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me, I don't really believe that people in the nuke industry are any more dishonest or craven or wicked than any other group of insiders in a corporate subculture that conditions their behaviour. as far as number of victims per year, their score is hard to ascertain [obligatory ref to 'Thank You for Smoking' and the M.O.D. Squad] -- because of the long incubation time of radiation-related damage and disease and the contested relevance of small doses.
what I mean is, it's fairly easy to point out the 400K+ Americans who die prematurely each year (!) from the effects of tobacco consumption or the 120K who die prematurely from incompetence, overprescription, neglect, poor record keeping etc. by the med mafia. it's much harder to count and name the victims of slow poisoning [btw the Edwardians considered this one of the most loathesome of crimes]: how many people's diseases and premature demises are due to the adulteration, contamination and general warping of our food supply by the corporate ag nexus? how many people die prematurely from cancers whose root cause is environmental -- be it chemical or radiation pollution? we just don't know. we have no idea what we're doing to ourselves. J Adams in his interesting book Risk pointed out that we've released over 5000 industrial chemicals into our air and water and food supplies, only about 400 of which have ever been rigorously tested for health effects -- and those 400 only in isolation, not in the staggering number of combinations with the other 4400 and each other. [don't quote me on those numbers: the proportions are about right but I don't have the book to hand.]
what we do know from an increasing number of studies is that notions of a linear dosage effect are, to say the least, quaint. the human body is not a simple mechanism, it's a complex living system (like the climate) and has nonlinearities, critical paths, and tipping points. a toxic exposure that would be nearly harmless at week N of fetal development may be nearly guaranteed to cause serious damage at week N+1. people can survive higher doses of some toxins than we think, and yet succumb to far lower doses of other toxins than are conventionally held to be "dangerous." and individuals vary widely. the world of living things is not reductionist: it is synergistic, symbiotic, complex, entangled, nonlinear. and we don't have the tools or the knowledge or the political or scientific will to attempt to understand such subtleties and complexities. we want simple linear rules and one-size-fits-all.
if we really understood low-dosage radiation exposure in combination with all the other toxic stressors to which we are currently exposed, we might understand better what cancer clusters mean, exactly by what mechanisms they occur, why they are more defined in one location than another, why one genotype or culture or individual might have greater resistance than another. but as with climate destabilisation, it is not at all difficult to understand the fundamental meaning of a cancer cluster: it means we're doing something wrong, something stupid, something that is injuring people -- in a very horrible way. and we should stop.
we don't know exactly, at the finest level of detail, how climate change is happening or how much worse it can get before it reaches a tipping point, but we know enough to know that dumping even more CO2 into the atmosphere is a stupid thing to do, and we should stop. we don't know exactly how toxicity interacts with diet and genotype and radiation exposure to produce maladaptive mutation, hormonal and developmental disorders, early- and late-onset diseases of many kinds; but we know enough to know that dumping poisonous substances into our bodies is a bad idea, and irradiating ourselves any more than necessary is a bad idea. in a sense we are, as a culture, like a patient dying of hepatitis who refuses to take any preventive or curative steps because he still doesn't fully understand the workings of his own liver down to the last enzyme and endocrine reaction.
as the old joke goes, "Doctor, it hurts when I do that." -- "So don't do that."
I think what can be said about the nuke industry is that the consequences of malfeasance and incompetence in their operations has the potential to be far greater, more devastating, more permanent, more irrevocable than most other corporate/industrial actors -- other than the weapons industry to which they are so intimately wedded. and their operating environment, their institutional culture, is even more conducive to malfeasance, secrecy, the covering-up of incompetence, than most. and they have a documented track record of living up to that promise. they are a ripe source of deniable slow poisoning as well as major catastrophe, and they have this perfect institutional culture -- as in Petri dish -- for lying, denying, and taxpayer-subsidised risk displacement.
the nuke industry -- along with selected sectors of the chem industry -- has a further solid asset in its candidacy for the gold medal: its toxic emissions can produce multigenerational damage, can damage a person's DNA in a way that passes deformity or disease down to our offspring. this, along with the enormous lifetime of that toxicity, lends it a "risk in depth" (the opposite of "defence in depth") aspect which I think quite rightly frightens and horrifies people. to strike at the viability and health of our unborn children is to strike at the heart of our mammalian existence. it is a chilly whisper of the threat of personal and cultural extinction: the use of DU shell casings (profitably disposing of nuclear waste) in the Balkans and Iraq was/is a form of slow genocide, there really is no other word for it. yep, there are chemical compounds with mutagenic effects, but the average person is unlikely to be caught up in a mass exposure to one of these (though their permeation of the background chemistry of our water, food, etc. is food for grim thought).
