stock to cover 75% of the company's outstanding shares? In any case, naked short selling is illegal if the intent is to drive down a stock's share price; and that was certainly the result here.9

I think that there may be some confusion here. My guess is that the big position in "out of the money" options was sold by one or more option market makers.

Nothing wrong in that, necessarily.

These option market makers would then have "hedged" their position by selling some Bear Stearns stock "short". This is routine, and because of the nature of the positions, they would not have needed to "short" much stock initially to cover the position.

But the position is now an accident waiting to happen, and as we know, it did.

The share price went rapidly down amid a storm of rumour and news, and this fall would then have triggered further stock sales by the option market makers' "dynamic hedging" to cover their position, and resulting in further falls......in a self fulfilling "death spiral".

If this is what happened,then who was it who actually bought Bear Stearns stock which was sold "short" during its "death spiral"? And why are they not complaining?

That is the $64 billion question.....

On May 10, 2008, in weekly market commentary on FinancialSense.com, Jim Puplava observed that naked short selling has become so pervasive that the number of shares sold "short" far exceeds the shares actually issued by the underlying companies. Yet regulators are turning a blind eye, perhaps because the situation has now gotten so far out of hand that it can't be corrected without major stock upheaval.

He noted that naked short selling is basically the counterfeiting of stock, and that it has reached epidemic proportions since the "uptick" rule was revoked last summer to help the floundering hedge funds. The uptick rule allowed short selling only if the stock price were going up, preventing a cascade of short sales that would take the stock price much lower. But that brake on manipulation has been eliminated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), leaving the market in unregulated chaos.

There is now the question of "who investigates", and of course one of the best qualified investigators recently disqualified himself in rather murky circumstances, but conveniently for the financial sector in the context of sub-Prime.

Eliot Spitzer has also been eliminated from the scene, and it may be for similar reasons. Greg Palast suggested in a March 14 article that the "sin" of the former New York governor may have been something more serious than prostitution. Spitzer made the mistake of getting in the way of a $200 billion windfall from the Federal Reserve to the banks, guaranteeing the mortgage-backed junk bonds of the same banking predators responsible for the subprime debacle.

While the Federal Reserve was trying to bail the banks out, Spitzer was trying to regulate them, bringing suit on behalf of consumers.10 But he was swiftly exposed and deposed;

Naomi Klein's "shock doctrine" covers how major shocks are turned to the financial advantage of Global Capital.

The Bear Stearns "shock" is no different. In just the same way that the Federal Reserve system was foisted on the US following the crash of 1907, so it is that the Fed is apparently trying to take away -post Bear Stearns - any controls still held by anyone else, to concentrate all regulatory power and control within the Fed.

and the Treasury has now broached a new plan that would prevent such disruptions in the future. Like the Panic of 1907 that justified a "bankers' bank" to prevent future runs, the collapse of Bear Stearns has been used to justify a proposal giving vast new powers to the Federal Reserve to promote "financial market stability."

The plan was unveiled by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, former head of Goldman Sachs, two weeks after Bear Stearns fell. It would "consolidate" the state regulators (who work for the fifty states) and the SEC (which works for the U.S. government) under the Federal Reserve (which works for the banks). Paulson conceded that the result would not be to increase regulation but to actually take away authority from state regulators and the SEC. All regulation would be subsumed under the Federal Reserve, the bank-owned entity set up by J. Pierpont Morgan in 1913 specifically to preserve the banks' own interests.

On April 29, a former top Federal Reserve official told The Wall Street Journal that by offering $30 billion in financing to JPMorgan for Bear's assets, the Fed had "eliminated forever the possibility [that it] could serve as an honest broker." Vincent Reinhart, formerly the Fed's director of monetary affairs and the secretary of its policy-making panel, said the Fed's bailout of Bear Stearns would come to be viewed as the "worst policy mistake in a generation." He noted that there were other viable options, such as looking for other suitors or removing some assets from Bear's portfolio, which had not been pursued by the Federal Reserve.11

Finally, I am not sure that I agree with banning naked short selling, so much as making it transparent.

Jim Puplava maintains that naked short selling has now become so pervasive that if the hedge funds were pressed to come in and cover their naked short positions, "they would actually trigger another financial crisis." The Fed and the SEC may be looking the other way on this widespread stock counterfeiting scheme because "if they did unravel it, everything really would unravel."

