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One of the most worryingly points against that is the recurring (and non-negotionable) urgency Iran puts on having gas (or isotope) centrifuges, those massive uranium enrichers. For the civilian use of nuclear energy, Iran needs centrifuges which can enrich uranium from its natural 0.7% to the necessarry 4 to 5% - after which nuclear fission is attainable.
Iran has and is building bigger gas centrifuges. There is but one goal for bigger gas centrifuges: higher uranium enrichment. There is but one goal known to man for uranium with higher enrichment than 4 - 5 percent: nuclear weapons. Do the math. Alarm bells should be ringing and they do ring in the IAEA.
And in that respect, I think there is a serious problem in Iran and Europe should not accept the way it gets treated. The Iranians even snuffed the perfectly acceptable offer of the Russians.
Having gas centrifuges for 4-5 % enrichment? Perfectly acceptable to me. Go ahead. Gas centrifuges bigger than that? No, no, no.
In an aside: To other raised points that there would be perfect reasons for Iran to have nukes, as deterrents or such, that doesn't fly with me at all. We want to ban nuclear arms, not promote it.
The other part of your point is good. Who says that they are building bigger centrifuges? Are there no other reasons for building them?
Who says that they are building bigger centrifuges? Are there no other reasons for building them?
IAEA has released very little substantial materials besides their resolutions on this matter, but the press officer has released tentative hints. We'll have to wait on the IAEA report early March to see what's left of this. Note that the press isn't helpful on the issue as the focus is on enrichment only. Never mind that there's a difference between civilian and military use. Yet now everything that links to enrichment is Bad. Chalk that one up to bad press reporting.
According to the opinion of people working at ECN Petten, one of the two locations in the Netherlands with nuclear technology, bigger centrifuges are only meant for nuclear weapons.
Chalk that one up to bad press reporting.
Again?
My understanding of the process is that the difference between enriching uranium to a low level (for energy) and a high level (for weaponry) is simply a matter of scale -- if they are currently enriching uranium to a low level (which they claim that they are) the technology they already have can produce highly enriched uranium, it will just take a lot longer.
The attraction of bigger/more centrifuges is being able to get the uranium to that point faster.
Obviously, it is possible to build a centrifuge that makes it extremely hard to reach weapons grade, but as I understood it, one of those is so hobbled as to make fuel grade hard to reach too...
The physical principle is to use the centrifugal force to produce an "exponential atmosphere" in order to separate the lighter from the heavier isotopes in gas form. The process of enrichment proceeds by multiplicative increments.
I can write something more detailed if I must.
Larger centrifuges are able to produce higher gradients, so a higher degree of enrichment is possible at each step. A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
In particular can you comment on Nomad's assertion that there are centrifuges which are useful for fuel creation which are not useful for weapons creation?
To a first approximation, the number of enrichment cycles it would take to reach a given level of enrichment increases as the log of the level of enrichment. A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
Wikipedia has a brief article about Gas centrifuges. I could try to answer questions about that. A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
How hard is it to work maraging steel anyway?
Remember I'm not an engineer. A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
The key parameter is the centrifugal acceleration on the centrifuge's rim: this is proportional to the diameter of the centrifuge times the square of the rotation frequency... or the square of the speed at the rim divided by the diameter. In terms of structural stability, smaller is better. A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
Le début de l'enrichissement a été constaté mardi par une équipe d'inspecteurs de l'AIEA, qui s'est rendue sur le site pilote de Natanz, au sud-est de Téhéran. "Notre équipe a vu que les Iraniens avaient commencé à introduire de l'hexafluorure d'uranium (un gaz) dans des centrifugeuses non reliées en cascade", affirme cette source. A team of IAEA inspectors, who went to the Natanz experimental site, noted Tuesday that enrichment had begun. "Our team saw that the Iranians had started to introduce uranium hexafluoride (a gas) into non-cascaded centrifuges", said this source. Le fait que cette manipulation concerne des centrifugeuses isolées, et non reliées en cascade, signifie que l'Iran n'a pas commencé à procéder à un enrichissement d'uranium à grande échelle - procédure indispensable à la production des composantes d'une arme nucléaire, et chose pour laquelle l'Iran aurait encore besoin de plusieurs années, selon des experts. <snip> The fact that this experiment concerns separate centrifuges, not linked in cascade, means that Iran has not started the process of large-scale uranium enrichment -- indispensable to production of nuclear weapon components, and a process which will take Iran several years, according to experts. Une délégation iranienne est attendue le 20 février à Moscou pour de nouvelles négociations sur la proposition formulée par le Kremlin de faire enrichir en Russie tout l'uranium dont Téhéran aurait besoin pour un programme nucléaire civil. Les Européens et les Américains soutiennent cette initiative russe, qui n'a cependant, à ce jour, recueilli que des réactions en demi-teinte côté iranien. An Iranian delegation is expected to be in Moscow on 20th February for fresh negociations on the Kremlin's offer to enrich all the uranium Tehran would need for a civil nuclear programme. The Europeans and the Americans support this Russian initiative, which has only received, up to now, half-hearted reactions from the Iranian side.
