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Some opposed it from the onset, others when realising that it is senseless destruction and won't even achieve its target (force Milo to concessions with terror bombing).
The large-scale ethnic cleansing was a deliberate reaction by Milosovic, it might be added. Presumably, he would also use this tactic in the case of a ground invasion (it would be far more disruptive to allied operations in the case of a ground invasion).
Before, we had small-scale ethnic cleansing and the occasional massacre. Should we have given Milosevic free hand in pacifying Kosovo after talks came into a deadlock?
In addition, I was on a physics student mailing list and there was one Serb member who started posting dispatches from under the bombs in Belgrade, and I was shocked that others on the mailing list couldn't distinguish the civilian population (and one of their peers, who they might have met at a previous conference) from Milosevic or the government. Some people literally told him to die, already. It's disgusting what taking the war propaganda at face value will do to people.
DoDo calls himself a "recovering interventionist". I wonder what his turning point was. Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
I suppose one can say that yes, the best strategy is to allow each country to run its own internal affairs however it likes, and not worry about what goes on inside. But then one must not listen to whining about the civilian populations of Darfur or North Korea or where-ever--just let them rot.
There must be a better way to decide this sort of thing...
In fact, correct. Even counting all Iraq/Iran-War casualties for Saddam and using a high number for domestic casualties, 2 million over 25 years is a lower rate than 0.6 million over 2.5 years. Furthermore, it is not right to count absolute numbers: the real comparison is between Saddam in a contained state (e.g. since the summer of 1991) and US occupation. And 0.6 million is really the number of excess deaths, the death rate above what it was just before the US invasion. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Serbia is on the way to become a functioning democracy, Montenegro is a free country, a crisis in Macedonia spun off by the aftermath of the war was resolved diplomatically. So to employ Colman's rule, intervention didn't create a bigger mess than was there before. If there would have been a less painful way, I don't know.
Of course, this argument can fall apart if you look at the larger consequences of the war, which were that the Republican party of the USA drew all the wrong lessons from it and that it may have fueled a resurgent nationalism in Russia. But both of these relations are rather tenuous.
In Kosovo, US-led NATO involvement may not initially have created a bigger mess than was there before, but it did involve the subsequent purging from most of Kosovo of all ethnic Serbs. And, having no central authority to speak of and essentially being run by organized crime, Kosovo is essentially now the entrepot through which heroin, sex slaves and illegal immigrants from SW Asia and SE Balkans transit. Not an ideal situation.
As for Serbia, the fact of the matter is that the NATO intervention did not drive Milosovic from power. Rather, violent Serbian protests in response to widespread election irregularities over a year later did. This election result arguably would have happened either way, given the state of the Serb economy and its painful (by contemporary European standards of the time) diplomatic isolation. The 96/97 environment was almost assuredly a thing of the past by 1999, given the deteriorating situation in Serbia even prior to the bombing campaign. In any event, arguing that intervention put Serbia on a path to western Democracy is discutable, given it has arguably not improved much since.
Also of note is the banditism in Serbia which, although not as acute in Albanian Kosovo, is still pretty bad (as evidenced by, among other things, the assassination of Zoran Đinđić by Serbian organized crime).
I'm not so sure you can say that the intervention made the situation better. In fact, I think it can be argued that it made things worse.
Unless, of course, if you are an Albanian Kosovar, and in particular if you are engaged in organized crime there. The Hun is always either at your throat or at your feet. Winston Churchill
Contrary to war apologia spread by Clinton, Wesley Clark et al, Miloević was actually temporarily strenghtened during the war. This was natural, it happened so before and after elsewhere, but the advocates of air war never learn: people will pull together when bombs are falling. So Milo could actually step up his hunt for oppositionaries, some of whom had to go in hiding, and even lost popularity for doing so.
Furthermore, the West did have a role in Miloević's overthrow, but not via the war: it was the concerted effort to get the opposition to organise itself and unite (this went along two main routes, financial and material support in the form of sister city help to local governments under opposition control, and organising conferences -- the most important here in Budapest -- to get the different factions to cooperate).