Evidently "promoting market stability" means that whistle-blowers and the SEC must be silenced so that a grossly illegal situation can continue, since the crime is so pervasive that to expose it and prosecute the criminals would unravel the whole financial system. As Nathan Rothschild observed in 1838, when the issuance and control of a nation's money are in private hands, the laws and the people who make them become irrelevant.

It appears to me that the Bear Stearns transaction has all the hall marks of being one of the greatest acts of financial piracy ever committed.

Maybe, out in the Blogosphere, are the people who can establish the truth of it....

Display:
I need to read this again to really get my head around it but this is important stuff...

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 06:01:22 AM EST
Indeed: Galbraith had a word for this - when the losers do not know they are losing - the "Bezzle".

This is probably one of the biggest "Bezzles" the world has ever seen.

As a former fraud investigator and regulator, I have to admire the sheer "chutzpah" of it......

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 06:17:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
As with Chris' previous post, my reaction is that if the figures given are true (I'm talking about the exercise rate of the put), and now even if not since the number of shares traded just would not make sense if things were clean, then there is something majorly foul. No other sane explanation is possible.

As for the lack of investigation, I have to hope that it's not the case, that investigations are merely secret. If not, then a huge and brazen grab for power has just taken place. It really is worrying.

Earth provides enough to satisfy every man's need, but not every man's greed. Gandhi

by Cyrille (cyrillev domain yahoo.fr) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:33:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You mention that the Federal Reserve could lend out public money. You also say that it is a private entity. How is it possible that a private entity can loan out public money? That strikes me as curious. Even by State standards.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:36:41 AM EST
JakeS:
You mention that the Federal Reserve could lend out public money. You also say that it is a private entity. How is it possible that a private entity can loan out public money?

I didn't say that: Ellen Brown did.

In most countries - even the UK - the Central Bank is an arm, agency or entity in the ownership of the State.

In the US that is not the case. The Fed has since 1913 been owned by private banks, and operates in the interests of its owners.

Most money is created by private banks as interest-bearing debt, and the small amount (<3%) that is not is created by Central Banks as notes and coin.

The result in the case of the Fed is a strange hybrid for sure.

It is remarkable that at the moment of its greatest failure it is attempting to get rid of the last vestiges of democratic oversight by assuming a regulatory "conduct of business" responsibility in addition to its responsibility for financial stability etc.

Before Nemesis comes Hubris.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 08:30:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In any case, neither the NR bailout nor the BS one have been funded with "taxpayers' money", as the money didn't come from the respective Treasuries.

The Central Banks do act as bankers for the Government, and if they make decisions which hurt the Treasury maybe the treasury should go shopping for another banker.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 08:42:34 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Migeru:
The Central Banks do act as bankers for the Government, and if they make decisions which hurt the Treasury maybe the treasury should go shopping for another banker.

Or maybe, as in Hong Kong, dispense with a Central Bank entirely and turn it into a "Monetary Authority".

As we have seen in Northern Rock, one of the major reasons for the f..k up appears to be the fact that the UK Treasury not long ago took away from the Bank of England -after 300 years - the core function of the "Debt Management Office".

True to grasping Treasury tradition they simply could not resist the "seignorage" income available from the loans they made to "bail out" the Wreck. The fact that this starved the system of liquidity passes them by: that's the Bank of England's problem....

Another triumph of central control freakery.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 08:56:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Government which is run as a for-profit at the expense of the little people is the final and ultimate aim of all 'reform.'

So there isn't really anything unusual here. This isn't all that different to starting a stupid war for the financial benefit of contractors. And it's not exactly news that the easiest way to trade on insider information is to get a job associated with the government.

The scale of it may be unusual, but we're never going to know who did those trades, because it's never going to be investigated - in the same way that the massive profits from put options before 9/11 were never investigated properly.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:20:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Stupid question time: If the Fed is a private entity and it isn't doling out government dime, then what is all the fuss about? The Fed wanted to bail out some rich fatcats who got overeager on the race track exchange. So what?

The fact that so many knowledgeable people around these parts are shouting bloody murder about it tells me that someone is being ripped off. But damned if I can see who the sucker is if it's not the taxpayers. And you're saying it isn't the taxpayer? Or are you saying that it is the taxpayer, but in some indirect fashion?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 09:37:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
People tend to forget that money loaned is created for the purpose. And the Fed is the monetary authority.

These loans were not made at the expense of the Treasury, but at the expense of the Dollar itself, and of the underlying "Full Faith and Credit of the US Government". On this last point, I wasn't aware that the Fed had loaned over $20bn to Bear Stearns, but I was aware that the $30bn loaned to JP Morgan was in the form of allowing toxic-waste "subprime" assets as collateral instead of the "prime" US Treasuries customarily used as collateral. And even then, my memory was faulty...

Times Online: Bear Stearns sold to JPMorgan Chase under Federal Bank pressure

As part of the deal, America's central bank has effectively underwritten $30 billion worth of Bear's toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed bonds, to protect JP Morgan Chase shareholders. It is also providing special financing to JP Morgan Chase - of an undisclosed sum. Terms of the deal are unknown, and it is not clear whether such special financing is to cover the cost of JP Morgan's emergency loan to Bear made late on Thursday night.
[Murdoch Alert]

But, in any case, the crisis is the result of bankers creating money to lend to themselves and each other through the Fed's dereliction of its monetary oversight duty, and now the Fed continues to create money to bail them out. Ultimately, this is an "inflation" or "devaluation" tax on every holder of US$ on the planet, but first and foremost for American residents.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 09:56:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So basically, the Fed has been printing something on the order of 50 million $1000 bills and handed them to the fatcats?

Which, of course means that the suckers are everyone who isn't among the recipients. That makes sense...

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:21:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But that's after the fat cats already printed a boatload of money for themselves under the Fed's nose, which isn't supposed to happen. When the bezzle became too big to pass unnoticed, the Fed discontinued the M3 money supply statistical series on the argument that it doesn't correlate with economic activity as well as M2.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:25:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
More Socratic questions:

I understand how they printed the money (asset bubbles, cheap credit, etc.). But how were the Fed supposed to prevent that (if it had been doing its job)? It could have raised interest rates. But is that really the only weapon at its disposal?

Which interest rates can it change at all, by the way? The way I heard the story the central banks can only change the rate they charge from the banks - but if the banks can make money for themselves without the central bank, then what kind of fulcrum does the CB have?

Or does the CB control the ratio of "funnymoney" that banks can print to "real money" that they must have in stock to do so?

And what is "real" money anyway? Does "funnymoney" become "real money" once it's been loaned out and then re-deposited by the guy who took out the loan?

We seem to keep running into this relationship between central banks and the rest of the world. Maybe someone should write a Central Banking For Dummies diary and stick it somewhere we can find it. (Fortunately I'm not knowledgeable enough about the subject to do so myself :-P)

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:51:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
According to JK Galbraith in The Great Crash 1929, the bubble of 1925-9 wasn't due to low interest rates, which were in the double digits but still below the average return of the stock market indices which still justified borrowing to gamble on stocks. One of the things that could have been used, in hindsight, would have been a tightening of the margin requirements (ultimately making it impossible to trade shares on credit if the margin requirement reaches 100%) but the SEC was created (and given the power to set margin requirements) only as part of the New Deal after 1932.

But the current crisis has little to do with margin requirements. It is really directly about skirting the banking regulation and the monetary policy limits of the Fed. The banks have done an end-run around banking and credit regulation with securitization and off-balance-sheet "special investment vehicles". I am not sure monetary policy tools like interest rates would have been effective at all. Tightening reserve requirements wouldn't have helped either because essentially what banks have done is outsource the credit risk from money creation by loans, which is what reserve requirements protect banks against, to institutions with no reserve requirements.

I have been called wrong a couple of times on my interpretation of just how regulation was skirted in the subprime case, so I can't say I know how this could have been prevented. However, it does appear that Greenspan was warned about both the lending practices going on in the subprime sector, as well as the financial risks, and chose to do nothing. The blame probably lies squarely with the Fed as bank regulator, not as monetary authority.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 03:57:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But houses are no stocks. After all people were living in those houses and I doubt that many people are willing to take negative armotisation mortgages. Even if the house price goes on upwards for some more time, you still have the debt and you can't sell your house without some form of replacement. When your house price goes up so much, then probably your replacement would be expensive, too. So you would  always end up in trouble.
So people look on the loan and what they can pay back and decide. With higher interest strong relative movements are much less likely. The principal to income ratio would be better, the houses would be easier to heat. I doubt as well that there would have been no credit crisis at all, but I would have been smaller.

