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The sad fact is only a modicum of effort is required to build nuclear weapons. If Iran is willing to make the effort there is nothing anyone can do to stop them. A more intense, time consuming, and expense effort is required to build the Command and Control, targeting systems, launching infrastructure, maintainance and service organizations, and delivery systems to be able to reliably deploy the weapons as an element in the Iranian political arsenal.
Note that! Political arsenal. "Warfare is politics by other means," per von Clausewitz and, if that means anything at all, the weapons of war are political tools -- ultimately.
Focusing, for the moment, on delivery systems there are two venues for striking a target: air and land. The air delivery systems Iran can use are missles and planes. I dismiss missles as a point targeting system from my feeling Iran does not have the technology, yet, to construct the guidance systems. They do have the technology to use missles as a area delivery system. Iran does have the ability to use aircraft as both a point and area delivery system.
Missles have the advantages they can be launched with minimal notice from either fixed (hardened) or mobile launching sites with a short flight time (15 minutes, say) giving a short reaction time to the targeted nation. The disadvantage, to Iran, of missles (given my assessment above) is if they were launched against Israel, say, they are as likely to hit Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, or Jordan as Israel. Launched against Saudi Arabia, say, they have a good chance of destroying Mecca as any other Saudi city.
The same reasoning applies to aircraft as an area delivery system leaving us with aircraft as the only point air delivery system available to Iran. Aircraft have the decided disadvantage of a long(er) flight time, depending on the target, and, thus, a longer reaction time given to the targeted nation. Further aircraft are easily and quickly detected giving the targeted nation sufficent reaction time to direct its own Air Force against the Iranian Strike Force making the success of the strike problematic.
We can now make the tentative conclusion the only practical means for Iran to delivery nuclear weapons is by land: a truck or car. This method shifts the advantages to Iran. First, the weapons can be pre-set to achieve a point strike. Second, it is almost impossible to prevent a weapon from being successfully smuggled into a country. Third, the weapon can be exploded with no advance warning.
The downside to pre-sitting is the danger of a security breach allowing the targeted nation to find the weapon. A continual operating team of technicians have to be able to get to the site in order to do maintainance on the weapon, for example. The operations team has to maintain strict security. Iran has to maintain internal strict security to prevent the sites from being blown. Last, the longer the weapon(s) sit there the greater the odds for disclosure. Once it is known these weapons have been pre-sited the targeted nation is going to freak-out with unpredicable results. Also it is possible for security to be blown by a third party, including non-govermental groups, with the potential for these weapons to fall into the hands of a group that would use them against directly against Iran or against the target when Iran does not want them to.
Whether the Iranian political leadership would choose such a delivery system is up to your assessment of the Iranian political leadership. I doubt it, mainly for the last postulate, but I can be convinced otherwise.
The use of a truck or car to delivery a weapon breaks into two operational methods: intermediate siting in a third country for delivery to the target and keeping the weapons under control in Iran. The intermediate siting has the same problems as pre-siting, without any of the advantages, so I dismiss it. Keeping the weapons under control in Iran means land delivery to the target takes more time and becomes much more difficult but it is the method I would choose - sometimes the way my mind works frightens me! - so let's spend some time here.
Land delivery by car, truck, camel ... whatever ... means the weapon can be point targeted with a high degree of security. Command and Control can be maintained so the weapon can be recalled if the political situation changes, something not possible with any other delivery system, and it gives the Iranians the chance to "use" the weapon without actual detonation.
If it is not known that these weapons have been deployed then it is almost impossible for the targeted nation to prevent all of these weapons from being sited. Some of the weapons will almost certainly be stopped but the targeted nation can never be sure of interdicting all of the weapons. Of course once these weapons are sited they cannot stay sited for long otherwise the problems of pre-sited weapons comes into play. So either these weapons need to be used, in fairly short order, or they must be withdrawn with some of them, perhaps, discovered during the withdrawal and we're back to the problems with pre-sited weapons. The fact some of the weapons may be halted in transit means more than one weapon must be sent to the target(s) to ensure one of them will get through.
For a number or reasons the operational teams have to be fairly fanatical as the chances of being detected or killed through an 'Own Goal' are pretty good. From the Iranian Command and Control perspective this means the team may decide, upon detection, to detonate the sucker no matter where they are. Which means a land delivery system is not a reliable point targeting system and detonation can occur just about anywhere at just about any time. Therefore, Land Delivery systems while theoretically point systems need to be considered as potential area systems.
And we're back to that, again.
Given this, superficial, discussion the question now becomes, "With all the problems, why the hell do they want these things?"
As has been already mentioned, nuclear weapons are a political weapon that, in the last resort, make the statement: Don't Mess With Us. Whether or no Iran can use nukes they could use them and that's enough. Once these weapons are operational Iran immediately becomes the Islamic Middle Eastern Power and eventually a Global Political Power capable of forcing the world to its will. Once they have the weapons the ability to develop a reliable delivery system (missles) becomes a matter of time, money, and effort; this is what is causing the goverments of France and Germany concern. (Along with a bomb placed on a ship and sailing into Marseille, Hamburg, Jaffe, or New York but this post is already too long to go into that!)
OK, what are the options preventing Iran going nuclear?
Military: Forget it. A conventional bombing campaign will not guarantee destruction of any weapons already existing. Nor will it guarantee destruction of weapons making material disbursed across Iran. A pre-emptive nuclear strike won't guarantee destruction either and it ensures retaliation from Iran, if or when. (And what about Pakistan? What happens there? How do you prevent contamination of the Middle Eastern oilfields? How do you prevent destruction of the ports?) Military invasion and occupation just makes it easier to target the occupying forces. Neither does it totally preclude land, or ship, delivery to a target.
A blockade is pointless. It will not stop development while giving a greater impetus to develop and force an end to the blockade.
Political: All we need to do is convince the Iranian political leadership for all time not to make these weapons. How?
Economic: I've mentioned several times Iran needs money to successfully complete a weapons program. OK, all we need to do is (1) stop buying oil and (2) hope like hell they don't have enough money already to fund the project. H'mm. That doesn't look so great either.
Technical: Prevent Iran from purchasing the required tools. This one does have some hope of success but they could make them internally, given time and the need. So it is only a short term solution.
Wrapping this up.
If Iran wants to make nuclear weapons ... they will, eventually. While they, currently, face severe operational problems if they try to use nuclear weapons these limitations are not insurmountable. Immediate global prevention options do not seem insurmountable, by the Iranians, either. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
To your first query:
Yes. And No. And I got a bit 'over the top.' ;-)
Yes. I'm going too fast, as I understand the situation, Iran has not yet fully developed fusion weapons and a global delivery system - ICBMs.
No, if one assumes, and it is an assumption, they can low-tech their way through. What would Germany, or France, or the US do if the goverment was informed: Either X or kiss Hamburg/Marseilles/New York goodbye? What would happen if they said: Either X or kiss the Iranian and Saudi oil fields goodbye? This gets into the difference between capability and intension.
I don't defend 'over the top' use of "forcing the World & etc." My Bad. What I should have wrote was, "increasing political stakes such that the decisions of other powers would be more likely to accord with the political position of Iran."
As to your second query: I can only speak generally. To put as much resources into a nuclear weapons program as that program requires intimates a consensus from a widespread, however deep, Iranian political alliance among the Iranian ruling elites. Which suggests there is not a single but a diverse range of reasons - IF they DO have such a program which is not certain, according to other posts in this thread. She believed in nothing; only her skepticism kept her from being an atheist. -- Jean-Paul Sartre
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