Welcome to European Tribune. It's gone a bit quiet around here these days, but it's still going.
Display:
How do the "rational" strategies change when the game is played repeatedly and the players know that they will face off again?

Can the last politician to go out the revolving door please turn the lights off?
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 18th, 2007 at 06:07:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
by Sassafras on Wed Jul 18th, 2007 at 06:47:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Well, yes, that's exactly why I'm asking. The optimal strategy in the iterated prisoner's dilemma is suspected to be tit for tat. Applying tit for tat to the ultimatum game, if player 1 says "fuck you" to player 2 ("I give you 1 unit, take it or leave it") player 2 feels betrayed and so decides to betray back (tit for tat: "fuck you back, I won't take my 1 so you lose 99").

So I suspect the experimental result is consistent with people playing as if they were playing an iterated version of the ultimatum game, even if they are aware the rules say the game is a one-off thing.

Can the last politician to go out the revolving door please turn the lights off?

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 18th, 2007 at 06:53:28 PM EST
[ Parent ]

Display:

Occasional Series