For complex phenomena there is usually more than one way to influence them. Interest rates would have been one in this case. Mortgage lending regulation another, higher reserve requirements yet another, and there are probably even more. Using more than one measure to reach a goal is usually a good idea.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 04:25:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But houses are no stocks. After all people were living in those houses and I doubt that many people are willing to take negative armotisation mortgages. Even if the house price goes on upwards for some more time, you still have the debt and you can't sell your house without some form of replacement. When your house price goes up so much, then probably your replacement would be expensive, too. So you would  always end up in trouble.
So people look on the loan and what they can pay back and decide.
If people had reasoned that way we wouldn't be talking about a subprime crisis. Moreover, there were "many" people who took negative-equity or interest-only mortgages. And there is now a higher default rate than anyone expected because people with no equity in their houses are just walking away from them and such a behacioural change just wasn't factored into the mortgage valuation models.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 05:04:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Right, as walking away is often even perfectly legal, it is really a subbrain crisis on the side of the lenders.

But still as the banks had to figure in some risk, higher interest would have led to lower leverage?

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 06:12:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And maybe I'm not that convinced.
The problem is very concentrated on adjustable mortgages, and threatening there even to go in the near prime and prime sector. Too low rates as well lead to higher volatility in rates and make therefore adjustables much more dangerous. As an example look to the variation of lead interest set by the Fed and by the ECB over one cycle. The ECB goes about from 2 - 4%, so we are speaking of a doubling. The Fed goes from 1 - 5.25 % or so, that is more than a fivefold.
With negative interest rates, as the US had for some time, it simply makes sense to buy tinned food on credit and sell it later for profit.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers
by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:55:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Greenspan invented this scam in 1977 and was subsequently offered the chair of the FRB, having proved himself a thorough despicable, innovative marketer. Besides which Congress repealed Glass-Steagall to create entrants, a supply chain for debt production.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
by Cat on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:44:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Who set margin requirements before the SEC existed?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 08:08:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The exchanges or the brokers themselves? I don't know.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 04:53:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
So basically, the Fed has been printing something on the order of 50 million $1000 bills and handed them to the fatcats?

Not "handed": "loaned", secured by a heap of crap. But it's the Treasury at risk on these Fed loans, as I understand it.

Heads the banks win, tails the tax-payer loses.

Only Treasuries can "hand" : which is of course a pinko subversive act undertaken only by cheese-eating surrender monkeys and the like....

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:58:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
More than that, because the Fed has been systematically lying about the real rate of inflation, it's been possible for the banks to inflate away indebtedness, push down the real rate of pay and also score a government bail out, which will magically have no apparent inflationary effect.

Unlike wage demands.

So there will be no reason not to try to push for more bail outs in future, because - clearly - apart from making the dollar wobble for a week or so, this deal hasn't had any real effect on the real economy.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:26:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Terms of the deal are known and were publicly available at EDGAR and at BSC websites 17 March the day after the deal was done. At the time of the merger, JPM was carrying $91 trillion and BSC $13 trillion in notional derivatives; these figures are documented by OCC and BSC's 10-K filing, Jan 2008. Incidentally, Federal Reserve Bank of New York president, Timothy Geithner, represented the FRB in negotiations between JPM and BSC.

You are absolutely correct: "These loans were not made at the expense of the Treasury, but at the expense of the Dollar itself, and of the underlying "Full Faith and Credit of the US Government".

BSC is not an FDIC-insured bank, but JPM is on several accounts as it is a bank holding company with retail and commercial operations. Both bank's however are two of the FRB's 20 primary dealers of US treasuries. (more links here) The Primary Dealer Credit Facility was created the day that the JPM-BSC merger was announced, 16 March. These are the facilities for primary dealers as of 28 March. You will note also the Term Discount Window created 17 Aug 2007; at that time Bush and Bernanke announced a plan to "rescue" homeowners by extending FHA origination and insurance underwriting. This was a public signal that Treasury and FRB understood the MBS market and housing values were collapsing. OFHEO was not amused. By Dec 2007 reserve system non-borrowed funds were negative, and FRB established the Term Auction Facility.

And there is no law prohibiting or limiting FRB underwriting precisely because three of the FRB "core banks" are primary dealers and LIBOR panelists -- BoA (which has been "asked" to absorb Countrywide), JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup. I don't need to tell you that "the market" is forcing BoE to validate LIBOR panelists' compliance. In effect, the only thing keeping treasury yield level (USD) is market confidence in these institutions capacity to deflate housing value and suppress dilution (inflation) as directed by the US Congress.

