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DoDo says upthread that there is no "technical proof as of current that Iran does have a nuclear armament programme".

One of the most worryingly points against that is the recurring (and non-negotionable) urgency Iran puts on having gas (or isotope) centrifuges, those massive uranium enrichers. For the civilian use of nuclear energy, Iran needs centrifuges which can enrich uranium from its natural 0.7% to the necessarry 4 to 5% - after which nuclear fission is attainable.

Iran has and is building bigger gas centrifuges. There is but one goal for bigger gas centrifuges: higher uranium enrichment. There is but one goal known to man for uranium with higher enrichment than 4 - 5 percent: nuclear weapons. Do the math. Alarm bells should be ringing and they do ring in the IAEA.

And in that respect, I think there is a serious problem in Iran and Europe should not accept the way it gets treated. The Iranians even snuffed the perfectly acceptable offer of the Russians.

Having gas centrifuges for 4-5 % enrichment? Perfectly acceptable to me. Go ahead.
Gas centrifuges bigger than that? No, no, no.

In an aside: To other raised points that there would be perfect reasons for Iran to have nukes, as deterrents or such, that doesn't fly with me at all. We want to ban nuclear arms, not promote it.

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 10:11:53 AM EST
So what's your recommended course of action Sanctions, regime change, bigger carrots?
by lemonwilmot (lemonwilmot at gmail.com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 10:28:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
If you don't mind, I reserve my answer to your question to the next installment of the Gnomemoot: The Return. Nor have I finished chewing on it, anyway.
by Nomad (Bjinse) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 05:27:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The Russian offer would not be acceptable to a country that wanted nuclear power for strategic reasons: would you give Russia control of your fuel supply in that scenario? Where does Iran get it's uranium from?

The other part of your point is good. Who says that they are building bigger centrifuges? Are there no other reasons for building them?

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 11:15:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Agreed. As far as I understand it, the Russian deal dealt in yellowcake - which can also be used for civilian (nuclear fission) purposes. But I did not plunge too deeply into the details on that one.

Who says that they are building bigger centrifuges? Are there no other reasons for building them?

IAEA has released very little substantial materials besides their resolutions on this matter, but the press officer has released tentative hints. We'll have to wait on the IAEA report early March to see what's left of this. Note that the press isn't helpful on the issue as the focus is on enrichment only. Never mind that there's a difference between civilian and military use. Yet now everything that links to enrichment is Bad. Chalk that one up to bad press reporting.

According to the opinion of people working at ECN Petten, one of the two locations in the Netherlands with nuclear technology, bigger centrifuges are only meant for nuclear weapons.

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:09:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Chalk that one up to bad press reporting.

Again?

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:15:37 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Actually, they don't need bigger centrifuges so much as they'd need more of them.  And technically, they don't need more, either.

My understanding of the process is that the difference between enriching uranium to a low level (for energy) and a high level (for weaponry) is simply a matter of scale -- if they are currently enriching uranium to a low level (which they claim that they are) the technology they already have can produce highly enriched uranium, it will just take a lot longer.

The attraction of bigger/more centrifuges is being able to get the uranium to that point faster.

by the stormy present (stormypresent aaaaaaat gmail etc) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:23:55 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Thankyou! That was my understanding as well.

Obviously, it is possible to build a centrifuge that makes it extremely hard to reach weapons grade, but as I understood it, one of those is so hobbled as to make fuel grade hard to reach too...

by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:37:16 PM EST
[ Parent ]
References anyone? This is surely a point of contention that can be cleared up by the power of Google. Or a chemist.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:38:27 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You need a physicist ;-)

The physical principle is to use the centrifugal force to produce an "exponential atmosphere" in order to separate the lighter from the heavier isotopes in gas form. The process of enrichment proceeds by multiplicative increments.

I can write something more detailed if I must.

Larger centrifuges are able to produce higher gradients, so a higher degree of enrichment is possible at each step.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:53:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, I would request more detail, if you are willing.

In particular can you comment on Nomad's assertion that there are centrifuges which are useful for fuel creation which are not useful for weapons creation?

by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 01:34:25 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'll write more detail when I have time.

To a first approximation, the number of enrichment cycles it would take to reach a given level of enrichment increases as the log of the level of enrichment.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 01:36:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
On the engineering design side of the question I have little to say. Wikipedia says fuel grade is up to 5% enriched, but weapons grade is 20% (crude weapon) to 85% or more.

Wikipedia has a brief article about Gas centrifuges. I could try to answer questions about that.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 01:42:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
...has been lovely. I've been reading for a few hours this evening. Of course Francois pummeled me to the punch, but what gives.
by Nomad (Bjinse) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 05:31:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Migeru,

In practice, the diameter of a centrifuge is limited by the structural strength of material and the dimensional control. The larger, the more stress at a given rotational speed and the harder to maintain geometry (and keep the rotor balanced).

The determining factor for the dimension of a centrifuge is not really the enrichment target but simply technical feasibility.
by Francois in Paris on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 02:01:49 PM EST
[ Parent ]
BTW, have you seen any report on Iranian technical capabilities for metal work. Are they using aluminium or maraging steel?

by Francois in Paris on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 02:04:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I have no idea.

How hard is it to work maraging steel anyway?

Remember I'm not an engineer.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 03:56:17 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, the rumours are that maraging steel is an important smuggling item into Iran. But, I don't know how reliable the rumours are.
by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 04:05:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I do believe they are using maraging steel at least at the Natanz facility.

Bitsofnews.com Giving you the latest bits.
by Gjermund E Jansen (gjans1@hotmail.com) on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 02:43:17 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, at least some of them seems to be.....

Bitsofnews.com Giving you the latest bits.
by Gjermund E Jansen (gjans1@hotmail.com) on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 04:10:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You're right: it all comes down to a balance between how big the centrifuge is and how fast you can make it spin.

The key parameter is the centrifugal acceleration on the centrifuge's rim: this is proportional to the diameter of the centrifuge times the square of the rotation frequency... or the square of the speed at the rim divided by the diameter. In terms of structural stability, smaller is better.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 03:54:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
From Le Monde:

Le début de l'enrichissement a été constaté mardi par une équipe d'inspecteurs de l'AIEA, qui s'est rendue sur le site pilote de Natanz, au sud-est de Téhéran. "Notre équipe a vu que les Iraniens avaient commencé à introduire de l'hexafluorure d'uranium (un gaz) dans des centrifugeuses non reliées en cascade", affirme cette source.

A team of IAEA inspectors, who went to the Natanz experimental site, noted Tuesday that enrichment had begun. "Our team saw that the Iranians had started to introduce uranium hexafluoride (a gas) into non-cascaded centrifuges", said this source.

Le fait que cette manipulation concerne des centrifugeuses isolées, et non reliées en cascade, signifie que l'Iran n'a pas commencé à procéder à un enrichissement d'uranium à grande échelle - procédure indispensable à la production des composantes d'une arme nucléaire, et chose pour laquelle l'Iran aurait encore besoin de plusieurs années, selon des experts. <snip>

The fact that this experiment concerns separate centrifuges, not linked in cascade, means that Iran has not started the process of large-scale uranium enrichment -- indispensable to production of nuclear weapon components, and a process which will take Iran several years, according to experts.

Une délégation iranienne est attendue le 20 février à Moscou pour de nouvelles négociations sur la proposition formulée par le Kremlin de faire enrichir en Russie tout l'uranium dont Téhéran aurait besoin pour un programme nucléaire civil. Les Européens et les Américains soutiennent cette initiative russe, qui n'a cependant, à ce jour, recueilli que des réactions en demi-teinte côté iranien.