And the long-term consequences for Serbia proper (they never consider the long-term consequences) were even worse than you describe. That chief propagandist of 'liberal' interventionism, Thomas "Let war give a chance!" Friedman, infamously wrote: "Every week you ravage Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing you. You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389 too." 'They' did 1950. Sane people realise that the country doesn't consist of Miloević, and realise that throwing a country back decades means poverty and resentment lasting for decades. Especially if once pro-Western forces get into government, and start reforms (including neoliberal "reforms"), yet the West won't send the promised financial aid, resentment will turn into hate and into support of demagogues of various dangerous kinds. This is exactly what happened. The air war killed any possibility of a genuine development towards Western-style democracy. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
What you want to know, of course, is what course of action would have been best, which would require plotting various scenarios, which is a lot of work and largely untestable. But the bigger mess rule ignores the hypotheticals that a situation is on the brink of spiralling beyond control and, on the opposite, that a better solution is clearly available.
All ethnic Serbs are not yet out of Kosovo, though the majority fled.
Though an aerial bombardment has an effect of rallying the people around the leader, losing a war does not have the same effect. Kosovo was the heart of Milosevic's nationalist politics. Posing as the protector of the Serbian minority there is what brought him to power, and failing at this will have had an impact on the elections. The credit for deposing Milosevic goes to the Serb people, but the Kosovo war will have played a role in it.
The Serbian economy recovered to its pre-war level in 2002 or 2003 and has since grown by 7% in 2004 and 5.9% in 2005.
The lawlessness and banditism in Kosovo was already there before the war began. In addition there was a guerilla war, which was threatening to spill over into Macedonia.
In total, I don't think it is arguable that the overall situation now is not better now than before the NATO intervention. What parts of the overall improvement were caused by the intervention can be argued about, as well as whether the intervention was worth it and whether the situation could not still deteriorate.
That the bombing campaign didn't reach its target should be also clear if one reads up on the original plan. It was a three-tiered escalation in hope of the regime balking or the people rebelling against it: first bomb the military in Kosovo, then bob it all across Serbia, then bomb civilian installations (bridges, refineries etc.) too. But the third ladder was reached in the first two weeks, NATO ran out of designated targets, two months before the end of war. What followed was senseless, copntinuing a failed strategy out of military bureaucracy and political inertia, with Clinton et al hoping that Milo would get enough after some time, until finally waging to make the ground invasion threat while climbing down on demands. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
In this way, Eltsin's Russia provided its last (but priceless, if you are looking from certain quarters) service to the West (again, suitably defined). The mighty irony is, of course, that the current groundswell of patriotism in Russia started from anti-American and anti-Western sentiments born during the Kosovo campaign.
And yes, "planes over Belgrade" was a figure of speech. They were part of the military operation which, among other goals, included bombing of civilian targets in Belgrade (yes, I know, propaganda TV tower and Chinese embassy which presumably collected intelligence and passed it on to the Serbs). Still, they were providing military services. There isn't even the weakest of excuses the Czech Republic used (CR sent a field hospital plus military police to Kuwait and later to Iraqi south; as a result, local politicians claimed that CR isn't part of the "coalition of the willing". The USA included it in their coalition list anyway).
Indeed I even remember articles from the time that the ground invasion threat was a successful smoke and mirrors, with NATO leaders not really daring to risk it.
They were part of the military operation which, among other goals, included bombing of civilian targets in Belgrade
I recognised that, that's why I put that information as a final (side)note. Being party in a military operation is why Germany was a subject in that lawsuit for a specific operation done by American planes.
yes, I know, propaganda TV tower and Chinese embassy which presumably collected intelligence and passed it on to the Serbs
Personally I don't see those points as suitable excuse.
weakest of excuses the Czech Republic used (CR sent a field hospital plus military police to Kuwait and later to Iraqi south; as a result, local politicians claimed that CR isn't part of the "coalition of the willing".
Hehehe. During the Kosovo War, the then right-wing government of Hungary lent support by opening airspace, but was in denial about it. One thing the then opposition made noise about was whether AWACS planes circulate in Hungarian airspace. It was denied. Having been an astronomer student at the time, astronomers working at a mountain observatory told me about having observed AWACS planes with a binocular at sunset.
