2.) "Responsibility for Western Sahara lies originally with Spain."

What are you saying?
I think it has been a humanitarian crises for decades. It is close to Europe, the EU should try to broker a solution, if Spain can't do so or is considered biased (?) for historical reasons (?) I don't know.

3.) Re Cyprus: Still, it is a conflict in our backyard. And then you got the issue of Turkish EU membership and those silly Turkish-Greek quarrels that resulted in that fighter plane crash recently. These conflicts don't appear to be sooooo difficult as Darfur/Iran/Iraq, but the EU hasn't solved them. Why?

4.) Re Bosnia: I criticize that there are still thousands of our troops in Bosnia. The EU should bring peace to Bosnia and withdraw its troops rather than babysit for decades. European papers criticize the political failures in Iraq. The political issues in Bosnia and Kosovo don't appear to be as complicated, but the EU does not make any progress.

5.) Conclusion:
Colman criticizes US failures and blames it on their stupidity; not just on Bush, another party in power would not make a difference, hes wrote.

Perhaps I exaggerate, but for me this suggests that Colman assumes that the European governments are smarter and more successful in solving conflicts, if those stupid Americans don't interfere as they do Iran. Thus I pointed to some other ongoing conflicts, which the EU should have solved. Instead of discussing those conflicts and EU shortcominings, most European newspapers and citizens discuss US failurs.

Joerg: But who is to blame for the EU failure to bring peace to Algeria during the ten years of civil war? Why did not the EU negotiate a peace? Is the US to blame for that as well? ... Or Bosnia? Or Kosovo?

*Migeru": Regarding Kosovo, UpstateNY has provided interesting insights into the less-than-helpful diplomacy conducted by the US. I shall dig up the links.

As well, I don't believe Bosnia should have been split up as envisioned by Izebetgovic/Tudjman/Milosevic early on. The Vance Owen plan seemed to present a perfectly functional framework for gov't, one that worked elswehere, and without 100,000 deaths that ensued, the people would have been much more capable of getting along in a power-sharing gov't.

I think Holbrooke was one of the few who did things correctly. He essentially fought for the plan that Jim Baker killed three years earlier (Vance/Owen). If you look at Dayton and Vance Owen, they are very similar. Holbrooke was also very critical of Albright and her boy Jamie's conduct of Kosovo diplomacy. I dare say that if Holbrooke were still in charge, Kosovo would be a very different (and much better place) today.

When it comes to American diplomats dealing with the Balkans in the 90's, I rank them like so:

1. Holbrooke
.....
.....

703. Albright and Jamie
     
704. Jim Baker

Well, it depends on what you mean by integrity. Jamie was instrumental in sidelining the Kosovo Albanian leadership like Ibrahim Rugova in favor of KLA leaders like Hasim Thaci who were previously considered a bit too thuggish (by Holbrooke). By isolating Rugova and keeping him out of the talks, Rubin effectively triggered the collapse of talks at Rambouillet, especially when Thaci rejected the Serb acquiescence to Albright's demands for Kosovo.

I listened to Amanpour closely during that period. Her portrayal of the KLA as freedom fighters and her reportage PRIOR to western bombing were all too closely linked to the work of her husband on the ground. That's what I question. There were definite decisions for the West to make at that point, and Holbrooke would have opted for Rugova and a peaceful settlement. Instead, Albright opted for Rubin's way, and the clash ensued.

The Serbs AGREED to Albright's demands at Rambouillet. They did NOT refuse a NATO military presence in Kosovo at Ramby. They allowed it. The Albanian side came into the room with Albright, as Albright was sponsoring them. She was reported to be completely livid by the Albanian response. When the meeting reconvened, the new text of the agreement included a proviso which stated that NATO would deploy to Serbia proper and have effective free reign. That's what the Serbs refused.

Look into the Rambouillet negotiations. There you will find your answer. The Serbs agreed to permanently give up the province so that the UN and NATO could rule it. This was 6 months before the war. However, because Albright had sidelined the peaceful elements of the Kosovo leadership (i.e. Ibrahim Rugova) she was left with egg on her face when the Serb capitulation at Ramby surprised both her and Hasim Thaci sitting beside her. To the Serbs, "Yes, we agree," Thaci replied with a "No, we Albanians do not agree." Albright was absolutely stunned. They left the room, and they came back with an additional demand. The Serbs would not only leave Kosovo and give it up to the UN, but they would allow the UN and NATO unfettered control of Serbia proper. A non-starter. Obviously. And there you have the blown diplomacy that led to the war. Without the hostilities that ensued, both sides would have been more amenable to a bicommunal federal state on the order of Bosnia. First off, 35% of the population were non-Albanians at the time as opposed to the 95% today. Fromm Racak to Operation Horseshoe, the West concocted an ethnic cleansing plan which had no basis in reality. before the bombs started dropping, Kosovo was a low-level counter-insurgency skirmish in which less than 1,500 had died in gun battles, about a third of those Serbs, and one thousand Albanians.

Since Serbia is a regional power, the UN and EU will have to provide protection for many many years to Kosovo, and in so doing they will also have to prop it up financially. Until that time when both areas are integrated into the EU--if they ever are. Albania will be an EU member before this comes to pass.

Really, this is what happens when political neophytes like Madeliene albright try to make a necessary political point (punishment of Milosevic) without considering the consequences. If the Serbs see Kosovo as their land (and they surely do) they will regard it as such until that time that the fact of Kosovo's independence is completely erased from their cultural memory. That takes a long time. Probably a century. The fact that there have been 6 Balkan Wars in the last century, not including warring between these factions during the World Wars and the Kosovo War of 1999 shows that the two sides are not averse to fighting it out again and again and again over this same patch of territory. The colossal failure of diplomacy at Rambouillet is to blame for this mess. Had Albright done the proper thing and stuck by her initial proposals (which the Serbs accepted much to her consternation) then we would have had a viable peace, a Kosova for Albanians run by Albanians, and a small chunk of Mitrovica for the Serbs. The war itself created such hostility that this division is no longer possible, especially now that the West is on the ground and seen as protectors.

Yet another diplomatic screw-up among the many screw-ups that characterized the ex-Yugo wars of the 1990s.

The political issues in Bosnia and Kosovo don't appear to be as complicated [as in Iraq], but the EU does not make any progress.

Chirac, Blair and others love to strut on the world stage and appear important, forgettign each time that the only way that they ever get anything done is when they find a common position, which they've found extremely hard to do.

Part of it is the toxic relationship between the two men, part of it is outsiders who alos enjoy playing them off one agaisnst the other (but that works only because our European leaders let them and play along), and part of it is the history of mistrust between European countries, especially these two.

The Constitution was a first institutional step to try to solve this; but at the" core countries like France and the UK have to admit that they cannot go it alone anymore. Having a joint EU seat at the UN and other organisations would be the appropriate step to have a seachange in Europe's influence.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes