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I have a good friend who was maybe 80 percent of the way through a PhD in philosophy with a focus on the philosophy of physics. He was at one of the top programs for study of such things, and was doing very well in it. He quit, partly (but not entirely) because he realized that he would be spending the rest of his career writing papers that would be read by maybe five people. In other words -- he'd be doing all this hard work to address "why" questions, but to what end, if those answers are never considered by anyone outside a narrow field of specialization? He came to feel that there are better ways for him to deal with the "why" questions while not relegating those answers to abject obscurity. And that's a systemic problem -- not just a problem for this one guy.
In centuries past, it was possible for people to be "Renaissance Men" (or, less frequently then, women) who could be quite up-to-date and literate in the latest scientific advances, as well as the contemporary literary or artistic modes of expression -- these things were not seen as mutually exclusive, but on the contrary, advances in each were propelled and fueled by advances in the others. Literature and art and philosophy -- especially philosophy -- have always been inspired or informed by technology and science, and in the past it was considered admirable for a person to be able to move back and forth between these "worlds" fluently. That is no longer the case. Now, too often, such people are viewed with suspicion from both "worlds."
We specialize now; science has advanced and expanded to the degree that even practicioners of one branch of the sciences can have trouble comprehending the latest research in another branch; artists and writers and philosophers (to the degree that we still have philosophers) are even less likely to try to do so (but, I want to emphasize, are not inherently unable to do so) and are more often finding their inspiration elsewhere; the people who deal with "why" questions for a living are increasingly alienated from those who deal with the question of "how," and vice versa. I am not interested in whose fault this is, but I do wish that I saw more of a concerted effort to change it.
This is why I have a problem with these proponents of right-brain-left-brain theories, which have included some of my former schoolteachers, even one of the (otherwise) best and most inspirational teachers I've ever had. As a student, I kept being presented over and over and over with this idea that I had to choose -- are you good at science and math, or are you good at writing and literature and history? And the truth is, I have an aptitude for both, but this manner of approaching the world (and it is a manner of approaching the world, not just learning) imposed this artificial dilemma -- which am I? It's not that I regret my choice, so much, it's that I regret the fact that I was told I had to choose, and believed it.
</rant>
Wow, uh, sorry for the diatribe. Not sure where that came from.
Part of the problem is doing anything that is not relegated to obscurity. Many researchers face the same problem...
Another aspect is that, beyond the obscurity of such subjects, fewer and fewer people care about the why ; that is not a social value nowadays. I have a distinct feeling for example economists don't really have a solid epistemology ; and they don't feel any need for it. Politicians now care about being elected rather than "the good of the country". People will have no problems working for weapons makers... A society defined by money exchange cares not about the why, as l'argent n'a pas d'odeur - money has no smell. Un roi sans divertissement est un homme plein de misères
This Week's finds in Mathematical Physics: week198
While in Hong Kong, I received a copy of a very interesting book: 1) David Corfield, Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 2003. More information and part of the book's introduction available at http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~dc23/Towards.htm I should admit from the start that I'm completely biased in favor of this book, because it has a whole chapter on one of my favorite subjects: higher-dimensional algebra. Furthermore, Corfield cites me a lot and says I deserve "lavish praise for the breadth and quality of my exposition". How could I fail to recommend a book by so wise an author? That said, what's really special about this book is that it shows a philosopher struggling to grapple with modern mathematics as it's actually carried out by its practitioners. This is what Corfield means by "real" mathematics. Too many philosophers of mathematics seem stuck in the early 20th century, when explicitly "foundational" questions - questions of how we can be certain of mathematical truths, or what mathematical objects "really are" - occupied some the best mathematicians. These questions are fine and dandy, but by now we've all heard plenty about them and not enough about other equally interesting things. Alas, too many philosophers seem to regard everything since Goedel's theorem as a kind of footnote to mathematics, irrelevant to their loftier concerns (read: too difficult to learn).
While in Hong Kong, I received a copy of a very interesting book:
1) David Corfield, Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics, Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge, 2003. More information and part of the book's introduction available at http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~dc23/Towards.htm
I should admit from the start that I'm completely biased in favor of this book, because it has a whole chapter on one of my favorite subjects: higher-dimensional algebra. Furthermore, Corfield cites me a lot and says I deserve "lavish praise for the breadth and quality of my exposition". How could I fail to recommend a book by so wise an author?
That said, what's really special about this book is that it shows a philosopher struggling to grapple with modern mathematics as it's actually carried out by its practitioners. This is what Corfield means by "real" mathematics. Too many philosophers of mathematics seem stuck in the early 20th century, when explicitly "foundational" questions - questions of how we can be certain of mathematical truths, or what mathematical objects "really are" - occupied some the best mathematicians. These questions are fine and dandy, but by now we've all heard plenty about them and not enough about other equally interesting things. Alas, too many philosophers seem to regard everything since Goedel's theorem as a kind of footnote to mathematics, irrelevant to their loftier concerns (read: too difficult to learn).
It leads to people in the humanities being completely innumerate, the mathematical equivalent of never having heard the name of Shakespeare or not being able to understand a newspaper article. It also lends to people in science and engineering who can't write to save their lives, even though they may spend a substantial amount of their professional life writing reports.