A team of IAEA inspectors, who went to the Natanz experimental site, noted Tuesday that enrichment had begun. "Our team saw that the Iranians had started to introduce uranium hexafluoride (a gas) into non-cascaded centrifuges", said this source.
Le fait que cette manipulation concerne des centrifugeuses isolées, et non reliées en cascade, signifie que l'Iran n'a pas commencé à procéder à un enrichissement d'uranium à grande échelle - procédure indispensable à la production des composantes d'une arme nucléaire, et chose pour laquelle l'Iran aurait encore besoin de plusieurs années, selon des experts. <snip>
The fact that this experiment concerns separate centrifuges, not linked in cascade, means that Iran has not started the process of large-scale uranium enrichment -- indispensable to production of nuclear weapon components, and a process which will take Iran several years, according to experts.
Une délégation iranienne est attendue le 20 février à Moscou pour de nouvelles négociations sur la proposition formulée par le Kremlin de faire enrichir en Russie tout l'uranium dont Téhéran aurait besoin pour un programme nucléaire civil. Les Européens et les Américains soutiennent cette initiative russe, qui n'a cependant, à ce jour, recueilli que des réactions en demi-teinte côté iranien.
An Iranian delegation is expected to be in Moscow on 20th February for fresh negociations on the Kremlin's offer to enrich all the uranium Tehran would need for a civil nuclear programme. The Europeans and the Americans support this Russian initiative, which has only received, up to now, half-hearted reactions from the Iranian side.
NEXT STEPS 20 February, Moscow: Russia-Iran talks on Russia's proposed compromise March, Vienna: IAEA to report on Iranian compliance; possible Security Council action to follow
My gut (there we go again...) tells me Iran will reject the offer, but we'll see on the 20th.
Iran is full of shit when it proclaims that its nuclear program is all nice and peacefull. It's plain false (or the Iranians have really no clue what they are putting their money into). Their program is for military use. Those who proclaim that the sky is falling are also full of shit. Iran is nowhere near having a bomb. At least 10 years away, or, assuming that it throws at it every bit of money and resources it has (and starve its population to death), makes no attempt to hide the program from the rest of the planet and get every technical detail right on first try, a strict minimum of 5 years.
Those who proclaim that the sky is falling are also full of shit. Iran is nowhere near having a bomb. At least 10 years away, or, assuming that it throws at it every bit of money and resources it has (and starve its population to death), makes no attempt to hide the program from the rest of the planet and get every technical detail right on first try, a strict minimum of 5 years.
I'm not knowledgeable enough about the exact process, and was pretty much hoping my post wouldn't get too much flak, as I would've to bail... Your post is extremely useful and very much appreciated.
The plutonium track & slow-burn reactor was completely new to me; most of what I have informed myself about was on the uranium enrichment controversy.
So, it just doesn't make any sense except if they want to control the level of enrichment, not targeting lightly enriched uranium for light-water reactors, but ultra-high enriched uranium for nukes.
That's similar to my own conclusion pretty much based on what I knew... The plutonium angle adds a whole other dimension. Now it's no wonder at all why the IAEA is at high alert.
The other bit, which I didn't want to put here since I know even less about it, was that the Iranian yellowcake of U3O8 is not pure grade enough caused by contamination of Be(?)-oxydes, which has a similar atomic weight as 235-U. But this falls into the categorie debunking the warmongers...
To give a criticism from another angle than afew, this has been the publicly stated policy of Iran since at least 1992. You may argue that it is not economic, but such an argument doesn't convince me given my knowledge of the economic irrationalism of another regime. (Hungary was supposed to become a land of steel, altough neither iron ores nor demand was up to it. Later, a grand programme to build lignite-fired power plants was started, only there wasn't enough lignite and mining it was enormously expensive.)
Iran claimed that the Arak reactor is for medical radioisotope production. The issue is that Iran already has a zero-power research reactor in Esfahan under IAEA control but is not using it actively, so their claim about the Arak reactor doesn't hold.
I don't get your argument. What does the current non-use of research reactors have to do with the use of one from 2014 on? And, as said above, as Iran wants to control the full fuel cycle, would building an own reactor with own technology and own-produced fuel, rather than just use Chinese-supplied technology and fuel, be part of that? Especially as the HWZPR is small and not fitted with hot cells.
This also brings me to the question of timing. Arak would not be ready by 2014 - and the EU-3+USA dismissed an Irani offer to suspend centrifuge enrichment for two years, provocately demanding a 10-year moratorium instead (let everything built rust, yeah that's acceptable), as well as Ahmadineyad's offer to let the enrichment facilities be run as joint facilities with foreign provate companies. Thus neither of your two fears would have had to be an issue now, or anytime when there is IAEA oversight. In my opinion, we are seeing a rush towards war, this time with wider European help (government change in Germany comes handy, and Chirac was always a cynic enough). *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
In my opinion, we are seeing a rush towards war, this time with wider European help (government change in Germany comes handy, and Chirac was always a cynic enough).
