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Of course Hegel has something to do with it: it is called the cunning of reason. French militant secularism can be treated as a component of a Hegelian view of Europe, since French secular values are secularized Christian values. Hegel, and I following him, are neither in favor of secularism nor of a strict separation of church and state, so I have no problems with the CSU on those grounds. (In Europe, unlike America, even reactionaries can be correct on some issues. This is because European societies are organic. The U.S. on the other hand is an artificial construct, the product of social engineering. So since reactionaries here have no authentic tradition to fall back upon, they have nothing to help them to get it right at least some of the time.) We don't need to be in favor of secularism, since reality is secular. So we can afford to give religion some space in society. This isn't possible in America, since reality isn't allowed to enter into the debate. This is because the notion of reality implies that there is an objective reality, binding on everyone: but that contradicts that prime American principle, that everyone has a right to their opinion. If the creed is everyone has a right to their opinion (without the qualification that it must be a well-justified opinion, and able to withstand criticism by others, which the creed does not include), then reality has no privileged place in America. It is just another perspective, one among many others.

I don't know what you're thinking about when you say that in the Federal Republic, religion has "rail[ed] against civil law". I'd be grateful if you could tell me what it is you have in mind. But I should point out that the German Enlightenment, unlike the French and Scottish enlightenments, never adopted a hostile position against religion. In essence, in Germany, philosophers and theologians just agreed to work together. That is why about the only modern society you have Christian fundamentalism is America: it is virtually unheard of in Germany. (But there is significant anti-abortion sentiment in Germany, which I find puzzling. My guess is that that is an instance of the contemporary German drive to over-compensate for the crimes of the Nazi period.)

A bomb, H bomb, Minuteman / The names get more attractive / The decisions are made by NATO / The press call it British opinion -- The Three Johns

by Alexander on Wed Jan 17th, 2007 at 03:05:44 AM EST
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This is because European societies are organic. The U.S. on the other hand is an artificial construct, the product of social engineering.

All nations are social constructs. Period. If you want to say that America's national identity is ideological rather than ethnic, fair enough. But that's equally true of France.

So since reactionaries here have no authentic tradition to fall back upon, they have nothing to help them to get it right at least some of the time.) We don't need to be in favor of secularism, since reality is secular.

Given that Europe managed to come up with some remarkably  nasty reactionaries appealing to 'authenticity' and 'tradition', based on the notion of a 'real' 'organic' society, as opposed to the constructs of modernity, I'm not sure this is a good argument. You should do some reading on proto-fascism. Fritz Stern's Politics of Cultural Despair is a classic.  But the literature is enormous.

On France and it's 'Christian rooted' secular values - ?! Actually based on a hatred of Catholicism.

Germany's anti-abortion stuff is simply the product of the dominant part[ies] being predominantly by Catholic - and the direct successor to a explicitly Catholic part[ies].

by MarekNYC on Wed Jan 17th, 2007 at 03:29:13 AM EST
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Wow. This should be a thread in its own right. But this is a role that Islam plays in the West today: it forces us to return to the notion of rationality.

You say that France's identity is ideological exactly in the same way that America's is, with France's 1300 year  history being of no consequence. I wonder how many French people would agree with you.

The argument I was making derives from Louis Hartz's The liberal tradition in America: an interpretation of American political thought since the revolution, a canonical work of American liberalism. Hartz's argument (which I think is irrefutable) is that since the American revolution was based on liberal ideas, and since the American revolution is constitutive of America, there can be no such thing as an authentic American conservatism. (Needless to say, there can be such things as authentic German or French conservatisms, since those societies predate the very idea of liberalism.)

With respect to your second comment about Europe having nasty reactionaries appealing to authenticity, I would say that that is irrelevant, since today it is the anglophone countries that show signs of fascism, not European ones (backward countries like Poland and Latvia being excepted, of course). (Germany had only a couple of decades in which it was involved in conquest of foreign lands, whereas Britain's imperial career, based on military might, spans centuries. So America's current belligirence simply falls into the anglophone pattern.)

