US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence | 56 comments (56 topical, editorial, 0 hidden)

Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 1)

Based on newly released documents of the CIA, NSC, DIA and the US State Department Intelligence & Research Division, which were declassified between March 1992 and September 1998, it's clear that as early as 1971, CIA experts on Yugoslavia were considering the violent breakup of the country with the secession of Vojvodina, Kosovo, Macedonia and of course Croatia and Slovenia.

Most of those scenarios revolved around US/NATO providing political, military and financial support to Slovenian and Croatian "Western leaning" separatists. Saying that the US was against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while at the same time supporting the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark.

As usual, there are clearly differences between public posturing (US declarations that they're against independence, for peace and what not) and the financial, military realities on the ground (who gets the arms & the money).

It's not what we say but what we do that defines who we are.

by vladimir on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 04:41:57 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Intelligence & Research Divisions, eh? You mean brainstorming sessions. And this surprises you. Over and over again, I've asked you the question, and you completely avoid it. What did the US gain by refusing to recognize Coratia and Slovenia? Answer that.

"Saying that the US was against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while at the same time supporting the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark."

This comment seems like a blatant contradiction. I'm arguing that the US opposed German policy. You write that the US was against recognition even while Germany was training KLA guerillas. As though this is a contradiction. It's not. The US has one policy. The Germans had another. This is central to my original point. How can you miss this?

Not to mention the fact that Germany had helped train the KLA long after the period we are talking about (1991). The KLA hardly existed as such back then. They came into existence after the fall of the Albanian ponzi scheme years later.

"It's not what we say but what we do that defines who we are."

Well, you have to get the story straight first.

by Upstate NY on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 11:17:25 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Intelligence & Research Divisions, eh? You mean brainstorming sessions. And this surprises you.

Doesn't surprise me at all. It confirms my thesis that Washington is a major protagonist in the violent breakup of Yugoslavia - and not the "peace maker" it portrays itself as being.

You write that the US was against recognition even while Germany was training KLA guerillas.

No I don't. I say that the public posturing of the US was against recognition in 89-90-91 and I give a number of reasons for this (see my previous posts).

The US has one policy. The Germans had another.

Don't buy that. George H. W. Bush (Senior), president of the US from 1988-1992 proclaimed on numerous occasions during his tenure that Germany was America's strategic partner. You don't make that kind of statement if you've got a serious foreign policy disagreement with your "strategic partner". Conclusion: US and Germany were partners in which the roles were well defined and distributed (it's a classic in business negotiations).

If the world's sole surviving superpower in 1990 wanted peace, why didn't it offer a balanced peace plan to the parties - for example: the right to autodetermination for eacht ethnic group: Albanians in Kosovo, Serbs in Croatia, Serbs in Bosnia, Croats in Bosnia, ... etc?

And I don't buy "bludner" as the answer, given the armies of men & women that work on "brainstorming" scenarios, as you pointed out.

by vladimir on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 03:07:20 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You're making wild leaps in logic about CIA research and planning. These people are paid to project scenarios. That's their job.

I WROTE: "You write that the US was against recognition even while Germany was training KLA guerillas."

YOU WROTE: "No I don't. I say that the public posturing of the US was against recognition in 89-90-91 and I give a number of reasons for this (see my previous posts)."

A. In your earlier sentence you stated that US policy was contradictory because the US refused recognition while Germany was training the KLA. You did write this.

B. I see absolutely no reasons explaining why the US refused recognition when in reality it wanted to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.

"Don't buy that. George H. W. Bush (Senior), president of the US from 1988-1992 proclaimed on numerous occasions during his tenure that Germany was America's strategic partner. You don't make that kind of statement if you've got a serious foreign policy disagreement with your "strategic partner"."

Hmmm, America and Germany are strategic partners therefore they never disagree.

Gotcha.

by Upstate NY on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 08:28:12 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Upstate NY:

Over and over again, I've asked you the question, and you completely avoid it. What did the US gain by refusing to recognize Coratia and Slovenia? Answer that.

Actually, vladimir takes a stab at a reason:

vladimir:

As usual, there are clearly differences between public posturing (US declarations that they're against independence, for peace and what not) and the financial, military realities on the ground (who gets the arms & the money).