The reality of mathematics is that there is a lot of writing and that formulas are shorthand, except when one engages in calculation which is considered inelegant. But I am reminded of one time when two professors from teh University came to my high school to make a presentation about the university access examination and the one from the humanities, after stressing the importance of writing clearly and without errors she said something to the effect of "of course, in the science exams you don't need that. The other professor was a Mathematics professor I had met earlier and we looked at each other in horror - all you do in a math exam is write long streams of reasoning. We have met the enemy, and he is us — Pogo
;) Be nice to America. Or we'll bring democracy to your country.
There's a failure often to understand people and the dynamics of societies and communities and that limits the potential of developing specialisms and their impact - whether it is humanities or science or anything else.
Politics especially. How many policies are formed that take no account of how society actually works?
I too wasn't happy with having to make the decision between science and humanities/arts. I'm an all rounder and did science because I was told to in terms of giving me better career prospects. I don't regret that for a minute since in physics especially I was able to lose myself in a whole new world.
But now I'm older, I find myself consciously developing other skills to create a better balance and a broader understanding of the world around me. Social policy, politics, photography and art - from a science trained brain. Both sides compliment each other well.
Unfotunately there are no reliable theories of how society actuallyworks.
The best the Left came up with was Critical Theory, which is a kind of ritualised distilled Marxism, inbred with semiotics and a lot of quoting.
It's completely useless for real social policy.
The absense of a real theory is why the Chicago jackasses were able to fill the vacuum with their neo-liberal monetarist nonsense. Which is why we're here now debunking the same old talking points about 'reform' when we could be doing something useful.
There have been some attempts to model policy statistically in an empirical and disinterested way, rather than making a priori assumptions about it. But the social sciences are still treated as humanities, not as sciences, which means real research isn't common.
If you want to look at social engineering, talk to the CIA. They seem to have a better idea of how to do it than anyone else at the moment - even if it's only on ad hoc Skinnerian basis, with crude aims manipulated by even cruder means.
Never being able to start from a blank slate makes the process really complicated and so many things intertwine. Psychology, sociology, economics, politics, anthropology, history... a narrow focus fails to make creative connections. So useless social policies.
But going back to the analogy of religion inspiring, banding people together, and politics. Blair's '97 election win came about partly because of that strength of feeling, being inspired, following a leader who promised us that things can only get better.
I think some of the lacklustre in the UK at the moment is because the 'left' have been in power for so long. It's much harder to maintain inspiration and motivation and a sense of belonging when you are actually running the country rather than rallying the crowds in opposition to the latest evils of a Tory Government.
Now the 'left' are no longer much distinguishable from the right and where are the critical masses to oppose this in an organised way? Who is rallying the troops from the left? Who or what am I meant to put my faith in now?
Why oh why theya re not promoted, the structure for this stuff as Migerus says is pure bulls***.
Why this dichotomy.. why not big careers for them.. why not people doing physics and philosophy at the same time..
Philosophers which master physics and antrhopology and math should be rewarded with scholarships... to be sholars!!!
And we should have th media to publish and project those ideas...
A pleasure I therefore claim to show, not how men think in myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of the fact. Levi-Strauss, Claude
By the way, there have been a good number of philosophers working in the field of Philosophy of Science. The best know are Thomas S. Kuhn and Karl Popper, but you have also Henri Bergson, Gaston Bachelard, Ludovico Geymonat, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos and more recently, Michel Foucault, Edgar Morin and Michel Serres (and probably many I don't know of...). "Dieu se rit des hommes qui se plaignent des conséquences alors qu'ils en chérissent les causes" Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet
but we still need the Sagans and Asimovs... :)
I think there's very little point trying to teach most people to do science, because many of them either can't do it, aren't interested, or both.
But story-telling is hugely influential. A narrative that resonates is a very powerful force for change.
This confuses hard-core scientific types, because narrative thinking is pre-rational. It doesn't make sense in rational terms.
But it does make sense in social terms - especially in terms of values, status, aims, and relationships. And if you want to reach the majority of the population, stories have to be pitched at that level using the kinds of concepts and narrative lines that make people feel a part of the story.
Unfortunately much of the population still seems to see rationality as a a slightly frightening skill which they don't entirely understand and which makes them feel uncomfortable.
They can offer opinions, but they won't be deeply thought out opinions, they'll often be quoted verbatim from 'authorities' (qv the media) and they'll have a pre-rational value basis.
But give them a good story and make them feel they're at least as important to it as you are, and they'll be with you instantly.
Pirsig again, in "Zen etc"
Religion isn't invented by man. Men are invented by religion. Men invent responses to Quality, and among these responses is an understanding of what they themselves are. You know something and then the Quality stimulus hits and then you try to define the Quality stimulus, but to define it all you've got to work with is what you know. So your definition is made up of what you know. It's an analogue to what you already know. It has to be. It can't be anything else. And the mythos grows this way. By analogies to what is known before.
So your definition is made up of what you know. It's an analogue to what you already know. It has to be. It can't be anything else. And the mythos grows this way. By analogies to what is known before.
and then this, from the pivotal moment in the book
All this is just an analogy. Fantastic, Phædrus thinks, that he should have remembered that. It just demolishes the whole dialectical position. That may just be the whole show right there. Of course it's an analogy. Everything is an analogy. But the dialecticians don't know that.
All this is just an analogy.
Fantastic, Phædrus thinks, that he should have remembered that. It just demolishes the whole dialectical position. That may just be the whole show right there. Of course it's an analogy. Everything is an analogy. But the dialecticians don't know that.
...and one of the consequences - as we have explored here often enough - is that to change anything we have to change the narrative, and in doing so, in moving from Rhetoric to Reality, we reinvent religion... "The future is already here -- it's just not very evenly distributed" William Gibson
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