I doubt "insider trading" triggered a panic or the JPM-BSC. Any institutional fund manager paying the slightest attention to BSC litigation, exposure, margins, or rumor of default, under the conditions described above would have pulled have pulled out ($17B over two days, iirc) at the first opportunity the last 10K was filed because they were well aware the company's market cap was bogus.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 06:27:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
MarketTrustee:
I doubt "insider trading" triggered a panic or the JPM-BSC.

Did JPM pick up BSC "on the cheap" in your view?

They already increased the offer from $2.00 to $10.00 per share of course...

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:14:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That was still cheap.

But what was the point of that move? Was it just a bit of fake haggling to stop the markets going into meltdown and ruin the party for everyone?

Or had someone made their money by then, so it didn't matter if prices started to climb back up again?

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:25:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
Or had someone made their money by then, so it didn't matter if prices started to climb back up again?

Quite.

The fact that they increased the price by 500% with such alacrity indicates there was a little slack in there.....

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:57:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Cheap, yes. For one, the deal is a stock trade. There is no JPM cash on that table. And if I remember correctly, the $10 ps revision to the Merger Agreement occurred at month end. By then fin/biz reporters had detected alleged "insider trading" by Coyne et al --personal stakes >3% plus fund managers-- to pump the share market value after 16 March. Their strategy, I imagine, was to leverage threats of shareholders' litigation over the initial strike price. I don't know if there have been further revisions to the Merger Agreement JPM option price, $2.00 ps, on BSC shell, operations remaing liquidation and settlements.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
by Cat on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:28:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
No question is stupid, especially if asked in a Socratic spirit...

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:30:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
this is huge...

these guys have owned the board, game and players for too long.

seems like it's coming to a head.

talk about unsustainable...

thanks for the history lesson, chris.

'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 11:02:45 AM EST
Yup. I think we can expect over the next year or so for all sorts of Bear Stearns duff assets to be "exposed".

We saw it in the financial press only today.

Bear Necessities

Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's chairman and chief executive, told a banking conference organised by UBS that the higher costs were driven by the losses suffered by Bear this year and the larger-than-expected amount of bad assets on its books.

Of course it had billions more crap than we expected.....

JPMorgan executives say the final figure will depend on what else they find on Bear's balance sheet

...and there's more to come as all the JPM crap quietly morphs into Bear Stearns crap, is gradually "brought to light" and sorted out by the JPM geniuses.

Grand Theft IV?.

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 11:22:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not just a system based on plundering the "other guys", --but a system that plunders --everyone. Incredible.
No, I take that back.
What's really apparent is that the definition of "other" -- of "fair game"-- has been stretched to include almost everyone, except a tiny club.

Chomsky's definition of "unworthy victims" now includes home owners who have a crap mortgage, ---and even encompasses Bear Sterns shareholders.

Just a whiff away from cannibalism.
Maybe they'll eat each other?

Thanks for this, Chris. An incredible detective story. How can we get real investigation? Do you agree with those who see it as a Never Happen?

Capitalism searches out the darkest corners of human potential, and mainlines them.

by geezer in Paris (risico at wanadoo(flypoop)fr) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 06:59:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
geezer in Paris:
Do you agree with those who see it as a Never Happen?

I think that within a few months - once we get well into Phase Two of the ongoing Credit Crash - we will see the politicians looking for scapegoats.....

A few financiers dangling from the Senate lamp-posts will go a long way to allowing the politicians who allowed it to happen to pass the buck...

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:28:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Just think what a pleasure it would be to see a few of those very politicians dangling similarly, across the street.

Capitalism searches out the darkest corners of human potential, and mainlines them.
by geezer in Paris (risico at wanadoo(flypoop)fr) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:46:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
When Ms Brown asserts
The plan was unveiled by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, former head of Goldman Sachs, two weeks after Bear Stearns fell. It would "consolidate" the state regulators (who work for the fifty states) and the SEC (which works for the U.S. government) under the Federal Reserve (which works for the banks). Paulson conceded that the result would not be to increase regulation but to actually take away authority from state regulators and the SEC. All regulation would be subsumed under the Federal Reserve, the bank-owned entity set up by J. Pierpont Morgan in 1913 specifically to preserve the banks' own interests
she means US regulatory structure looks like this.

That the "Short-term Recommendations" chapter (teal-colored bands) of the "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure" are not temporary. In fact, they are provisions in federal legislation passed by the House last year. And that there will be no SEC investigations of equities or RMBS or CDO arbitrages -- not by Bush, not by his successor. The profits are taken.