In effect, that recognition was withheld for some time for public relations reasons. It looked (to some group, for some reason) better if Germany went first. Plausible? Sure. True? Don't know.

Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se

by A swedish kind of death on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 03:20:53 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

I still don't see an answer.

Public relations, you say?

How is that an answer? Rather vague. The US was concerned about how hurting the Serb's feelings would play out in front of a somnabulistic American public?

As for looking better if Germany went first, that would be easily done by standing aside, but instead the US denounced and blocked Germany's moves in the UN. This was well known at the time.

by Upstate NY on Sun Dec 16th, 2007 at 08:23:33 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Saying that the US was against the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while at the same time supporting the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark.

There is clearly some confusion and misunderstanding here. Le me restate:

[ Upstate NY ] saying that the US was against recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while it [the US] was supporting at the same time the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark.

I thought that was clear, but sometimes, when you have to put your ideas on paper quickly, it's just not crystal clear. I hope now it is.

As for looking better if Germany went first, that would be easily done by standing aside, but instead the US denounced and blocked Germany's moves in the UN. This was well known at the time.

Blocked a German move in the UN? Germany has about as much power in the UN as Zanzibar (ok, a bit more). Are you suggesting that Germany's letter to the Secretary General of the UN informing him of German's intent to recognize Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 was a "move at the UN"? France was against recognition at the time as was most of the EU - so there was no need for the US to "block" anything at the UN.

Let me repeat my reasons why the US was publicly against German haste to recognize:

1. Public posturing, for a number of reasons including keeping relations smooth with the rest of the EU which was against recognition.

2. US-Serb negotiations that were underway and that could have provided the US with a much better deal than the one it struck with Bonn - yes we're talking about spoils.

3. US-German disagreement about spoils.

Let's go back to 1991. The CIA plans for the breakup of Yugoslavia since the 70s.The "right" people are promoted to power - or supported by the US and Germany once they made it to the top. The arms are delivered in the 80s. Everything's ready to roll, when all of a sudden, the Soviet Union collapses. This provides an opportunity to the US to extend its influence over all of ex-Yugoslavia... which it tries to do, putting it at odds with Germany, on the other hand, which wants to consolidate its influence over an independent Slovenia and Croatia. There's disagreement about spheres of influence and who gets what. Political maneuvering ensues.

As a Swedish kind of death summarizes: Plausible? Sure. True? Dunno. Unless you are Kohl or Bush or Tudjman or Milosevic or Baker... or one of their close pals, chances are you won't know for sure which (if any) of these 3 hypotheses is the real reason behind what happened.

To conclude, I don't think that it serves your case to focus exclusively on this single issue of a US-German "public rift" in December 1991 as the key element disproving the thesis that the US's long term goal and interest was in the breakup of Yugoslavia and its forceful integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 03:32:24 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

"[ Upstate NY ] saying that the US was against recognition of Slovenia and Croatia while it [the US] was supporting at the same time the delivery of arms to Croatia's nationalists and the training of KLA guerillas in Germany just does not make the mark."

Again, your understanding of the events does not correspond to the timeline. There was no training of KLA guerillas in 1991. I really can't see how you make the claim that the US was against recognition and for training the KLA at the same time. It is, frankly, preposterous.

Lastly, it wasn't just Germany that the US was against. You paint the picture that France was also against it. Here are articles about the US's disagreement with the EC:

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D6113CF935A25752C0A964958260
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3D6123CF935A25752C0A964958260

I've only asked you a thousand times, but tell me what the US gains by disagreeing with the ENTIRE EC at the time. What literally is to be gained?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 09:09:27 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You are misunderstanding me again (it must be my English!). I'm not saying that the US was AGAINST recognition and FOR training the KLA. I'm saying the US was FOR recognition, and FOR training the KLA albeit not publicly at first. I know that the training of the KLA came later - I mentioned it to support my thesis that the US has been supportive of secessionist movements throughout ex-Yugoslavia.

Europe, on the other hand was AGAINST recognition, except for Germany:

http://www.globalbritain.org/BNN/BN06.htm

The CFSP established by Maastricht immediately proved itself inadequate in dealing with the crisis in Yugoslavia. EU diplomacy worked on the assumption that problems could be solved by tinkering with the structure of the Yugoslav federation, rather than seeing the federation itself as the source of the problem. The EU's refusal to recognize the secession from the federation of Croatia (despite the fact that this was the will of 92 per cent of the vote in Croatia's referendum) led Germany to threaten to recognize Croatia unilaterally. Unwilling to break ranks from a determined Germany which was prepared to smash the very CFSP it had advocated so strongly if it did not get its own way, the rest of the EU caved in and followed Bonn's lead.