An Iranian delegation is expected to be in Moscow on 20th February for fresh negociations on the Kremlin's offer to enrich all the uranium Tehran would need for a civil nuclear programme. The Europeans and the Americans support this Russian initiative, which has only received, up to now, half-hearted reactions from the Iranian side.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 02:03:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Accoriding to the BBC page linked by Metatone Iran has not refused the Russian offer.
NEXT STEPS
20 February, Moscow: Russia-Iran talks on Russia's proposed compromise
March, Vienna: IAEA to report on Iranian compliance; possible Security Council action to follow


A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:19:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Huh. I thought they had.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:22:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Chalk that one up to bad press reporting.

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:25:10 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I hadn't heard of Iran rejecting it.  The FT reporters seemed to imply that the Iranians were leaning towards rejection but were reconsidering, given the hardline stances of the EU3 and the US.  I don't think Iran was expecting Germany, Britain and France to come out as close to the US as they have.  I still can't figure out the assertiveness coming out of Paris.  Germany and France's words and actions are a big reason for why I'm even willing to entertain the subject, because it's nearly impossible for me to trust anything out of Downing Street these days, let alone the Bush administration.

Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.
by Drew J Jones (pedobear@pennstatefootball.com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 12:41:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
...I thought they had, too. But I guess that in this game the sides quickly change. I'd go with Drew for the most accurate state of things.

My gut (there we go again...) tells me Iran will reject the offer, but we'll see on the 20th.

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 05:22:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Nomad,

Attainable enrichment levels are not related with the size of the centrifuges but with how many of them are cascaded. A chain to produce 4% U235 uranium can produce 98% HEU by recirculation. It "just" takes longer (much longer). Ideally, you want more centrifuges, a bigger cascade to maintain acceptable processing times.

The centrifuges are one of the warning signals coming from Iran. The official explanation is that Iran desires to control its own fuel cycle. But this is a huge investment for a very dubious return. Iran's uranium resources are very modest - nowhere near what they need to cover a large scale deployment of nuclear power plants - so they will have to go abroad to buy natural uranium to put in their enrichment cascades. They may as well buy large quantities of reactor-grade lightly enriched uranium to protect themselves from any foreseeable embargo and concentrate on things like fuel conditioning and post-processing.

So, it just doesn't make any sense except if they want to control the level of enrichment, not targeting lightly enriched uranium for light-water reactors, but ultra-high enriched uranium for nukes.


In my opinion, the real give-away is what's going on in Arak. Iran is building a 40 MW heavy water reactor outside the IAEA control.

A slow-burn heavy water reactor has no interest for energy production and doesn't help Iran to design reactors for energy production. There is only one civilian reactor technology using heavy water - the CANDU reactors - and the very point of that type of reactors is that it can use natural uranium as fuel. So, for civilian purposes, it's either heavy water or enrichment but not both. In addition, CANDU-like reactors are technically pretty complex and this is not what a third-world country would start with for an indigenous design. Iran has nothing to learn from a slow-burn reactor which is not already widely available in open literature.

Slow-burn reactors have only 2 uses:
  • As a neutron source for various usages: radionuclide production, material tests, etc.
  • High purity Pu239 production


Iran claimed that the Arak reactor is for medical radioisotope production. The issue is that Iran already has a zero-power research reactor in Esfahan under IAEA control but is not using it actively, so their claim about the Arak reactor doesn't hold. Let's be very broadminded and assume that Iran has legitimate uses for plutonium, such as MOX fuel for light water reactors and get more bang for their fuel buck. That same type of light water reactor, like the 1000W reactor in Bushser, is a good source of plutonium suitable for MOX cycle and, on top, actually produces useful energy. No need for a slow-burn reactor.

