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So many things to react to, I'll make a only a start:

  • Who made them averse to the word tax? You did, dear editorial writer of the The Economist.

  • Cap and trade was sold to us by you and your editorial economist ilk also. Why? Because it formed part of your ideology that markets create inherent efficiencies. How can "easier investment planning" suddenly be more important than "allocative efficiency"? Was the old ideology wrong then?
by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Mon Jun 4th, 2007 at 05:49:52 AM EST
The gall of the first point is what left me speechless.

The second one has left me perplexed, becuase I'm not really sure what made them change their mind, and what it really means. The only reason cap-and-trade does not work is because industry lobbied for higher quotas than were compatible with goals of actually bringing pollution down, and because industry was handed out quotas for free instead of being forced to buy them (again, thank to Economist-supported lobbying).

Sigh...

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Mon Jun 4th, 2007 at 06:05:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
One should also expect The Economist to argue that businesses worried about price uncertainty should just hedge with carbon futures.

Can the last politician to go out the revolving door please turn the lights off?
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Mon Jun 4th, 2007 at 06:10:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Stabilizing effective demand assists business planning ... why, that is an argument that, without ever stating it, the Economist has been campaigning against for decades.

Hypocrite twice over ... I reckon it means that the Economist is confident that serious carbon taxes will remain on the drawing board, while there is actually a threat that serious auctioned permit cap-and-trade could get put into place somewhere.

And then the next step is a carbon offset tariff on nations that are not pursuing effective carbon reduction programs and, shock, horror, we would have the twin evils of an effective government policy and an effective sanction against a global race to the bottom on carbon emissions.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Jun 4th, 2007 at 05:15:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yeah, sorry I couldn't come up with a snappy title to encapsulate the first point. It's hard to do more than scream "Hypocrite!" at them.

I'm very confused by the apparent change of mind buried in that second point too.
Ideas:

  1. Cap and trade is becoming discredited in the newspapers (ironically as the system seems to be beginning to stabilise), so they want to avoid being associated with it?

  2. Who loses out under working cap-and-trade?
by Metatone (metatone [a|t] gmail (dot) com) on Mon Jun 4th, 2007 at 06:25:00 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Taxes on the carbon content of fuel do not provide an absolute ceiling on emissions. There is no guarantee that they will accomplish a certain reduction. This can be alleviated by periodically increasing the tax, but that provides the same kind of investment insecurity to businesses that a periodically reviewed emissions trading system does.
by nanne (zwaerdenmaecker@gmail.com) on Mon Jun 4th, 2007 at 06:52:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]
http://www.interfluidity.com/posts/1180146496.shtml


Would it be possible to design a carbon tax that the public would enthusiastically support? That would be progressive, rather than regressive, imposing greater costs on the rich than the poor? Is it politically possible to strictly limit the total amount of carbon emitted, without rewarding past polluters with windfall emissions permits? Yes, it is. And it's fun! Politicians -- Here's an opportunity to give money to your constituents, and save the world too! It works like this:

First, enact a carbon tax. Nothing fancy here, just your usual I'm-Greg-Mankiw-Wanna-Join-My-Club? "Pigouvian" carbon tax. Embedded in what drivers pay at the pump, added as yet another surcharge to heat and utility bills, would be a new Federal tax on carbon sold or used as fuel. That was easy.

Unfortunately, a carbon tax is regressive. It imposes disproportionate burden on the poor, as the higher cost of driving to work and heating a home takes a much bigger bite out of a burger-flipper's paycheck than a hedge-fund manager's "capital gain".

But, here's a trick. Just as flattish taxes are regressive, flattish subsidies are progressive. So, when we enact the carbon tax, we grant citizens the right to a refund of the tax on a fixed quantity of carbon consumed. We distribute those refunds equally among all taxpaying US citizens annually. And, we permit citizens to sell any refunds they won't need to use.

Suppose, in the beginning, we set the amount of refunds to be equal to the total expected carbon tax, given 2007 US carbon consumption. This seems dumb, right? In the aggregate, we've just created a system whereby the government collects a tax and sends it right back out again, exacting a net cost of zero from the private sector for its profligate use of carbon. All the government has done is caused transfers within the private sector. Yes. But from whom to whom? Light users of carbon end up receiving cash, from the excess permits they sell, while gas-guzzle-monsters pay up! That's likely to mean that most poorer people earn cash from their allotment, paid for by the people whose Hummers they can't see over. Moreover, note that our refunds are distributed only to taxpaying humans, not to businesses, but businesses are still subject to the tax, and can purchase refunds. That means that on net, the government will have underwritten a transfer from businesses to voters households. The vast majority of human beings will see ka-ching positive net wealth from this scheme, without any cost to the government. People who conserve more will earn more, people who conserve less will earn less, or even have to pay. Businesses will buy refunds from households, so long as the cost of the refund is less than the cost of the tax. When there are no more refunds left to buy -- when aggregate carbon consumption exceeds the refund allotted -- some users will have to pay the tax outright, at whatever rate the government has set.
[...]


by Laurent GUERBY on Mon Jun 4th, 2007 at 07:01:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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