in the end the gene vandals may turn out to be the death of us all, with their cynically planned contamination of the world's flora including our most important cultivars... or it may be the fossil fools, determined to go on dumping CO2 ad lib and selling cheap air tickets to a clueless public... maybe it'll be the reckless release of CFCs that tipped the balance, or the endless migration of POPs through the global food chain... or a wave of happy prions, liberated by our insane ag practises... or a smart and peppy new bacterium mutated via our industrial effluents or our mad ag practises -- or even deliberately tailored by our bio-warfare criminals. all we know is that these practises are mad, a kind of monstrous Russian Roulette played by our elite for private profit, with the complicity of our technomanagers, and with very little understanding, let alone influence, for the average person whose health and future are being gambled with. we're told repeatedly that it's all worth it, we should be grateful for all the toys and goodies with which the Filth Industries distract and beguile us; but were we ever given a chance to say, "No, it is not worth it to me and I don't wish to play, I would rather have fewer toys and healthier children"? that option is not even on the table.
but I digress as usual.
the nuclear industry does seem well positioned to compete for a gold medal among the great criminal enterprises of this fraught chapter, the endgame of C19 industrial capitalism... they have what every serious competitor needs: muscle, will, and Attitude.
I guess I personally see nuke power plants as the ultimate evolutionary development of the age of heavy, centralised, elite-controlled, dangerous, "finger trap" technology (once you'be bought it, it's bought you): like T Rex or the giant Airbus or the Hummer (or those wonderfully bizarre finned monster cars of the late 50's), a kind of evolutionary excursus to an extreme that (from where I sit) doesn't look adaptive. when the elk's antlers get too big to fit between the trees, what was an advantageous display of fitness suddenly becomes a fatal error... imho it's way past time to leapfrog -- skip the land lines and leapfrog to cell phones. skip the nukes and leapfrog to non (or least) toxic power generation, less lethal, more distributed, and more opensource. ontology doesn't have to recapitulate phylogeny... we could ffwd through the deadends.
also we might reflect that bigger, more expensive, more technologically gee-wow isn't always more effective, as the Yanks learned in Viet Nam and are learning all over again in Iraq. small fast mammals who network, that's the model :-) it's served us well, we of the Mammalia -- why pin our hopes on the stegosaurus model? distributed, ubiquitous, light, and not a chain around our necks and the necks of our descendants for millennia to come: that's the power generation model I want to see. The difference between theory and practise in practise ...
"I began with the city that was the crime capital of America," Giuliani, now a candidate for president, recently told Fox's Chris Wallace. "When I left, it was the safest large city in America. I reduced homicides by 67 percent. I reduced overall crime by 57 percent." Although crime did fall dramatically in New York during Giuliani's tenure, a broad range of scientific research has emerged in recent years to show that the mayor deserves only a fraction of the credit that he claims. The most compelling information has come from an economist in Fairfax who has argued in a series of little-noticed papers that the "New York miracle" was caused by local and federal efforts decades earlier to reduce lead poisoning. The theory offered by the economist, Rick Nevin, is that lead poisoning accounts for much of the variation in violent crime in the United States. It offers a unifying new neurochemical theory for fluctuations in the crime rate, and it is based on studies linking children's exposure to lead with violent behavior later in their lives. What makes Nevin's work persuasive is that he has shown an identical, decades-long association between lead poisoning and crime rates in nine countries. "It is stunning how strong the association is," Nevin said in an interview. "Sixty-five to ninety percent or more of the substantial variation in violent crime in all these countries was explained by lead." [...] Nevin says his data not only explain the decline in crime in the 1990s, but the rise in crime in the 1980s and other fluctuations going back a century. His data from multiple countries, which have different abortion rates, police strategies, demographics and economic conditions, indicate that lead is the only explanation that can account for international trends. Because the countries phased out lead at different points, they provide a rigorous test: In each instance, the violent crime rate tracks lead poisoning levels two decades earlier. [...] The centerpiece of Nevin's research is an analysis of crime rates and lead poisoning levels across a century. The United States has had two spikes of lead poisoning: one at the turn of the 20th century, linked to lead in household paint, and one after World War II, when the use of leaded gasoline increased sharply. Both times, the violent crime rate went up and down in concert, with the violent crime peaks coming two decades after the lead poisoning peaks. Other evidence has accumulated in recent years that lead is a neurotoxin that causes impulsivity and aggression, but these studies have also drawn little attention. In 2001, sociologist Paul B. Stretesky and criminologist Michael Lynch showed that U.S. counties with high lead levels had four times the murder rate of counties with low lead levels, after controlling for multiple environmental and socioeconomic factors. In 2002, Herbert Needleman, a psychiatrist at the University of Pittsburgh, compared lead levels of 194 adolescents arrested in Pittsburgh with lead levels of 146 high school adolescents: The arrested youths had lead levels that were four times higher. "Impulsivity means you ignore the consequences of what you do," said Needleman, one of the country's foremost experts on lead poisoning, explaining why Nevin's theory is plausible. Lead decreases the ability to tell yourself, "If I do this, I will go to jail." Nevin's work has been published mainly in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Research. Within the field of neurotoxicology, Nevin's findings are unsurprising, said Ellen Silbergeld, professor of environmental health sciences at Johns Hopkins University and the editor of Environmental Research. "There is a strong literature on lead and sociopathic behavior among adolescents and young adults with a previous history of lead exposure," she said. [...] Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes, for example, were built over the Dan Ryan Expressway, with 150,000 cars going by each day. Eighteen years after the project opened in 1962, one study found that its residents were 22 times more likely to be murderers than people living elsewhere in Chicago. Nevin's finding implies a double tragedy for America's inner cities: Thousands of children in these neighborhoods were poisoned by lead in the first three quarters of the last century. Large numbers of them then became the targets, in the last quarter, of Giuliani-style [draconian, zero-tolerance]law enforcement policies.