Executive Summary | Introduction | History of the Current Regulatory Framework | Short-term recommendations

I would have posted this before but reformatting is just to much.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 06:59:20 PM EST
So you're saying the Congress has effectively taken the subprime crisis as an excuse to undo the New Deal financial regulation?

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 04:59:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You know the saying: "When you're in a hole; Keep digging!"

It seems to be a core operating principle of the current crop of leaders in Washington. Right alongside "Fight lots of land wars in Asia."

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 05:40:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
They're not in a hole, they're plundering.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 05:42:50 PM EST
[ Parent ]
No, I'm asserting that that the latest financial market failure was predictable because it was scripted as early as the New Deal. The trade associations, private entities or "pools,"  which exist today in sole charge of regulatory and fiduciary power and which the FRB exemplifies, were established legally and formally, legitimated, as public trustees during New Deal federal government. FDR played conservatives (federalists) against "free-booters" or nouveau riche (democrats doesn't quite fit the reality) in the Oval Office in order to stimulate a fundamentally, weak structural economy -- no sustainable basis for wealth projection.

At that time, still, FDR had inherited "free" market structures from "merger mania" of fin de siècle industry monopolies, including domestic and "global" finance, dictated by corporatists such as Carnegie, Du Pont, Ford, or the more ambiguous Sam Insull and sanctioned by multiple, previous administrations. FDR inherited Paul Warburg, JP Morgan "gold bug," for example, to negotiate proto-Basel II monetary policy viz. European gold reserves. At the same time, the "populists" legacy --proto-agribiz represented in the House-- was agitating for silver-back currency and inflation, explicitly, to improve export marketing --rather than absorb deflationary price levels-- and so consolidate fragmented producer output. Ironically, Americans today, unfamiliar with the situation of yester year, recall little else of that administration besides WPA fiscal policy (Dorthea Lange) and cannot comprehend the individual actors battling personal gain through central, legislative control over  financial and economic "self-governance." Eh, voilá, Greenspan. Or Icahn for that matter.

What has changed since 1904 is popular perception, cultural artifacts.

The 'subprime crisis' is incidental to a relentless, historical legislative agenda to assure the wealth and political hegemony of republicans as distinct from democratic agitators for distributive authority. That is all I have to say about N. Klein's "shock doctrine," and I haven't read it. I refer to monopolists (neocon.*)  as federalists also because US political economy virtually guarantees the concentration of those resources, capital and coercion, through constitutionally authorized prerogatives granted Congress members, particularly senators.

What I realized, again, in review of financial and economic events preceding the New Deal administration is that there has never been a time, an era, when mercantile profit motivations have not decided so-called social justice, equal protection and living wages. Ultimately, the very concept of profit precludes a public trust and public goods, those "general utilities" like food, shelter, water, power, and yes labor.  So long as private entities such as trade associations are permitted to dictate public goods, management conflict will plague econcomic "fairness." The concept of profit has no place assuring delivery of utiliies, not in any humanitarian world. Play, entertainment, that's different; games  abound. Otherwise, no man serves two masters, especially if they're tempted by unearned income of $75,000 or more per month. Per month, university graduate.

Review the war/(implied) market failure timeline in the "history" section. US republican-oriented government exists to disguise its economic failures.


Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 10:27:21 PM EST
[ Parent ]
So disaster was built into the system by permitting private organisations to do things that should be done by public institutions? Such as central banking. Is that a fair summary?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun May 18th, 2008 at 05:04:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
"disaster was built into the system," where the exhange system --at public policy (macro) and firm-level (mirco) economic value-- is defined by profit maximization. "Disaster" is best, or axiomatically, explained by "management conflict"  rather than by a geo-political pattern of market disruption, suggested by N. Klein et al. One ought to examine individual rather than nation-state agents after all to predict organizational trends.

I refer to a text book to define "management conflict" for two reasons. First, corporatist are well aware that this task-oriented, ethical problem is an impediment to firm growth and sustainability; I would search my case study library except that I'm certain that level of detail is unnecessry. Second, I've discovered that there are virtually no "free" toobz references on the topic, but there are plenty of opinions about "conflict management" which is technique to minimize or neutralize "management conflict."

Surprising no one, theoretically, my reference text is Brearly, Meyers, and Marcus, "Fundamentals of Corporate Finance (1995).