Hear! Hear!
This is to me the most disturbing aspect of the whole situation, the one most reminiscent of the Iraq debacle and the most frustrating part of the debate.
I cannot deny that the prospect of Iran with nuclear weapons does not fill me with joy. However, there seems to be an enormous pressure towards military action at the moment. As with Iraq, there seems to be a lot of people advocating a timescale of action which is much more rushed than the "facts on the ground" seem to justify.
Surely even those who claim great faith in the motives of the US and EU-3 at this time would be wary, given the progress in Iraq so far, of rushing into badly planned action?
To quantify this: according to the IAEA, the HWZPR has a mere 10^8 neutrons/cm²/sec flux, the Araz facility was scaled for a 10^13-10^14 neutrons/cm²/sec flux, and the latter is similar to some reactors for similar purposes, including one China built for Algeria - which is on-topic because China was in negotiations in the nineties to export a similar reactor to Iran before the USA intervened. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Others also addressed the 'acceptable' and 'snuffed' offer from the Russians, and elsewhere I addressed the unreported part of Iranian offers and EU-3+USA refusals.
I add a further point. You acknowledged that the beryllium issue was false. You probably also remember the highly-enriched particles in Iranian centrifuges touted as absolute proof, which turned out to have been contamination from the Pakistani manufacturer. A third example is when the USA touted photos of Iranian nuclear facilities including Arak, claiming they are held secret - despite the facts that (a) under the NPTP, new facilities have to be reported six months before they come on-line - in Arak's case, that would be in late 2013 -, (b) the facilities were, in fact, already known by then, only not visited, (c) Iran has invited the IAEA to inspect those facilities, which then didn't yet happen.
Now, do you see a pattern? One reminding of 2002/3?
We want to ban nuclear arms, not promote it.
Indeed. And the NNPT explicitely involves the promise from existing powers to dismantle their arsenal. But they refuse to do so, what's more they refuse to give up on the first-strike option, in fact issue threats to use their nukes (USA, France), what's more one of them (the USA) wants to build a missile defense system that would strategically weaken rival existing nuclear powers (by reducing their return strike capacity). I don't know about you, but I cannot convince myself that this talk is only empty rhetoric, I do see a spectre of nuclear war. In this context, one possible target gaining deterrence may reduce the threat of a nuclear war.
This is not a promotion of nukes, quite the contrary. This is purely a counter-argument to the threat argument, and points to problems I see as more much serious on the way to ban nukes. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Of course I'm seeing a pattern, and I've hinted myself that I feel there are warmonger drums being banged. It's just not the main issue I'm addressing. There is propaganda from two sides and right now I'm not going to take any side as the truth. My problem lies specifically with the nuclear facilities of Iran and there it ends.
You acknowledged that the beryllium issue was false.
Where did I do that? I asked for confirmation whether Be-contamination of the hex was true. In what way do you mean it is false? I don't understand at all. Elaborate, please.
In this context, one possible target gaining deterrence may reduce the threat of a nuclear war.
Blech. I can see your reasoning, but I completely disagree. In Chris Kulczycki's diary on the Culture of Guns, you see that lesser weapons around result in smaller numbers of accidents. I'd go with that on this issue as well.
I find the hyporcricy of nuclear nations equally disturbing, but I would go never so far as to knead it into a counter-argument for an increasing nuclear arsenal. I can see why people would use it, but I find it utterly self-destructive. To me, this has always been a two pronged fight: demote the nuclear use in other countries and promote the disbanding of nuclear weapons in those countries which have it.
The problem is, of course, that you can read the propaganda of the Iranian side and the IAEA's factual assesments only channelled through sources often sympathetic to the EU-3+US side. Which sets the terms of the debate.
Where did I do that?
Sorry, was cursory reading, I completely messed up. I misread your last sentence in that post as an implicit reference that you know the following info: that the US claims that Iran imported large quantities of beryllium were disproved by IAEA a year ago. That one is in line with a series of over-egged to false claims, but not what you were speaking about.
Regarding what you were speaking about, the yellowcake impurities, worth to read this and this. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Which is why I generally go back to the IAEA as the most reliable source... I take their factual assessment any time above the clamour of Iran or the USA.
Thanks for the links to the UF gas. That's indeed the issue I was looking confirmation for. Unfortunately, nothing is "official". Sources are among others anonymous IAEA diplomats - which at least gives it an appearance of credibility.
Since then, Iran's oil production has halved, its population has doubled, and Iran consumes 40% of its oil production domestically.
As for "bigger" centrifgues -- this is the first time that I've heard of this claim, and secondly, so what? Bigger doesn't necessarily mean "for nuclear weapons" -- especially since Iran's enrichment program is under IAEA safeguards.
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