Although crime did fall dramatically in New York during Giuliani's tenure, a broad range of scientific research has emerged in recent years to show that the mayor deserves only a fraction of the credit that he claims. The most compelling information has come from an economist in Fairfax who has argued in a series of little-noticed papers that the "New York miracle" was caused by local and federal efforts decades earlier to reduce lead poisoning.
The theory offered by the economist, Rick Nevin, is that lead poisoning accounts for much of the variation in violent crime in the United States. It offers a unifying new neurochemical theory for fluctuations in the crime rate, and it is based on studies linking children's exposure to lead with violent behavior later in their lives.
What makes Nevin's work persuasive is that he has shown an identical, decades-long association between lead poisoning and crime rates in nine countries.
"It is stunning how strong the association is," Nevin said in an interview. "Sixty-five to ninety percent or more of the substantial variation in violent crime in all these countries was explained by lead."
[...] Nevin says his data not only explain the decline in crime in the 1990s, but the rise in crime in the 1980s and other fluctuations going back a century. His data from multiple countries, which have different abortion rates, police strategies, demographics and economic conditions, indicate that lead is the only explanation that can account for international trends.
Because the countries phased out lead at different points, they provide a rigorous test: In each instance, the violent crime rate tracks lead poisoning levels two decades earlier.
[...]
The centerpiece of Nevin's research is an analysis of crime rates and lead poisoning levels across a century. The United States has had two spikes of lead poisoning: one at the turn of the 20th century, linked to lead in household paint, and one after World War II, when the use of leaded gasoline increased sharply. Both times, the violent crime rate went up and down in concert, with the violent crime peaks coming two decades after the lead poisoning peaks.
Other evidence has accumulated in recent years that lead is a neurotoxin that causes impulsivity and aggression, but these studies have also drawn little attention. In 2001, sociologist Paul B. Stretesky and criminologist Michael Lynch showed that U.S. counties with high lead levels had four times the murder rate of counties with low lead levels, after controlling for multiple environmental and socioeconomic factors.
In 2002, Herbert Needleman, a psychiatrist at the University of Pittsburgh, compared lead levels of 194 adolescents arrested in Pittsburgh with lead levels of 146 high school adolescents: The arrested youths had lead levels that were four times higher.
"Impulsivity means you ignore the consequences of what you do," said Needleman, one of the country's foremost experts on lead poisoning, explaining why Nevin's theory is plausible. Lead decreases the ability to tell yourself, "If I do this, I will go to jail."
Nevin's work has been published mainly in the peer-reviewed journal Environmental Research. Within the field of neurotoxicology, Nevin's findings are unsurprising, said Ellen Silbergeld, professor of environmental health sciences at Johns Hopkins University and the editor of Environmental Research.
"There is a strong literature on lead and sociopathic behavior among adolescents and young adults with a previous history of lead exposure," she said.
Chicago's Robert Taylor Homes, for example, were built over the Dan Ryan Expressway, with 150,000 cars going by each day. Eighteen years after the project opened in 1962, one study found that its residents were 22 times more likely to be murderers than people living elsewhere in Chicago.
Nevin's finding implies a double tragedy for America's inner cities: Thousands of children in these neighborhoods were poisoned by lead in the first three quarters of the last century. Large numbers of them then became the targets, in the last quarter, of Giuliani-style [draconian, zero-tolerance]law enforcement policies.
