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Although the nominal Debt to GDP ratio is c. 40% of GDP, some authorities now estimate the real Debt GDP ratio to be closer to 100% once all the contingent liabilities taken on by the Bank nationalisations are taken into account - the highest figure for over 50 years.
Yes, well, Alice at UKhousebubble.blogspot. was kind enough to post a graph of UK "external debt" that linked to Spectator.co.uk. The one to the left the other of the pair. I take it "external debt" comprises government bonds ("gilts") as well as corporate bond and securities held by foreign investors. Note that the graph merely describes rates of change rather than absolute value outstanding. Evidently, investors "fled" to UK debt quality over the period. The Spectator's blogger implies a crash in roll-over corporate debt is imminent:
"Narrow it down to short-term debt, ie IOUs that have to be paid back within a year, and the picture grows even bleaker. It adds up to 300% of GDP - six times that of France whose loans are long-term. Saunders says, with some understatement, that this makes "the UK economy and financial system highly vulnerable when, as now, global banking and capital flows dries up." I would suggest that Ireland's miracle industrial growth over the past decade is vulnerable to the similar credit dependencies more so than ForEx ties to the UK.
I didn't find the Saunders source material, but I did discover his opinions are rather ubiquitous, in the manner of Delong and his "good friends" Mankiw and Furman. Saunders appears at silobreaker.com (what an amusing masthead!). He also publishes at MarketWatch. As the Euro-contributor to the January 2007 bulletin, "Benign Outlook Reinforced," (pdf) his analysis betrays his rank in the silo. Consider one top-line: "M3 appears increasingly uncorrelated with GDP in the short- and medium-term, while credit to firms overstates the growth of total liabilities." In his section Saunders clarifies "credit to firms" is a head-line for excessive leverage encouraged by low interest rates, cascading from the ECB setting over all. Which strikes me as odd since ECB resisted despite much press acrimony FRB formulations 2007-2008. Perhaps Saunders was somewhat biased by UK-IR securities marketing and firm-level data. I dare not speculate on that matter. His observation about cumulative corporate debt and "total financing" exceeding capacity is well taken. Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
It adds up to 300% of GDP
Fuck.
Rancid shark steak - here we come.
I don't see the bank nationalisations as a problem - as long as they're paying their way, they're not a key debt.
More worrying is the long-term PFI fix, which was was always designed to take government borrowing off the official balance sheet, but will have the unfortunate effect of back loading repayments so that various councils and social services become less and less able to afford them.
If the short term debt figures are accurate - and bear in mind the Spectator is a Tory rag - that's quadruple plus ungood.
MarketTrustee:
I would suggest that Ireland's miracle industrial growth over the past decade is vulnerable to the similar credit dependencies more so than ForEx ties to the UK.
Although the Sterling area is our biggest single market, the Eurozone, taken as a whole, is much bigger. I suspect most Irish corporate borrowing is in Euros - interest rates have been low, and why take on exchange risk?
The problem for the Brits is that with so much of their borrowing denominated in $ and , they have to pay back so much more as Sterling depreciates.
Longer term this can be offset by the improved competitiveness of Sterling based companies, but short term it must make their borrowings look pretty scary.
For many companies, there may be no long term. notes from no w here
Ireland's miracle industrial growth
Analogies to bigger countries are often pretty much vacuous, just like they were when the neo-libs were singing the praises.
Comparison by total population isn't the point of my comment. The point of my comment is comparison, if any, to structure, or composition, of the labor force and perforce domestic demand for certain skills. The so-called service sector is non-farm and non-manufacturer. Now, the types of occupations that comprise the service sector have varied over time, for example, to exclude "gardeners" but include "landscapers", real estate agents and customer service reps as well as "independent software vendors" (ISVs). In any case and as a matter of asset production, such employment classes are not coupled to durable assets and are historically speaking extremely vulnerable to substitution effects, ergo unemployment and prevailing (non-unionized) wage competition, in both B2B supply chains and consumer DI markets.
Now, the welfare costs, if any, to the state is a function of the size and composition of the labor force. Of course, the cost would be greater in the US than in Ireland simply because of the population differential. So that is an uninteresting observation.
The truly interesting hypothesis of cost and unemployment rates depend on composition characteristics. Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
Sounds like the province of Madrid... Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
- Jake Friends come and go. Enemies accumulate.
This article re Ireland is first rate: McWilliams is excellent.
Brace yourself now for the Deckland Depression
In fact Ireland is the most exposed EU country of all, and what is coming there will test the Euro to destruction, I think.
Unlike the UK, where housing values are underpinned by a shortage of building land, Ireland has a huge oversupply of newly developed property, developments in progress, and overpriced "banked" land zoned for building.
Irish land prices have collapsed - and the decline has been accelerating, I was told. Virtually all Irish banks - but the "Builders Bank" Allied Irish in particular - are sitting on time bombs.
Several people I talked to in Dublin when I gave
this lecture
think that there will be carnage when auditors get to grips in earnest with this year's set of bank accounts.
McWilliams sets out brilliantly how viciously he sees a depression kicking into the Irish private sector in the DeckLand suburbs...
Brace yourself now for the Deckland Depression - David McWilliams - Independent.ie
Commuter towns such as Naas, Arklow and Navan are likely to be hit hardest and the people who will lose their jobs and, eventually, their homes are the very ones who bought into the boom most. They are the young working families, largely employed in white-collar jobs, who believed the hype and bought the new houses, complete with decking and barbeques, close to the top of the market. They are the Decklanders and Ireland is about to endure the great "Deckland Depression". A few years ago, it was all so different. Deckland, that vast expanse of new suburbs, which emerged in the past 10 years, was the most optimistic place in the country. It was young, energetic and despite the snobbishness of many commentators who believed that these new towns were soulless, Deckland was as vibrant and community-focused as any new suburb has ever been. If you dispute this contention, look at the growth of community organisations like the GAA or new school rolls in the commuter counties. Deckland was Ireland's "Babybelt"; and for many thousands of people, Deckland represented a New Ireland, where people could settle, own their own houses and begin the great Irish process of trading up. Deckland embodied the essence of the New Irish Dream, where the population was on an upwardly mobile conveyor belt, propelled by the twin forces of easy credit and rising house prices. Everyone could be a winner.Now all that is shattered and the dream is over. Unemployment is rising fastest in these areas, house prices are falling quickest and a recent survey indicated that the most insecure part of the workforce are young, heavily committed white collar workers.
Commuter towns such as Naas, Arklow and Navan are likely to be hit hardest and the people who will lose their jobs and, eventually, their homes are the very ones who bought into the boom most. They are the young working families, largely employed in white-collar jobs, who believed the hype and bought the new houses, complete with decking and barbeques, close to the top of the market. They are the Decklanders and Ireland is about to endure the great "Deckland Depression".
A few years ago, it was all so different. Deckland, that vast expanse of new suburbs, which emerged in the past 10 years, was the most optimistic place in the country. It was young, energetic and despite the snobbishness of many commentators who believed that these new towns were soulless, Deckland was as vibrant and community-focused as any new suburb has ever been. If you dispute this contention, look at the growth of community organisations like the GAA or new school rolls in the commuter counties. Deckland was Ireland's "Babybelt"; and for many thousands of people, Deckland represented a New Ireland, where people could settle, own their own houses and begin the great Irish process of trading up. Deckland embodied the essence of the New Irish Dream, where the population was on an upwardly mobile conveyor belt, propelled by the twin forces of easy credit and rising house prices. Everyone could be a winner.
Now all that is shattered and the dream is over. Unemployment is rising fastest in these areas, house prices are falling quickest and a recent survey indicated that the most insecure part of the workforce are young, heavily committed white collar workers.
Ireland has, fortunately, a small enough GDP that a government guarantee of 2-3 times GDP is has been put in place is only about 5% of the Eurozone's GDP. Ireland may become a wholly owned subsidiary of the European Central Bank, but it won't take the Euro down with it.
However, the days where the EU could have a monetary union and no EU-wide fiscal or industrial policy are likely over. Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
P.S. To answer CoffeeHousers' query, this is "external debt" by the IMF definition, which is gross. (And does not include contingent liability, just debt). One must take into account that Britain is likely to have proportionately greater net assets whose value would be amplified by sterling's plunge. But how much greater? I'll keep hunting. Every crisis is different, and each has its own metrics. It was our concentration on the metrics of the last crisis (inflation) that blinded so many to the causes of this crisis (debt).
If they are in derivatives, dodgy mortgages and other asset bubbles and Ponzi schemes, then you are looking at a massive default.
As always the bottom line is income. Repayment is dependent on income, irrespective of sources. Of course, many of us are watching in wonder as central bankers connive QoQ by ForEx and mineral reserves to "ease" the obligations of their most favored clientele. Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
Fraser Nelson is trying to scare us by pointing out that the UK's external debt is equivalent to 400% of our GDP.Actually, on the most obvious measure, he understates the true amount. National Statistics say our external liabilities were £6.7 trillion in Q2 - 461% of our annualized GDP. (Tables D and K of this pdf).What he doesn't say is that our overseas assets are also big. They`re £6.4 trillion. So our net overseas liabilities are just £309.4bn, 21.2% of annualized GDP. This is largely a reflection of the fact that we've been running small current account deficits for ages.
United States[1] $13,703,567 6/30/2008 $42,343 31-March-08 99.95% 2 United Kingdom $10,450,000 6/30/2007 $189,855 Q4 2007 376.82% 3 Germany $4,489,000 6/30/2007 $54,604 30-Jun-07 159.92% 4 France $4,396,000 6/30/2007 $68,183 30-Jun-07 211.86% 5 Netherlands $2,277,000 6/30/2007 $136,795 30-Jun-07 352.75% 6 Ireland $1,841,000 6/30/2007 $448,032 30-Jun-08 960.86% 7 Japan $1,492,000 6/30/2007 $45,287 30-Jun-07 34.93% 8 Switzerland $1,340,000 6/30/2007 $509,529 30-Jun-07 441.95% 9 Belgium $1,313,000 6/30/2007 $126,202 30-Jun-07 348.74% 10 Spain $1,084,000 6/30/2007 $176,019 30 June 2007 est. 79.65% 11 Italy $996,300 12/31/2007 $124,049 30-Jun-07 55.35%
Wow, 6th. in the whole world for gross external debt, for such a small country!!
Looks like Ireland has a much bigger problem, although, again, we don't know what the NET debt is, and the degree of currency risk involved. notes from no w here
Then I looked at the definition:
List of countries by external debt - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"External debt" is defined as the total public and private debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services
Small countries has more international trade per capita, as borders are passed more often. Trade yields debt, and if trade is equal then debt is equally on both sides of the border, giving both countries more external (as opposed to internal) debt. A country can be on the top of the external debt list and have no problems at all if it has assets to cover every one of those debts on a moments notice.
So I would say that external debt in it self says very little. Sweden's finest (and perhaps only) collaborative, leftist e-newspaper Synapze.se
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