But plutonium produced (and used as MOX) by those light water reactors with a normal fuel cycle is not just Pu239 but a mixture of Pu239, Pu240 with bits of Pu241. Those isotopes are produced when Pu239 absorbs more neutrons. Pu240 and Pu241 are horribly radioactive, including spontaneous neutron decay. So, while it still possible to use reactor-grade plutonium to build nukes, those nukes are very dangerous and have serious issues:
  • Explosive yield is very hard to predict and the risk of a complete or partial dude is high.
  • Those weapons are very dangerous to store and manipulate because of radioactive decay heat and radiation exposure to personnel.
  • There is a non-negligible risk of auto-ignition, which would certainly not generate the full yield but still make a fine mess of your cherished nuclear weapon storage facility.

That's where slow-burn reactors kick in. They run on natural uranium (no need for enrichment) and it's the only way to produce high purity Pu239, which is easy to extract from the reactor fuel by chemical process (easy as compared to U235 enrichment).

The enrichment capacity and the heavy water reactor are consistent with a diversified, dual-track uranium/plutonium military nuclear program, similar to the North Korean program, and nothing else.

With the highly-enriched uranium track, the issue is the uranium enrichment, slow and expensive, but the weapon assembly can be very simple, safe and very reliable. The weapon can as simple as a gun assembly, similar to the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima. There is no need to test those weapons. They work. Period.

For the plutonium track, producing the Pu239 nuke fuel is fairly easy and only involves slow-burn reactors running on natural uranium and a bit of weird heavy metal chemistry for separating the plutonium from the uranium fuel rods. The issue lies with the weapon itself, which must be a implosion assembly, a very complex design. Incidentally, it is that type of weapon the US tested at Trinity before dropping one, Fat Man, on Nagasaki. They weren't sure at all it would work, while the Hiroshima bomb wasn't tested beforehand as the Manhattan folks knew it would work.

Iran is full of shit when it proclaims that its nuclear program is all nice and peacefull. It's plain false (or the Iranians have really no clue what they are putting their money into). Their program is for military use.

Those who proclaim that the sky is falling are also full of shit. Iran is nowhere near having a bomb. At least 10 years away, or, assuming that it throws at it every bit of money and resources it has (and starve its population to death), makes no attempt to hide the program from the rest of the planet and get every technical detail right on first try, a strict minimum of 5 years.
by Francois in Paris on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 01:40:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Iran is full of shit when it proclaims that its nuclear program is all nice and peacefull. It's plain false (or the Iranians have really no clue what they are putting their money into). Their program is for military use.

Those who proclaim that the sky is falling are also full of shit. Iran is nowhere near having a bomb. At least 10 years away, or, assuming that it throws at it every bit of money and resources it has (and starve its population to death), makes no attempt to hide the program from the rest of the planet and get every technical detail right on first try, a strict minimum of 5 years.

This seems well said, and many agree with this point of view.  I'm certainly not knowledgeable enough to take it on.  But,,,,,,one's intelligence is never perfect, and gaining consensus on an opinion will be difficult--so you'll have to have some probability range around this.  Like for example, they can accomplish this under cover in 5 years--maybe people would take that as a worst case option.  I think Colman is looking for a problem statement like that, so we can move on to "now what do we do?"
by wchurchill on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 02:19:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The 5/10 years estimate deserves an explanation.

The 10 years seems to be the general consensus that floats around most experts and intelligence agencies, assuming Iran maintains its program on a steady clip and doesn't hit major technology snags. From what I understand, it's based on what is known of the current state of Iran's nuclear program, reasonable assumptions on resources and know-how, and comparisons with other military nuclear programs in the past. Iranians seem to be serious, competent and well-organized and there is no reason to believe they won't get there if they are decided to get there. But it's going to take time and they are not there yet.

The 5 years lower bound is not really an estimate but more of a standard cover-your-ass disclaimer, based on the 3 years it took to the Manhattan project from its founding to building weapons:
- On one hand, most of the science and technology that the Manhattan project had to invent is now in the public domain.
- On the other hand, the amount of resources and talents the US threw in this effort was absolutely staggering, mind-blowing, earth-shattering (throw in any superlative you want, it deserves it). There's nothing in human history that compares to that, save, may be the race to the Moon.

A third-world country has a strong head start on the Oppenheimer team and doesn't need to reinvent the science behind the bomb. But it cannot replicate the resources. So counting the amount of time to build the nuclear piles, the facilities to reprocess the fuel and extract plutonium, do the research for the weapons, and get the whole thing running, it all comes to about 5 years.
by Francois in Paris on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 10:50:53 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The latest US NIE seems to put it at 10 years, not 5 (nor 5-10), due to the problems Nomad mentioned. (Not that I believe there is proof that a nuke is the end goal, just sayin'.)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 11:55:27 AM EST
[ Parent ]
That's why it's important to stress what the 5 years figure really is : a CYA absolute worst case, not a realistic assessment. I was being negligent there.
by Francois in Paris on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 12:55:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Francois,

I'm not knowledgeable enough about the exact process, and was pretty much hoping my post wouldn't get too much flak, as I would've to bail... Your post is extremely useful and very much appreciated.

The plutonium track & slow-burn reactor was completely new to me; most of what I have informed myself about was on the uranium enrichment controversy.

So, it just doesn't make any sense except if they want to control the level of enrichment, not targeting lightly enriched uranium for light-water reactors, but ultra-high enriched uranium for nukes.

That's similar to my own conclusion pretty much based on what I knew... The plutonium angle adds a whole other dimension. Now it's no wonder at all why the IAEA is at high alert.

The other bit, which I didn't want to put here since I know even less about it, was that the Iranian yellowcake of U3O8 is not pure grade enough caused by contamination of Be(?)-oxydes, which has a similar atomic weight as 235-U. But this falls into the categorie debunking the warmongers...

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 05:13:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But isn't that possible to separate by chemical means?

A society committed to the notion that government is always bad will have bad government. And it doesn't have to be that way. — Paul Krugman
by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 05:21:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
As I understand it, it is, but it's extremely hard and you need a different apparatus for it - which practically everyone suspects Iran does not have yet. This was one of the main reasons why the 5 to 10 years figure floats up every time.
by Nomad (Bjinse) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 05:26:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The centrifuges are one of the warning signals coming from Iran. The official explanation is that Iran desires to control its own fuel cycle.

To give a criticism from another angle than afew, this has been the publicly stated policy of Iran since at least 1992. You may argue that it is not economic, but such an argument doesn't convince me given my knowledge of the economic irrationalism of another regime. (Hungary was supposed to become a land of steel, altough neither iron ores nor demand was up to it. Later, a grand programme to build lignite-fired power plants was started, only there wasn't enough lignite and mining it was enormously expensive.)

Iran claimed that the Arak reactor is for medical radioisotope production. The issue is that Iran already has a zero-power research reactor in Esfahan under IAEA control but is not using it actively, so their claim about the Arak reactor doesn't hold.

I don't get your argument. What does the current non-use of research reactors have to do with the use of one from 2014 on? And, as said above, as Iran wants to control the full fuel cycle, would building an own reactor with own technology and own-produced fuel, rather than just use Chinese-supplied technology and fuel, be part of that? Especially as the HWZPR is small and not fitted with hot cells.

This also brings me to the question of timing. Arak would not be ready by 2014 - and the EU-3+USA dismissed an Irani offer to suspend centrifuge enrichment for two years, provocately demanding a 10-year moratorium instead (let everything built rust, yeah that's acceptable), as well as Ahmadineyad's offer to let the enrichment facilities be run as joint facilities with foreign provate companies. Thus neither of your two fears would have had to be an issue now, or anytime when there is IAEA oversight. In my opinion, we are seeing a rush towards war, this time with wider European help (government change in Germany comes handy, and Chirac was always a cynic enough).

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 05:33:33 PM EST
[ Parent ]
In my opinion, we are seeing a rush towards war, this time with wider European help (government change in Germany comes handy, and Chirac was always a cynic enough).

