The first big book on the credit crunch saw the crisis coming three years ago

IN 2005, while running a financial-software company, Charles Morris became convinced that credit markets were heading for a crash. He found a publisher who was willing to take a gamble and began tracing the roots of the yet-to-unfold crisis. However up to date it may seem, this book is no rush job. Mr Morris deftly joins the dots between the Keynesian liberalism of the 1960s, the crippling stagflation of the 1970s and the free-market experimentation of the 1980s and 1990s, before entering the world of ultra-cheap money and financial innovation gone mad.

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He describes three trends converging to create the bubble. By 2006 the growing trend towards deregulation had pushed three-quarters of all lending outside the purview of regulators. Securitisation created a serious agency problem, leaving loan originators, who were paid up-front, with no incentive to avoid bad credits and every reason to piggyback inappropriate products onto good ones (in one particularly depressing tale, a retired postal worker whose mortgage is almost paid off is switched to an interest-only product that leaves him in danger of losing his home). Banks and rating agencies were gripped by the pretence that all finance can be calculated by risk-modelling eggheads. It did not help that many investors blindly accepted the rating agencies as a kind of "financial Supreme Court".

The story has no single villain, but Alan Greenspan comes close. Under him, the Federal Reserve fuelled the housing boom by sharply cutting the cost of short-term money. Mr Greenspan ignored warnings about subprime excess, while eagerly championing "new paradigms", from hybrid mortgages to credit derivatives.