"Management conflict" is definitively a condition, where fiduciary control and ownership of an asset are not one and the same. Presumably the self-interest of the "manager" is incommensurate to that of the "owner." At firm level, equity and option compensation is evince conflict of interest between one or more managers who exercise operational control over share valuation that may constitute arbitraged benefit, e.g. C-level "insider trading" and collusion. At a public policy level, managers who exercise operational control over multiple firms within an industry, i.e. trade association directors, that are awarded "self-regulation" are freed from "shareholder" and "stakeholder" penalties by virtue of public trust protection and practicable enforcement. In any case, if management and shareholder are agreed on share value growth, then return targets may easily exceed fundamental capacities or book value of the ongoing concern in order to obtain traded profit.

Brearly et al write under the heading "Ethics and management objectives".

We have suggested that managers should try to maximize market value. But some idealists say that managers should not be obliged to act in the self interest of their stockholders. Some realists argue that, regardless of what managers ought to do, they in fact look after themselves rather than shareholders.

Let us respond to the idealists first. Does a focus on value mean that managers must act as greedy mercenaries riding roughshod  over the weak and helpless? Most of the book is devoted to financial policies that increase firm value. None of these policies require gallops over the weak and helpless. In most instances there is little conflict betwee doing well (maximizing value) and doing good.
[...]
In part, the law deters managers from blatanly illegal action. But when the stakes are high, competition is intense, and a dealine is looming, it's easy to blunder, and not to inquire as deeply as they should about the legalit or morality of their actions. [1995: 19]

Under the heading "Corporate governance in the United States and elsewhere" Brearly et al write.

The separation between ownership and management in major United States corporations creates a potential conflict between shareholders (the principals who own the company) and managers (their agents who make the decisions). We noted in Chapter 2 several mechanisms that have evolved to mitigat this conflict:
  • Shareholders elect a board of directors, which then appoints the managers, oversees them, and on occasion fires them
  • Managers' remuneration is tied to their performance
  • Poorly performing companies are taken over and the management is replace by a new team

[...]
For large corporations, separation of ownership and control is seen the world over. In the United States, control of large public[ly traded[ companies is exercised through the board of directors and pressure from the stock market. In other countries the stock market is less importan, and control shifts to major stockholders, typically banks and other companies.

Please, take what you will from this textbook description of corporate governance and conflict to explain the action of the FRB viz. Bear Stearns et al. and most certainly within the FRB's legal authority as both trade "self-regulator" and Treasury trustee and Treasury lender.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Sun May 18th, 2008 at 10:51:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I think you're onto something but that you're looking at the wrong aspect of the JPM-Bear relationship.  They were shoveling huge piles of credit default swaps through one another.  Bear's positions were threatening to unwind, and JPM was hugely undercapitalized to cover.  How hugely?  Impossible to say.  Every dime of CDS paper is bogusly valued because there is no way to value it beyond assigning an arbitrary price.

Anyway, if Bear unwound, JPM would unwind, and if those two unwound, the entire multi-trillion dollar CDS market would unwind, and the emperor would be shown to have no clothes and a tiny willy.  None of the regulators were interested in having the ensuing panic happen on their watches, and so they did whatever was necessary to allow JPM to absorb Bear and prevent The Great Unwinding.

by rifek on Fri May 16th, 2008 at 11:19:46 AM EST
rifek:
They were shoveling huge piles of credit default swaps through one another.

So a massive internal netting out will be going on....?

It doesn't make the alleged option transactions any less manipulative, but it's a plausible scenario.....

"The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Fri May 16th, 2008 at 12:08:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
A massive internal zeroing out, more likely.  A CDS is really an insurance policy, but it's treated like a security, and there's the rub.  Two counterparties enter into the CDS, one buying protection, the other selling it.  The buyer wants protection from a third-party reference entity defaulting on a debt obligation the buyer holds, and so the buyer pays the seller premiums for that protection.  The buyer can then take the "insured" debt obligations it holds and sell them at a higher rate, because they have a higher credit rating (They're insured, after all.).  The seller can also market its income stream from the premiums.

The problem arises when the reference entities start defaulting.  The buyer finds the seller woefully undercapitalized, and the secondary market folks downstream from the buyer discover the same thing when they try to call the CDS (They know that if the CDS is no good, it is doubly futile to try to enforce the repo clause against the buyer.).  On the other side, the seller finds it charged far too little for premiums, as do the folks it sold the premium stream to when someone knocks at their door with CDS in hand.