I'm not specifically endorsing this guy's theory, just pointing out that the effects of just one environmental toxin may take years to manifest, it may take several dispersal and reduction cycles in different environments to provide any convincing correlation, etc. It would be a lot cheaper -- not to mention socially more just, ethically more sensible -- to conclude that a policy of slow poisoning (allowing industries license to emit toxins so long as they remain below the exposure level where people actually keel over on hour-to-year timescales) is a bad idea. The precautionary principle, and all that... The difference between theory and practise in practise ...
that's harsh speaking for a guy[?] called 'melo' -- whether it means "mellow" or not...
some days it does, some days it's more of an affirmation, such as when i read this diary! mostly, it's italian for 'apple tree', but i like the connection to 'melograno' (pomegranate, favourite fruit juice) too, and as perhaps you all have noticed by now, an occasional irascible penchant for melodrama, lol!
working on that...dalai lama, help me attain the supreme calm cheerfulness that is true compassion.
years in california, oregon and hawaii, have given me a deeper understanding of 'mellow' than the average europerson, though. one person's 'chilled' is another's 'spaced', is another's 'out to pranzo'; next to hawaiians, europe hums along powered by a low-level angst (half guilt, half restless escapism!)
there is a joyful curiosity too of course, principally in the young ...
i am mostly male, btw.
you are some writer, madame...
it is not at all difficult to understand the fundamental meaning of a cancer cluster: it means we're doing something wrong, something stupid, something that is injuring people -- in a very horrible way. and we should stop.
it appears to be well above the level of intelligence required to arrest it, though the media's doing its best to ensure our continuing to be dumbed down, egged on by right-wingers, who never met a central-control model they didn't envy and/or abuse.
you can say that again, so i did!
..., possibly most important of all, private CONNECTIONS.
imho it's way past time to leapfrog -- skip the land lines and leapfrog to cell phones. skip the nukes and leapfrog to non (or least) toxic power generation, less lethal, more distributed, and more opensource. ontology doesn't have to recapitulate phylogeny... we could ffwd through the deadends.
maybe we are the mutated generation, turning, singed, to say 'that way be dragons', to those younger and less informed. if so, and only, then it was worth it.
those 'dragons' are really 'drags'-... on evolution 'The history of public debt is full of irony. It rarely follows our ideas of order and justice.' Thomas Piketty
Cancer clusters will happen naturally, from basic rules of randomness that simply state that any phenomenon that is caused by random factors will not happen in a neat, regular repartition but will be randomly spread out, which includes apparently unnatural clusters that are in fact statistically normal.
I do think that with onur current entitlement culture, any such cluster, once identified, will be seen as a magnet for damage seeking parasites, and they will waste no time in identifying a credibly dangerous industrial facility nearby to blame for such cluster - there will always be one, whether a power plant, chemical factory, waste treatment facility or other.
It is easy to create the apparence of causality out of purely random factors, and people will leap on it, and the media will lap it up. That does not mean, of course, that all clusters are random, of course, but this should certainly be taken into account whenever cluster do not reach uncontestable order of magnitude of unusual concentration. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
It can easily be shown that a "random" distribution of points does not appear random to us. Conversely, if asked to scatter points "at random", people will usually avoid putting points close together compared with what happens in a random distribution.
[Technically: I take "random" to mean that the position of each point is independent from the position of the previous point; this can be done assuming a uniform probability per unit volume, but not necessarily. When people manufacture a "random" distribution they usually do somethin akin to what physicists call a "hard-sphere gas", that is, there is a minimum distance below which a new point won't be added, but otherwise the distribution is "random"] Can the last politician to go out the revolving door please turn the lights off?
[What's the point of teaching people calculus if they never encounter this kind of stuff?] Can the last politician to go out the revolving door please turn the lights off?
I have a very simple solution to this problem. All such facilities should be located in upperclass neighbourhoods, gated communities, and the Financial Districts of the industrial metropoles. Luxury condos should by law be located in clusters around potentially toxic industrial facilities -- golf courses too (of course, most golf courses are already toxic industrial facilities but that is material for a different diary). That way, if there is significant toxic leakage, those affected will be well able to bear the cost of treatment and mitigation; their well-known attentiveness to property value and neighbourhood amenity will ensure minute and scrupulous monitoring; and should injury or illness ensue, at least those who benefit the most handsomely from the industrial entropy game will pay the price of their affluence, instead of shuffling it off willynilly onto lower income people.