So the French hate Catholocism? I am not sure it so simple. The philosophes hated Catholocism I suppose, but they didn't turn the French into Protestants, did they?

As for the anti-abortion stuff: thanks for the point that it is due to Catholicism. That makes sense. If you look at the history of anti-abortionism in the US, you will find that this "movement" originated with Catholics. The evangelicals simply picked it up because they thought it was a good rallying cry.

A bomb, H bomb, Minuteman / The names get more attractive / The decisions are made by NATO / The press call it British opinion -- The Three Johns

by Alexander on Wed Jan 17th, 2007 at 04:46:58 AM EST
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You say that France's identity is ideological exactly in the same way that America's is, with France's 1300 year  history being of no consequence. I wonder how many French people would agree with you.

What self-deluding French reactionaries might think is irrelevant. France circa 1100 AD, or 1700 for that matter, is meaningless. Or no more meaningful than various European pasts are to America in the sense that any given period came out of what preceded it, and given that America is largely a Western culture it is a product of these pasts. Any appeal to 'tradition' by conservatives is about the present, the 'traditions' which are being invoked are at best arbitrarily chosen and reinterpreted for the present, at worst made up of whole cloth. To the extent that conservatism is authentic it is seeking to preserve the existing or to return to a recent past. Even the latter isn't quite that simple - nostalgia for the nineteen fifties is already in part a nostalgia for a specific contemporary re-imagining of the fifties. When you go back centuries seeing anything authentically 'traditional' about those 'traditions' is ridiculous.

This was a hot topic in the eighties and nineties. The closest that any of it came to your viewpoint was Anthony Smith, e.g. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. And even Smith wouldn't go anywhere near as far as you. The more widely accepted interpretation was that set out by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities or the modernization one in Ernest Gellner's Nations and Nationalism . On the 'authentic' traditions Eric Hobsbawm (ed) The Invention of Tradition is fun.

Germany had only a couple of decades in which it was involved in conquest of foreign lands, whereas Britain's imperial career, based on military might, spans centuries.
Germany as a state didn't exist all that long; it's sort of hard for a non-existent state to be conquering people. France, Spain, Britain, and Russia on the other hand... or even the Dutch. Of course if you look at the Prussian and Habsburg states a rather different picture emerges. Polish nationalist versions of your view of authenticity and tradition see the early Prussian Teutonic Knights based state as an earlier version of Nazi Germany with the Deutsche Orden as the first draft of the SS.  Amusingly enough so did the Nazis. In the Polish communist nationalist remix this became class struggle with Germans as the eternal opressing imperial nation-class.  Wilhelmine conservatives saw that state as the early incarnation of their own vision of Germany, Drang nach Osten included, what a surprise. All that shows is that people can and do play any game they want with  ancient 'traditions' in order to find support for whatever political interpretation of the present they're pushing.

by MarekNYC on Wed Jan 17th, 2007 at 03:09:08 PM EST
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You make a pursuasive case about the identity question. (Citing books your oponent has not read (except Gellner's) is an effective debating tactic.) Certainly, the US has a real identity, history, and tradition(s) by this point. I'll have to rething my position on their being a qualitative difference between the US and European countries here.

Probably Hartz's book should be viewed not as a destriction of an objective cultural reality, but as an attempt by a liberal to marginalize conservatives. I used to really believe what he argued: that in the US, there can be no authentic conservatives. But having read up a little on the history of American evancelicalism, it now strikes me that Harz does what many liberals do: simply ignore evangelicalism as irrelevant for understanding American culture. Obviously, this is harder to do today than it was in 1955, when Hartz wrote his book.

The rest of your remarks are amusing. Yes, I forgot about Prussia. So more than just a couple of decades of conquest.

A bomb, H bomb, Minuteman / The names get more attractive / The decisions are made by NATO / The press call it British opinion -- The Three Johns

by Alexander on Wed Jan 17th, 2007 at 05:56:53 PM EST
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