(Then for reasons I detailed here, Bush and PM Orbán got at loggerheads, and the sides switched: the right-wing became anti-Bush and anti-NATO, and the Socialists marched into Iraq, sending truck drivers, until Parliament forced them to recall.) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I don't suppose you think it would be ok for the US to bomb Al Jazeera in Qatar?
BBC: Al-Jazeera seeks 'US bomb' talks (25 November 2005)
A senior al-Jazeera executive is in the UK to demand publication of a memo in which George Bush allegedly discusses bombing the TV station's HQ. Wadah Khanfar, al-Jazeera's director general, is hoping to meet UK government officials to press its case. A spokesman for al-Jazeera told the BBC News website that the channel only wanted the record set straight.
Wadah Khanfar, al-Jazeera's director general, is hoping to meet UK government officials to press its case.
A spokesman for al-Jazeera told the BBC News website that the channel only wanted the record set straight.
Did the US mean to hit the Kabul offices of Al-Jazeera TV? Some journalists are convinced it was targeted for being on the 'wrong side'. Matt Wells reports When World Service correspondent William Reeve dived under his desk in Kabul to avoid shrapnel from the US missile that had landed next door, some think it marked a turning point in war reporting. The US had scored a direct hit on the offices of the Qatar-based TV station Al-Jazeera, leading to speculation that the channel had been targeted deliberately because of its contacts with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. If true, it opens up a worrying development for news organisations covering wars and conflicts: now they could be targeted simply for reporting a side of the story that one party wants suppressed.
When World Service correspondent William Reeve dived under his desk in Kabul to avoid shrapnel from the US missile that had landed next door, some think it marked a turning point in war reporting.
The US had scored a direct hit on the offices of the Qatar-based TV station Al-Jazeera, leading to speculation that the channel had been targeted deliberately because of its contacts with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. If true, it opens up a worrying development for news organisations covering wars and conflicts: now they could be targeted simply for reporting a side of the story that one party wants suppressed.
The designers of airial bombing campaigns like to bomb anything and everything on the flimsiest excuses. Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
The initial target list, I believe, was the substance of much political discussion, with the French and Italians initially blocking much of the targets that the US wanted to bomb, and gradually being convinced to allow for an expansion. NATO was made up of many countries with different positions, and the development of the war has to be seen as a matter of compromise internationally and also nationally (between Clinton and a Republican Congress).
Yes, because Albright took up Thaci's demand. After the Serbian side said they agree and Thaci said they don't, Albright changed the text. This wasn't a single example of Albright (wittingly or unwittingly) playing for war during the negotiations, consaider also the issue of NATO or civilian peacekeeper leadership.
and that the Serbian counter-proposal was unacceptable even to the Russians.
Which was the end of it. Then as Wiki says, the Serbian Parliament accepted the non-military part of the second version of the Rambouillet proposal, and Wiki goes into details about what Serbia [rest-Yugoslavia] objected to.
The initial target list, I believe, was the substance of much political discussion, with the French and Italians initially blocking much of the targets that the US wanted to bomb
This was more complex. On one hand, the US held some target decisions for itself, which hapened to be the most sensitive: especially those involving stealth planes. On the other hand, they held intel information regarding why they picked targets for themselves. In the end, war by committee wasn't really by committee.
Then again, the "sexed-up dossier" and the "45 minutes claim" of that war didn't came from Britain but Germany. I mean the claims about a pre-planned "Operation Horseshoe" and about torture chambers and concentration camp in Pristina's stadium. So there was cooperation and also in the dark dealings. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
All of this happened within the space of 6 days before the campaign started, as the wiki article seems to suggest. So the narrative that the Serbs compromised almost completely but their enemy was bent on war (mimicking the WWI narrative) doesn't hold up. Once you have an agreement on a civilian peacekeeping force, you have to negotiate about its size, makeup, rules of engagement, etcetera. So just proposing that you may wish to allow a civilian peacekeeping force isn't much of a step forward to the demand that 30,000 NATO troops are allowed in.
Whether or not there was an operation horseshoe is still uncertain. The actions of the Serbs during the war suggest that something similar existed. Of course, the existence of a plan doesn't necessarily mean that it will be carried out.
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