And the NYT says the same - December 15th 1991:

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CE7DA113AF936A25751C1A967958260

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's spokesman, Dieter Vogel, said on Friday that the Bonn Government would wait until after a meeting of European Community foreign ministers in Brussels on Monday before announcing recognition, which has been opposed by the United Nations, the United States and by the European Community. But officials made clear that Bonn's decision would not be affected by the outcome of Monday's meeting.

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 11:05:56 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

"You are misunderstanding me again (it must be my English!). I'm not saying that the US was AGAINST recognition and FOR training the KLA. I'm saying the US was FOR recognition, and FOR training the KLA albeit not publicly at first."

It's not a failure of your English. It's a failure of your logic. We are discussing here whether the US was initially predisposed to the breakup of Yugoslavia. The fact that they recognized the secessionists later while the KLA was being trained is not being disputed at all. This is the essence of my very first post on this subject.

You write: "I know that the training of the KLA came later - I mentioned it to support my thesis that the US has been supportive of secessionist movements throughout ex-Yugoslavia.""

How does that support your thesis if it came later AFTER the US recognized the new republics? It doesn't support your thesis at all.

"Europe, on the other hand was AGAINST recognition, except for Germany:"

I just linked to you in the previous post NY Times articles which showed that the US was AGAINST recognition even as the entire EC was for it.

Please explain to me why it benefits the US to refuse recognition even while Ireland and Norway elect to recognize?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 12:19:26 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

In that case, that leaves us with two options:

US-Serb negotiations that were underway and that could have provided the US with a much better deal than the one it struck with Bonn - yes we're talking about spoils.
US-German disagreement about spoils.

What's your theory?

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 12:40:57 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

All this language is so vague. Spoils what where?

What deal with Bonn?

What are you talking about?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 12:59:41 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

If I understand vladimir correctly, the claim is this:
vladimir:

Let's go back to 1991. The CIA plans for the breakup of Yugoslavia since the 70s.The "right" people are promoted to power - or supported by the US and Germany once they made it to the top. The arms are delivered in the 80s. Everything's ready to roll, when all of a sudden, the Soviet Union collapses. This provides an opportunity to the US to extend its influence over all of ex-Yugoslavia... which it tries to do, putting it at odds with Germany, on the other hand, which wants to consolidate its influence over an independent Slovenia and Croatia. There's disagreement about spheres of influence and who gets what. Political maneuvering ensues.

We have met the enemy, and he is us — Pogo

by Carrie (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sat Dec 22nd, 2007 at 08:05:07 AM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You remind me of those who split the world up into two kinds of people.

Me, I also do that on occasion: there are two kinds of people in this world, I say, the kind of people who split the world into two kinds of people, and the kind who don't.

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 01:01:18 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 1)

What is vague? That a huge chunk of the industrial and services sectors in all ex Yugoslav republics were "privatized" mostly to Western business concerns at rock bottom prices? No Sir, from Serb mines to the Croat tourism sector - it's well documented. That's what I call the spoils of war. Is it vague that place is teeming with foreign occupation forces? No Sir - it's well documented and I call that spoils of war too.

If you are referring to my lack of "proof" regarding US German collusion, yes it's vague. Tudjman wasn't a buddy of mine. Neither was Slobodan. James & George even less. No, I don't have first hand accounts of the politics at play in January 1992 and this is not the kinda stuff you find on the newspaper stands. But that wasn't even the subject of my thesis.

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 02:14:06 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

You still haven't answered the basic question: Why, when th entire EC had recognized the former republics, was the US still holding out?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 02:54:00 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

oh, let me see now. well.
can you repeat the question ?

by vladimir on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 03:58:12 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Why, when the entire EC has recognized the ex-Yugo republics, did the US refuse to recognize them?

by Upstate NY on Mon Dec 17th, 2007 at 04:58:15 PM EST
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Re: US policy in the Balkans: recipes for violence (none / 0)

Now why on earth would you want an answer to a question like that?