I'd argue only the credible threat of a ground invasion achieved the goal of removing Serbian troops from Kosovo, while the goal of collapsing Milo's system and to control Serbia weren't fulfilled. As Upstate NY reminds us again and again, Milo consented to this much at Rambouillet, but then the UCK/KLA representatives insisted on NATO troops in Serbia proper.

That the bombing campaign didn't reach its target should be also clear if one reads up on the original plan. It was a three-tiered escalation in hope of the regime balking or the people rebelling against it: first bomb the military in Kosovo, then bob it all across Serbia, then bomb civilian installations (bridges, refineries etc.) too. But the third ladder was reached in the first two weeks, NATO ran out of designated targets, two months before the end of war. What followed was senseless, copntinuing a failed strategy out of military bureaucracy and political inertia, with Clinton et al hoping that Milo would get enough after some time, until finally waging to make the ground invasion threat while climbing down on demands.

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}