Hear! Hear!

This is to me the most disturbing aspect of the whole situation, the one most reminiscent of the Iraq debacle and the most frustrating part of the debate.

I cannot deny that the prospect of Iran with nuclear weapons does not fill me with joy. However, there seems to be an enormous pressure towards military action at the moment. As with Iraq, there seems to be a lot of people advocating a timescale of action which is much more rushed than the "facts on the ground" seem to justify.

Surely even those who claim great faith in the motives of the US and EU-3 at this time would be wary, given the progress in Iraq so far, of rushing into badly planned action?

by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Fri Feb 17th, 2006 at 06:16:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Especially as the HWZPR is small

To quantify this: according to the IAEA, the HWZPR has a mere 10^8 neutrons/cm²/sec flux, the Araz facility was scaled for a 10^13-10^14 neutrons/cm²/sec flux, and the latter is similar to some reactors for similar purposes, including one China built for Algeria - which is on-topic because China was in negotiations in the nineties to export a similar reactor to Iran before the USA intervened.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 04:32:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My issue with Iran is the two-track thing. It's heavy water or enrichment but not both.

Enrichment is legitimate to fuel light-water reactors such as the one in Bushehr. Although, as I mentioned above, it probably doesn't make any economic sense. If Iran wants to secure its fuel supply, it would be much better off by adopting a clear non-proliferation attitude and uses it to justify acquiring a big stockpile of lightly enriched uranium that would protect it from an embargo.

The heavy water reactor in Arak would also make sense if they want to develop a natural uranium track for civilian reactors (google for CANDU). But this is not what they are saying. And no, it doesn't make sense to build a new research reactor when they are not using the one they already have. Developing a sensible and useful research program is not something you pull off your ass like in "Mmmm, lemmesee, what are we going to irradiate today?"

As for Chirac, Bush, Ahmadinejad and assorted psychopaths, I play by Colman's rules of the Gnomemoot. First the facts, discussion of motivations later [thank you, Colman].

Right now, the issue I'm trying to discuss is whether or not Iran is trying to get nuclear weapons. And having looked at the available information, having run reasonable assumptions on said information, having considered the facts in the most dispassionate manner, having thought the expertise of reputable, knowledgeable and unbiased specialists, having maintained a clear-head and reasonable approach in the general assessment of the situation, my answer will be, trying to muster my best imitation of Lewis Black,

Yesssss!!! Yesssss, God damnit!!! Which part of the word "Yesssss!!!" do you fail to understand !?!?!?

[just a sec so I sponge the foaming spit which is dribbling from my mouth]

Yesssss!!! Yesssss!!! Yesssss!!!

Not that I see that as such a big problem, but that will be for another session of the Gnomemoot.
by Francois in Paris on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 12:19:03 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Supplementing other replies regarding the centrifuges (e.g. no sole use for nuclear enrichment, only enrichment in less steps/faster), one ignored point is that Iran's centrifuges are not an Iranian but an imported Pakistani design. You could argue that the Pakistanis did indeed use their centrifuges to produce bomb-grade uranium. However, given the context that the USA prevented Iran from gaining nuclear technology it was entitled to under the NNPT with diplomatic pressure, getting even China to renege on contracts, the "you get them where you can" argument holds.

Others also addressed the 'acceptable' and 'snuffed' offer from the Russians, and elsewhere I addressed the unreported part of Iranian offers and EU-3+USA refusals.

I add a further point. You acknowledged that the beryllium issue was false. You probably also remember the highly-enriched particles in Iranian centrifuges touted as absolute proof, which turned out to have been contamination from the Pakistani manufacturer. A third example is when the USA touted photos of Iranian nuclear facilities including Arak, claiming they are held secret - despite the facts that (a) under the NPTP, new facilities have to be reported six months before they come on-line - in Arak's case, that would be in late 2013 -, (b) the facilities were, in fact, already known by then, only not visited, (c) Iran has invited the IAEA to inspect those facilities, which then didn't yet happen.