In fact, I will promise to withdraw my objections to nuclear power on the day that the following conditions are met:
then we might find out what a "true cost accounting" of the worth of a human life really is, and how safe the investors and rentiers really believe their facility is. after all, if a chef will not eat in his own restaurant, or a carny barker will not ride on his own ferris wheel, then I would be wary of eating there (or riding on it) myself.
shortly after these laws are passed, mandatory military service for the children of all politicians will be enacted. and doctors will be required to seek medical treatment for themselves and families at their own hospitals.
most people know enough not to sh*t where they eat, but alas most are all too willing to sh*t where someone else eats. they shouldn't be allowed to. localised and decentralised technology brings the "externalities" back inside, where they belong. The difference between theory and practise in practise ...
And as far as I can tell, the managers of French nuclear plants do live with their families nearby the nuclear plants they run. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
however, a few false positives don't discredit all pattern recognition, and there's an noncoincidental history of failure to do thorough epidemiology in most of these cases... I'll concede the likelihood of some overaggressive pattern id on one side, but I think we have plenty of documentation of [my gut feeling is more, and better funded] coverup and denial on the other side.
I'm posting at a disadvantage here being in the midst of downsizing and packing, short on sleep and free time and with half my reference library packed or disarranged so I can't find anything. in about 4 months, I hope, I'll be able to come back with something more substantive on epidemiology and geomapping of toxic plumes of various kinds...
my fundamental point remains that distance or decoupling, whether geo or chrono, has an obfuscating effect on cost, cause/effect, and a warping effect on ethics. zBs plastics plants in the SE US are contributing to cancer in beluga whales in the Arctic, but the delay factor and the physical distance contribute not just to deniability, but to a kind of conceptual difficulty in grasping the connection. as the global commons becomes increasingly saturated with industrial "externalities" refusing to remain theoretical and external, this problem of distance or detachment and its skewing effect on operational ethics becomes more and more urgent; and imho localisation is far cheaper, more robust and straightforward than micromanagement and totalising surveillance...
btw I am glad the French managers live near their plants. it's a good policy and s/b law. for one thing, a manager is far more likely to blow the whistle on a safety vio (even if his job is on the line) if it's his own family in the plume path. but imho their neighbours should be the designers, the safety inspectors, and the investors...
I will happily live next to any wind or solar farm of any size. you couldn't pay me enough to live next to a nuke... maybe if I lived in France I'd be less definite about that, but not in the US. The difference between theory and practise in practise ...
Therefore, the probability of a type II error should be minimised, with a limit to the expected cost of type I errors.
In other words, the false positives should be turned into an estimated "expected cost of doing business", and the compensation possibly capped by statute, and then the probability of false negatives should be minimised. Can the last politician to go out the revolving door please turn the lights off?
I'll also point out that accurate epidemiology gets harder and harder as the potency (lethality), mobility, incubation time and longevity of the toxic material increase. in other words an oil spill into a harbour is nasty, but it's visible, the immediate kill effect is visible, it's visually detectible and remedial efforts are, if not perfect, at least feasible (booms, absorbent barriers, dispersal with surfactants, pump-n-filter etc). and eventually -- maybe in years or decades -- that oil will settle or break down. a plume of fine particulate or aerosol isotopes from a nuke plant is a far tougher nut to crack: invisible for a start, and depending on the isotope, possibly toxic for millennia rather than a decade or two. toxic effect can occur from minimal inhalation or ingestion (i.e. high lethality) with a long delay (incubation), and it's highly mobile (can travel far and wide in a short time depending on wind conditions or river volume and speed).
containment is impossible, you can't put the genie back into the bottle, not even in a half-assed way like an oil spill. figuring out who is exposed and who is not is nearly impossible, as no one may be immediately symptomatic and the amount of contaminant needed to do mortal harm may be too small to detect. with a 20-30 year incubation and current standards of mobility, the exposed population may be anywhere by the time they are finally symptomatic.
dimethyl mercury is about as close as the non-radioactive world gets to this kind of bad scariness. it is lethal in tiny quantities, incubation is fairly long (months/years though not decades, ahd a distinctive neurological trauma signature which makes it a bit easier to trace). the response of the chemistry labs of the academic research world to a high profile case of death by dimethyl mercury was, in effect, to stop using it -- to phase it out -- because the properties of the substance mean that there is no safe way to use it.
one response to methods or substances which are highly lethal and present intractable epidemiology is to shrug and say "nothing can be proven, we are doing the best we can, it is unreasonable to expect more, no one can show conclusively that these deaths are really related." another is to conclude that it's inherently unethical to use methods and substances which present so intractable an epidemiology problem that they create a de facto culture of impunity, in which "nothing can be proven." The difference between theory and practise in practise ...
Pierre
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