The best JPM could do was to keep Bear from presenting its CDSs by buying Bear, and then perhaps tangling all the secondary market claimants up in the internal bookkeeping of the newly merged JPM-Bear.

by rifek on Sat May 17th, 2008 at 02:08:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Let me see if I have understood this correctly:

Alice takes out a $ 1 mil loan from Bob paying $ 10k in interest pr. year.

Bob knows that Alice likely can't re-pay the loan, so Bob insures insures the loan against default with Charlie for $ 3k a year.

Bob then sells the (now insured) loan to Dora for $ 1.1 million.

Alice got her loan and everyone else earns money so everyone is happy.

Then Alice defaults on her loan.

Bob now doesn't get the 10k, so he can't pay Dora the 7k/year that he has to pay her because she owns the loan.

So he tries to collect his 1 mil from Charlie to pay off the loan so he doesn't have to pay Dora the 7k.

Charlie underestimated the risk of Alice defaulting so he doesn't have the $ 1 mil. Charlie becomes insolvent and goes belly-up.

Bob has now lost the $ 1 mil. Bob doesn't have a fresh million in liquid assets, so Bob now also becomes insolvent and goes belly-up.

Now Dora doesn't get her $ 10k/year, so Dora lost $ 1.1 mil. Dora goes belly-up.

Everyone is bankrupt and everyone is sad.

Now back up to where Bob tries to collect his 1 mil from Charlie.

Instead, Charlie spreads the rumour that Bob has gone Hare Krishna and Bob's investors panic and Bob goes belly up.

Charlie buys Bob's assets (including the loan).

Charlie now doesn't have to pony up the million he doesn't have. He can get away with ponying up the 10k that he does have out of his own pocket for a couple of years until things wind down.

Everyone is happy? (Well, except Alice and Bob who both went bankrupt.)

As a bonus, Bernanke gives Charlie a lot of cash. Everyone is happy, except Alice, Bob and everyone who holds US$ but isn't Charlie.

Did I miss something?

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun May 18th, 2008 at 05:22:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
By George, I think he's got it.  Except this scenario gives the actors too much credit, as it indicates planning and intent whereas most of the mess resulted from absence of mind and viewing the world through greed goggles.  My experience is that, if an event can be explained by either cold calculation or simple stupidity, stupidity wins.
by rifek on Sun May 18th, 2008 at 10:09:10 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So suppose that Helicopter Ben didn't give Charlie half a million near the end of the story. Would we have reason to care then?

I understand that it would clearly be illegal for Charlie to spread rumours that Bob had gone Hare Krishna. But considering that in the real world, Bob is not a real person but a publically traded company, the only people who were losing out until the arrival of Helicopter Ben in the parable would be Alice (who lost out in both scenarios) and Bob's shareholders.

I am not sure that I understand why we are having any sympathy for Bob's shareholders. They gambled on the exchange. They lost. So what? If they lost because of illegal market manipulation then presumably they could get fines and compensation by way of a civil suit. They're big boys - I think they can take care of that part for themselves.

- Jake

Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Sun May 18th, 2008 at 05:32:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Some may sympathize, The Lone Benger among them.  I, however, do not.  The ramifications of an unwinding are enormous, though.  Our entire credit-financial system is based on packaging debt obligations and sending them downstream.  That has become the prevalent method of "creating money" for extending credit and capitalizing projects.  Unwinding CDS positions would trigger unwinding of all other debt obligation positions, resulting in what would amount to the largest margin call in history.  Credit and market caps would shrivel like raisins, and the global economy would be circling the drain overnight.

I don't think this ultimately can be stopped, but Bernanke has managed to stall it enough for the "people who matter" (i.e. rich buggers with "vacation homes" in Paraguay and private, sovereign islands) to bail out at public expense and for the creation of a diversion of skyrocketing commodities that will cover the tracks of the financiers who created this mess and the "regulators" who let them.

by rifek on Sun May 18th, 2008 at 07:57:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Chris, sorry I missed this diary due to unexpected deadlines. But reading it now is an eye-opener. Thanks.

Both the orginal article and your insights are worthy of the widest dissemination. Any chance of a Cook copyrighted article that can be sold to the business press (I'm think of Finland, of course)?

You can't be me, I'm taken

by Sven Triloqvist on Sat May 17th, 2008 at 07:49:58 AM EST


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