Now, do you see a pattern? One reminding of 2002/3?

We want to ban nuclear arms, not promote it.

Indeed. And the NNPT explicitely involves the promise from existing powers to dismantle their arsenal. But they refuse to do so, what's more they refuse to give up on the first-strike option, in fact issue threats to use their nukes (USA, France), what's more one of them (the USA) wants to build a missile defense system that would strategically weaken rival existing nuclear powers (by reducing their return strike capacity). I don't know about you, but I cannot convince myself that this talk is only empty rhetoric, I do see a spectre of nuclear war. In this context, one possible target gaining deterrence may reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

This is not a promotion of nukes, quite the contrary. This is purely a counter-argument to the threat argument, and points to problems I see as more much serious on the way to ban nukes.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 04:23:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Now, do you see a pattern? One reminding of 2002/3?

Of course I'm seeing a pattern, and I've hinted myself that I feel there are warmonger drums being banged. It's just not the main issue I'm addressing. There is propaganda from two sides and right now I'm not going to take any side as the truth. My problem lies specifically with the nuclear facilities of Iran and there it ends.

You acknowledged that the beryllium issue was false.

Where did I do that? I asked for confirmation whether Be-contamination of the hex was true. In what way do you mean it is false? I don't understand at all. Elaborate, please.

In this context, one possible target gaining deterrence may reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

Blech. I can see your reasoning, but I completely disagree. In Chris Kulczycki's diary on the Culture of Guns, you see that lesser weapons around result in smaller numbers of accidents. I'd go with that on this issue as well.

I find the hyporcricy of nuclear nations equally disturbing, but I would go never so far as to knead it into a counter-argument for an increasing nuclear arsenal. I can see why people would use it, but I find it utterly self-destructive. To me, this has always been a two pronged fight: demote the nuclear use in other countries and promote the disbanding of nuclear weapons in those countries which have it.

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 09:36:04 AM EST
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There is propaganda from two sides and right now I'm not going to take any side as the truth.

The problem is, of course, that you can read the propaganda of the Iranian side and the IAEA's factual assesments only channelled through sources often sympathetic to the EU-3+US side. Which sets the terms of the debate.

Where did I do that?

Sorry, was cursory reading, I completely messed up. I misread your last sentence in that post as an implicit reference that you know the following info: that the US claims that Iran imported large quantities of beryllium were disproved by IAEA a year ago. That one is in line with a series of over-egged to false claims, but not what you were speaking about.

Regarding what you were speaking about, the yellowcake impurities, worth to read this and this.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Feb 18th, 2006 at 11:50:41 AM EST
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The problem is, of course, that you can read the propaganda of the Iranian side and the IAEA's factual assesments only channelled through sources often sympathetic to the EU-3+US side. Which sets the terms of the debate.

Which is why I generally go back to the IAEA as the most reliable source... I take their factual assessment any time above the clamour of Iran or the USA.

Thanks for the links to the UF gas. That's indeed the issue I was looking confirmation for. Unfortunately, nothing is "official". Sources are among others anonymous IAEA diplomats - which at least gives it an appearance of credibility.

by Nomad (Bjinse) on Sun Feb 19th, 2006 at 05:23:03 AM EST
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Iran's "urgency" in developing nuclear enrichment technology could be for the very reasonable reason that their nuclear program has fallen behind by decades -- remember, it was the Shah that started the program, and Iran was supposed to have 7 functioning nuclear reactors by now.

Since then, Iran's oil production has halved, its population has doubled, and Iran consumes 40% of its oil production domestically.

As for "bigger" centrifgues -- this is the first time that I've heard of this claim, and secondly, so what? Bigger doesn't necessarily mean "for nuclear weapons" -- especially since Iran's enrichment program is under IAEA safeguards.

by CyrusI on Fri Mar 10th, 2006 at 05:33:05 PM EST
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